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A B S T R A C T
Formulating proper responses to housing problems re­
quires looking at the processes of housing consumption and production in 
a systemic way. From this perspective, the questions the thesis asks 
are (a) how the housing system and the wider economy and society 
interact, (b) how the housing system changes and evolves over time, 
and (c) how economic, political and social factors can be brought 
together in an explanatory framework. Moreover, answers to these 
questions must have general applicability, and not be appropriate for 
one or two similar countries only. Therefore, in addition to a 
theoretical approach to these issues, the thesis cites international 
evidence, and focusses on a comparison between Britain and Greece.
The thesis argues that housing systems proper appear 
only in the capitalist era. It explains the significance of this 
proposition for the dynamics of housing systems, stressing the factors 
of rising needs and of the formation of rights and claims on the part of 
various groups.
Chapter 3 overviews how 'politics' and 'economics' 
together shape housing system dynamics. The next four chapters discuss 
the links between the housing system and the wider economy, and chapters 
8 to 10 discuss how the socio-institutional framework (e.g., the pattern 
of land and dwelling ownership) affects those dynamics.
The thesis stresses that both the development path 
of a given country and its socio-institutional features determine the 
amount of resources that are spent on housing, and suggests how the two
can be accounted for separately. It also explains the relationship 
between dwelling prices, households1 housing costs and incomes, and 
suggests that the mechanism involved operates not only in a 'pure' 
capitalist environment, but - with modifications - in 'mixed1 ones also. 
It subsequently incorporates that mechanism in an inter-disciplinary 
account of dwelling price determination (ch. 7).
The thesis further explains how different patterns 
and types of rights (e.g., property rights) affect households' housing 
strategies and a society's housing processes. It links rights and 
claims in the housing sphere to more general, societal patterns of 
rights and conceptions of legitimacy, and to the political system. It 
shows how the British and Greek patterns of property rights, and the 
respective housing systems, differ because, among other things, each 
country does not adhere to the 'rule of law' in the same way, and 
explains why. It also shows how state housing policy (or non-policy) re­
sults from the position of the state between a continuously reformulated 
pattern of rights and claims in the housing sphere, and a more lasting 
set of principles of societal organisation, which the state is supposed 
to uphold.
Finally, the thesis demonstrates many of the 
insights gained above, and the special importance of the socio-insti­
tutional context, by focussing on the turmoil in the Greek private 
rented sector between 1978 and 1990. It shows, in particular, why gov­
ernment intervention in the rented sector has not followed a consistent 
policy path, but also why it has happened at all, and why many dwelling- 
owners and some landlords, in addition to tenants, have supported it.
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S
To my parents, George and Anastasia,
and to Evlyn Mac far lane,
whose support made this thesis
possible.
I also wish to thank my supervisor,
Professor David Donnison,
for his much appreciated assistance
over the last five years.
C O N T E N T S
CHAPTER
CHAPTER
CHAPTER
CHAPTER
CHAPTER
CHAPTER
CHAPTER
CHAPTER
CHAPTER
1: Issues for Discussion. p. 6
Footnotes p . 19
2: The Housing System and Capitalism. p. 22
Footnotes p. 50
3: Housing System Dynamics: A Holistic
Process. p. 53
Footnotes p. 82
4: A Framework For Isolating the Effect of
National Socio-institutional Features on
Housing Investment Levels. p. 85
Footnotes P. 105
5: Housing and the Value of Labour Power. p. 109
Footnotes p. 123
6: Dwelling Prices, Housing Costs and Incomes:
An Explanation of Their Relationship. p. 127
Footnotes P. 189
7: Location Premia & Differential Rents:
Extending the Explanation. p. 195
Footnotes p. 220
8: Rights and Claims in the Housing Sphere. p. 221
Footnotes p. 241
9: The 'Rule of Law' and Variations in Pri­
vate Property Rights: Britain vs Greece. p. 242
Footnotes p. 265
CHAPTER 10: Form of Government, Official Ideology,
and Housing Policy.
Footnotes
CHAPTER 11: The Greek Private Rented Sector,
1978 - 1990 (A).
Footnotes
CHAPTER 12: The Greek Private Rented Sector,
1978 - 1990 (B).
Footnotes
CHAPTER 13: Concluding Comments and Research Implications.
APPENDIX I: Income Differentials Among the 'Working Class'
and House Price Bands: Preliminary Notes Prior 
to Further Research.
APPENDIX II: The Structure of Dwelling Ownership in the Greek
Housing System c. 1980.
AUXILIARY TABLES
REFERENCES
P. 268 
p. 297
p. 299 
p. 329
p. 333 
p. 355
P. 356
P. 378 
P. 389 
P. 410 
P. 425
(c) Nicholas G. Pirounakis, 1990.
N O T E
If a table is not incorporated in the main text, 
it will be found in the auxiliary tables section 
(pp. 411-424).
SECTION 1
SECTION 2
C H A P T E R  1 :
Issues for Discussion.
Purpose of the Thesis.
Structure of the Thesis.
CHAPTER 1: Issues for Discussion.
This chapter sets forth the main questions which I 
have tried to answer in writing the present thesis, and describes its 
structure.
SECTION 1: Purpose of the Thesis.
There are many good reasons for studying the 
production and consumption of housing in to-day's world, but a primary 
one stems from a sense of urgency. Securing appropriate accomodation 
for people may not be on a level with the case for finding a cure for 
AIDS, alleviating famine, or foiling the many threats to the environ­
ment, but I would readily put "the housing issue" high up in the list, 
and very close to those problems.
The United Nations Organisation reflected this 
urgency when it declared 1987 "International Year of Shelter for the 
Homeless". Of course the discussions which took place in the context 
of that campaign served to re-affirm the well-established connection 
between poverty and bad housing, or lack of housing altogether. Even a 
cursory examination of the modern world will reveal, for example, that 
poorer countries have worse housing conditions than richer ones, and 
that homeless people in the advanced countries are among the poorest 
(IYSHT, 1988). This view, correct but limited, allows one to assert, 
along with R. Muth (1975: 2), that, in so far as "the housing issue" 
means bad, or lack of, housing, it is a result of poverty, rather than 
the other way around. In an obvious way this is tautological. Called 
upon to define poverty, one will invariably make a reference to housing
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conditions (cf. Townsend, 1979). Less obviously, a simplistic 
connection of this kind can lead to lop-sided policy recommendations. 
For example, a rejection of urban renewal programmes on the ground that 
they do not attack the real problem, which is about making, say, slum- 
dwellers better-off financially (Fischer & Dornbusch, 1983: 458).
A simple association between poverty and "the 
housing issue" presents other problems too. Why, one might ask, has the 
number of homeless people in the USA, or Britain, been rising in the 
last 10 years or so (The Guardian, 06.01.1987; The Times, 26.02.1987; 
Stearn et al., 1987; The Correspondent Magazine, 14.01.1990), despite 
the fact that the real incomes of most Americans and Britons have risen 
over the same period? What, in other words, causes the reproduction of 
homelessness in the midst of relative affluence? One expects the 
distribution of income to be a factor here. Evidence suggests that it 
may have become less equal in Britain between, say, 1979 and 1985 
(Stark, 1988: 7), and that the number and proportion of the poor has 
risen between 1973-77 and 1984-85 {The Guardian, 28.04.1989). On the 
other hand, the PM of Britain has asserted in Parliament that "there 
has been a real increase in disposable income between 1979 and 1985 of 
5.9 per cent for the poorest 10 per cent" (ibid.). If true, her 
figures point to a more complex relationship between poverty and 
homelessness than some people think, as at the very least one can only 
conclude that it is not absolute, but relative poverty that is 
associated with homelessness (cf. Donnison, 1988). In which case, the 
intuitiveness of any simple link between the two is open to question.
I think that a clue could be offered by the fact 
that, while bad housing conditions are part of the definition of
poverty, equally, dwelling wealth tends to form a large, and often
increasing, proportion of many people's marketable wealth. At the same 
time a statement of this kind is likely to carry more conviction in, 
say, Britain, where the housing market is very advanced and efficient, 
and people move home often (Boleat, 1989: 29), than in, say, Greece or
Germany, where dwelling wealth is not as readily marketable (for socio­
cultural reasons, among others). If so, what needs to be explained is 
how rises in incomes, and how particular distributions of incomes, are 
in at least some cases reflected in (a) more than proportionate
increases in dwelling prices, and (b) more unequal distributions of
3dwelling wealth, respectively.
It could be that the two factors together, (a) and 
(b), are reasons why housing often becomes dearer to a number of new 
and/or poor households even as a society becomes wealthier. But the 
mechanisms whereby this happens still need to be explained, especially 
since the invocation of poverty is not a satisfactory solution. One 
has to look at the broader picture, the overall processes of production 
and consumption of housing, in order to begin forming the right 
questions in regard to "the housing issue". In short, one has to look 
at the housing system as a whole. In this endeavour, the links between 
the housing system and the wider economy and society, as regards, in 
particular, the connection between dwelling prices and incomes, are an 
inevitable as well as little investigated area of research^ - one which
will constitute an important part of this thesis.
Having said that, I would like to remind the reader 
that those links were discussed by Engels in "The Housing Question", 
back in 1887, and that this work constitutes, in my opinion, a model
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undertaking of its kind. In some respects Engels1 contribution is now 
outdated. It ignores the cultural, or even existential, significance 
that owner-occupation may have for housing consumers (cf. Agnew, 1981; 
Cox, 1981; Duncan, J.S., ed., 1981). It takes for granted that the form 
of tenure does not matter to workers - a view reminiscent of modern 
arguments in favour of a 'tenure-neutral' housing subsidy system 
(O'Sullivan, 1987; Boleat, 1989). It does not examine how different 
housing processes and tenures are likely to interact with one another. 
And it is short on solutions - apart, that is, from the general remedy 
of socialist revolution. On the plus side it draws attention to the 
property relationships in the housing system, which it does not 
consider - and rightly so - a purely, or even mainly, economic 
phaenomenon. It focusses on the role of landlords explicitly. It 
constitutes a brilliant analysis of the links between the industrial and 
housing spheres in 19th century Germany - links mediated by the value of 
labour power. Even more importantly, it is the most intelligent 
attempt to account for the way 19th-century industial capitalism 
transformed and defined 'the housing issue' to date. Unfortunately, 
many subsequent studies have either thrown the baby out with the 
bathwater, or, on the Marxist fold, have become lost in highly stylised 
generalisations (e.g., Castells & Godard, 1974) or even platitudes 
(Cardoso & Short, 1983). Others have sought to apply mechanistically 
Engels' arguments in different contexts (cf. Papamichael, 1985). For 
example, the heat wave that struck Greece in July 1987 (as a result of 
which about 1,100 people died), gave the daily of the Communist Party 
of Greece an opportunity to re-assert that Athens is
" a monstrous concrete desert, created by the pursuers of easy 
profits and their governments... The monster-cities of modern 
times are outgrowths of the system of dependency and big
10
capital"
(Rizospastis, 28.07.1987).
Statements like this betray a naive, if well-intentioned, understanding 
of the post-war housing processes in Athens (cf. Emmanuel, 1981; Leon- 
tidou, 1985; 1986; Petras, 1984; Skouras, 1984; chapter 6 of this 
thesis). If a moral blame must be lain at someone's doorstep for the 
present condition of Athens (cf. OECD, 1983), some of it may well need
to be apportioned to millions of ordinary people, many of whom migrated
to Athens after the war, in addition to governments and speculators.
I think one can, and indeed must, anchor one's
analysis of modern housing systems in an overall capitalist context, and 
still tackle the problems that Engels left unanswered. One of these
problems is the apparent multiplicity of housing systems and processes 
in the world to-day. Earlier Marxists might have sought to account for 
such variety by reference to 'deep' structures, like the 'secondary 
circuit of capital' (Harvey, D., 1981; 1982; 1985b), or by attaching to 
particular national experiences greater significance than they deserved 
(cf. Castells, 1977; Duncan, S.S., 1981, for a critique).
Admittedly, postulating unobservable mechanisms at 
the heart of observable phaenomena is one, and sometimes the only, way 
to explain them. It also accords with a 'realist' conception of 
science (Keat & Urry, 1982). The danger here is that one can easily end 
up with 'structures' devoid of all life and the potential for surprise - 
a grave mistake to make, particularly in the study of social phaenomena. 
Such a mistake is apparent, for instance, in Rizospastis' comment (op. 
cit.), where the daily actions and choices of a great many urban immi-
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grants are viewed purely as emanating from 'the system of big capital1.
Recognition of this danger has in the last 10 years 
or so led to a quest for ways to reconcile 'structure' and 'agency' 
(people) in social theory - one answer being Giddens' 'structuration' 
theory (broadly, how to breathe life and dynamism into structure - cf. 
Giddens, 1984; Moos & Dear, 1986a, 1986b; Healey & Barrett, 1990).
But one does not have to follow this particular 
avenue (see Storper, 1988, for a critique). Recently an increasing 
number of scientists have been realising that the repeated application 
of the same set of simple rules can lead to increasingly complex 
outcomes - the so-called 'chaos' theory {The Economist, 08.09.1984; 
26.12.1987, 21.04.1990; Poundstone, 1985; Gleick, 1987). One can
therefore look for mechanisms that operate in fundamentally the same way 
in the housing systems of all capitalist societies, and still expect to 
find different housing conditions, tenures, markets, and processes in 
different countries - even among equally rich or poor ones. To find 
out, or at least speculate about, some of the mechanisms involved is my 
second major task here.
One might of course ask why such a task should be 
undertaken at all. Why, in other words, some idea of the determinants 
of housing system dynamics in capitalist societies is an interesting and 
useful task to set oneself upon. Would not a thorough study of any 
particular housing system suffice if, for example, the object is to 
tackle 'the housing issue' in that particular country?
The answer lies in the need to learn from others.
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While it is true that "you cannot transport the [housing] system from 
one country to another" (Boleat, 1989: 30), features taken from one
system may well prove useful elsewhere. Such 'transplants' (e.g., the 
Abbey National Building Society selling endowment loans in Spain; fixed 
rate mortgages - a Continental characteristic - being offered in 
Britain; a particular planning, tax, or rent control arrangement; 
etc.) may or may not have to be copied exactly. Adaptation is often 
necessary, and this is especially true in the case of what is broadly 
referred to as 'social housing'. To understand what one can or cannot 
do with any given housing system feature, one must first understand how 
that feature relates to its overall context, and then try and estimate 
what its effect will be on a different housing system if it is 
transplanted there, and how it should be adapted in order to ensure 
success. This calls for some form of comparative analysis (cf. Harloe, 
1981; Harloe & Martens, 1984; Jones, C., 1985; Pickvance, 1986). But 
to do that one needs to utilise a framework that will be as generally 
applicable as possible. In turn, universality of this kind can only be 
assured if at the basis of such a framework lie some mechanisms of 
housing system dynamics that are thought to be common in all housing 
systems.
Housing deprivation, as well as the opportunity to 
evaluate housing ideas from other countries, are two very important 
reasons to 'theorise' about the housing system at all, but are hardly 
the only ones. First, dwellings make up the largest part of the built 
environment - which is the typical experience of people born into 
'second-' and 'third-wave' civilisations (Toffler, 1981). Second, the 
amount of resources directed into housing is very large. In the OECD 
member-countries, for example, residential construction as a percentage 
of GDP was 5.6 per cent between 1960 and 1986^ (OECD, 1988: 66-7),
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while it is not unreasonable to assume that total consumer spending on 
housing must have been between a fifth and a quarter of GDP (cf. Burns & 
Grebler, 1977; Donnison & Ungerson, 1982). Third, housing has a very 
high degree of complementarity with other goods and services that an
Q
industrial economy produces.
These aspects of housing - not to mention its socio­
cultural significance - mean that 'events1 within the housing system, 
as well as policies aimed at influencing it, affect 'events' and
Q
processes in almost all other areas of the economy and society - and 
1 0vice versa. Thus a purely 'economic', or 'political', or 'sociolo­
gical' analysis of housing, or of the links between the housing sphere 
and the wider economy and society, is hardly adequate as a method of un­
derstanding. To show both the need for and effectiveness of an inter­
disciplinary approach will be my third aim in writing this thesis.
But how important is knowledge of social processes?
I accept that it is not axiomatic that some high authority will or 
should always intervene in the affairs of men and women, trying to 
direct and control them. I think, however, that the advent of a
stateless and/or 'laissez-faire' society is even less probable than its 
opposite - a truly and completely totalitarian state. Real life has 
always tended to veer between these two extremes. Thus, the attempt to 
understand and do something about perceived problems is not only
legitimate, but inevitable. In this respect, the housing sphere can 
be said to force itself upon modern governments and policy-makers with a 
vengeance. But to ensure that any responses to such pressures minimise 
unintended consequences and optimise intended ones, a deeper under­
standing of the dynamics of the housing system is required first.
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SECTION 2: Structure of the Thesis.
The three main issues I will address in this thesis
are:
a. Links between the housing system and the wider 
(capitalist) economy and society.
b. Determinants of housing system dynamics, i.e., me­
chanisms of housing system evolution and change.
c. The need for and effectiveness of an inter-disciplinary 
approach to the housing system.
Permeating this discussion will be the attempt to 
build a framework for understanding housing systems and their dynamics, 
and for conducting research into them or into specific 'problem' areas 
in the field. A corollary to that, will be the attempt to ensure the 
universal applicability of the framework, or at least identify the 
conditions that would warrant its use across different contexts.
To facilitate the discussion and exposition of these 
ideas I have organised the material of the thesis as follows:
Chapter 2: The Housing System and Capitalism.
This chapter defines a housing system, discusses the 
analytical relevance of the concept of 'capitalism', and suggests that 
the main ways in which capitalism can be shown to affect developments 
in the housing sphere are (a) by increasing the dependence of households 
on outside parties for their housing, (b) by subjecting capitalists in 
the housing sphere to the 'laws of motion1 of capital, (c) by causing 
the formation of rapidly changing and expanding needs, and of rising
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expectations, and (d) by facilitating the formation of 'rights' and 
'claims' on the part of people with interests in the housing and land 
sphere.
Chapter 3: Housing System Dynamics: A Holistic Process.
Understanding these dynamics requires abandoning the 
'consumption vs production' dilemma, taking the two together, and look­
ing into the nature of the consuming and producing agents. The latter 
employ both economic and non-economic means in pursuing their goals. The 
interaction of these means, and of the groups which employ them, is a 
holistic process. Recognition of this fact makes an inter-disciplinary 
approach to the study of housing system dynamics highly appropriate.
Chapter 4: A Framework For Isolating the Effect of National Socio-
institutional Features on Housing Investment Levels.
Any simple connection between housing investment and 
national income levels (or 'development') is inadequate. In addition 
to the influence of a historic development pattern and of building 
cycles, the socio-institutional context retains its importance, which 
can only be gauged on the basis of international comparative studies.
Chapter 5: Housing and the Value of Labour Power.
This chapter paves the way for an analysis of the 
relationship of incomes to dwelling prices to households' housing costs 
by arguing that the concept of the 'value of labour power' can be 
fruitfully utilised for this purpose, even though workers' needs - 
which the 'value of labour power' is supposed to reflect - are 
determinate only under rather strict conditions.
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Chapter 6: Dwelling Prices, Housing Costs and Incomes: An Explanation
of Their Relationship.
Dwelling prices tend to reflect the need, capacity 
and willingness of households to pay for their housing out of their 
earned incomes. Since most earned incomes take the form of wages, the 
introduction of a housing cost component in the modal wage (roughly, the 
value of labour power), and the increase or decrease of that component, 
are likely to affect business profitability, hence workers’ incomes 
and, eventually, dwelling prices. This mechanism forms a crucial link 
between the housing sphere and the wider economy.
Chapter 7: Location Premia & Differential Rents: Extending the
Explanation.
This chapter completes the account advanced in the 
previous one by explaining how dwelling price changes can come about 
not in response to changes in households' earned incomes, but to other 
influences, thus affecting households' housing costs 'autonomously'.
Chapter 8: Rights and Claims in the Housing Sphere.
This chapter introduces the discussion of the
influence of political and legal factors on the evolution of housing
systems. It focusses on the role of 'rights' and 'claims' as dynamic
structural factors that both enable and constrain housing processes.
Chapter 9: The 'Rule of Law' and Variations in Private Property Rights:
Britain vs Greece.
This chapter demonstrates how private property
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rights can have different meanings in different countries by comparing 
Britain and Greece. It underlines the importance of differing degrees 
of adherence to the 'rule of law' in bringing about these differences in 
meaning. It shows the consequences of this difference for the dynamic 
of the housing system of each country.
Chapter 10: Form of Government, Official Ideology, and Housing Policy.
This chapter reinterprets the role of the state in 
shaping housing outcomes, and stresses that in a systematic sense it is 
neither pro-active nor re-active, but both. The state can assume 
either role, depending on what it stands for, and on the complexity of 
conflicts and group interests in which it becomes involved.
Chapter 11: The Greek Private Rented Sector, 1978 - 1990 (A).
Chapter 12: The Greek Private Rented Sector, 1978 - 1990 (B).
These two chapters apply the approach and insights 
developed earlier to a study of a concrete situation. Following on 
chapter 3, they demonstrate that developments in the Greek private 
rented sector between 1978 and 1990 cannot be understood by divorcing 
'economics' from the socio-institutional framework. They show, in 
particular, why government intervention in the rented sector in Greece 
has not followed a consistent policy path, but also why it has happened 
at all, and why many dwelling-owners and some landlords, in addition 
to tenants, have supported it.
Chapter 13: Concluding Comments and Research Implications.
Self-explanatory.
18
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1
Those with less than half the average disposable income (The 
Guardian, 28.04.1989).
2
In the UK dwellings represented 19% of personal wealth in 1960; 
27% in 1970; and 37% in 1976 (HMSO, 1980). The contribution of 
dwellings to personal wealth tends in fact to be more pronounced 
the lower the wealth bracket. In the UK in 1981 dwellings 
represented 8% of the wealth of those whose total wealth was 
£200,000 or more; 15% of those between £50,000 - £199,999; 15% of
those between £10,000 - £49,999; and 34% of those whose wealth 
was less than £10,000 (Fothergill & Vincent, 1985: 20). See also 
Thorns (1981).
o
As indicated by P. Spencer's calculation that real capital gains 
in the British housing market as a percentage of personal 
disposable incomes rose from 10% in 1984 to 60% in 1988 (Brittan, 
1990).
 ^ Hence Brittan's comment that "there is a good deal of agreement 
that housing and land are central to many of Britain's economic 
problems, but much less agreement on how the link should be 
analysed and described" (Brittan, 1990). See also Barrett &
Hooper, 1983; Maclennan, 1986.
5
One remarkable exception is Benwell Community Development Project, 
1978.
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"[A] theory is not an untested assertion of alleged fact. The 
statement that saccharine causes cancer is not a theory, it is a 
hypothesis, which will either prove to be true or false after the 
right sorts of experiments have been completed. Instead, a theory 
is a deliberate simplification (abstraction) of factual 
relationships that attempts to explain how those relationships work 
... it is an explanation of the mechanism behind observed 
phaenomena"
(Baumol & Blinder, 1988: 13).
By comparison, non-residential construction was 7.6 per cent, 
investment in machinery & equipment 8.6 per cent, and exports of 
goods & services 15.0 per cent (OECD, 1988: 66-7).
"The recent upsurge in ownership of cars and domestic equipment has 
important implications for housing. It means that many people need 
room somewhere in or around their homes for these large 
possessions. Thus a new source of housing obsolescence has 
appeared, for those households which do not have the space to 
accomodate cars, freezers, dishwashers or washing machines will 
eventually perceive themselves as deprived ... Housing which 
prevents people from sharing in this way of life will become the 
slums of tomorrow"
(Donnison & Ungerson, 1982: 59). 
From another angle D. Harvey has made much the same
point:
"[T]he whole structure of consumption in general relates to the
20
form that housing provision takes. The dilemmas of potential 
overaccumulation which faced the United States in 1945 were in part 
resolved by the creation of a whole new life style through the 
rapid proliferation of the suburbanisation process"
(Harvey, D., 1985b: 28).
The discouraging effect of high house prices on labour mobility, 
particularly in Britain, is a well-known case (Muellbauer & 
Murphy, 1988; Boleat, 1989; Brittan, 1990).
It is said that an Englishman's home is his castle. Some castle, 
when he has managed to occupy it on mortgage interest tax relief 
and borrowed money - only to find that because of Britain's 
widening trade gap, the Treasury has raised interest rates yet 
again (The Independent, 26.11.1988, p. 1), consequently our 
Englishman's mortgage debt has become bigger, and he cannot move 
downmarket because at the same time house prices are stabilising, 
or even falling (The Guardian, 23.01.1989, p. 4; 05.03.1990, p. 
1; 05.03.1990, p. 3; 10.05.1990, p. 5; Counsell, 1989b)!
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C H A P T E R  2:
The Housing System and Capitalism.
SECTION
SECTION
SECTION
SECTION
SECTION
: The Housing System.
: Tenures and 'Modes of Housing Production*.
: Housing Processes.
: The Relevance of the Concept of Capitalism.
Capitalism and the Housing System.
CHAPTER 2: The Housing System and Capitalism.
Below I define a housing system. I discuss the 
concepts of tenure, 'mode of housing production', and housing process, 
and show how any housing system can be conceptualised as a 2 x 2 matrix 
of four distinct housing processes. I argue that a housing system 
proper emerges only in the capitalist era. I discuss the extent to 
which the concept of capitalism can usefully inform the study of modern 
societies, even those some of whose characteristics are apparently non­
capitalist. I finish by drawing attention to those features of 
capitalism that are particularly relevant to the development of housing 
systems.
SECTION 1: The Housing System.
I take the term 'housing system' to mean the 
totality of relations that people form with one another (individually or 
through collectivities of various kinds), as well as the roles these 
people assume, while they go about producing and/or consuming 
residential land and buildings.
Such people or collectivities can be sellers and 
buyers of dwellings, builders and planning authorities, governments, 
tenants and landlords, finance and exchange professionals, and of 
course households. Occasionally some of the roles are carried out by 
the same person or agency, as in self-building. The above definition 
of a housing system conforms to the standard definition of a system as
"not just a totality of parts but rather a totality of
23
relations among and including those parts11
(Goodall, 1987: 461).
I would argue further that where the majority of the 
population build their homes themselves, or hire contractors to do that 
for them, the housing 'system' becomes less of a system. The collapse 
of a housing 'system' to a simpler entity becomes more pronounced where 
self-building and/or contractor activity is carried out in the absence 
of third parties or agencies, which might otherwise impose planning or 
building regulations, and/or where there is no, or only a very limited, 
housing market. A sufficiently large number of householders must first 
become dependent on others for shelter before a housing system proper 
begins to emerge.
For example, one cannot speak of a Greek housing
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'system' during the 19 century, as at that time, and even well into
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the 20 century, Greek peasants (70 per cent of the economically 
active population in 1920 - Freris, 1986: 36) built their own homes 
using a variety of locally procured building materials. This author's 
father (a geoponist) saw hovels made of dung during his excursions in 
rural Macedonia in the 1930s. The more affluent among the peasants 
would employ local craftsmen and builders, who often practised their 
skills in addition to other occupations (Eleutheroudakis, 1929, vol. 5, 
p. 384). Even as recently as 1952 agricultural advisers would instruct 
peasants as to how fast how many pairs of hands could use or make and 
use stones, bricks, clay-and-straw bricks, etc., in order to erect 
simple constructions (Papasoteriou & Spyrou, 1952: 673-5). In towns and 
cities contractual building was far more common than in the countryside, 
undertaken by a small, fluid, casualised, and occasionally more
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specialised labour force. Still, speculative building (i.e., building 
for the general market when the client is unknown), exchange 
professionals, or outside finance were virtually non-existent.
It is also wrong to assume that the multiplication 
of relationships, dependencies, and roles that gives rise to a housing 
system proper is a spontaneous corollary of urbanisation. Turning to 
the Greek experience again, speculative building, which in the Greek 
context is appropriately measured by the number of permits issued for 
buildings four-storey high or more, has never contributed more than 
half of all buildings, even in the capital. Its peak - 47.4 per cent of 
all buildings in Greater Athens & Piraeus - was in 1978. The Greek 
housing system has indeed become more complex and 'system-like' since 
the civil war, but still household-controlled housing processes 
predominate.
A housing system proper appears not so much as a 
result of urbanisation as of capitalism. There are two reasons for
this. First, in its countries of origin (chiefly Britain) capitalism
was made possible by, among others, the forcible separation of the 
mass of the peasant producers from the means of production, including 
land. Because the latter is a sine qua non of housing production, 
wherever that pattern prevailed people quickly came to depend on others 
for shelter, and sought to secure accomodation either through the build­
up of market capacities (which meant higher incomes), or through forms 
of collective action, or both. A housing system evolved as a result.
By contrast, Greece, along with many other 
countries since, got to know capitalism primarily through the economic
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pressures the first industrialisers exercised upon her. Her 
agricultural population, who were already or were soon to become 
independent small-holders, were not thrown out of their land by some 
group of big landowners. Yet over the decades many peasants have had to 
leave agriculture behind and migrate. Many of these people have been 
able to utilise their real estate wealth, as well as take advantage of 
the wide distribution of landed property in Greece, in order to house 
themselves in the cities. They did not become dependent on private 
landlords and speculative builders the way their British counterparts 
did. Hence the Greek housing system is only gradually evolving towards 
more complexity and interdependence.
Second, capitalism brings about advanced, and 
growing, specialisation. The majority of the population lose building 
skills in the course of social development, the more so since housing 
standards rise at the same time.
Together the two reasons mean that most of the wage- 
earners (working and middle class) tend to be housed through processes 
over which they have less and less direct control or influence. They 
even come to rely on external financing in order to buy or build their 
dwellings. Again, rising housing standards make the housing dependence 
of households on specialist suppliers wider and more pronounced. As a 
result residential land and buildings are increasingly commodified, 
i.e., acquire exchange values. At the same time productivity in the 
housebuilidng industry tends to lag behind that in most other industries 
(I come back to this in chapter 6), which means that the long-term price 
of housing (a necessity) relative to other goods tends to rise 
accordingly, other things held equal.
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External dependence, commodification, and the 
relative expensiveness of residential land and buildings make for a 
perpetual tendency towards imbalances between the supply of and the 
demand for housing, in quantity and quality that different social groups 
demand and/or need. Such imbalances are at the heart of the 'cobweb' or 
'hog cycle' models of housing market behaviour (Robinson, 1979; The Eco­
nomist, 17.01.1981, p. 23). What is not often appreciated is that 
'cobweb' models presuppose a complex, i.e., highly marketised, housing 
system, with a high degree of interdependence between its decision­
making units. For this reason, a 'cobweb' model is more appropriate 
for the British, US or Canadian markets for new owner-occupied, or even 
private-rented, housing than for the Greek market (cf. chapters 10 and 
11). It is also obviously inappropriate for describing public provision 
processes (see, e.g., Donnison & Ungerson, 1982, on housing allocation 
criteria followed by Eastern European governments).
In turn, a recurring imbalance of this type causes 
volatility in the production of housing, and in the political 
articulation of housing-related demands and claims by, or on behalf of, 
various groups. There is thus an in-built pressure for continuous 
change in the housing systems of capitalist societies.
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SECTION 2: Tenures and 'Modes of Housing Production1.
From the point of view of housing system dynamics 
housing conditions are the starting and ending points of each 
evolutionary phase, but are not by themselves of primary operational 
significance. Crucial considerations in this respect are how dwellings 
are produced, how they are bought, sold, rented, or otherwise made 
available to end-users, how these activities are financed, and whether 
the rewards or penalties accruing to specific agents in the housing 
system are sufficient in order to induce them to behave in desirable 
ways. A housing process is a shorthand for a subset of such activities, 
that can be shown to comprise a reasonably self-contained circuit 
between one or more kinds of agents and, invariably, some type of end- 
user.
Housing processes must not be confused with 'modes 
of housing production'. In Britain speculative housebuilding is in the 
hands of developers and builders (often through chains of subcontracting 
- see Ball, 1980b; 1981; 1988), who try to secure development gain by 
means of landbanks (Ball, 1983; 1985a). In Greece it is carried out by 
builders who enter into an 'exchange arrangement' with owners of urban 
plots, the two parties sharing the created floorspace between them 
(Emmanuel, 1981; Pirounakis, 1986). Often builders will get funding for 
their operations by selling in advance. The first practice adds a strong 
contractual dimension to speculative building in Greece, while the 
second violates the requirement that in speculative building the client 
be unknown (Ball, 1984). The Greek experience shows why one cannot
theorise about the housing system on the basis of 'modes of housing 
production'. There are simply too many of them, and they change all the
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time (cf. Ball's 1984 critique of Cardoso & Short's 1983 attempt to do 
just that). Equally, one cannot - the way Emmanuel, for instance, does 
- postulate the existence of 'modes of housing production' that are
"necessarily associated with capitalism, one of its stages of
development, or its laws of motion"
(Ball, 1986b: 158).
Of course 'speculative building', as a generic term, tends to appear and 
spread as dwellings are commodified, and the dependence of households 
on outside suppliers for their housing increases. But,
(a) there is no ONE universal speculative housebuilding mode, 
but MANY, perhaps as many as there are different capitalist societies, 
and
(b) considering a housing system in its entirety, the actual­
ly present 'mix' between, say, public housing provision, private 
renting, and owner-occupation, as well as their particular forms and 
meanings, are never the same between any two different societies either.
Equally, no particular 'mode of housing production' 
can be thought of as 'intrinsically' associated with any particular
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tenure. In Britain, for instance, the 20 -century fact that most new 
dwellings for owner-occupation have been produced by the speculative 
housebuilding industry may have caused some people to forget:
a. That a variant of the modern British speculative 
housebuilding industry was responsible for the production of dwellings 
for private renting in 19 century Britain (Kemp, 1982, 1986), and
b. That owner-occupation in other countries has been the
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result of very different 'modes of housing production1 - contractual 
housebuilding, self-building, or government-assisted building - (Pi- 
rounakis, 1987).
Thus a particular 'mode of housing production' and a particular tenure 
do not have to go always together, even though they may do so for 
prolonged periods of time.
Like 'modes of housing production', tenures carry 
different meanings depending on context. For example, a Bulgarian 
owner-occupier could, even before the recent liberalisation in Bulgaria, 
bequeath his home to his close relatives, but could sell it only 
through, and after permission from, the local council (Gallacher, 
1987). A Greek can sell his, but has to operate in a rigid market, and 
face a 15% transfer tax (although no capital gains tax - see Papamichos 
& Skouras, 1981). Greeks who own flats ('condominia') in high-rise 
buildings (perhaps most householders in the capital and Salonica) are 
obliged by law to take the management of the building in turns (e.g., 
supervising repairs, seeing that the building does not run out of fuel 
in winter, collecting each resident's share of the electricity bill for 
the common spaces of the building, etc.), and hold owners' meetings re­
gularly. A Greek, as a rule, can in practice, and often in law, do more 
with his property than a British owner-occupier, who is overburdened 
with local planning regulations (and, until recently, with rates). On 
the other hand, a British home-owner can usually sell his property, 
often realising an untaxed capital gain, far more easily than a Greek.
As a form of property (cf. Reeve, 1986), a tenure 
is not an immutable category, but a set of rights, obligations, 
liberties and non-liberties that are determined socially and legally.
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It is an array of characteristics that can change depending on time and 
place. This is true as much for landlords and tenants as for 
'independent' owner-occupiers. Part of the reason for such variability 
has to do with the way a particular tenure has come about in a given 
society. For example, the expansion of owner-occupation in countries 
such as France, Spain, or Germany has relied on far more active and 
direct government support than it has in Britain (Pirounakis, 1987; 
ECMF, 1987a; 1987b), where the main ways the state has helped owner- 
occupiers have been mortgage interest tax relief and the abolition of 
tax on imputed rent. The inappropriateness of conventionalising the 
concept of tenure to the point of abusing it has led some authors to 
argue, correctly, that
"'tenure' has become more widely used as a taxonomic 
'shorthand' to describe broad categories which very often do 
not have substantive, binding attributes. This means that 
diverse social and economic relations are reduced to 
unexamined tenure categories which do not have much 
correspondence with real-world attributes"
(Barlow & Duncan, 1988: 229).
To suggest a possibility: Even if a country had 100
2
per cent owner-occupation, one should not expect no tenurial 
diversification whatsoever. Location, housing conditions, or 
selectively applied planning or building regulations might eventually 
create a systematic bias for or against particular subsets of the 
housing stock and/or of the population of households. As soon as that 
happened new tenures would begin to creep in, even though all stock 
would in name be owner-occupied (cf. Kemeny, 1981).
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SECTION 3: Housing Processes.
If neither tenures nor 'modes of housing production'
provide a satisfactory basis for building a general framework in order
to explain change in a housing system, an alternative is offered by the
concept of 'housing processes', as defined above. But to avoid the
pitfall of losing oneself in an endless stream of national 
peculiarities, the housing processes that make up a housing system must 
be thought of in such a way as to allow insights into the system 
without being exclusive to any particular national housing system.
Let us start by considering the case where housing 
is provided to end-users - perhaps because it is their legal right to 
enjoy this provision, or because there in no alternative to outside 
provision. Potential providers are volume speculative builders, the 
central state, municipal authorities, or non-profit organisations, 
usually subsidised by the state. For example, in 1969 5.2 per cent
and 56.1 per cent of dwellings completed in Sweden were built by state 
and non-profit institutions, respectively; 19.0 per cent and 31.7 per 
cent in Holland; 0.7 per cent and 34.7 per cent in France; 2.5 per cent 
and 22.1 per cent in West Germany. In the same year, local authorities 
in Britain completed 50.5 per cent of all dwellings, and even in the 
USA they completed 2.6 per cent of the total (Heidenheimer et al., 1983: 
1 0 2 ) . 3
Alternatively, housing can be acquired by the end- 
users themselves if they have wide access to land, and direct control 
over the financing and/or building process. Contrary to the previous 
case, housing processes involving acquisition occur more often and
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strongly in countries with either precarious power structures (the 
strongest case), or extensive distribution of landownership, or both. 
Examples of housing acquisition abound. Here are some:
(1) The inquilinarios of Veracruz, who
"while they sought to negotiate the level of rents, they did 
not, unlike the rent strikers of Glasgow, appeal to the state 
to intervene, in spite of the willingness of one sector to do 
so. At heart, they did not want a welfare system, but ... a 
new society, free of foreigners, speculators, and policemen"
(Castells, 1983: 334).
(2) Various squatters' movements in Latin America (Drakakis- 
Smith, 1981; Ward, 1982b; Castells, 1983; Rodwin, ed., 1987).
(3) Urban immigrants in Turkey, who gain(ed) a foothold in the
cities (mostly Ankara) by participating in informal and semi-formal 
networks of patronage in the gececondu areas (Donnison & Ungerson, 1982; 
Payne, 1982).
(4) The widespread practice in Greece of building (often via 
contractors) on own land, but without planning permission, with the 
state subsequently legalising the settlements and/or supplying urban
amenities like running water, sewerage, electricity, and telephony.
Rarely in real life can a housing process be
described as either purely 'provision-based' or purely 'acquisition- 
based'. All sorts of 'blends' are possible. Pressing for the provision 
of urban amenities to settlements of unauthorised dwellings erected with 
private means, is one 'in-between' example. Essentially, a 
strategy that combines 'provision' and 'acquisition' is employed
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wherever the people involved value what they see as their autonomy from 
the state or big private interests, or have reasons to mistrust the 
state, but at the same time their resources fall far short of their 
needs. Another possibility is that they employ 'combination' strategies 
whenever they fail to conceive a radical transformation of existing 
housing arrangements as either beneficial or feasible, and therefore 
opt instinctively for 'short-range' demands. For instance, the Glasgow 
and Clydeside rent strikers did not ask for public housing (Darner, 1980, 
1985; Melling, 1980; 1983; Castells, 1983). It was, rather, the gov­
ernment and the Labour Party which, for different reasons each (Merrett, 
1979; Dunleavy, 1981; Ball, 1983), saw in public housing a proper 
response to the housing problem of the times. Equally, despite unrest 
in the Greek rented sector since 1978, there have been no calls 
whatsoever for creation of a public housing stock, and only minimal 
calls for direct public housebuilding.
Provision and acquisition are two dimensions along 
which one can conceptualise housing systems and processes. But a 
housing system does not evolve only on the basis of urban, or 
specifically housing, struggles and movements, and of the results of the 
latter in terms of institutionalised patterns of provision or 
acquisition. It also evolves on the basis of income levels, and the 
degree to which housing consumers participate in various markets. 
Moreover, in so far as purchasing power implies the exercise of choice 
(e.g., which area of a city would I like to live in? which house or 
flat, and which design, to buy? how do I want it decorated? etc.), it 
has^a—cultural— dimension—that— cannot—be-dismissed—simply because— it— is— 
money that has enabled its manifestation. Thus, when Castells, for 
example, says that modern urban movements combine "the search for
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cultural identity11, "the search for increasing power for local 
government", and "collective consumption trade unionism",
"in contradiction to the notion of the city for profit in 
which the desirability of space and urban services are 
distributed according to levels of income"
(Castells, 1983: 319),
he is laid open to attack. He forgets that money is spent according to 
cultural choices as well, and therefore the shaping of a city on the 
basis of income is not less of an urban movement than the sort he seems 
to prefer. In reality it is both sorts of activity, with their many 
variations and interconnections, which continuously 'make' a city, and 
define its 'urban meaning1 (ibid., p. 303). Market and non-market, or 
even anti-market processes of housing provision or acquisition interact, 
sometimes in an antagonistic, sometimes in a complementary, fashion, 
and it is the totality of those processes that makes a housing system.
The dimensions I have just discussed can be depicted 
along the lines of the following 2 x 2  matrix:
Fig. 2.1: Housing Processes.
Market (M) Non-market (N-M)
Provision (P) (i) (ii)
Acquisition (A) (Hi) (iv)
Any housing process can be conceptualised as combining any two of the 
above dimensions, while the precise 'blend' and its form can only be 
ascertained through empirical investigation. Any housing system may
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include any of a number of such combinations. For example, (i) is a 
situation where housing is provided through the market on the basis of 
ability to pay, but where consumers have minimal direct influence over 
the development, financing, and housebuilding process as such. This is 
the case of speculative housebuilding in Britain and the USA. (ii) is a 
situation where housing is provided by the state, probably at subsidised 
prices, as a welfare item. (iii) is a case where people acquire their 
housing through the market (say, via contractors), but with a large 
measure of control over things like access to land, building design, or 
financing. (iv) is a case where again housing consumers have some direct 
control over a range of things that affect them, but with minimal 
market-mediated inputs, as in many instances of 'Third-World' self-build 
housing (cf., e.g., Gilbert & Ward, 1986).
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SECTION 4: The Relevance of the Concept of Capitalism.
I argued above that the hallmark of a housing sys­
tem is the separation of housing production from housing consumption 
and, less strongly, the multiplication of interconnected housing 
processes. I also argued that the emergence of housing systems is a 
corollary of the development of capitalism. I feel that this last 
point deserves further explanation in view of the fact that housing 
systems exist in many countries, at least some of whose characteristics 
are, or have been, apparently - and often strongly - non-capitalist, and 
even anticapitalist. Examples are all the Eastern European countries 
prior to perestroika, and Greece. In all such cases, how can it be 
said that their housing systems are the result of capitalism? And, more 
generally, how useful is the concept of capitalism in facilitating un­
derstanding of those systems?
The answer to the first of the two questions is 
rather simple. The housing systems of many countries that did not 
develop indigenous versions of capitalism have nevertheless been 
responses to upheavals - the flight from the countryside, urbanisation, 
etc. - which were caused by 'exported' capitalism (cf. Brewer, 1980),
4
and inevitably so. This is what happened to Greece, for example.
Yet more obviously, state housing provision - a phaenomenon histori­
cally associated with social-democracy and communism - was ushered in as 
a response to what were perceived as the injustices and/or ineffi­
ciencies of capitalist housing processes (cf. BCDP, 1978; Melling, 
1980; 1983; ed., 1980; Dunleavy, 1981; Heidenheimer et al., 1983; 
Jones, 1985; Shapiro, 1985; Ashford, 1986).
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What is less easy to explain, particularly as 
regards state housing provision, is the apparent unwillingness and/or 
inability of all centrally planned economies (or perhaps of economies of 
ANY kind) to (a) ban variety from their housing systems (i.e., to 
achieve only one housing process), and (b) to reconcile the producer 
and consumer roles of households with respect to their housing. It is 
well-known, for instance, that the housing systems of Eastern European 
countries exhibit at least as much complexity as those of the West 
(Grant, ed., 1980; Andrusz, 1984; 1987; Dangschat, 1987; Hegedus, 1987; 
Szelenyi, 1983; 1987; Tosics, 1987).
I think that the separation of the two roles 
reflects the advantages of specialisation, which may not be possible, or 
even desirable, to dispense with now, no matter what the social system 
is. Perhaps certain forms of democratic involvement and control will 
eventually lead to a new and successful blend of the two roles (cf. 
Ball, 1983; Donnison, 1987b), but this remains to be seen. More 
importantly, the preservation of a high degree of variety in a housing 
system, in terms of 'modes of housing production1 and tenures, may not 
just be inevitable, but also desirable in that it allows people certain 
flexibilities which they might not otherwise have. The existence of a 
private and/or public rented sector, for example, may facilitate the 
entry of newcomers (students or workers) to a city, while a universal 
owner-occupied sector of the British type may inhibit it. But urban 
immigration may also be facilitated, as the Greek experience shows, by 
means of relatively easy access to cheap peripheral urban land, i.e., 
owner-occupation of the Greek type. On the other hand, the wide 
availability of owner-occupation as an alternative to renting may check 
some otherwise unscrupulous or inefficient landlords.
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Turning to the second question - to what extent the 
concept of capitalism is useful in studying the housing systems of 
societies with apparently non-capitalist characteristics -, the answer 
is 'a great deal'. In general, the problem can be posed in the 
following way:
If the three premises of capitalism are
(a) the separation of economy and polity (cf. Giddens, 1973);
(b) competition, and
(c) the mass of the population are forced purely by means of economic 
coercion to sell their labour power in the market place,
then the problem is about the extent to which these premises 
are violated by factors such as
1/ a large state sector;
2/ state interference in the economy;
3/ absence or erosion of civil and individual liberties;
4/ a weak industrial base, and/or
/ 55/ a large informal economy.
The problem can be solved by examining the
epistemological status of both the concept of capitalism - as developed, 
for example, by Marx in his 'Capital1 - and the seemingly non-capitalist 
aspects themselves. The first type of examination is about assessing 
whether the 'laws of motion' of capital,^ which are central to the
'source' model of capitalism as per Marx, are at the root of the
economic pressures modern societies experience, EVEN THOUGH
(a) the full effects of those laws are ameliorated or
distorted through political interference, and
(b) the units of analysis through which the laws and
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pressures are manifested can be at a far remove from the archetypal 
units of analysis employed by Marx (i.e., individual, disorganised 
workers and individual capitalists).
The second type of examination asks whether non­
capitalist aspects can be assigned 'ontological primacy1 (whether, that 
is, they can be deemed as having an autonomous and ACTIVE role to play 
in social development), or are merely manifestations of backwardness, 
and hence transitory, or both.
Let us dwell, briefly, on these two queries. In the 
first, the main issue seems to be about kinds of fusion between economy 
and polity beyond which the 'laws of motion1 of capital cease to 
operate. There is nothing in the 'source' model of capitalism to
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establish firm guidelines on this. The reason 19 century Britain 
served as that model is that there the relatively high degree of freedom 
that competition and private enterprise enjoyed, allowed the 'laws of 
motion' of capital to operate and manifest themselves very forcefully. 
But even in Britain political and state interference in the economy 
inescapably occurred, and was not always unequivocally in the interests 
of the capitalists. In yet other cases - France, Germany, Sweden, 
Japan, or Brazil - the state has played a much more energetic role in 
promoting capitalist industrialisation and guiding the economy than
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19 , or even 20 , century Britain (or America) ever did (Kidron,
1970; Burks, 1981; The Economist, 17.01.1987; 25.04.1987). Thus,
fusions of the economy and polity, even if quite strong, are not 
necessarily anticapitalist. The conceptualisation of the economy and 
polity as distinct spheres was the result of the requisite breach with 
Absolutism (i.e., a feudal state - see Anderson, P., 1979) so that the
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forces of private enterprise and competition, politically veiled as 
individual and citizenship rights, and legally as private property 
rights, could be given a free hand.
What this means is that one must distinguish the 
'laws of motion1 of capital both from the conditions that facilitate or 
hinder their operation, and from responses to them. For example, anti­
trust legislation in the USA is a political attempt to stop or even 
reverse the monopolisation of an industry by one or two big firms. Yet 
such legislation cannot 'prohibit1, so to speak, the inherent tendency 
of capitalist industry to move towards increasingly oligopolistic 
structures (cf. Buzzell, 1981) - which is one of the 'laws of motion’ of 
capital. A society may indeed armour itself against at least some of 
the most undesirable effects of free-roaming capitalism (cf. Ashford, 
1986; Galbraith, 1990), but unless it engages in successful grand-scale 
planning, it will still be struggling against economic forces (the 'laws 
of motion' of capital) over which it will have, at best, only partial 
control.
Similarly, since Marx's time, the units of analysis 
through which the 'laws of motion' of capital operate, have become, and 
are becoming, different. Along with individuals, modern capitalist 
agents can be joint-stock companies, unit trusts, insurance companies, 
local governments, co-operatives, states, and, of course, professional 
managers. Again, one should not view such transformations as 
paradoxical, provided one sees capital as a 'recursive' phaenomenon. 
Recursiveness is a tendency towards increasing orders of complexity on 
the basis of successive applications of relatively simple rules 
(Poundstone, 1985). In other words, although the capitalist system may
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explode continuously into highly variegated patterns, the logic behind
Q
it may remain unaltered over quite a large number of metamorphoses.
The question of how to treat non-capitalist features 
of any given society to-day cannot be answered unequivocally. Are such 
features - whether 'backward' (i.e., 'pre-capitalist') or of a socialist 
nature - transitory or do they have some more lasting significance? In 
many respects, the question reminds one of debates concerning the nature 
of economic growth. The crucial choice to make - whether to view 
disturbances and frictions of all kinds as part of the nature of growth, 
or as temporary deviations from an otherwise smooth growth path, cannot
q
be readily resolved by recourse to evidence (Gottlieb, 1976: 48). To a
large extent, it is a matter of conjecture.
Traditional 1developmentalists1 (see chapter 4) as 
well as traditional marxists have often found themselves agreeing on the 
transiency of the non-capitalist features of many societies (see 
Corbridge, 1986, for an exposition of both views, and a critique). 
Where they had differed was on how to interpet the so-called socialist 
societies - a higher social order, or an aberration? To many on the 
Right, the current upheavals in Eastern Europe appear as a vindication.
Fukuyama has even rushed to announce the 'end of history' because, he
says, the West (i.e, liberal democracy and market economics) has
triumphed, and an era of 'boredom' is about to ensue (Atlas, 1989). The 
recent spread of democratic reform in Latin America (The Economist, 
23.01.1988) reinforces such views. They are erroneous because they are 
eclectic, i.e., they emphasise only those features that appear to 
conform to the Right's highly stylized version of a mythical capi­
talism (cf. Galbraith, 1990). They are also erroneous because they take
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such features out of context.
The Left has erred similarly. Leontidou (1985; 
1986), for instance, interprets Athenian urban and housing history as a 
result of the transition to capitalism and the incorporation of the 
country into the world market. So far, so good. But she subsumes 
national specificities under the notion that Greece has belonged to the 
imperialist 'semi-periphery1. As a result, she attaches a lot of 
importance to superficial similarities between Greece and certain Latin 
American countries. On the basis of those similarities she invents 
typologies of social classes that purport to capture the particularities 
of 'semi-peripheral' class patterns as opposed to those of 'core' 
countries. At the same time she draws most of her evidence from Greece 
- a country whose property rights pattern, including the distribution of 
land and home ownership (see chapters 8, 9, 11, 12, and Appendix II), 
are markedly different from that of any Latin American country. Not 
surprisingly, she has difficulty accounting for the formation or 
absence of urban movements in 'underdeveloped' countries (like Greece), 
and resorts to the explanation that a 'radical' political leadership 
was/was not present. This is cyclical reasoning.
On its part, the Communist Party of Greece (CPG) has 
for decades analysed Greek society by reference to 'state monopoly 
capitalism' (a concept whose appropriateness even for advanced capital­
ist countries is questionable - cf. Wirth, 1977) and to 'relative 
retardation' - both in the same breath. Worse, the Party's effort to 
remain blindly faithful to Stalinist precepts, has at times led it to 
invent instances of backwardness. In 1930 the CPG described Greece as a 
country "without serious feudal remnants". In 1934 it found "serious
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remnants of quasi-feudal relations". And in 1966 it re-asserted that 
"despite their important decrease after the war, certain partial feudal 
remnants still exist in the countryside" (Ladis, 1972, p. 41). All this 
ambivalence, while feudalism never took hold in Greece (or in Byzantium 
or the Ottoman empire) (Anderson, 1979; Vergopoulos, 1975; McGowan, 
1981; Tsoucalas, 1983), and the few pockets of ’feudalism1 that did 
appear at the end of the 19 century were liquidated with the 1917 
agrarian reform (Vergopoulos, 1975).
Interestingly, if one chooses to focus on other cha­
racteristics of modern Greece, one can come up with a radically 
different, but equally spurious, interpretation. Namely, that Greece is 
by now a full-fledged capitalist country (Mastrantonis & Melios, 1983; 
Mavris & Tsekouras, 1983; Melios, 1983; 1984). Among others, these
authors (working through the magazine 1Theses') stress the development 
of monetary, exchange, and wage relations in Greece. They also dismiss 
the significance for class structuration of the security of tenure that 
public sector employees enjoy in Greece, and quite peremptorily assign 
most of these employees to the 'proletarian' class (Mavris, 1984). The 
error of this particular view has been exposed quite decisively by 
Tsoucalas (1986) (see also Hoff, 1985).
I will not go into details. Rather, I will advance 
my case utilising Vergopoulos' (1975) thesis on the 'social incorpo­
ration' of Greek agriculture. This author denies that the overwhelming 
presence of the small familial holding in the Greek countryside is a 
sign of retardation. On the contrary, he argues that such fragmentation 
is the normal and necessary way by which modern capitalism incorporates 
agriculture into the economy. He cites the dependence of Greek farmers
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on state subsidies and loans as evidence. I do not agree with 
Vergopoulos1 functionalist hue here. But even if capitalism 'needs' 
this type of rural fragmentation,
the crucial point I wish to emphasise is that such a pattern 
of landownership among the peasants implies and conditions a 
very different political dynamic from a situation where the 
typical agricultural production relation involves, say, 
capitalist farmers and hired labourers, or whatever else. 
This dynamic, in turn, diffuses into the societal whole in 
ways quite removed from a conception of a capitalist state as 
the instrument of the ruling class in a dichotomous class 
model (cf. Giddens, 1973).
For example, as a result of this dynamic the state may be forced to con­
sistently heed the interests of small proprietors in counterdistinction 
to the requirements of industrialisation. In Greece the discrepancy 
between ostensible policy and the anti-industrial/anti-capitalist 
resilience of society at large is striking (see chapters 8 and 9).
Thus both on the Left and on the Right, stylized 
versions of capitalism have been applied on actual societies by means of 
an unwarranted eclecticism. This is a thoroughly unhelpful approach, as 
it mystifies and obscures much more than it is supposed to illuminate. 
Obfuscation is a danger inherent in the blanket use of all general 
terms. I have already warned against the mistake of thinking that what 
is meant, say, by 'speculative building' or 'owner-occupation' in one 
country, means the same in another. The same warning can be advanced in 
relation to the category 'informal sector':
"Infravalorization of wage labour is confused with small
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enterprise and non-commodity production or with illegal modus 
vivendi; the specific nature of gender exploitation is lost
as women's work is associated with unskilled manual labour; 
any badly paid job is disguised as unemployment and, lastly, 
no distinction is admitted between brutal, alienating labour 
relations and potentially autonomous, creative forms of 
production"
(Connolly, 1985: 86).
Connolly's comments are also apposite to discussi­
ons about self-help building. The latter must not be confused with 
self-building, at least in Greece (Emmanuel, 1981), as more often than 
not it has involved contractors rather than physical inputs on the part 
of the user household. Unsurprisingly, at times it has involved both. 
Self-help must more appropriately now be taken to mean housing processes 
under the direct control of the household, in counterdistinction to, 
say, speculative or state building. Neither is self-help necessarily 
illicit building - both versions are equally plausible. And even self- 
building proper, it is increasingly acknowledged, must not be 
counterposed to the market, as it often involves various proportions of 
purchased inputs (cf. Ward, ed., 1982; Gilbert & Ward, 1986; Hardoy & 
Satterthwaite, 1987; Peattie, 1987; Renaud, 1987; Scottish Federation 
News, 1987; Officer, 1988).
In conclusion, the concept of capitalism can be 
fruitfully used to study societies with apparently non-capitalist chara­
cteristics to the extent that the fundamental economic and political 
tendencies of capitalism, revealed through historical experience, are 
identified as major sources of pressure for change in such societies.
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The form, direction and nature of change need not be identical between 
different societies.
Understandably enough, the historical experience 
that usually provides the necessary benchmark is that of the advanced 
capitalist countries. But to ask only whether Greece, for instance, 
will become more like Britain, given time, misses the point. Strong 
similarities may indeed develop, to the extent that both countries 
participate in an increasingly internationalised global economy, and 
are therefore subject to the same 'laws of motion' of capital. Equally, 
differences may well remain or ensue because these 'laws' can operate - 
in typical 'recursive' fashion - through many diverse channels, 
determined by both old factors (perhaps remnants of past social orders) 
and new developments, which is another way of saying that capitalism is 
as adaptable as it is revolutionising. Thus, rather than seeking to 
show that any particular country conforms to a model set by another, or 
that it is on its way there, a more useful question is the extent to 
which particular laws of motion of capital are arrested, enhanced, or 
their operation is distorted, by social and political factors in 
concrete situations.
I will utilise these ideas in my discussion of the 
relationship between dwelling prices and incomes (chapter 6), and also 
of the recent upheaval in the Greek rented sector (chapters 11 and 12). 
But having shown how the concept of capitalism can inform the study of 
societies with apparently non-capitalist characteristics, it is now 
time to turn to those 'fundamental tendencies' of capitalism that are 
directly relevant to the dynamics of housing systems.
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SECTION 5: Capitalism and the Housing System.
The relevance of capitalism for the dynamics of 
housing systems can be captured by the following four general proposi­
tions :
(1) Capitalism tends to increase the dependence of households 
on outside agents for their housing.
(2) The 'laws of motion' of capital affect the behaviour of 
capitalists in the housing sphere also. For instance, speculative 
builders or landlords may face qualitatively different obstacles and 
opportunities from those faced by capitalists in other spheres, but 
cannot, on account of that, be assumed to be impervious to the 
imperatives of capital accumulation. On the other hand, whether there 
are capitalists in any particular housing system, or in a sector of it, 
and, generally, how the nature of agents in the system determines the 
extent of their susceptibility or adaptability to those 'laws', cannot 
simply be assumed, but requires empirical investigation. This is 
further discussed in chapters 4, 11 and 12.
(3) The spread of capitalism has been associated with the 
emergence and strengthening of civil and political individual rights 
(Giddens, 1973; Barbalet, 1988). People in a capitalist society expect 
(or have the moral and political right to expect), for example, 
equality before the law, with all that this entails in terms of access 
to property and opportunities. People in a socialist society expect (or 
should legitimately expect) the establishment of socialist rights of 
egalitarian participation in the wealth society produces (Campbell, 
1983). Either way, people have become increasingly enabled to pursue 
constant improvement in their living standards, including their housing
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conditions. Herein lies a prime source of pressure for change in the 
housing system, i.e., the fact that while people's expectations are 
rising along with the growth in social production and productivity, 
their opportunities - and hence power - to do something about their
needs are not merely a function of their purchasing power, but are also
institutionalised in the political and legal system. This is again 
discussed in chapters 3, 9 and 10.
(4) Finally, far from annihilating the political and legal 
side of social life in favour of a universal commercialism (or 1 econo- 
mism'), capitalism maximises their significance, precisely by allowing 
the institutionalised transformation of 'needs' into 'rights' and 
'claims' (cf. Turner, B.S., 1986; Barbalet, 1988). By their very
nature, rights and claims are both 'structure-1 and 1 agent-'related 
categories of social life. They are structural because, once created, 
they are there for people to take advantage of, or to subject others to 
concomitant obligations (possibly), i.e., they have both 'enabling' and 
'constraining' dimensions. Meanwhile claims can become rights through 
successful collective action. And obviously rights, no less than
claims, are created, upheld or opposed by real people, who act as 
social agents. For example, the rights and claims of landowners or 
landlords, as checked by the rights and claims of other groups, define 
their effective power, but also the landownership or rented sector 
pattern. Patterns of rights and claims also define tenures, housing 
subsidies, and development and building activity or 'modes'. How 
they come about, how they constrain and/or enable particular housing 
processes, and what the relationship of housing-sphere-specific rights 
and claims to wider patterns of rights and claims in a society is, are 
thus cardinal questions to ask in order to understand housing system 
dynamics. I do this especially in chapters 8 to 10.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2
And not always unamusingly. Look at this reported incident:
"Brontosaurus ban: Farmer Mr Denis Brant has been told by
council planners to remove a huge model brontosaurus from land 
near Newbury because the gift to his 13-year-old daughter, 
Katie, is not a grazing animal"
(The Sunday Telegraph, 14.01.1990).
2
The only one to actually do so is Mongolia, according to The 
Guinness Book of Answers, 1989, p. 339. It is unclear, though, 
what is meant by owner-occupation in this, as well as in each and 
every, national case.
3
These instances belong to a deliberately limited view of housing 
provision. A wider view would include general infrastructure 
provision, like roads, sewerage, electricity, tap water, etc.
4
Although Greece is special because even before it re-emerged as a 
nation-state around 1830, her (expatriate) bourgeoisie had become 
well integrated into European capitalism. So, in a sense, ca­
pitalism in Greece was both indigenous and alien. (Psyroukis, 
1975.)
5
To various degrees, all features of modern Greece.
^ I.e., the tendency towards equalisation of the rate of profit
between various industries; the tendency of the rate of profit to 
fall, provided various counter-tendencies do not neutralise the
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first; the tendency towards capital concentration and 
centralisation; towards reproduction of a 'reserve army of the 
unemployed'; towards 'realisation' crises, and internationalisation 
of markets and capitals; the continuous revolutionisation of 
production processes, and the commodification of human 
relationships.
7
Witness the prolonged struggle over the repeal of the Corn Laws, 
or, perhaps, the gradual introduction of a shorter working day, or 
the prohibition of child labour.
g
Hence Marx's famous dictum in his prologue to the fist German 
edition of Capital, "De te fabula narratur" - Of you the story is 
told. He wanted, that is, to make it clear to his German readers 
that, although Capital was based on the British experience, its 
conclusions (i.e, the 'laws of motion' of capital) were applicable 
to Germany as well.
Q
"Adjustment for trend has been called the 'fundamental logical 
problem of time series decomposition'... Common to all methods of 
trend elimination is the presupposition that the force of growth is 
separate from fluctuation and that the economic system tends to 
grow by a smooth, continuous movement and then to oscillate around 
that movement... Conversely, ... economic development has a mixed 
dynamic of creation and innovation, and ... 'evolution is 
essentially a process which moves in cycles,' so that the trend 'is 
nothing but the result of the cyclical process or a property of it 
...’ [Schumpeter, 1939, I, p. 206]. Those who accept this in 
itself unprovable hypothesis necessarily oppose trend elimination
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from cyclical contours ...1
(Gottlieb, 1976: 48).
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C H A P T E R  3:
Housing System Dynamics: A Holistic Process.
SECTION
SECTION
SECTION
SECTION 4
SECTION 5
1: Housing: A Consumption- or Production-
Orientated Approach?
2: Housing Investment and Housing Consumption.
3: Needs: Prime Variable of Social Dynamics.
: Resources and Strategies.
: The Transformation of Housing Markets and
Products.
CHAPTER 3: Housing System Dynamics: A Holistic Process.
Below I review the debate on whether housing studies 
should more appropriately focus on the consumption or production side of 
housing, and conclude that this is a false dilemma. The difficulty 
stems partly from confusing the focus of analysis with 'theory' (section 
1), and partly from the way the two sides are defined. For example, 
it is often overlooked that the nature of the decision-making units 
behind production and consumption affects the substantive content of 
these concepts (section 2).
From the point of view of housing system dynamics 
the consumption/production dichotomy (or overlap) is important mainly in 
so far as it sheds light on the behaviour of social groups which advance, 
oppose, or support patterns of rights and claims over housing resources. 
The broader issues, therefore, are (a) how needs are formed (section 
3), and (b) how resources are accessed (section 4). Access can be 
achieved by a variety of strategies, often involving both economic and 
political means. The two operate and cause change together. Therefore, 
one has to go beyond a purely 'economic' or a purely 'political' 
analysis of housing system dynamics, and combine them instead (section 
5).
SECTION 1: Housing: A Consumption- or Production-Orientated Approach?
A number of authors from within the broad marxist 
fold have recently attempted to redress what they view as the one­
sidedness of both mainstream, and particularly neoclassical, housing 
research, and of some marxism-inspired work (involving, chiefly, the
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'collective consumption' thesis). They argue that a lot of housing 
research is overly pre-occupied with the consumption side of housing 
(keywords: tenures, housing sub-markets, subsidies, taxation, state
policy), and pays scant attention to the production side (cf. Harloe
& Martens, 1984; Ball, 1983, 1986b; Dickens et al, 1985).
This type of critique has led to a quest for better 
theorised housing analysis (Ball, 1986b), in which the emphasis should 
lie on 'production' (Dickens et al., 1985) or, in a more sophisticated
version, 'provision' (Ball, 1983, 1986a, 1986b, 1988). Ball, in
particular, has advised against concentrating on either production or 
consumption on a priori grounds, and said that only detailed analysis 
can reveal which aspect, which relations, and which agents are important 
(Ball, 1986b: 158). He has asserted that "landownership, relations of 
production, exchange agencies (where they exist) and housing consumers" 
matter, but warned that "forms of finance and the state" are "problema­
tic and contingent" factors (ibid., p. 160).
I am afraid that even Ball's analysis is not satis­
factory. It is not enough to restate that in particular national cases 
particular factors are likely to be more important than others - that 
much we know already. I have shown, moreover, that the term 'housing 
provision', as used by many authors currently, is highly inadequate: 
housing is not only 'provided' to households, it can also be 'acquired' 
by them, and the difference is substantial (chapter 2).
The real question is whether it is possible to
show that relations between the various factors are not equally ad hoc, 
but instances of a more general mechanism or mechanisms that is/are
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responsible for housing system evolution and change in capitalism. 
Labelling an eclectic mixture of demand and supply relationships and 
factors "structures of housing provision" (Ball, 1983, 1986b) does not 
get us nearer to understanding those mechanisms than we were before the 
introduction of the novel terminology. On the positive side, drawing 
attention to the significance of socio-economic relations among agents 
involved in housing 'provision1, has indeed served to expand our know­
ledge of particular national housing systems (see Dickens et al., 1985; 
Martens, 1985; Folin, 1985; and of course Ball's entire - and remarkable 
- work). Having said that, it is also true that Marxism-inspired 
approaches have by no means a monopoly of intelligent interest in the 
supply side of housing (cf. Grant, ed., 1980; Emmanuel, 1981; Paris, 
1984; Rodwin, ed., 1987; Weesep & Maas, 1984). Lastly, Ball's (1986b) 
formulation of the 'provision' thesis faces us with the paradoxical 
suggestion that the state need not always be important (p. 160).
More generally, the terms in which most of the 
housing consumption vs production debate has been conducted, have been 
unhelpful in terms of theory-building because
"the focus of analysis is being confused with something called 
'theory'"
(Kemeny, 1987: 259).
But Kemeny's suggested alternative, namely to construct
"conceptual frameworks derived from disciplines such as 
Marxism, sociology, geography, and political science"
(ibid, p. 250),
is not a solution either. For one thing, the problem of explaining what
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makes housing systems 'tick* is not addressed - Kemeny simply urges his 
readers to do so. At least M. Ball has attempted it, and has indeed 
illuminated many aspects of the British housing system. For another 
thing, Kemeny's suggestion that particular 'disciplines' are all 
possible avenues to genuine knowledge is questionable. Castells (1976a, 
1976b), for example, has dismissed mainstream urban studies on the 
grounds that the 'urban' is neither a real nor a theoretical object of 
analysis. The fragmentation of social reality into 'aspects', 
legitimately discussed in the context of appropriate 'disciplines' such 
as economics, sociology, etc., has been held by some to be more than a 
heuristic device (which it can very well be): it serves, they have
argued, as a deliberate counter-procedure against marxism (Cockburn & 
Blackburn, eds, 1969), which is supposed to be the main approach to the 
study of social life that is both holistic and critical of the status 
quo.
This does not mean that marxism, or a certain inter­
pretation of marxism, is the correct path to true knowledge. The point, 
rather, is that there is nothing necessarily 'theoretical' (i.e., illu­
minating) in the perspective one chooses to focus upon (as Kemeny 
himself would admit), while there may indeed be demerits in some 
attempts to compartmentalise reality (cf. Ball, 1979). Housing, I have 
argued, is precisely one area where such an attempt is likely to be 
especially unhelpful.
57
SECTION 2: Housing Investment and Housing Consumption.
Since any attempt to explain housing system dy­
namics has to take account of the multiplicity of existing housing 
systems, and utilise comparative housing research, the researcher must 
be aware that analytical concepts such as housing investment, house 
prices, or housing expenditure are not immutable categories, but are 
themselves problematical. One must constantly ask whether it is 
legitimate to take any given housing economic concept for granted in 
forming additional research questions, or whether the concept itself 
should first become the object of investigation.
(A) Investment is a process that depends critically 
on who the investor is. Investment in dwelling wealth cannot be 
expected to exhibit the same characteristics and sensitivities across 
different housing systems. In one system the decision-makers may be 
families, in another the state, in yet another speculative builders or 
prospective landlords. In Sweden, for example, co-operatives accounted 
for 16 per cent of the housing stock in 1980 (Clapham & Millar, 1985: 
10), and in Oslo for 45 per cent of households in 1983 (Kintrea & Munro, 
1985: 35). Co-operative housing in both Sweden and Norway has involved 
features usually associated with owner-occupation, like the right (and 
opportunity) to sell one's equity or interest in the co-op (which in 
effect means the right to live in a co-op dwelling) at market prices.
In West Germany social housing, in many different forms, has played for 
decades a very important role in housing provision. The recent 
innovation of Housing Action Trusts in Britain (CB News, 1989, p. 14) is 
another example along the same lines.
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It is wrong to expect one investment model - e.g., 
the 'cobweb' capital stock adjustment model mentioned in chapter 2 - to 
capture the behaviour of each and every one of those different agents. 
Although there are speculative developers and builders in Scandinavia 
and West Germany, understanding the housing investment process in those 
countries would necessitate taking account not only of how housing 
investment agents other than those behave, when considered in 
isolation, but of how all agents behave, or are likely to behave, in 
interaction with one another. In another example from Sweden,
"[t]he downturn in the property development market has meant 
that many property companies are offering their services to 
co-operatives. In general, they have not been successful in 
generating much business, because of the attitude of co­
operative owners who consider them to be less caring and more 
expensive than the service from the co-operative, although the 
evidence for HSB [one of the two major co-operative 
organisations of Sweden - NP] seems to indicate that the HSB 
services are in fact more expensive"
(Clapham & Millar, 1985: 24).
This example brings to mind the British case, where 
at times many Local Authorities have felt they could exercise a choice 
between setting up their own Direct Labour Organisations (to the open 
hostility and resistance of the big private builders in particular - see 
Direct Labour Collective, 1980) and employing private contractors to 
build or rehabilitate public housing for them (Direct Labour 
Collective, 1978). (For an example of a more positive relationship 
between a LA and the private housebuilding sector in Britain, see Sim, 
1985.)
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The two cases cited contrast in that in Sweden 
private capital has sought or accepted collaboration with the non-profit 
sector, whereas in Britain the relationship between the private building 
and the municipal sectors has always been much more strenuous. I will 
not get into the reasons for the difference; I am only stressing it, 
pointing out that non-market and/or acquisition-oriented housing 
processes (see chapter 2) may well give their place to market and/or 
provision-oriented ones in the course of social development, but not 
necessarily or inevitably to the stereotypical speculative developer or 
builder of the USA or Britain, or to a bureaucratic state either. Other 
forms, perhaps combining end-user control with state assistance or 
private external financing, are possible.
(B) Housing consumption is usually taken to mean 
"consumer allocations to pay for the services rendered by the total 
inventory of dwellings [ 3 the amount spent for rent or home-ownership 
expenses" (Burns & Grebler, 1977: 47). The way this concept is defined 
affects subsequent estimates of the so-called income elasticity of 
demand for housing; knowledge of the latter has important policy 
implications:
"With inelastic demand, a subsidy for general income support 
[ ] will be less effective in raising levels of housing 
consumption than one of the same amount earmarked 
specifically for housing"
(Burns & Grebler, 1977: 50).
The problems of determining what counts as housing consumption, and what 
does not, are three-fold.
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First, consumption expenditure on housing has to be 
disentangled from investment expenditure on housing. Burns & Grebler 
(1977) try to do this via a shift in their definition of housing: from
"housing as a competing use of capital" they arrive at "housing as a 
competitor for consumption resources" (p. 47). But their shift in the 
definition does not seem to be able to cope with cases where the 
investing and the consuming agents are one and the same - as very often 
has been the case in Greece and many other countries. This is 
important. The main usefulness of the distinction between housing in­
vestment and housing consumption is that it allows one to investigate 
cases where apparently desirable areas for investment, like (usually) 
industrial development or restructuring, are starved of funds because 
these are directed elsewhere - e.g., into housing. But competition of 
capitals presupposes competition of capitalists, who consider investment 
alternatives depending on their rates of return. Where, however, the 
investing and consuming agents coincide, the field of economic activity 
so circumscribed is not open to competition, it is a closed personal or 
household field geared towards autarky, and therefore what we have here 
is a form of economic activity inherently and often deliberately un­
capitalist, if not outright anti-capitalist. This is a finite field in 
the sense that all that is invested is consumed by the same agent and is 
not sold on a market (i.e., it is not meant for sale on the open 
market), hence no extended reproduction of capital takes place, and no 
meaningful rate of return can be applied. Whatever funds are invested 
and consumed in this way cannot be said to have competed against other 
funds (capitals) for the field of activity in question (e.g., 
housebuilding), and consequently that field cannot be said to have been
in competition with other fields for funds. (I will return to this
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topic in section 3.) An example from 18 century England is
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appropriate here:
"A man of means who wished to build a country mansion or a 
town house for his own use might perhaps ignore conditions in 
the capital market: even in years of acute shortage of funds
some building took place. But if such a man contemplated 
putting up a house as an investment he would surely consider 
the yield he could obtain by buying other assets and, in 
particular, government stock"
(Ashton, 1959: 87).
The point I am making is this: It is often not
possible to distinguish consumption from investment expenditure on 
housing. If, however, in comparing different time periods or countries, 
one chooses, in some cases to drive an arbitrary wedge between 
consumption and investment, and in other cases to conflate the two, 
without sufficient theorisation and justification, then any figures for 
the income elasticity of demand, for example, will be severely distorted 
(over- or under-stated). If, on the other hand, one chooses to avoid 
comparative research, and base one's policy recommendations only on the 
study of short time periods or of very ad hoc environments, then there 
is no way of telling whether, say, the size of the elasticity arrived at 
in this way can be of any use in other contexts. What is needed is 
awareness of any subtle changes in the meaning and significance of 
housing consumption and investment across different settings, so that 
time series, or cross-sectional, studies can be conducted using the 
appropriate magnitude for each time period or locality.
The second problem in determining what can count as
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housing consumption involves deciding which from among clearly 
consumption expenses are to be included in the analysis, and which left 
out. Does expenditure on minor repairs, fuel or electricity qualify? 
What is a house without power supply, tap water, and other amenities 
that in an advanced society are widely conceived as necessities? 
Following the neoclassical device of talking in terms of housing 
services instead of actual dwellings can lead to Byzantine complexities: 
Why not include, for example, expenses on items of furniture, cookery, 
entertainment, etc., that a larger dwelling space makes possible and 
desirable, thereby helping create potential demand for (cf. Donnison & 
Ungerson, 1982: 59)? Why not include household expenses on neighbourhood 
child-care facilities, schools, or rates, which are obviously related to 
the location of a dwelling? Space and location are, according to 
neoclassical theorising, two typical housing services (Straszheim, 1975: 
79), and attempting to price them in terms of the costs that their use, 
or consumption, incurs, or even in terms of the opportunity cost of non- 
available room or of an inconvenient location, seems quite legitimate. 
But if one were to follow that road, it would soon become apparent that 
one would be talking of by far the largest part of total household
consumption expenditure. Such a shift would be at the cost of
understanding anything specific about the consumption of the housing 
commodity as such.
Finally, there exists a problem in relation to those 
housing consumption expenses, usually rent or loan repayment
installments, that allow one, whether tenant or owner, primary access to 
a dwelling, i.e., give one the right to use a dwelling in more-or-less 
prescribed ways, and to the discretionary exclusion of other parties. 
Neoclassical economists like to incorporate imputed rents in their
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conceptualisations of housing consumption expenses (see the debate 
between Merrett et al., 1989; Hancock & Swales, 1989; Pirounakis, 1989). 
The neoclassical argument is that there is something called "real 
income" which is neither money nor income in kind, but the flow of 
services that any item, especially a long-lasting one, yields to its 
owner (Hancock & Swales, 1989); hence a house yields a "real income" 
over its life, which must be priced through calculation of an imputed 
rent even where no actual rental payments take place. In my view this 
argument belongs to the realm of shadow-fighting: real magnitudes, like
monetary income or in kind, are ignored in favour of obscure service 
flows which must, in turn, be priced in an equally obscure fashion 
through regression exercises that typically involve circular reasoning 
(cf. Ball, 1979). The possibility that a whole - a dwelling and its 
location, for instance - is greater than the sum of its parts in a way 
that no decomposition of the whole into its parts can reveal, is ignored 
as well. Further, the calculation of imputed rents usually involves 
asking the following question: What would a given owner-occupier pay
for rent if he had to rent instead of owning? Now, there may be
circumstances where calculation of an imputed rent, in the form of 
actual income not spent on rent, is possible - e.g., one or few working 
class households who own their dwellings in a situation where the vast 
majority do not, the wages of all are more-or-less at the same level,
and all live in approximately similar dwellings. Then obviously those
households who do not have to pay rent are better off than the rest by 
the amount of rent saved. But these are rather strict conditions. As 
soon as owner-occupation expands and/or wages and dwelling types begin 
to vary, there is no standard of comparison which one can base 
calculation of an imputed rent on. It is pointless, in such
circumstances, to ask what a household would pay for rent if it had to:
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The very act of searching for rented accomodation, especially if under 
pressure (an occurence which implies absence of alternatives - whereas 
often owner-occupation is precisely an alternative to renting), would 
affect the prevailing prices for rented accomodation, and the structure 
and workings of the housing market. One household searching for rented 
accomodation would not, of course, affect the housing market conditions 
significantly, but the neoclassical project is about assigning imputed 
rents to the entire owner-occupied stock - a different matter 
altogether. Consequently, prevailing rental prices could not be used in 
calculating imputed rents not only on empirical, but also on 
theoretical, grounds; certainly it would be very difficult - and 
probably uninteresting - to learn what rental prices would be like in a 
different, non-existent market.
It is thus better to limit the definition of housing 
consumption expenditure to payments that allow a user or consumer to 
obtain a dwelling for his and/or his kin's personal use. These 
expenditures can take only the following forms:
(a) One-off cash payments to buy title to a dwelling;
(b) Rental payments;
(c) Loan repayment installments (for buying, building, 
expanding, altering or repairing a dwelling);
(d) Cash payments associated with building, structurally 
repairing, rehabilitating, expanding, or otherwise 
substantially altering a dwelling.
Some of the above expenses can also count as investment in dwelling 
wealth, but whether - on account of that - housing investment can be
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assumed to be in competition with capital investment proper is a 
different matter, and I have urged caution against such an assumption. 
If these four items are to be accepted as the only genuine forms of 
consumption expenditure on housing, then, for example, the loan that a 
building society extends one in order for him to buy a second-hand house 
should not be carried as either investment or consumption expenditure in 
the given financial year - it is merely a tranfer payment, representing, 
that is, a transfer of wealth through the financial system from one or 
more parties to one or more other parties. The repayment installments, 
however, should count as consumption expenditure. The expenses incurred 
by an owner in having a contractor build his home could count as 
either consumption or investment expenditure, depending on what one 
wants to measure. If, for instance, these expenses came from the 
proceeds of a bank loan, the actual payments to the contractor could 
represent housing investment, while the repayment installments would 
count as housing consumption (double counting should be avoided, of
course). But if the builder were a capitalist building for the general
market, as is often the case in Britain, or the owner of the property a 
prospective speculative landlord, then the outlays of either of those 
agents should definitely count as investment. Equally, when a state 
builds dwellings, its outlays are to be considered investment in so far 
as the relationship between the state and the people concerned is 
bureaucratic, paternalistic, and dominated by a logic of industrial 
exigency and expedience. A characteristic example is departmental 
housebuilding in the Soviet Union (Andrusz, 1984):
"The formal rejection in the Soviet Union of private ownership 
of the means of production initially created a tendency for
those possessing a set of property rights in the productive
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sphere to extend their range of activities to embrace the 
production (and maintenance) of objects of collective 
consumption in order to ensure the reproduction of their 
labour needs"
(Andrusz, 1984: 78).
In conclusion, the proper use of the concepts of 
housing investment and consumption requires an understanding of the 
nature and rationale of investing and consuming agents in any particular 
society or setting. But how does this insight help one discuss larger 
processes - for example, the relationship between spending on housing 
and national income (see ch. 4)? The answer is that the extent to which 
housing investment and consumption are or are not conflated, and 
therefore are or are not in the hands of the same agents, affects the 
formation and strategies of various social groups, who end up trying to 
uphold rights and/or advance claims over housing resources (land, 
buildings, materials, know-how, utility infrastructure). In turn, the 
pattern of rights and claims thus created (e.g., the landownership pat­
tern or the scope and authority of the planning practice) influences the 
way any society responds to its housing needs.
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SECTION 3: Needs: Prime Variable of Social Dynamics.
It is an empirical fact that the correspondence 
between (housing) needs and resources is not one-to-one: the material
needs of some people, or groups, overshoot their material resources at 
any one time. But "needs" can be a very vague concept, while a 
"resource" is anything that enables one to (strive to) achieve a certain 
goal. On its part, 'demand1, or 'effective demand', the way it is 
defined by economists, is simply realised sales, or realised purchasing 
power, while 'potential demand1, an admittedly vaguer concept, is 
merely expected effective demand (cf. Donnison & Ungerson, 1982). 'De­
mand' is not a problematical notion, while 'needs' is. For this reason 
I will now concentrate on the latter, and later see what happens when 
the two come together.
Needs are formed on the basis of perceptions of what 
is desirable and/or necessary, and often of what is just. Apart from 
immediate biological urges it is society, or social development if one 
likes, which creates needs (cf. Galbraith, 1958; Hayek, 1961), and for 
this reason they cannot be said to exist prior to their being acted 
upon, prior to their instigating a social (including a political and 
economic) dynamic. But needs must not be confused with utopian dreams 
or capricious desires: for needs to arise and spread, a certain
element of attainability must usually be present too. Otherwise, if 
something is perceived as unattainable, one may not feel it is worth 
pursuing, and therefore that thing may not be experienced as a need - 
at least to the eyes of most people, which is what counts from the point 
of view of social dynamics. It has been observed, for example, that 
people, when asked, often do not put forth their "real" most pressing
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needs, but what they feel are their most feasible ones.
Obviously the larger the number of people who are 
aware of their needs and are prepared to do something about them,^ the 
greater the "realism" of those needs, and their importance in shaping 
social dynamics. In other words, needs become an objective factor 
behind social change only to the extent that they are socialised, i.e., 
they become standards of well-being shared by an increasing number of 
people, and eventually the majority or a great many of them, in any 
given society or sub-section of it (e.g., a social class). In 
capitalism the ’socialisation' of needs, as defined here, determines, 
of course, the value of labour power (see chapter 5), and is 
empirically approximated as the average (or modal) wage:
"The actual value of ... labour power ... depends not merely 
upon the physical, but also upon the historically developed 
social needs, which become second nature"
(Marx, 1959: 837).
Some needs are universal. These are usually 
epitomised in the notion of necessities, which were defined by A. Smith 
as
"whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for 
creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without"
(Smith, 1976: vol. 2, p. 870).
Needs other than necessities are particular to different social classes 
and strata. That is to say, people in any given social stratum will 
tend to perceive as need anything contributing to the standard of well­
being normally associated with their class or "station in society". In
69
the absence of institutionalised artificial barriers to social mobility, 
they are, in addition, likely to incorporate in their notion of needs 
standards of well-being normally associated with the stratum or class 
immediately above or, at any rate, near their own - but not those 
associated with too "distant" classes or strata. Alternatively, if 
there are barriers to social mobility, people on the lower rungs of the 
social ladder are quite likely to "know their place in the scheme of 
things," have no, or only very modest, aspirations, and consequently no, 
or few, needs other than those a rigid social hierarchy allows them to 
contemplate and have.
On occasion, however, especially in modern times, 
people or groups do have opportunities to conceive of a better future 
(better for them, that is), do form new needs, but cannot fulfill those 
needs because they are still politically and/or legally excluded from 
access to certain goods, services, opportunities, and locations, or are 
otherwise discriminated against (for instance, on racial or religious 
grounds). Two examples are black Africans under apartheid, and non­
members of the "nomenklatura" in stalinist countries. Such cases, 
combining rising expectations with awareness of exclusion, can be quite 
explosive politically, whether in Soweto or Beijing. By far, however, 
the commonest reason to-day why needs are not readily fulfilled has to 
do with the high cost of sought goods and services relative to 
purchasing power, i.e., incomes and income-generating assets. In other 
words, as I emphasised in chapter 2, nowadays cases of obvious and 
direct political and/or legal (i.e., non-economic) exclusion from the 
fruits of social progress are becoming increasingly rare.
Because of the way needs come about, it is often
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futile for scholars or governments to try and define other people’s 
needs. Sometimes this can be done, and I explain the conditions under 
which such an exercise makes sense in chapter 5, when I discuss the 
value of labour power concept. The difficulty of defining needs ex 
cathedra is compounded in a context of rapid economic growth. It is 
better, I feel, to leave the definition exercise to individual people or 
groups, and then concentrate on the effects of their chosen strategies 
to fulfill those needs on society at large and/or any particular sector 
of it - like the housing system. What the groups and their strategies 
are, is more important than whether people have defined their own needs 
in a 'scientific' way.
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SECTION 4: Resources and Strategies.
To fulfill their needs people utilise a variety of 
different resources and strategies. Income is a resource, of course, 
but so are citizenship and individual rights - like equality before the 
law and freedom of speech -, the capacity to mobilise politically, 
affiliation to a powerful party, having the right "connections," 
participation in a strong trade-union, possession of market skills, or 
wealth. From the point of view of the satisfaction of material needs, 
however, what matters is the extent to which political and other non­
monetary resources or means enable one to access directly usable and/or 
exchangeable material resources - those epitomised in income and wealth.
Between the last two, it is incomes that are 
ultimately important - after all, many forms of wealth are but 
accumulated income, while the power that wealth, in all its forms, 
confers on one results from the possibility of using wealth in order to 
generate an income, or of liquidating it in exchange for commodities - 
i.e., part of the national income. This is borne out clearly if we 
examine the various components of most people's wealth nowadays. Their 
wealth is mostly in the forms of dwellings, savings, pension rights, and 
shares.^ Savings are simply part of their past incomes plus interest, 
which is a charge on the earnings of other agents in the economy. 
Shares are valued in so far as there exists the potential of receiving 
dividends from them - in turn, dividends are part of an enterprise's 
profits. Pension rights are either accumulated savings, or funded by 
the contributions which the currently working population makes out of 
its incomes. Land and dwellings, especially after they are inherited, 
can be a different matter, but the needs of most people cannot be
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permanently satisfied by liquidating their wealth - this is a one-off 
solution. Many Greeks, for example, gained a foothold in the cities 
after the war by selling (some of) their agricultural holdings; for 
some this was sufficient in order to allow them to secure both a plot 
and a dwelling in the city; others still had to buy or build the actual 
dwelling to live in, or improve, or expand it. Certainly many from 
among the second, and increasingly the third, generation of urban 
dwellers cannot cash in on their countryside assets in order to house 
themselves because they do not have any left, or what they have may not 
be marketable. Wealth liquidation tends to be a "singular" event, 
which, although occasionally very important, at most enables 
individuals or groups to embark upon their housing careers at a point in 
time. It is not a substitute for the resources - the income - 
subsequently required, and on an on-going basis, for the satisfaction of 
future needs. For that, what matters in the long-term is incomes, and 
their relationship to costs.
To a certain extent, of course, political struggles, 
either directly or through their impact on the political and legal 
system, can help bridge the gap between needs and resources: the latter
can be redistributed, for example, as a result of such struggles (cf. 
Simmie & Hale, 1978). In the housing sphere, redistribution of 
resources has traditionally taken three main forms: (a) utilisation of
tax revenue, or even imposition of additional taxes, in order to finance 
public housing and/or housing subsidies - let alone urban infrastructure 
in general; (b) government intervention in the private rented sector, 
and (c) the broad area of land-use politics, characteristic examples 
from which have been: urban squatters' movements in many Latin American 
countries (Ward, 1982b; Castells, 1983; Angel et al., eds, 1983), the
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colonisation of sub-urban public land in Greece (Emmanuel, 1981; 
Leontidou, 1985; 1986), and the controversies surrounding land-use
planning in Britain (Pugh, 1980: 241-3; Cullingworth, 1982: 170-96; 341— 
4; Ball, 1983: 193-271; Healey et al., 1988).
Redistribution struggles go on all the time, in 
different forms and at various levels. But beyond a certain difficult 
to define point it is the wider economy which provides, and ultimately 
must provide, whatever resources are needed: the size of the cake
matters roughly as much as the number of pieces it can be divided into. 
Equally the size of the cake and the number of pieces are dialectically 
related: in some cases an egalitarian environment can actually foster
growth of the cake; in other cases, it may discourage such growth 
This is because economic magnitudes are sensitive to contextual 
parameters of an institutional and qualitative nature - who spends, who 
invests, who builds, and how, where their incomes derive from, who owns 
and/or controls what, and who has what kind of power in any given 
situation. Nowhere is this more apparent or pertinent than in the broad 
area of housing provision, since the latter depends critically on the 
nature of prior claims upon land. Such claims usually take the form of 
private landownership in capitalism, but other forms are possible, e.g., 
claims of government bodies. The landowner may simply deny any 
particular change of use of his land for as long as he wishes or as long 
as he is allowed sovereignty over it. In advanced western countries the 
landlord's sovereignty is circumscribed by the legal and planning 
system, and only rarely does it become a directly political issue. But 
this does not make the processes of land acquisition for housing, and 
housing production, purely economic, despite appearances (cf. Emmanuel, 
1981: 123).
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The relationship between resource availability, 
epitomised in incomes, and constraints on those resources, epitomised in 
costs, provides an objective basis for the formulation and deployment of 
strategies - individual and/or collective - aimed at the satisfaction of 
needs. Strategies of this kind may assume a multiplicity of forms - 
hard work, a marriage of convenience, educational pursuits, political 
mobilisation, criminal activity, moonlighting, speculation in the stock 
exchange, etc. Some strategies will utilise an existing array of legal 
rights and institutional opportunities in order to meet their aims. One 
example of such an institutional opportunity is a legal framework making 
most forms of private property somehow sacrosanct. Another example is 
dowry. Other strategies will run against the rights of others, or their 
perpetrators will feel unhappy about the existing legal and 
institutional framework, and will try to change it, often by advancing 
counter-claims on what are ultimately the resources of other people. 
Such activities, constant as they are, add life and liveliness to the 
dynamic structure of rights and claims, which is present in every 
society, and to the institutions that are set to uphold or oppose 
particular rights and claims. This process lies at the root of the 
transformation of housing markets and products, which I address in the 
next section.
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SECTION 5: The Transformation of Housing Markets and Products.
Economic theory suggests that a level of national 
income is possible at which spending equals output. This is the
equilibrium level of national income. It also says that in any
particular market a price can be established which, given certain 
conditions, equates demand and supply. If demand exceeds supply, price 
will rise, calling forth more supply, which will lower the price. The 
question is - can housing system change be visualised in these terms? 
And, more importantly, can one limit policy recommendations to removing 
market imperfections?
Let us note that it is possible to have an equili­
brium level of national income consistent with almost any level of unem­
ployment or prices (Baumol & Blinder, 1988). Equally, it is possible to 
have equilibrium in any particular market at almost any price or output
level, which at the same time leaves out of the market those who cannot
buy the given product at the equilibrium price although they may well
want or need to obtain it.
Clearly, the supply and demand equilibrium model is 
not cast in terms of need or potential demand (or potential supply, for 
that matter), but in terms of effective demand (and supply) at a given 
price. Therefore any freely realised price can be shown to be an
equilibrium price as supply and demand are equal at that price by
definition. In other words, the conception of a price-quantity 
equilibrium through equalisation of demand and supply sheds no light on 
anything in the real world because the reasoning involved is cy­
clical. The model says that supply and demand determine price, while
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price determines supply and demand (cf. Marx, 1959: 184-9). In
addition, prices (an observational term) are very poorly 'explained' by 
the neoclassical theoretical term of utility maximisation. Transactions 
are, among other things, rarely as voluntary as utility theory 
assumes:
"Housing is a necessity and it is indivisible (an infringe­
ment of the assumption needed to derive continuous 
indifference curves and budget lines). A low-income household 
may have virtually no choice at all as far as the housing 
market is concerned"
(Richardson, 1977: 30).
But let us go along with the model for a while. It
is not inconsistent with it to say that even cases of unfulfilled demand
can be taken care of in the long run, as the initial high price will 
call forth additional supply, which can be sold only at a lower price.
If the initial high price is the result of monopoly, and it is still 
possible to increase output at increasing returns to scale, then there 
may be another price, lower than the initial high price, at which the 
increased output can be sold in a way that augments revenue and profit.
The incentive to raise productivity and lower prices 
varies as an industry moves along the spectrum of possible structures, 
from monopoly to perfect competition. Even a monopolist or oligopolist 
will feel pressure to do so if he operates in a contestable market
(Baumol & Blinder, 1988: 628). The situation is less certain under
monopolistic competition (the typical case of the housebuilding 
industry, and of housing markets in general - cf. Emmanuel, 1985) 
because, on the positive side,
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such firms can utilise the fact that they tend to operate 
under excess capacity (Baumol & Blinder, 1988: 616) in order 
to experiment with the market, and guestimate its absorption 
capacity for their products, if the latter are offered at 
lower prices as a result of increasing output.
But, on the negative side,
they are unsure, because of product heterogeneity, as to 
whether extra output can be sold, even at a lower price.
Note that a crucial feature in the above analysis is 
the potential for increasing returns to scale by means of technological 
applications and know-how leading to higher productivity. Often such 
innovation is not easy or fast enough, for a variety of reasons: 
capital rationing, technological impossibility, industrial structure, or 
landownership (a case of capital rationing, really). If, at the same 
time, the product involved is a necessity, and in general politically 
sensitive, the larger the number of people who cannot get it because of 
its high price, the stronger the case for regulatory (e.g., rent 
controls), or even more radical forms of, intervention in the market 
(e.g, public housing provision, sequestration of properties, or land 
nationalisation). Needless to say, a notable form of intervention in­
volves the formation of collectivities (trade unions, pressure groups, 
co-ops, etc.). Collectivities breach another crucial assumption of the 
neoclassical model of economic behaviour - that of atomistic 
competition.®
The result of intervention is that the initial high- 
price equilibrium is disturbed, while at the same time the 'natural'
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long-term movement towards a new equilibrium at a lower price/higher 
output level is interrupted. Concomitant to these developments is the 
very strong possibility that, as a result of those 'interferences', new 
products and markets will be created and/or non-market or acquisition- 
based processes will emerge (see chapter 2). From the time political 
intervention occurs, equilibrium as per mainstream economic theory is no 
longer attainable, and what may be attainable in the future is equili­
brium in a different market, in the context of a different industry, and 
possibly about a different product, from the one with respect to which 
the intervention happened in the first place. This is a transformation 
process which conventional economic analysis, with its disregard for the 
socio-institutional framework that shapes economic activity, cannot even 
begin to address.
Products whose 'evolutionary cycle' has been 
subjected to 'government mediation' (Tellis & Merle Crawford, 1981), and 
other forms of political intervention, may be few compared to the total 
number of products in circulation at any one time. But they are, or 
have been, arguably, among the most important precisely because they 
have involved strong popular needs, and have therefore been highly 
relevant to the determination of the value of labour power (chapter 5). 
Housing is such a product par excellence.
The growth of the product 'owner-occupied housing' 
in Britain, and the particular way it is defined, is a case in point. 
The government has sought to make it widely accessible, in response to 
a perceived and/or induced need for it, by means of mortgage interest 
tax relief, abolition of tax on imputed rent, rent controls (which made 
landlords want to sell to owner-occupiers), and strict enforcement of
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building and planning regulations (and, in recent years, discounted 
sales of public housing stock to sitting tenants). In this way a 
particular housing market has emerged, in which
(i) demand and supply have been broadly in long-term 
equilibrium (as evidenced by the remarkable stability of the dwelling 
price/earnings ratio in Britain since before World War II - Donnison & 
Ungerson, 1982; see also chapter 6), and
(ii) owner-occupiers have less liberty to do as they please 
with their properties than, say, the Greeks, but can sell them and/or 
realise capital gains more easily, and more often, than the latter.
Even these forms of intervention, however, may not 
prove enough to turn owner-occupation into the only tenure in Britain, 
as the evolutionary cycle of this 'product' is envisaged to reach its 
'saturation' phase at a level of owner-occupation between 70 and 80 per 
cent, sometime around 2000 (Boleat, 1989: 29; see also The Economist, 
24.02.1990, pp. 21-24). On the other hand, if the British state had 
chosen a different form of intervention (for example, if it had 
nationalised peripheral urban land, and then allowed or tolerated 
squatting on such land, or had not strictly enforced building and 
planning regulations), the kind of owner-occupation that would have 
resulted might have reached its 'saturation' phase sooner, but at a 
lower level - e.g., 60 or 70 per cent around 1980 -, and the British 
housing market as we know it would have been quite different. How 
different we cannot really tell, neither would it be very interesting 
(but probably it would bear strong similarities to the Greek market).
The reason it would be different is that the modern
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British housing market operates on the premise of a severe planning 
and building regulatory framework, and takes full advantage of it. For 
example, planning authorities in Britain go to great lengths to ensure 
the homogeneity of neighbourhoods and estates. Such homogeneity is 
crucial in allowing professional valuers, surveyors, buyers and sel­
lers, to valuate owner-occupied dwellings as accurately as possible. 
In turn, valuation accuracy enables building societies and banks to 
finance owner-occupation to a far larger extent (in terms of both amount 
advanced and number of clients served) than otherwise would have been 
possible. This is part of the reason why in European countries with lax 
planning frameworks the percentage of the value of a dwelling that can 
be covered by a mortgage loan is traditionally lower than in Britain 
(cf. Pirounakis, 1987; ECMF, 1987a).
What is interesting, is to show, for example, that 
the forms and substance of state intervention in housing in Britain 
have been linked to, and have been an outcome of, wider societal 
characteristics (cf. ch. 9). That is, the British state may have
intervened in the market when it began to support owner-occupation, but 
it did so in ways that were consistent with, and ultimately encouraging 
of, capitalist expansion in the housing sphere. In Greece, by 
contrast, the introduction of rent controls in 1978 and after served to 
discourage capitalist housing interests, and extended the life of more 
traditional, family-controlled housing processes. This theme is 
revisited in chapters 11 and 12. It is obviously important to 
understand how a society's general features determine the evolution of 
its housing system because such knowledge will allow policy makers to 
pursue more practicable policies and/or take additional measures in 
order to ensure the success of the policies they do choose.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3
In 1987 it involved 3.3 million dwellings, or 12.6% out of a stock, 
of 26.3 million. Of those 3.3 million, 2.4 belonged to housing 
associations, and 0.9 to the private rented sector. In addition, 
42.0% of the stock was owner-occupied, and 3.7% and 41.7%,
respectively, belonged to housing associations and private landlords 
outside social housing (Tomann, 1989). On recent problems of social 
housing in West Germany, see Kratke (1989).
To neoclassical economists, housing service is an "'unobservable 
theoretical entity1" (Straszheim, 1975: 20).
In her study of the problems of new settlements in Papaloapam, 
south-east Mexico, in 1976/77, Liz Allen, of the Glasgow 
University Institute of Latin American Studies, found that some 
people were saying, for example, that their most pressing need was 
for electricity. Liz Allen felt this was because those people knew 
there was an on-going electrification programme, and thought they 
could plug into it - while a bridge might have been a more effective 
solution to their immediate problems (interview with E. Allen on 
23.08.1989).
Identification of an individual with a group often facilitates this 
process.
But still above their own: Voltaire once remarked that the trouble
with equality is that people always seem to want it with their 
superiors...
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In the UK in 1976 the ingredients of personal wealth were as 
follows: 37% homes; 3% land; 7% other physical assets; 10% company 
shares; 14% life assurance policies; 8% building society deposits, 
and 21% other financial assets (HMSO, 1980). For a decomposition 
of personal wealth in the UK in 1981 by wealth bracket, see 
Fothergill & Vincent (1985).
People can also borrow on the basis of their wealth. One example is 
owner-occupiers in Britain when house prices appreciate, as they 
have done in the 1980s. Again, the debts so raised must be paid for 
either through liquidation of wealth or through future income. 
Another influence of household wealth (towards which house . prices 
contribute about 60% in to-day's Britain - The Economist, 19 August 
1989: 26) seems to be on spending and savings: that is, the
wealthier people feel, the more willing they become to spend as 
opposed to saving - with sometimes dire consequences for the trade 
balance and the price level. This at least is what some recent 
studies of the British economy have pointed out {The Economist, op. 
cit.). The implication of this behavioural pattern is that people 
run down one form of their wealth (cash and bank deposits, and 
possibly other relatively liquid assets) on the basis of their 
confidence in the strength of other forms of wealth, usually 
property. The resultant inflation (unless contained by higher 
productivity) is bound to redistribute income, and, as usual, does 
so capriciously (Baumol & Blinder, 1988: 104).
"It is a mistake to limit collective action to State action; many 
other departures from the anonymous atomism of the price system are 
observed regularly. Indeed, firms of any complexity are
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illustrations of collective action, the internal allocation of 
their resources being directed by authoritative and hierarchical 
controls"
(Arrow, 1977: 79).
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C H A P T E R  4:
A Framework For Isolating the Effect of National Socio-
Institutional Features on Housing Investment Levels.
SECTION 1: Housing Investment Levels: Problems of
Interpretation.
SECTION 2: An Alternative Framework.
CHAPTER 4: A Framework For Isolating the Effect of National Socio-
Institutional Features on Housinqr Investment Levels.
Both incomes (and wealth) and people's needs and pre­
ferences (and the socio-institutional framework - including demographic 
factors - which shapes them and gives them voice) affect housing 
investment levels. For this reason the presence as well as absence of a 
significant statistical correlation between incomes and housing 
investment levels cannot allow us to form any qualitative conclusions 
regarding the relationship between housing investment and 'development' 
(the more so since national income - whether total or per capita - is 
not tantamount to 'development') (section 1). Neither can it inform 
policy unless some way is found to take account of the influence of both 
economic and socio-institutional factors.
An alternative approach can be built on the double 
observation that (a) fluctuations in housing investment lead to the for­
mation of building cycles, and (b) the historic development trajectories 
of modern countries can be associated with characteristic building 
cycles. Differences between countries that cannot be attributed either 
to their different development paths, or to their being at different 
phases of a building cycle, must be due to the effect of nationally spe­
cific socio-institutional features (section 2). The latter affect hous­
ing investment also indirectly - through their influence on the relati­
onship between incomes and housing costs.
SECTION 1: Housing Investment Levels: Problems of Interpretation.
It is a recurring theme in the housing economics 
literature whether, and to what extent, housing investment "crowds out"
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industrial investment (cf. Maclennan, 1986: 15-18; Ermisch, ed., 1990; 
Muellbauer, 1990). These questions occur in the context of views - 
mostly of classical and neoclassical ancestry (cf. Pen, 1980: 49-51) - 
that "balanced11 growth somehow presupposes a particular resource 
allocation mix:
"[ ] the spur to demand for higher standards in housing [ ]
crowds out crucial housing priorities and may affect 
production in the rest of the economy"
(Kilroy & McIntosh, 1982).
"[ ] the distribution of housing subsidies in the UK [ ] has 
undesirable implications for the allocation of resources"
(O'Sullivan, 1987: 15).
"On allocational grounds, we would naturally wish to treat 
owner occupier housing for tax purposes in such a way that 
distortion of resource allocation within the economy is 
minimised"
(O'Sullivan, 1987: 20).
"It has sometimes been argued that British economic growth 
would have been faster if there had been less investment in 
dwellings and in some forms of infrastructure, so as to free 
resources for investment in other sectors, especially 
manufacturing"
(Matthews et al., 1982: 417). 
"The question of the role of housing investment in the Greek 
economic development is quite familiar. The debate about the 
causes and effects of its large magnitude in the post-war has 
been recurring from 1948 down to the present, when a case on
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the need to curtail it, is being advanced"
(Emmanuel, 1979: 84).
But are such anxieties by and large justified? In 
their seminal work on British economic growth, Matthews et al. (1982) 
concluded that
"Much turns on whether a lower level of investment in infra­
structure or dwellings would in fact have caused investment in 
manufacturing to be significantly higher. This must be 
considered doubtful, since there were in each period good 
reasons on the [Marginal Efficiency of Investment - NP] side 
why manufacturing investment was no higher than it was. On 
this reckoning, lower investment in infrastructure and 
dwellings would not have helped to speed up economic growth"
(Matthews et al., 1982: 418).
And on the Greek side, Emmanuel was firm that
"[t]he solution to the problem of limited industrial 
investment must be sought in the domain of industry and of 
related policies, and not in housing policy. The reasons are 
simple: The 'capital structure1 of industrial firms, and the
post-war evolution of their capital needs, compared to the 
available volume of deposits, have precluded the emergence of 
funding problems"
(Emmanuel, 1979: 89).
If that has been the case, the existence of resource
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allocation worries, spanning, as we have seen, at least two quite 
different countries, is a direct result of the official acceptance of 
the classical idea that investment implies abstaining from consumption 
(Pen, 1980), and, on that count, the "consumption" of housing is bound 
to subtract from "investment" funds or resources. However, this idea is 
not tantamount to a law (although it does have a historical basis - cf. 
Marx's discussion of primitive accumulation in 'Capital'). Let us look 
at the only two possibilities that a dynamic economy faces:
(a) Rising consumption may well encourage new investment, made 
possible either through higher revenue and profit or through more easily 
available credit. As a result of new investment fewer hands, and 
perhaps less energy, will be needed to produce a given quantity of
goods: this represents a liberation of resources, brought about by the
autonomous effect of technology on productivity and growth (Pen, 1980: 
238-42). In Marx's words:
"The criterion of this expansion of production is capital 
itself, the existing level of the conditions of production and 
the unlimited desire of capitalists to enrich themselves and 
to enlarge their capital, but by no means consumption, which 
from the outset is inhibited, since the majority of the
population, the working people, can only expand their
consumption within very narrow limits, whereas the demand for 
labour, although it grows absolutely, decreases relatively, to 
the same extent as capitalism develops"
(Marx, 1969: 492).
(b) On the other hand, falling consumption may well justify
89
TABLE 4.1: Composition of Personal Sector Physical Wealth in the
UK, 1957-84 (current prices, £ billion).
Physical Assets 1957 1961 1966 1970 1975 1980 1984
Stocks & work in 
progress 
Vehicles, plant & 
machinery 
Dwellings 
Other developed 
land & buildings 
Agricultural & 
other land 
Consumer durables
1.9 2.2 2.0 2.6 5.4 7.1 8.9
1.3 1.8 1.5 2.0 5.4 14.6 17.9
12.4 16.6 35.0 49.9 137.5 322.8 485.6
2.1 3.6 1.9 2.7 12.2 21.0 25.6
4.6 4.6 11.0 27.6 29.7
2.8 4.0 11.4 16.1 38.2 74.7 98.2
Total 20.6 28.2 56.4 77.9 209.6 467.8 665.9
Source: Halsey (1988: 155).
and lead to a search for cheaper ways of making things (a process which 
can be facilitated by the availability of credit, and primarily involves 
orders to firms making producer's goods), and to a search for new 
products. The situation is no different if, instead of total 
consumption, we deal with "consumption" of industrial goods only. 
Either way, no necessary resource allocation mix need be assumed or 
required for growth to go on, whether we deal with a self-contained 
dynamic economy or with a country that participates in an internatio­
nalised global economy.
In both cases - rising or falling consumption - 
the onus for achieving growth falls on the shoulders of industry, and it 
involves three things. First of all, the capacity of its people - its 
entrepreneurs - to invent, to innovate, to organise and manage 
efficiently, to take calculated risks, and hire and involve the right 
staff; second, the performance and attitude of the work force, and 
third, the efficacy of financing mechanisms and arrangements. But only 
in stagnant and/or early capitalist economies would growth in one 
sector - e.g., industry - involve transferring resources from another 
sector - e.g., housing - , and that would not do them much good anyway, 
would not allow them "to produce amply and diversely for themselves as 
well as for others" (Jacobs, 1985) if the ingredients we have mentioned 
were absent. If anything, in dynamic economies the formation of housing 
wealth can be associated positively with industrial expansion: it can
lead to demand both for building materials and equipment (Emmanuel, 
1979), and for furniture and other consumer durables (Donnison & 
Ungerson, 1982: 59). From Table 4-1 it can be seen, for example, that 
next to dwellings (whose value is usually inflated in monetary terms 
over time relative to the value of other physical assets), it is
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consumer durables (whose cost of production tends to decrease over 
time) which are by far the largest component of personal sector physical 
wealth in the UK.
To pose the problem of growth in inter-sectoral 
terms requires the occurence of two conditions which are by no means 
ubiquitous in to-day's world: economic stagnation and reliance of both
prospective housebuilders or housepurchasers and businessmen on the 
availability of the same credit facilities, so that the two parties
compete against one another for the same, usually centrally controlled, 
pool of funds. This, up to a point, does seem to have been the case in 
Greece in the 1980s (Emmanuel, 1989), though not during the three 
previous decades (Emmanuel, 1979). It does not seem to have been the 
case in Britain because in this country, up to relatively recently, the 
financial system was neatly bifurcated into two parallel sectors: one,
the building societies, catering almost exclusively to the needs of the 
home-buying public, and attracting the largest part of the personal
sector's deposits with the financial system, and another, the banks, 
catering mainly to the needs of businessmen and local authorities, and 
attracting mostly non-personal sector deposits.
"Traditionally building societies operated on a separate 
financial circuit from that of the rest of the economy. They 
raised funds in the retail sector through just one type of
savings account, the ordinary share account [ ]. As late as
1980 80% of the funds held by building societies were held in 
ordinary share accounts"
{BSA Bulletin, 1988, Oct.: 21).
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Another reason why the building societies sector was distinct from the 
rest of the financial system was that
"[t]he rate of interest paid on such balances [see previous 
quot. - NP] was below money market rates"
(ibid., p. 21 ) .
Deregulatory changes during the 1980s - e.g., withdrawal of government
interference in mortgage rate setting - allowed and/or encouraged banks
and building societies to get into each other's respective fields if
they so wished (Pirounakis, 1987: 1 1-12), and brought both on a more
equal footing with one another (Roistacher, 1987). As a result building
societies began to raise an increased amount of funds from the wholesale 
2
money markets, while the prolonged bull market of the 1980s (up to 19 
October 1987, that is) soon subjected them to severe competition with 
shares and unit trusts for the small investors' savings.
The situation changed after the Crash, and the
building societies were once again perceived as very stable and secure 
investment outlets (BSA Bulletin, 1988, Oct.: 22). Without doubt, this 
must have been due to the overwhelming concentration of most of the 
building societies' own investments in dwelling mortgages. It can be 
seen, then, that there are more than one way to perpetuate and/or re­
establish a division of labour in the credit markets, with the result
that different institutions attract different investors/savers, both 
according to the latter's perception of, and attitude to, risk, and
according to the investors/savers' aims and plans. The described
developments in the British financial scene can then be interpreted to 
mean that building societies still tend to attract principally the
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savings of people who are rather risk-averse and/or whose primary aim is 
to save as securely as possible. Such people would not normally, as 
experience has shown, enter the equities or bonds markets, and even if 
they did (like they did before the Crash for a time), they would be very 
likely to withdraw at the first signs of trouble. The industrial 
sector, therefore, cannot be said to compete, albeit in highly 
contingent circumstances, with the housing sector for the savings of 
such people.
I have adopted the view that there is no unique or 
necessary resource allocation mix for economic "development". But this 
view might be questioned if a significant association between measures 
of national income (GNP or GDP) and measures of housing investment could 
be established. It might then be argued that "development" does seem to 
require, after all, a certain proportion of housing investment into 
national income, and no other. Burns & Grebler (1977) tried to muster 
support for such an association by evaluating (a) data from 39 countries 
at a point in time, and (b) time series from the USA. They concluded 
that
"[clontrary to what might be expected, the share of 
residential building in total output is found to be a non­
linear function, that is, the share increases with the wealth 
of nations up to a point but declines in the richest 
countries"
(Burns & Grebler, 1977: 13).
But this should not really be surprising: The share
of residential construction in national income cannot go on increasing
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indefinitely as, taken to extremes, this would imply that one day most 
or almost all of a country's national income would be made up of 
residential construction. Intuitively such an outcome seems absurd. 
Neither could that share stay the same over time, because it is bound to 
reflect levels of attainment of what society regards as acceptable 
housing standards. More precisely, the share is affected by the 
operation of four main factors, each of which justifies one to expect 
the alternation of periods of contraction and expansion in housebuilding 
activity:
(a) the way needs-related perceptions diffuse among the 
general population - whether in a smoothly continuous fashion during 
some periods, or in leaps and bounds in other periods;
(b) the ease and speed with which existing stock can be 
replaced, and sub-urban land become available for housing;
(c) demographic patterns, and
(d) technological and business cycles, or phases.
Actually , Burns & Grebler (1977) take issue with 
authors like Howenstine (1957) and Donnison (1967) who, on the one hand, 
have described, sometimes in rather normative terms, the housing 
policies of countries at various "stages of development", and, on the 
other, have mainly had in mind needs-related absolute expenditures. 
There is no denying that the latter may well go up with national income 
even though they may decline coevally as a proportion of it. Thus, 
Burns & Grebler's attack on the aforementioned authors is unwarranted 
and unnecessary: the two sides have been talking about different
things. A more important concern is how illuminating the conclusions 
of those authors are. The robustness of any conclusions is directly
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related to the explanatory power of the framework adopted. A framework 
is in turn required in order to show that it is possible to generalise 
on the basis of the conclusions reached, that they do have a wider 
relevance. In this case both sides have adopted variants of the so- 
called 'developmental' framework. Burns & Grebler assume that levels of 
national income imply development stages, and Howenstine and Donnison 
associate the latter with identifiable, and sometimes 'appropriate', 
housing policies. I wish to argue that the conventional 'developmental' 
paradigm is inadequate as a means of understanding world development to­
day, and therefore those authors' conclusions - although not 'false' -
are of limited scope.
"Developmentalism consists of two primary assumptions. The 
first asserts that the modern world consists of a large number 
of relatively autonomous societies. They are viewed as
autonomous to the extent that social change within these
societies can be adequately understood as processes operating 
within each society. [ ] The second assumption is that social 
change operates as a series of parallel paths for all 
societies. Hence each society or nation-state can be viewed as 
occupying a position along this common path. This implies [ ] 
a practical duty to advise governments on how to speed their 
journey along the path"
(Taylor, P., 1989: 305).
Explicit criticism of these two assumptions is by 
no means new (cf. Jenkins, R., 1970). Nation-states are not distinct, 
self-contained, separate spheres in pursuit of their own trajectories, 
occasionally clashing with one another. They interact and influence one
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another, especially nowadays when they are increasingly drawn into one 
global capitalist system (Wallerstein, 1979; Brewer, 1980; Corbridge, 
1986; Taylor, 1989). As a result the development paths of the early 
industrialisers, for example, cannot be copied by the rest of the world. 
One implication of this state of affairs is that associating national 
income levels with "stages of development" (the way Burns & Grebler 
1977, do, p. 20), poses the problem of how to account for instances when 
a "less developed" country surpasses a "more developed" one in income 
terms. Has the latter country regressed somehow? Is this some form of 
"negative development"? (One would be tempted to use the term 
"underdevelopment" for such cases had not the term been hijacked by the 
"underdevelopment" theorists.)
I feel that income levels may at times be a useful 
shorthand for "development", but this is neither rigorous nor sufficient 
(cf. Cole, 1979; World Bank, 1988: 222-23 & 236-37; The Economist,
26.05.1990). Development proceeds unevenly, and involves the continuous 
realignment of growth and decline centres within and between countries 
(and regions) (see Brewer, 1980; Warren, 1980; Carney et al., 1980; 
Corbridge, 1986; Massey & Meegan, 1989; et al.). Social evolution does 
of course involve at times necessary and at times inevitable phases or 
trajectories, features and patterns - like monetisation, urbanisation, 
decline of the agricultural sector, spread of capitalist relations, etc. 
But the timing, duration, and forms of these are not - and indeed cannot
- be the same from country to country, although groups of countries may 
well share a development tradition - and perhaps a future - that is more 
characteristic of them than of others. For this reason, the experience 
of a country, or group of countries, at a point in time or over a period
- for example, any empirically found relationship between income and
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housing investment levels - need not be repeated by other countries 
When Burns & Grebler (1977) describe this relationship as a non-linear 
function with certain characteristics (see above), on the basis of a 
sample of countries from 1963-70 or of American time series, there is 
no way of telling what this result means for any of them now or in the 
future. This is not a result which can inform policy. Governments or 
policy analysts who worry about levels of housebuilding in their 
countries would utilise their time better if they devoted their 
attention to problems particular to the industrial and financial sectors 
of their countries, instead of resorting to the sometimes easy solution 
of inventing imaginary resource drains.
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SECTION 2: An Alternative Framework.
Instead of trying to understand the behaviour of
housing investment by relating it to national income levels as a proxy
for development stages, it is possible and, I believe, more fruitful to 
place it in the context of an alternative to the conventional 
developmental framework. Such an alternative would involve linking 
investment in dwellings and infrastructure to the position of a country 
at any point in time along the shorter and longer building cycles it 
experiences (cf. Gottlieb, 1976), and would incorporate causes for each 
type of cycle,^ the factor of different stock vintages,^ the effects 
of variations in the value of fixed capital, and the interaction of a 
country's cycles with those in other countries.^ The power of this 
framework is that it brings together both a needs-related dynamic and 
the behaviour of capitalists and of capital. It does so, moreover, in 
full recognition of the interdependence of countries in the world to­
day. Let us elaborate:
Housing needs are about the characteristics and 
availability of dwelling units that people or groups would like to have
in particular areas. What these dwellings should be like relates to 
aspirations, which are a function of incomes and opportunities for 
social mobility. Where they should be is a reflection of needs formed 
on the basis of: (a) the magnitude, specificity and geography of
business investment; (b) advances in transport technology leading to 
investment in transport infrastructure, and (c) technological 
revolutions that affect the structure of employment, the nature of the 
labour process (cf. Littler, 1982), and the required distance between 
dwelling place and work place. These, in turn, are precisely the
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processes that Juglar, Kuznets and Kondratieff cycles are supposed to be 
made of (see footnote 5). In contrast to the view that associates 
development stages to income levels, the above processes are development 
in its real, organic sense. The cycles in business and building
Q
activity that these processes give rise to, form a development traje­
ctory which, although unique for each country or region, may have a 
number of common elements with that of another country or region. It 
may be possible, therefore, to construct a small number of stereotypical 
trajectories that typify the development paths of groups of countries 
over the last 200 years or so. Over the same period countries have 
become increasingly interconnected. Understanding how particular 
national and regional development paths interact with one another, might 
be necessary so that at some point one or more conceptions of a global 
development trajectory can be arrived at. This is an open research 
question (see ch. 13), and it is hoped that illuminating the way housing 
systems in the capitalist era change and evolve will contribute towards 
an answer.
In the meantime I will give a simplified example of 
the kind of trajectory I have in mind. The British development 
experience can be approached on the basis of the following highlights:
* Industrial revolution;
* Close proximity of dwelling place to work place;
* Rural-urban migration and urban congestion;
* Steam engine; railways; urban expansion and industrial 
investment along railway lines or near network nodes;
* Rises in productivity and incoiuGs f
* Public transport; longer distance between dwelling place and
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work place possible; urban sprawl;
* Car-ownership; road network; suburbanisation;
* Further rises in productivity and incomes; growth of service 
sector;
* Wartime destruction; urban regeneration; gentrification; 
housing careers related to family life cycles (cf. Pickvance, 
1973);
* Computers and telecoms; increasingly possible to work from 
one's home (cf. Kellner, 1989; Drucker, 1989: 28).
Throughout the above stylised trajectory housing 
investment has expanded or contracted in accordance with its major 
phases^ (Barras & Ferguson, 1985; 1987a; 1987b; Barras, 1987).
Consideration of fluctuations in building activity in conjunction with 
an overall development path of which they are part, makes it possible to 
ask a number of interesting questions:
* Which and how many countries' development experience is 
approximated by a given model, i.e., a characteristic 
development path?
* What other clearly distinct models are possible? Which
countries can each apply to?
* What differences in housing investment levels between
countries can be attributed to differences between their 
respective models?
* What differences in housing investment levels between any
two countries can be attributed to differences in the cycle 
phases they are in at any point in time, even though the 
countries in question may be described by the same model?
* Finally, what differences in housing investment levels
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Table 4.2: Residential Construction as a Percentage of GDP: selected
OECD countries & total OECD, 1960-86.
60-67 68-73 74-79 80-86 60-86
USA 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.4 4.7
Japan 5.2 7.2 7.6 5.6 6.3
Germany 7.3 7.2 6.1 6.2 6.7
France 6.8 7.8 7.9 6.3 7.2
UK 3.5 4.0 4.1 3.5 3.8
Italy 7.6 7.4 6.7 6.4 7.1
Canada 5.2 5.8 6.7 5.5 5.8
Austria 5.8 5.4 5.3 5.0 5.4
Belgium 5.9 5.1 6.8 3.7 5.3
Denmark 6.5 8.4 6.8 4.4 6.4
Finland 6.1 6.8 7.6 6.6 6.7
Greece 6.0 7.7 6.8 5.3 6.4
Holland 5.0 6.3 5.6 5.2 5.5
Iceland 8.1 6.5 6.2 5.1 6.5
Ireland 3.2 4.5 6.0 -- --
Norway 4.4 5.1 5.4 4.5 4.8
Portugal 3.5 2.7 5.6 -- --
Spain 5.9 6.5 6.6 5.1 6.0
Sweden 6.3 5.7 4.3 4.2 5.2
Turkey 3.0 3.4 3.1 -- --
OECD-Europe 6.3 6.8 6.4 5.7 6.3
OECD-Total 5.4 5.9 6.0 5.2 5.6
Source: OECD, 1988: 66.
cannot be explained as either model-linked or phase-linked? 
What are the explanatory factors? Through what mechanisms 
have they operated?
To begin forming an answer to the last question, let 
us look at another example, Greece. Its development highlights are:
* Formation of what is roughly the territory of modern Greece 
by 1913;
* A very elementary rail network constructed c. 1890;
* Influx of 1 million refugees in 1922 (see Ghizeli, 1984);
* Beginnings of industrialisation around the 1920s (cf. 
Agapetides, 1961); a second wave in the 1960s; nothing 
impressive then or now (Freris, 1986);
* Post-war urbanisation - mainly towards Greater Athens &
Piraeus - accelerated by civil war in the countryside in the
1940s;
* Widely available public transport since the 1950s; diffusion 
of urban car-ownership since the 1960s; rise in incomes;
* Main industries agriculture, shipping and tourism;
* A service-based urban economy.
Two contingent factors are immediately apparent in 
the Greek case: refugees and war, both of which led to abrupt
urbanisation spurts. It is also known that formal measurements of 
housing investment in Greece credit her with higher levels than what 
would be expected for countries at Greece's income-defined development 
stage (Emmanuel, 1979; 1981). From Table 4.2 it can be seen that
between 1960 and 1986 residential construction as a proportion of GDP
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Table 4.3: Housing Conditions in Selected Countries.
(a)
Country Percentage of households with: 
Kitchen Tap water Bath or shower 
(inside the dwelling)
Flush Toilet
Greece
1961
1981
Austria
1960
1980
Germany
1960
1980
Holland
1960
1980
USA 1
1960
1980
69.5
84.6
94.0
98.0
99.0
1 0 0 . 0
28.7
88.3
64.0
96.0
85.0
90.0
1 0 0 . 0
93.0
97.0
1 0 . 6
69.2
30.0
79.0
45.0
89.0
27.0
96.0
85.0
97.0
14.6
70.7
48.0
82.0
68.0
93.0
68.0
1 0 0 . 0
87.0
97.0
= percentage of dwellings.
(b)
Country Percentage of households with more than x number
persons per room
Greece (1981): 46 per cent with more than 0.9
11 per cent " " 1.4
Austria (1981): 21 per cent " 1 .0
France (1978): 15 per cent " " II II
Ireland (1977): 20 per cent 11 II
Spain (1975): 38 per cent II II
Holland (1981): 2 per cent 11 II
USA (1980): 4 per cent " " II II
persons per room.
ii ii ii
Source: Greece: 1964 and 1985 Yearbooks of the NSSG. All other: OECD,
1986, pp. 135 & 139.
in Greece was 6.4, as opposed to 6.3 for OECD-Europe and 5.6 for OECD- 
10Total. Greece's proportion was higher than Spain's, Portugal's, and 
Ireland's - countries with comparable incomes per capita to Greece's. 
It was also higher than Japan's and the UK's - countries whose housing 
stock was depleted severely during the war, and yet far richer than 
Greece. It was less than Italy's and France's. This is significant 
because, while Italy and France were richer than Greece over the period, 
yet they exhibited stronger socio-institutional similarities to Greece 
(e.g., many small proprietors, large agricultural sectors - cf. ch. 9) 
than Greece had with, say, the UK, Germany or Holland. I would then 
argue that these similarities are part of the reason for the very high 
proportions of their GDP that Italy and France invested in housing 
between 1960 and 1986.
However, if there are reasons to dissociate
development from GNP or GDP levels, there are at least as strong
11reasons to dissociate development from urbanisation levels. On the
basis of an analysis of labour force patterns in the cities of various
developing countries, Friedmann & Sullivan (1975) showed that
economic growth need not lead to alleviation of urban problems (see also
Cohen, 1981: 308-9). Hence the remarkable rise in real incomes in
12Greece from the early 1950s to the early 1970s is only part of the 
explanation behind the very high levels of housebuilding in that 
country, and the concurrent rise in housing standards, in a relatively 
short time, to a level comparable to that of definitely more advanced 
countries (see Table 4.3). Neither can urbanisation by itself lead to 
economic growth: J. Sachs has suggested, rather surprisingly, that
lower levels of urbanisation can in fact be causally associated with 
good manufacturing exports performance on the part of certain developing
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Table 4.4: Income Distribution: % of income falling into each decile
of a specified population (HH = households, URB = urban. 
NAG = non-agricultural, NL = national, EA = economically 
active). Selected Countries From Around 1960.
Advanced Countries and/or With Tradition of Welfare
UK Yugoslavia France Japa:
Greece (60,HH, 
(57/58,HH,URB)
NL) (63,HH,NL) (56,HH,NL) (62,HH
2.3 2.3 2.5 0.7 1.4
4.0 4.1 4.4 2.4 3.4
5.0 5.3 5.5 3.7 4.7
6. 1 6.4 6.6 5.0 5.8
7. 1 7.6 7.7 6.3 7.1
8.5 8.9 9.0 7.9 8.6
10.0 10.6 10.4 9.9 10.3
12.3 12.8 12.4 12.6 12.6
15. 7 16.2 15.3 17.2 16.4
29.0 25.8 26.2 34.3 29.7
Countries With Landless Peasants, Urban Squatting, Shanties
Turkey
(68,HH,NL)
Greece
2.3 1.0
Venezuela 
(62,HH,NL)(62,HH,URB) (61
1.3 1.7
Argentina 
,HH,NL)(61,HH,NAG)
3.1 3.2
Peru 
(61 ,EAP,i
1.6
4.0 1 .9 2.0 3.3 3.8 4.0 1 .7
5.0 2.8 2.7 4.2 4.5 4.7 2.2
6. 1 3.7 3.6 5.3 5.2 5.5 2.8
7. 1 4.8 4.8 6.5 6.1 6.4 3.7
8.5 6.2 6.4 7.9 7.2 7.4 4.6
10.0 8.1 8.4 9.7 8.6 8.7 6.1
12.3 10.9 11 .8 12.1 10.6 10.7 8.1
15. 7 15.9 17.8 16.3 13.9 13.8 11 .8
29.0 44.7 41 .2 33.0 37.0 35.6 57.4
Source: Jain (1975).
countries (The Economist, 22.02.1986: 65). In a complementary, or at 
least compatible, analysis S. Corbridge ascribed a great deal of the 
industrial success of Taiwan to the fact that
"the Taiwanese land reforms and the associated co-operative 
movements had the effect of institutionalising a pattern of 
rural demand which was at once supportive of low-level 
agrotechnologies [ ] and which could be met largely by local 
production in a decentralised industrial strategy"
(Corbridge, 1986: 182).
This account points to one of the two chief reasons
behind the post-war Greek housing performance (Emmanuel, 1979, 1981,
1989): the very wide distribution of landed property in Greece. This,
as in the case of Taiwan, is a socio-institutional factor that
conventional economic analysis cannot assimilate. The other reason,
which we have already mentioned, was the rise in real incomes, but also,
very importantly, their distribution: On the basis of data from around
1960 (the start of the Greek housing boom), the Greek pattern of income
distribution resembled closely the pattern of more advanced countries
and/or countries with a noticeable welfare or socialist tradition (UK,
Yugoslavia, France, Japan) (see Table 4.4). In turn, this pattern, in a
country not renowned either for its progressive taxation or its income
redistribution and welfare policies, was the result mainly of the wide
1 3distribution of landed property in Greece. Certainly income 
distribution in Greece around 1960 was more equal than in countries 
associated with landless peasants, urban squatters, and shanty towns 
(Turkey, Argentina, Peru, Venezuela) (see Table 4.4).
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In conclusion, there are two kinds of factors that 
may explain housing investment levels not attributable either to the type 
of development path a country follows or to the phase she is in along 
that path. One is the socio-institutional framework, e.g., the 
distribution of landed property and the assorted pattern of property 
rights - and, of course, the kinds of political activity and claims that 
this framework makes possible, and, indeed, inevitable (see chapters 8 
to 10). The other is the relationship between incomes and housing 
costs, which again is affected by the socio-institutional framework.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4
Following Lenin (1917), Schumpeter (1939), Storper (1988) et al., I 
believe that economic development is essentially an uneven, 
unbalanced, dynamically fluctuating process. That this is largely 
a matter of "belief" rather than "fact", see Gottlieb (1976: 48-9), 
where he discusses the fundamental unproveability of either of the
two main conceptions of "development" - the "smooth" and the
"discontinuity-fraught".
In 1980 the Nationwide BS and the Alliance BS were the first to 
issue negotiable bonds (BSA Bulletin, 1988, Oct.: 22).
Barras & Ferguson (1985: 1371) accept as significant the following 
four types of cycles in a modern industrial capitalist economy:
* 4 - 5 year business or Kitchin cycles, associated with
fluctuations in inventory investment in relation to a fixed
level of productive capacity;
* 9 - 10 year major or Juglar cycles, associated with plant
and machinery investment;
* 20-year or more long swings or Kuznets cycles in building
activity, associated with investment in transport 
infrastructure, and
* 50-year long waves or Kondratieff cycles in infrastructure 
investment, associated with dominant technologies, such as 
railways, electricity, and telecommunications.
"Each major phase of building creates a 'vintage* of urban stock 
which tends to age at a similar rate, and therefore becomes due for
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rehabilitation or replacement at the same time" (Barras & Ferguson, 
1985: 1370).
Capitalistically produced and owned built structures tend to 
exchange at prices that include location-specific valuations of 
expected rents. Should economic conditions change, and the 
expected rental stream is not realisable, the capitalist owners 
will either have to sell to others at a discount, so that the new 
owners can calculate profit rates on smaller capital bases, or will 
have to demolish the existing structures so that more profitable 
uses at the given locations can be found. This process, which Marx 
calls the "periodical depreciation of existing capital," is
"one of the means immanent in capitalist production to check 
the fall of the rate of profit and hasten accumulation of 
capital-value through the formation of new capital"
(Marx, 1959: 244).
"In the 'Atlantic economy' of the nineteenth century, for 
example, the long waves in investment in the built environment 
moved inversely to each other in Britain and the United States ... 
The two movements were not independent of each other but were tied 
via migrations of capital and labour within the framework of 
the international economy at that time"
(Harvey, D., 1985b: 19).
Burns & Grebler (1977) and Burns & Ferguson (1987) do not accept 
that needs are a proper object of concern for the kind of economic 
analysis they favour.
106
The Economist (05.08.1989) cites evidence and argues that business 
cycles nowadays are markedly less volatile than they were in 
the past.
g
"[T]he boom in housing and factory development in the 1860s and 
1870s, after the construction of the railways, established the form 
of the major industrial conurbations in Britain. The housebuilding 
booms at the turn of the century, and during the 1930s, were the 
driving force for suburban expansion. In the postwar period, 
development activity reached a peak in the 1960s, with continued 
decentralisation to the metropolitan fringes and smaller towns, the 
construction of the motorway network, a major public housing 
programme, and a wave of commercial development in city centres"
(Barras & Ferguson, 1985: 1369).
1 0 In reality Greece's proportion - and certainly Turkey's, and 
probably other Mediterranean countries' - was even higher due to the 
magnitude of informal, untaxed and unregistered, housebuilding, 
which in Greece at least makes for the largest chunk of the informal 
economy (Pavlopoulos, 1987).
11 "[The share of housing in total output] is far more responsive to 
level of economic development, and to changes in that level, than 
to population growth and urbanisation and changes in these 
variables"
(Burns & Grebler, 1977: 35).
12 Real GDP per person employed in Greece grew by 8.3 per cent per 
year between 1960 and 1968, and by 7.9 between 1968 and 1973. By
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contrast, Japan's rates were 8.8 and 7.3, respectively. Over the 
same period no other OECD country reached such levels of
performance (OECD, 1988: 47).
13 The reasons why a wide distribution of landed property tends to be 
associated with a wide income distribution probably involve (a) the 
capacity to tap income generated through physical asset utilisation,
(b) greater effort and care on the part of the owners, and (c)
easier access to credit facilities - all three prominent in the 
Greek case. For instance, in their study of the impact of land- 
ownership security in Thailand, Chalamwong & Feder (1988) found that
"[t]he risk of eviction on untitled lands and the advantages 
in access to credit associated with titled land are shown to 
account for the higher price of titled land. [ ] The analysis 
implies that granting full legal ownership to squatters can be 
a socially beneficial policy in many provinces [p. 187]
[because] the gain in agricultural productivity due to titling 
accompanied by agricultural credit expansion outweighs the 
losses in other sectors of the economy (represented by the
opportunity cost of capital) [p. 200]"
(Chalamwong & Feder, 1988).
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C H A P T E R  5:
Housing and the Value of Labour Power.
SECTION 1: Housing: From Necessity to Form.
SECTION 2: The 'Collective Consumption' Thesis.
SECTION 3: When Are Needs Determinate?
SECTION 4: Does 'indeterminacy' Matter Though?
CHAPTER 5: Housing and the Value of Labour Power.
The relationship of dwelling prices to housing costs 
to incomes is a fundamental influence on the dynamics of housing systems. 
Since most workers' incomes are in the form of wages, and since wages 
fluctuate around the value of labour power, use of the latter concept is 
necessary in a discussion of that relationship. As an introduction to 
this discussion (chapters 6 & 7), here I review briefly the 'value of 
labour power' concept (see also Appendix I). I show that its use need 
not entail either admitting to only one or two particular ways of 
satisfying housing needs, and to no other, or the determinacy of 
workers' needs (e.g., in contrast to the 'collective consumption' 
thesis). Moreover, notions of workers' housing welfare or satisfaction 
should and can be disentangled from the question of the value of their 
labour power. Such a 'disengagement' need not affect the usefulness of 
the concept otherwise.
SECTION 1: Housing: From Necessity to Form.
In The Housing Question Engels (1887) discussed the 
role of home-ownership on the part of domestic German workers in 
enabling German capitalists to deduct from wages what would otherwise 
have been necessary expenses, and concluded:
"Here we see clearly that ... the ownership ... of a dwelling 
place, is becoming today . . . the basis for an unexampled 
depression of wages below their normal level"
(P . 15).
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In this case Engels compared the real wages of one 
group of workers - the German ones - to those of a 'reference' group 
- French, English, and US workers. Such a comparison, however, makes 
sense only if the two groups can be said to have the same needs, and, 
moreover, to value the things that go towards satisfying those needs
equally. The reason is that the wav the need for 'housing' is satisfied
cannot easily be disengaged from whether it is satisfied at all.
For example, the German workers were owner-
occupiers, the English were not. The possibility that owner-occupation 
imparted to the German workers a subjective feeling of security and 
well-being that the English lacked, Engels simply did not discuss. But 
if the German workers did see things that way, then clearly it is 
difficult to tell whether they were worse off than the rest because
their wages were less. Neither is the significance of differences 
between the tenures merely emotional as far as the workers were/are
concerned. Ball (1983) cites the case of Welsh coal miners, for whom 
owner-occupation was a source of strength during the industrial strife 
of the 1920s and 1930s.
Equally, it may be that the growth of owner- 
occupation in all advanced capitalist countries is not merely the result 
of whatever economic advantages this tenure may have over others. It 
may also be due to it being most people's natural aspiration, something 
which they try to achieve as soon as they get the means or the chance. 
Although there does seem to be some evidence in favour of this 
proposition (cf. Duncan, J.S., 1981), cultural anthropologists are
perhaps better equipped to discuss it. But if the proposition is 
true, then the large rented sectors of a number of countries that
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industrialised and/or became capitalist earlier than the rest, are 
explainable either by their feudal past (enclosures, creation of a 
proletariat, etc.), in the case of the European early industrialisers, 
or, as with urban America and Canada, by the large numbers of immi­
grant labourers that poured into them over prolonged periods. In the 
long-run, one can argue, a large rented sector is but a distortion of 
people's natural preference, and a mere parenthesis in a country’s 
housing history.
In his analysis Engels assumed that the needs of 
workers in all industrial countries were the same, and, moreover, that 
the workers were indifferent as to how those were being satisfied. In 
other words, he took those needs to be established and unequivocal. 
Housing was one more necessity to be treated in that way, while its 
form was of secondary importance. This is not necessarily true.
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SECTION 2: The 'Collective Consumption* Thesis.
The notion of the determinacy of the needs of the
working class has also been implicit in the 'collective consumption1
thesis, which became very popular among marxists in the 1970s. 
Essentially this was an attempt to explain the post-war growth of the 
welfare state and of the public sector. The approach recognises that 
for capital accumulation to proceed as smoothly as possible, the
reproduction of the working class and its labour power must be assured
(Harvey, D., 1981; 1985a; 1985b). By 'reproduction' is meant the dia­
chronic satisfaction of a certain constellation of 'basic' needs such as 
housing, health care, and education, which amounts to the cultivation 
of 'basic' skills and attitudes 'required' by capital. The approach is 
clearly functionalist in that it subsumes the reproduction of the 
working class to the interests of 'capital'. The state intervenes in 
order to help capital where the market fails to ensure a viable
reproduction process. Hence Lojkine's theory of state intervention in 
urban space
"as a mechanism for the devalorisation of overaccumulated
capital"
(Dear & Scott, eds, 1981: 16);
Castells's theory of state intervention
"as the socialisation of consumption in the interests of
accumulation"
(ibid.),
and his definition of the 'urban' as "a unit of collective consumption" 
(Castells, 1977); or Preteceille's (1981) definition of advanced
113
capitalism as " a commodity mode of consumption". More specifically 
Maloutas (1986) explains:
"The tendency for the socialisation of consumption appears [ ] 
as an attempt to overcome difficulties associated with the 
individualistic - commercialised character of the labour power 
reproduction process. [ ] The main instrument for the
realisation of this tendency is the state [ ]. The two basic 
characteristics of the collective means of consumption are (a) 
the collective form of their ownership, and (b) the collective 
form of appropriation of the good or service they provide. 
Collective means of consumption are conventionally called 
those that possess at least one of those two characteristics"
(Maloutas, 1986: 125).
Social housing is normally cited as an example of a 'collective 
consumption' item by authors aspiring to this approach (e.g., Pincon, 
1976; Kotzamanis & Maloutas, 1985; Maloutas, 1986).
The 'collective consumption' approach fails as an 
explanation of state intervention in the economy and society on a number 
of counts (cf. Ball, 1986c, pp. 449-451; Harrison, 1986):
( 1 )  It fails to appreciate the extent to which necessities can 
be provided or acquired via the market, or acquired outwith the market, 
or to account satisfactorily for the conditions that make a switch from 
non-market to market provision or acquisition (and vice versa) possible 
and even inevitable. Pickvance (1980), for example, after examining 
Pincon's (1976) argument, concluded:
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"The fundamental problem with the argument was however the 
conceptual-historical connection between housing and the 
reproduction of labour power which turned out to be much 
weaker than is generally thought. We concluded that with two 
exceptions (housing shortage, excessive housing costs) state 
intervention in housing was unlikely to be explained by the 
role of housing in the reproduction of labour power"
(Pickvance, 1980: 48).
(2) The very definition of the ’collective means of 
consumption' cited above (Maloutas, 1986:125) is flawed. Following it 
would turn into means of collective consumption any items supplied 
through businesses owned by a multitude of share-holders, pension funds, 
or unit trusts - or Housing Action Trusts, for that matter. Equally, the 
notion of collective consumption is exceedingly difficult to 
operationalise. For example, the answer to the question whether bus 
transport or social housing is consumed collectively or individually 
does not depend on factual evidence, but on one's perspective.
(3) The 'collective consumption' approach can be called into 
question particularly nowadays that the political attacks on the welfare 
state in quite a few advanced capitalist countries, coupled with 
privatisation policies and experiments in both East and West, have 
shown the political and economic viability of the private provision of 
'collective consumption' items. Therefore their public provision is not 
a necessary or inevitable feature of advanced capitalism (or 
socialism?).
(4) Finally, the attempt to suggest that the trend towards the
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expansion of state-mediated 'collective consumption1 was/is inevitable 
relied heavily on the assumption of a falling rate of profit for the 
capitalist economy (cf. Harvey, D., 1981). More accurately, it
depended on minimising or ignoring any counter-tendencies to a falling 
profit rate. Yet:
* Marx himself was well aware of counter-tendencies, and
discussed them at length in 'Capital' (Marx, 1959; 227-35). The most
important of these is probably productivity increases in the producer
goods industries being on a par with productivity increases in the
2
consumer goods industries (Brewer, 1980: 34-45).
* A falling rate of profit is superfluous as an explanation of 
why 'capital' should like to pass on to the state certain functions that 
are supposed to help the reproduction of labour power. Surely, if these 
functions are invariably as costly or unprofitable as the 'collective 
consumption' thesis maintains, 'capital' should like to relegate them to 
the state anyway. The point, rather, is about the usage of the term 
'capital'. 'Capital', or the capitalist system, is not a uni-minded 
entity the way a particular enterprise is supposed to be. 'Capital' is 
merely the expansion of the wage relationship in the pursuit of profit. 
Whereas a particular firm, or group of firms, may well want to see the 
state assuming certain 'reproductive' functions (hence certain costs), 
other capitalists may equally want to take up the provision of the goods 
or services involved as soon as there is sufficient effective demand for 
them.
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SECTION 3: When Are Needs Determinate?
The assumption that needs are determinate is by no 
means unrealistic in all cases, but the conditions of its applicability 
or relevance need to be spelt out.
Let us suppose that initially the economy works at 
full capital capacity, i.e., all available capital is fully employed. 
Total output is bought by workers1 wages and capitalists' profits, i.e, 
consumer goods are bought by workers and capitalists, and producer 
goods by capitalists. Investment is equal to savings at that capacity- 
induced level of national income.
Let us also suppose that the pace of technological 
innovation is 'slow'. This tends to set short- to medium-term limits on 
the growth of product classes and even of product forms - though not
■3
necessarily of product brands. As a result, sales of the products of 
individual firms will depend on price competition aimed at securing as 
big a market share as possible, rather than on creating new markets 
through product differentiation or the introduction of new products.
Capitalists may invest all their profits in capital 
goods - so that total expenditure in the economy is enough to buy the 
total product. Suppose they do so. New investment (i.e., over and 
above capital replacement) can mean either starting new products - an 
option which is always circumscribed by the pace of technological 
innovation (as well as by institutional and behavioural factors - cf. 
Turner, G., 1971: 28-29), and therefore can be put aside for the sake of 
argument; or, it can mean mechanising existing production lines
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further. The latter option has the following consequences:
(a) Assuming a lower productivity in the producer goods 
industries than in the consumer goods industries, the rate of profit 
will tend to fall (cf. Brewer, 1980). Hence some capitalists will have 
second thoughts about investing their profits (or savings, i.e.,retained 
earnings) in the domestic economy. Competition may of course force many 
of them to invest, but not necessarily ALL that is available to them 
Immediately the flow of expenditure in the economy will be threatened 
with disruption.^ Consumption is likely to suffer.
(b) The implication of reduced consumption expenditure and 
increased mechanisation are, first, unemployment, and, second, that 
labour productivity will rise faster than production, i.e., sales will 
tend to stagnate. There will then be more unemployment, leading to 
even less consumption and to pressure on the wage rate, even though 
consumer goods may become cheaper.
Thus, the critical factor of slow technological 
innovation, causes what might be called the 'consumption possibility 
frontier1^  that the working population faces, first to stabilise, and 
then to be confined increasingly to necessities. In other words, needs 
become determinate once basic technologies are well established and 
reach saturation point, without new technologies (and products) having 
appeared or made an impact yet. This process may perhaps best be 
depicted by the so-called Kondratieff cycles (Marshall, 1987: 19-25, 28- 
35; Barras & Ferguson, 1985: 1371).
Marxist approaches that presuppose the determinacy
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of needs are more successful when the context is one of stagnation and 
decline. Consequently they tend to neglect the growth aspect of 
capitalism (cf. Storper, 1988). Such approaches contrast with Marx’s 
own emphasis on the possibility of real wage increases, contained in his 
1865 Address to the General Congress of the International Working Men's 
Association (Marx, 1978). Marx's argument, polemical in tone, is an 
exposition of the effectiveness of wage demands if there are no 
disruptions in the flow of expenditure, and, even more importantly, the 
static assumptions behind the situation I described above give way to 
dynamic considerations (Marx, 1978: 49). This is a slow growth situa­
tion, not necessarily in terms of output, but in terms of technologies, 
products, and needs. For example, the situation coinciding with the 
saturation of steam-based technologies, which Marx and Engels knew so 
well.
In their time, the slow growth in the number of 
affordable consumer product classes and forms allowed them to treat the 
subsistence needs of the workers as both determinate in that context, 
and correspondingly stable. Those needs were practically a datum in
Q
real terms. On the other hand, unemployment, an endemic phaenomenon 
aggravated by highly unmanageable disruptions in the flow of 
expenditure, would ensure that real wage fluctuations would average out 
over time around what was necessary for subsistence - a given. In such
a world, the pool of rewards to the workers (wages plus, say, free 
housing) would represent a zero-sum game. Hence Engels' sneering over 
partial solutions to 'the housing question' was in that sense justified.
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SECTION 4: Does indeterminacy1 Matter Though?
More often than not the value of labour power (in 
practice this means the cost of goods and services that a given group of 
workers is accustomed to enjoying) and the level of wages diverge. When 
this happens, as a result, say, of rising housing costs, both workers 
and capitalists are likely to experience certain economic pressures.
In the next chapter I examine the significance of these pressures for 
the way the housing system and the wider economy interact.
I have shown that housing may not be part of the 
'standard' workers' budget (the value of labour power), without this 
making the workers concerned necessarily worse off (recall section 1 ) . 
Equally, the workers', or the state's, responses to a situation of 
rising housing costs need not be the same everywhere (recall section 
2). In these and other cases, the people and governments involved can 
be said to exercise preferences for particular housing forms and 
processes (subject to existing constraints and opportunities). The 
resulting variety makes any simple statement about the kind of housing 
that workers or governments need or like, unwarranted. By the same 
token, the dynamics caused when the level of wages and the value of 
labour power diverge are more important than the precise forms of 
workers' housing needs.
I would also argue against the idea that housing 
becomes part of the value of labour power invariably as capitalism 
develops. Presently, the proportion of outright owner-occupiers in 
Greece is far higher than in Britain (approx. 65.5 per cent as opposed 
to approx. 25 per cent - Pirounakis, 1987). Consequently, Greek
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employers do not have to take account of their labour force's housing
costs to the same extent that British employers are obliged to. Twenty
or thirty years from now, as younger British households inherit the
9dwellings of the present generation of owner-occupiers, a similar
situation may prevail in Britain. This does not mean that the value of
labour power in Britain will become less than what it is to-day. In a
dynamically growing economy, the number and variety of goods that
become the object of people's needs expand at the same time that the
10individual values of those goods decrease.
But 'housing' in general can easily become part of 
the value of labour power. All that is required is that most wage- 
earners pay regularly for it. It is only then that rising housing 
costs, for example, can induce a type of chain-reaction that links the 
housing system to the wider economy. Where such is not the cse, or is 
the case only in part, the operation and effects of this mechanism are 
modified (see chapter 6).
For example, Greek workers have been able to 'colon­
ise' peripheral urban land, and build dwellings there without planning 
permission, and without borrowed money. British workers have not. This 
makes the dependence of British workers on regular money incomes as a 
means for paying their rents or mortgages (i.e., for housing themselves) 
greater than for Greek workers, even discounting the fact that the 
proportion of wage-earners in Greece has been considerably lower than in 
Britain. On the other hand, British workers have benefited from the 
introduction of subsidised public housing, Greek workers have been left 
mostly to their own devices. Such variety means that the study of the 
relationship between housing and the capitalist economy must be
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conducted in specified contexts - from a 'pure' capitalist to 'mixed'
ones.
In conclusion, I have viewed housing as a necessity 
which is, at least potentially, an ingredient of the value of labour 
power. However, I have rejected the notion that when the value of 
labour power does not include the cost of housing, the workers involved 
are necessarily worse off. I have also rejected the notion that 
workers' responses to expensive or bad housing, and/or the state's 
responses to their demands and problems, can take a single form only, 
as in the 'collective consumption' thesis. I have argued that both of 
these views assume the determinacy of the workers' needs, which can 
only be true under rather strict conditions. I have suggested, though, 
that what ultimately matters is that any divergences between wages and 
the value of labour power are manifested in, and are important because 
of, the dynamics they cause.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5
Marxists have not been alone in viewing the role of the state in a 
functionalist way. Contrast, for example, D. Harvey's (1981) or 
O'Connor's (1973) thesis that the state acts in the interests of 
capital accumulation to Wilensky's (1975; 1976) or Wilensky &
Lebaux's (1965) that it acts in the interests of industrialism. 
Others have viewed the role of the state in a conflict framework, 
i.e. 'bottom up' pressures or 'top down' responses in a continuous 
interplay between rulers and ruled (cf. Jones, 1985: 43-57). I am 
inclined to the second point of view.
2
According to J. Robinson (1971),
"[t]here is something contradictory in postulating a uniform 
rate of profit throughout an economy in which technical 
progress is going on. Some firms are always taking advantage 
of new ideas faster than others and enjoying a higher rate of 
profit in their investments. Moreover, technical progress 
alters the nature of commodities and the requirements of skill 
and training of workers"
(p. 128).
But for the rate of profit not to fall, technical progress in 
general is not enough; productivity in the producer goods 
industries must be equal to or higher than productivity in the 
consumer goods industries.
3
A product class = cigarettes. A product form = plain filter 
cigarettes. A product brand = Philip Morris regular non-filter. 
Example supplied by Kotler (1976: 232-33).
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"[T]he person who has effected a sale, who therefore has 
commodities in the form of money, is not compelled to buy again at 
once... [T]he commodity must be turned into money but the money 
need not be immediately turned into commodity, and therefore sale 
and purchase can be separated. We have said that this form 
contains the possibility of crisis"
(Marx, 1969: 509).
"The criterion of this expansion of production is capital itself, 
the existing level of the conditions of production and the 
unlimited desire of the capitalists to enrich themselves and to 
enlarge their capital, but by no means consumption, which from the 
outset is inhibited, since the majority of the population, the 
working people, can only expand their consumption within very 
narrow limits, whereas the demand for labour, although it grows 
absolutely, decreases relatively, to the same extent as capitalism 
develops"
(Marx, 1969: 492).
By analogy to the 'production possibility frontier1 (see any 
economics textbook). That is, the set of all possible combinations 
of products on which a person's or nation's budget can be spent.
In his study of the apparent allocative efficiency of the Soviet 
economy, Whitesell (1990) has come to a similar interpretation: 
"one would expect the Soviet economy to be efficient in a static 
allocative sense relative to market economies because of its 
technological stagnation. This is the case because technological 
stagnation gives planners and firms a long time to adjust inputs so
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as to converge to an efficient allocation" (p. 266).
The views of both Marx and Engels on the value of labour power 
developed from a rather dogmatic early position, amounting to a 
conception of absolute impoverishment, and later giving rise to 
Lassalle's 'iron law of wages', to more refinement and flexibility. 
These involved accepting the positive influence on workers' living 
standards of productivity increases (Rowthorn, 1980). In the text 
of Marx's 1865 Address to the General Council of the International 
Working Men's Association (Marx, 1978), Rowthorn (1980) has 
identified three different definitions of the value of labour 
power, which are not necessarily equivalent. They all emphasise, 
however, a "minimum standard of living which wages must be 
sufficient to provide" (p. 210).
"Calculations by a British merchant bank, Morgan Grenfell, suggest 
that about half the middle-aged households in the country will 
inherit property typically worth £35,000 - more than three times 
the average disposable income of £11,000 a year. As the proportion 
of elderly owner-occupiers rises, so will the proportion of middle- 
aged inheritors. By the end of the century, property worth nearly 
£9 billion (in 1986 prices) will be handed on each year ... Britons 
... will discover the delights of a second home"
(The Economist, 9 April 1988: 13).
"[W]ith the advance of capitalist production and the attendant 
development of the productiveness of social labour and 
multiplication of production branches, hence products, the same 
amount of value represents a progressively increasing mass of use-
125
values and enjoyments"
(Marx, 1959: 214-15).
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C H A P T E R  6
Dwelling Prices, Housing Costs and Incomes: 
An Explanation of Their Relationship.
SECTION 1: A Framework For Analysis.
SECTION 2: Upper Limits to Changes in Housing Costs in a
'Pure' Capitalist Environment.
SECTION 3: Lower Limits to Changes in Housing Costs in a
Variety of Environments.
SECTION 4: Upper Limits to Changes in Housing Costs in
'Mixed' Capitalist Environments.
CHAPTER 6 : Dwelling Prices, Housing Costs and Incomes: An Explanation
of Their Relationship.
I concluded chapter 4 with the observations that the 
relationship between incomes and housing costs is one important factor 
behind housing investment levels, and that it is affected itself by the 
socio-institutional context. The need, capacity and willingness of house­
holds to use part of their earned incomes in order to house themselves 
affects dwelling prices, which then affect the housing costs of house­
holds in turn. Earned incomes are not the only influence on dwelling 
prices, but in what follows I do not consider other important 
influences, which I discuss in chapter 7.
Here I suggest a mechanism linking dwelling prices, 
housing costs, and incomes. The mechanism involves the postulation of 
upper and lower limits to the movement of housing costs in relation to 
incomes - via dwelling prices. Its operation can best be seen in a ’pu­
re1 capitalist environment, where it forms a crucial link between the 
housing system and the wider economy, but it also operates - with modi­
fications - in a variety of 'mixed' ones. In this way the socio-insti­
tutional framework is brought to the fore. Importantly, housing costs 
need not always be financial, but can be environmental as well, as the 
Greek experience, for example, demonstrates. When environmental housing 
costs get too high, the political response and the resultant socio-insti­
tutional changes are likely to cause financial housing costs to increase.
SECTION 1: A Framework For Analysis.
A usual way of getting some idea of how expensive
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housing is in relation to incomes is to calculate how many years worth 
of (some measure of) average income are required in order to cover the 
market price (or cost of construction) of an average dwelling. This is 
the so-called house price/eamings ratio. In Britain, for example, this 
ratio has shown a remarkable stability in the post-war period at least, 
averaging 3.44 for the period 1956-1987, with a 4.95 maximum in 1973 and 
a 2.92 minimum in 1960 (BSA Bulletin, 1988, July: 14).
The house price/earnings ratio, useful though it may 
be as a general indicator, has one important limitation: It offers no
insights into the mechanism that determines its magnitude and movement 
over time. It does not tell us, for example, whether the relationship 
between dwelling prices and earnings is prices-led or earnings-led (an 
intuitive answer is that it is probably both; but how? and does each 
of the two variables affect the other equally strongly?). Neither does 
it tell us why the ratio changes markedly over a long period (as in 
Canada between 1961 and 1976 - see Table 6.1), or, alternatively, stays 
broadly the same (as in Britain between 1956 and 1987). To begin 
answering these questions, one needs to look into the relationship 
between housing costs, as experienced by households, and earned incomes.
The reason why one must turn from dwelling prices to 
hbusing costs is simple: housing costs are the organic link between
dwelling prices and incomes. The way that link operates is to be 
investigated below, but it is important to note from the start that 
movements in the ratio of house prices to incomes do not have an obvious 
or unequivocal significance for households. Commenting on the Canadian 
experience between 1961 and 1976 Patterson (1978) wrote that the fact 
that personal disposable income per capita increased faster than house
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prices did not necessarily mean that "housing is becoming easier for 
Canadians to obtain" (p. 281). He explained this by drawing attention
to two facts which took place over the same period:
"[ ] the costs of carrying a mortgage have risen faster than
personal disposable income [see column 7 in Table 6.1 - NP] [
] increases in per capita personal disposable income have 
exceeded increases in average weekly industrial earnings by a 
substantial amount. This likely reflects both decreasing 
household size and increased female participation in the 
labour force. That is, family incomes have increased more 
rapidly than the average worker's earnings. The capability of 
purchasing a home on the part of a one-earner family is 
therefore reduced"
(Patterson, 1978: 281).
Equally, the emphasis on earned incomes (i.e., wages 
and salaries, and earnings from self-employment) is deliberate. While 
housing demand by the unemployed or pensioners, for example, does contri­
bute to upward pressure on dwelling prices, it must not be forgotten 
that the incomes of these categories are in reality transfers of wealth 
generated by those currently at work, whether the basis of those incomes 
is taxation or accumulated savings. The latter, in particular, may have 
been the result, in part, of past earnings saved, but their real worth 
now depends on the value that the currently working population creates.
To postulate households' housing costs as the link 
between dwelling prices and incomes begs the question of what determines 
house prices. In formal valuation terms (cf. Engels, 1887) the price of
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a dwelling consists of a land price and interest on and amortisation of 
the capital invested (i.e., past construction costs). This is not a 
satisfactory starting point because nothing guarantees that the seller 
of a dwelling will at least recover his initial investment outlay - let 
alone interest. It all depends on market conditions.
Of course an investor in dwelling property has to 
consider whether the market will allow him to get his money back plus 
interest (or the interest on foregone investments), and, on top of that, 
make some profit out of an expected appreciation in the value of land. 
But what the market will ultimately offer is not based on such 
calculations, but on a variety of factors, including, importantly, 
people's earned incomes (whether current or some measure of permanent 
income), and, more to the point, on what those people need to, can afford 
and/or want to pay in order to house themselves. In short, it is based 
on the housing consumption costs households actually experience.
To facilitate the coming analysis of the 
relationship between dwelling prices, incomes and housing costs, I 
will focus on earned incomes as the key factor, and suggest that dwel­
ling prices reflect incomes in so far as fluctuations in the latter 
signal to housing providers fluctuations in the capacity and/or 
willingness of households to shoulder expected levels of housing costs. 
In turn, any given level of dwelling prices is likely to have an effect 
on incomes (probably weaker than the effect of incomes on dwelling 
prices) through causing demands for higher pay, or through making 
businesses pay more in order to attract desirable staff (cf. Appendix 
I). I will ignore, for the time being, influences on dwelling prices 
from other sources (e.g., differential rents and location premia - see
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ch. 7). Further, I will NOT address the effect on the relationship 
under discussion of the following four factors - other than dwelling pri­
ces themselves - that affect the housing costs of households directly:
(1) Changes in interest rates.
(2) The feasibility of access of a prospective housing 
consumer to alternative forms of housing to buying from an existing 
owner or builder, or renting.
(3) Administrative interventions like rent controls and 
regulations, credit rationing, or various tax and subsidy arrangements.
(4) The nature of any existing financing schemes via which 
people can buy dwellings. It is well-known, for example, that apart 
from the direct financing route (cash), the only other three ways 
whereby housing for owner-occupation can be financed are:
( i) The contractual savings system;
( ii) The deposit savings system, and
(iii) The bond-issuing system (Boleat, 1985: 6).
Any of these financing systems, or of variations thereof, has, depending 
on context. different implications for the capacity of individuals or 
groups to borrow in order to house themselves. This is why different 
housing credit regimes are appropriate for different countries. For 
instance, the contractual savings system requires that persons form 
families or households later rather than earlier in their adult lives, 
and that a substantial and flexible rented sector exist so as to 
accomodate prospective owner-occupiers while they save. It also 
requires a sound economy, with positive real growth rates, and it is for 
these reasons that this particular system has been more successful in,
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say, West Germany than in Greece (Pirounakis, 1987).
The reason I choose to ignore the above four factors 
is that I consider the proportion of housing costs to incomes of more di­
rect significance for dwelling price determination than the absolute mag­
nitudes of the variables making up that ratio.
Equally I will ignore a number of other factors that
affect that relationship indirectly. The most important of these are:
(1) Population changes.
(2) Urbanisation.
(3) Changes in the rate of household formation.
(4) Changes in the number and proportion of two-earner 
households.
Again, the reason I will not be addressing these
factors is that I want to examine the mechanism that affects the rela­
tionship of dwelling prices and incomes in an as unclattered way as 
possible. For example, expansion in female employment can induce 
dwelling price rises that would have been impossible to sustain if the 
mortgage repayments had to come from one wage (the male's) only. (This 
phaenomenon may be part of the reason for the high dwelling prices in 
the South-East of England in the 1980s, but is not the main reason, as I 
argue in chapter 7.) At the same time such a trend makes it more 
difficult for single-earner households to house themselves, and may 
therefore affect adversely the rate of household formation and/or the 
rate of urbanisation. On the other hand, these last two factors, left 
to themselves, would have affected dwelling prices positively. These 
are exactly the kind of complexities I wish to avoid in the coming
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analysis.
The natural context for this discussion is
capitalism, the on-going processes of capital accumulation (see also 
chapter 2). What I will do, is focus on the link between incomes,
housing costs and capital accumulation. The logical schema I have
adopted in order to describe that link is as follows:
* Capital accumulation depends crucially on the value of
labour power (it depends on other things too, but these
need not concern us here).
* The value of labour power at a particular time and in a
particular place tends to be epitomised in the modal per
capita income of the working class at that time and in that 
place.
* Therefore, the extent to which working class incomes 
incorporate a "housing cost component" affects the value of 
labour power (cf. chapter 5) and consequently the process 
of capital accumulation.
The focus on the working class and on wages (and salaries) is clearly 
necessary in addressing the relationship between housing costs and 
incomes in capitalism. For one thing, as capitalism advances the
percentage of independent entrepreneurs and self-employed in the labour 
force tends to decrease, and that of those who sell their labour power 
to increase; coevally, the share of workers' and employees' 
compensation in the national income increases too (Table 6.2). Finally, 
the largest part of the income (the "compensation") of the working class 
tends to be made up of wages (and salaries).
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There are two points to make: First, as I
suggested in chapter 2, housing processes can be understood by means of 
a 2 x 2 matrix, along the dimensions "market - non-market" and 
"provision - acquisition". Truly capitalist is only one combination, 
namely, the "provision" of dwellings through the "market"; yet most 
countries in the world to-day experience all four categories in various 
combinations. This is a reality that must be taken into account when 
developing a model of the relationship between housing costs and incomes 
in capitalism. Second, the working class itself is not a homogeneous 
mass, but is differentiated both by income and by 'structural position1 
in the economy - for example, there may be people who are not currently 
in paid employment, but who to all intents and purposes are working 
class (e.g., street hawkers: i.e., people without any productive 
property to fall back on, and dependent on their labour and chance to 
feed themselves from one day to the next). I will address the problem 
posed by working class income differentiation in Appendix I. Meanwhile, 
taking on board the two points just made, means that we have to proceed 
in the following manner:
First, I will propose a mechanism linking housing costs and 
wages in a 'pure' capitalist evnironment. The geographical scale of the 
analysis (a country, a region, a city) may vary without affecting 
whatever validity the latter may otherwise have. In such an environment 
all (or most) wage-earners house themselves through the market; more­
over, they have no housing alternatives to the market- and provision- 
based processes. At the same time all (or most) people who can be iden­
tified as working class are wage-earners. I assume, in addition, the 
existence of private landownership, and of a land and housing market 
(with or without effective planning authorities) in which speculative
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builders, landlords, and owner-occupiers operate. These agents may be
present in various numbers without, again, affecting any validity in the
analysis. Such a 'pure' capitalist environment was closely
1.1.
approximated in 19 century Britain (minus the planning function), and
in qualified ways (which I will discuss in sections 3 & 4) is the case 
nowadays in all the main English-speaking countries.
Second, I will relax the conditions that make up a 'pure' 
capitalist environment by introducing a cross-relationship between wages 
and incomes from self-employment on the one hand, and non-market and/or 
acquisition-oriented housing processes on the other. Then I will try to 
incorporate, say, the British public housing sector into the analysis, 
as well as the various - and varied - housing systems of Latin American 
and Mediterranean countries, among others.
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SECTION 2: Upper Limits to Changes in Housing Costs in a 'Pure'
Capitalist Environment.
In what follows I assume the existence of a 'pure' 
capitalist housing and labour market, as postulated in the previous 
section, and virtual equality of incomes for the working class. (The 
analysis pursued here can be extended to include incomes differentiation 
and a varied working class, but for that we need the concept of "pools 
of 'equivalent access' skills" which is developed in Appendix I.) I 
assume also that dwelling prices are only affected by households' need, 
capacity and/or willingness to use parts of their earned incomes (rents 
or loan repayment installments) in order to house themselves, although 
later I qualify this by bringing into the analysis the influence of 
'location premia' and differential rents (see chapter 7).
Housing is likely to be provided to wage-earners at 
most at such prices which will still allow the wage-earners to feed and 
clothe themselves, and generally to satisfy the barest of their other 
necessities. This is a kind of absolute upper limit to upward 
variations in housing costs, which, in the absence of other factors, is 
also a limit to house price rises. It will not concern us much because 
at to-day's level of capitalist development such cases are becoming 
increasingly marginal (although if it does come to the margin, that is 
the bottom line).
The issue is really more complex than that because 
both the housing and labour markets consist of a variety of supply-side 
agents, who employ different profit-maximising strategies, and are 
subject to different contingencies from one another. So, far before
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some absolute limit is reached, a rising housing cost component in the 
wage (I introduced this concept in section 1) is likely to initiate a 
kind of chain reaction across the capitalist economy, which will at some 
point force housing market supply-side agents to adjust their asking 
prices downwards. That point is governed by a certain 'corrective' 
mechanism, which centres around two distinct main factors (the influence 
of 'location premia' and differential rents is compatible with the
analysis that follows):
(a) Long-term productivity differences between the house­
building and non-housebuilding sectors of the economy,
and
(b) The 'locational specificity' of housing costs as opposed 
to the 'geographical homogenisation' of the costs of non­
housing goods making up workers' budgets.
I will now discuss these.
At the heart of the mechanism lies the capacity of
businesses, or groups of businesses (at whatever level of geographical
or sectoral aggregation), to sustain wage bills which become very large, 
by comparison to competitors' wage bills elsewhere (e.g., overseas, or 
in another region or city), as a result of an increasing and/or 
excessive, by the standards of even the relatively recent past, housincj
cos t component. Obviously, if other components of the wage (food,
clothing, etc.) become cheaper over time, the value of labour power (the 
modal wage) for the working class as a whole may be unaffected, or even 
drop, to the extent that cheaper non-housing items exactly compensate,
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or more than compensate, for higher housing costs. However, a 
combination of rising land prices and of productivity in the 
housebuilding industry lagging behind productivity advances in the food, 
clothing, car, and other consumer durables industries, will tend to push 
house prices up relative to the prices of those other commodities. This 
will cause housing market supply-side agents to seek higher returns on 
their assets (in terms of non-housing goods & services), and 
consequently the housing cost component of the wage to rise.
Before going any further, it is useful to digress on 
the proposition I have just advanced, about persistent productivity 
differentials between the housebuilding and sectors producing non­
housing goods. It is certainly a phaenomenon that has been recorded 
repeatedly throughout the history of (British) capitalism:
"Of all great industries, building - and it was among the 
greatest - had been least affected by invention, by 
metallurgy, or by the machine during the first half of the 
nineteenth century; nor was it much affected during the 
second half"
(Clapham, 1938: 195).
"Building, of all great industries, was least affected by 
machinery and even by non-mechanical technical advance. The 
late nineteenth century saw an increased use of concrete and 
in the first few years of the twentieth century a steel frame 
became more and more common for large buildings. But most 
building on a smaller scale was still done by methods that had 
long been known. It was in the methods of making some of the
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universal components of buildings, rather than in building 
work itself, that machinery was bringing some improvements and 
economies"
(Ashworth, 1960: 85).
Ball (1978) cites further corroborative evidence: Between 1907 and 1955
the average rate of productivity increase per annum (by output per 
operative hour) in the UK for selected sectors was as follows (p. 83):
Total manufacturing 2.1
Building materials 2.1
Building & contracting 0.2
And between 1955 and 1973 the trends in output per employee (per cent, 
per annum) for selected sectors were (p. 83):
Manufacture Bricks, Construction
pottery, etc.
1955-60 2.2 n.a. 2.2
1960-65 2.8 4.0 1.2
1966-71 3.6 4.8 7.01
1971-73 6.7 8.7 -2.2
Ball (1978, 1988) has examined a number of 
explanations as to why the housebuilding industry appears to be 
technically 'backward', and found them wanting. The reasons usually 
offered focus on
(1) the design stage (this view gave rise to the 'Modern 
Movement' in architecture);
(2 ) construction's low 'organic composition of capital' 
(circular argument);
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(3) physical characteristics of the building process;
(4) presumed impossibility of applying Taylorist and Fordist 
principles in the industry;
(5) moral and/or professional 'deficiencies' on the part of 
people in the trade, and
(6 ) in Britain at least, a long-standing separation between 
design and production (Ball, 1988: 23-34).
Ball does not deny that the building industry has 
traditionally been more technically 'backward' than most other sectors. 
But he dismisses, say, comparisons "between the long-term rate of 
productivity change in building and elsewhere " (Ball, 1988: 32) on the 
grounds of their theoretical implications:
"Why should the future technical development of construction 
necessarily be towards more and more factory production? An 
unwarranted idealisation of particular methods of production 
seems to be elided with a very essentialist view of technical 
change. Yet, without such a view of the perfect universal 
technology applicable to the production of everything, how can 
you compare technologies on a scale of backward and forward?"
(ibid.)
To me the argument about the 'perfect universal 
technology' involves using semantics in order to avoid the issue. 
Obviously each industry - and often firms from within the same industry 
(indeed, this is how innovation proceeds) - uses a technology which is 
different from that of any other industry: the nature of the thing to
be produced usually dictates how it is to be produced. But the common
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pattern throughout the history of capitalism is towards greater and 
greater division of labour - whatever its form: mechanisation,
automation, sub-contracting, project management. The real question is 
why, as the evidence cited shows, a particular industry - housebuilding 
- has persistently lagged behind other sectors in productivity terms 
despite various innovations and cost-cutting schemes occasionally 
adopted.
I accept that each of the answers to this question, 
which were enumerated above, does go some way towards an explanation for 
the relative 'backwardness* of the housebuilding industry. I also 
accept many of Ball's criticisms of those answers. The explanation I 
am going to offer differs from those above, but also builds upon the 
contributions of others, including that of Ball himself (Ball, 1978, 
1983; Colclough, 1965). To make my account relevant, I will not compare 
a non-capitalist housebuilding process (e.g., self-help or household- 
contracted building) to other capitalist industries, but I will compare 
capitalist housebuilding, a highly advanced example of which is the 
modern British speculative housebuilding industry, to other capitalist 
industries.
My explanation begins with the proposition that non­
housing goods are produced with technologies and capital that are more 
mobile geographically than the technologies and capital involved in the 
housebuilding industry. For example, concrete is more suitable to the 
dry> warm weather of Greece than to the weather of the British Isles. 
The same climatic factors make for longer-life, more-easily-maintained 
houses in Greece than in Britain (for the same type of house): i.e., to
make a house in Britain last as long and need as little maintenance as a
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similar house in Greece, a different and more expensive technology would 
have to be adopted. Equally, since the capital of a speculative 
housebuilding industry is mostly in the form of landbanks (Ball, 1983), 
the immobility and geographical specificity of this form of capital are 
patently obvious.
The significance of these features is that industry 
participants are not open to the same kind of competitive pressures to 
rationalise operations and cut prices that other capitalists face. What 
happens is that as soon as a speculative builder (or landlord, in the 
case of a free rented sector) lays claim to a plot of land (or one or 
more dwellings), he achieves a virtual monopoly over that property; 
the larger the area (or stock) thus monopolised, the greater the power 
of its owner, and the less his urgency to build and/or sell at prices he 
does not find 'suitable'. This is so especially if he has the financial 
resources to sustain a period of 'waiting' (before building or selling), 
and/or during times of rising land prices (Hallett, 1977: 108).
In such circumstances a speculative developer and/or 
builder will subordinate his adoption of new techniques to the 
imperative of securing as large a 'development gain' (Ball, 1983: 143-4) 
as possible. The latter must be understood as that share of any 
expected appreciation in real land prices going to the developer-builder 
(as opposed to the landowner: no reason, however, why the two cannot
coincide). Hence, the frequency of sub-contracting in the speculative 
housebuilding industry (Ball, 1980b), or the recent emphasis on project 
management (Ball, 1988), are but ways to achieve the flexibility 
required in order to tap development gain in a perennially volatile land 
and housing market. Econometric evidence from the British housing
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market supports this point. The fact that prices of existing and new 
dwellings have moved closely together in Britain since 1957 at least 
(Dicks, 1989: 72), means that
"[i]f, for example, prices were to slow, this would reduce the
profitability of building new houses - which would reduce the
rate of completions significantly [ ]. Substantially higher 
costs of stockholding would then give builders a strong 
incentive to cut back on starts but keep completions running 
close to current levels, in order to reduce the uncompleted 
stock as quickly as possible"
(Dicks, 1989: 73).
By the same token, there are periods when it pays to adopt new
techniques and cut costs, and others when to do so would imply creation 
of excess capacity and huge carrying costs. Of course, most firms under 
monopolistic competition (the usual case in the real world) tend to 
operate under some excess capacity anyway (Baumol & Blinder, 1988: 616), 
but the virtual monopoly associated with urban and/or developable land 
makes excess capacity in machinery & equipment particularly useless - 
and hence particularly dangerous financially - in the case of the
capitalist landbanking, housebuilding enterprise.
One implication of the relative immobility of the
technology and capital involved in the housebuilding industry, is that 
while the labour times going into the production of non-housing 
commodities tend to be standardised across similarly advanced
4
countries, the value of labour power (i.e., the modal wage) is left 
more open to the influence of the 'local' element of housing costs. In
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a worst-case scenario, the labour times spent on non-housing commodities 
are not standardised across similarly advanced countries, but then, in 
conditions of free trade, workers in the more ’expensive1 country will 
tend to substitute foreign goods for domestic goods (alas, not 
housing!). Hence, there will still be a standardisation (of sorts) of 
the value of labour power inter-nationally, in terms of non-housing 
items, but at the expense of poor or declining sales on the part of 
'domestic' firms. If, in addition, house prices in the more 'expensive' 
country begin to rise, and the housing component of the wage rises too, 
'domestic' firms will end up facing both a lower market performance in 
terms of domestic sales and higher wage bills than their overseas 
competitors. Needless to say, 'domestic' firms will not be able to 
substitute foreign sales for the declining domestic ones because, as I 
assumed, they were producing non-housing items more expensively than 
their overseas counterparts in the first place!
Thus, unless productivity in the non-housing sectors 
of the economy expands in proportion to house price rises, as the 
latter are reflected in the modal wage through their impact on housing 
costs (cf. Bover et al, 1989; Muellbauer, 1990), businesses will not be 
able to accomodate such rises indefinitely, especially if workers are 
capable of passing any rises in their housing costs unto their 
employers. Something will have to give or change. Whether some firms 
will go out of business, while others will rationalise and/or automate 
their operations faster than they would have done 'normally1, there 
will be downward pressure on the average wage: hence (since I have
assumed homogeneity of incomes), on the modal wage (the value of labour 
power), which will check further rises in the housing cost component of 
the wage, and ultimately in house prices.
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That pressure, however, may be mitigated due to a 
number of factors, most of which - with the important exception of 
induced state intervention - tend to facilitate house price rises, and 
in a roundabout way fuel anew pressures on the average wage, in the 
manner I have been describing. All of these factors involve the 
capacity and willingness of workers (a) to sacrifice other goods or 
services in order to attain or preserve their customary housing 
standards; (b) to suffer deterioration in their housing conditions, and 
(c) to engage in industrial action and/or political mobilisation in 
order either to pass their housing costs unto their employers or to 
cause some form of state intervention on the workers' behalf. Let us 
examine each in turn:
(a) The capacity of workers to sustain increases in 
the proportion of their expenditure budgets that is spent on housing is 
likely to be facilitated by price falls in basic items making up those 
budgets, but also by the fact that some of the items in question are 
consumed in more-or-less physically constant quantities, e.g., food. 
Thus, in the UK in 1984 the proportion of total consumers' expenditure 
(in current prices) spent on food was 14.6%; in 1900, it was 28.3%, and 
the average for the period 25.3%. The proportions spent on fuel & light 
and on clothing did not vary much over the period. The proportions 
spent on durables were 9.9% in 1984, 3.8% in 1900, and 6.5% on average. 
The proportion spent on cars increased (no surprise here). And the 
proportions spent on housing were 15.0% in 1984, 10.2% in 1900, and
10.7% on average (Halsey, 1988: 150). Overall, since 1955 the
proportion spent on food has been declining, while that on housing has 
been rising (ibid.). Had it not been for this relationship, businesses 
in Britain would probably have been under greater pressure to increase
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wages (other things held constant), and ultimately house prices would 
not have risen as much as they have.
(b) Despite the caution I urged at the beginning of 
this section, regarding the infrequency of cases of dire housing 
circumstances in most advanced countries to-day, it is a fact that the 
capacity of people to suffer appalling housing conditions seems at times 
to know no limits. Often this is due to straightforward economic 
necessity imposing itself upon them, but also because individually they 
can be weak and helpless, and, of course, shelter is itself a bare 
necessity. This is borne out in the following piece of press 
commentary, entitled "Workers forced to sleep in cars":
"Construction workers from the north and Midlands who have 
found employment in the Gatwick and Crawley areas of West 
Sussex are sleeping in their cars because of a local 
accomodation shortage. The practice highlights the complaint 
of local employers that high house prices and a limited supply 
of private rental accomodation in the area are hampering 
attempts to recruit staff from other parts of the country.
[ ] Ucatt, the construction union, [ ] says it regularly
receives reports of workers who come to the south in search of 
work and are forced to sleep in the buildings they are 
employed to renovate. One construction worker who sleeps 
regularly in his car at Gatwick said last week that he came 
south from Huddersfield seven weeks before after nine months 
of unemployment"
(Financial Times, 12.01.1988).
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(c) Nevertheless, alternatives like these, if 
generalised and/or if drawn to extremes, and consequently threaten the 
value of labour power which is appropriate or customary for a specific 
time and place, are very likely to lead to social and political 
upheavals. Such upheavals, in turn, will necessitate state intervention 
in the land use and housing spheres. This happened, for example, in 
Glasgow in 1915, and in post-war Greece, to name but two cases. To 
avoid potential unrest on a grand scale, to appear paternalistic, and 
because there was no landowners1 or developers' lobby to press for 
other "solutions", the Greek state tolerated large groups of people to 
build outside the formal plans (such as they were) of a great many 
cities and towns, or lay claim through rather dodgy practices on 
'national1, i.e., state, peripheral urban land.
For state intervention to occur, it is not necessary 
that the entire working class should suffer particular hardship. Even 
if only some workers' housing situation deteriorates, but these workers 
possess highly valued skills, or work in sensitive industries, their 
political clout increases accordingly, and some urgent solution to 
whatever their housing problems are, is likely to be sought by the 
state, often with employers' co-operation or approval (see the FT quote 
above). The success, in a relatively short time, of the 1915 Glasgow 
rent strikes and agitation must have owed something to the fact that 
many of the workers involved worked in ammunition factories (Castells, 
1983) at a time when Britain was waging a desperate war. The common 
thread running through all such state interventions is a practical 
attack on vested interests in the land and housing spheres, which 
results in a socially and politically more acceptable relationship 
between house prices and wages, or the re-establishment of an upset
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relationship.
To sum up: I have suggested the type of mechanism
that checks upward movements in households1 housing costs in a 'pure' 
capitalist environment, given certain facilitating assumptions. The 
major factors involved are two kinds of productivity differentials: 
between the housing and non-housing sectors of the economy, and between 
a given geographical area and all others. Two important conclusions 
have emerged:
(1) The question whether house prices lead or follow earnings 
is pointless. The two are related by means of a spiral in which higher 
earnings create the potential to pay more for one's housing, and thereby 
the potential for house prices to rise. Landlords, builders, and owner- 
occupiers will then try to realise this double potential by demanding 
higher rents and/or higher prices for their dwellings. They may even 
try to 'overshoot' the current potential if they expect yet higher 
economic growth, hence higher earnings, and therefore still higher house 
prices, in the future (cf. Hendry, 1984; Muellbauer, 1990, p. 17). 
Wage-earners will respond to these demands through a variety of 
strategies (e.g., cutting down on their consumption of non-housing 
items), but eventually by demanding higher pay (cf. Bover et al., 1989; 
Muellbauer, 1990, p. 18). Such demands, incidentally, are likelier to 
be generalised and hence successful if the number of those who seek to 
house themselves and/or improve their housing conditions is large 
relative to those who are outright owner-occupiers and/or live in 'good' 
dwellings.
(2) An intuitive implication of the model developed is that
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in some circumstances rising housing costs and house prices relative to 
incomes can actually contribute more towards mechanisation and 
automation in certain firms or industries than a stable or declining 
house price/earnings ratio - other things held equal.
The analysis has also enabled identification of a 
number of secondary factors, namely:
* The nature of the industrial structure;
* The degree of openness to foreign trade;
* The behaviour and attitude of supply-side agents in both the 
housing and non-housing spheres;
* The behaviour and attitude of the working class;
* Governmental policies in the respective spheres;
* The nature of landownership.
Some of these factors make intuitive sense or have 
been recognised by others (e.g., Massey, 1981; Ball, 1983; Barrett & 
Hooper, 1983). I feel that the novelty in my approach is that I have 
placed them in the context of an explanatory mechanism that binds the 
housing and non-housing spheres together. Thus,
(a) A crucial link between the housing system and 
the wider (capitalist) economy was identified and analysed. The 
inevitable link between the two is not via competing investment funds 
(cf. ch. 4) but via supply-side agents in the housing and non-housing 
spheres competing over the proportion of workers' take-home pay that is 
converted into rent or loan repayment instalments - and into house 
prices.
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(b) One or two factors that have not, to my
knowledge, been integrated in previous analyses of the topic, e.g.,
degree of openness to foreign trade, were shown to be directly relevant.
(c) The 'economic1, in the sense of costs and
productivity differentials, was linked to the 'political1, e.g., the
behaviour of the workforce.
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SECTION 3: Lower Limits to Changes in Housing Costs in a Variety
of Environments.
It is well-known that dwelling and land prices can 
go down as well as up. In the immediately preceding section I 
discussed the case of an upper limit to house price fluctuations. I will 
now discuss cases where lower limits apply.
A lower limit to the movement of housing costs 
relative to incomes is primarily determined by the capacity and 
willingness of landowners and landlords to hold onto their property 
rather than make it available at prices they don't like. This, in turn, 
means that the characteristics of landowners and landlords in any 
particular place, and the legal and political framework governing land 
use and development, the rented sector, property taxation, and 
compensation in case of forced sale, affect the speed and prices at 
which land and dwellings become available. The question is - are any 
particular landownership patterns (including the kind and strength of 
rights attached to them) more conducive to bringing down the ratio of 
dwelling prices to earnings than others? And even if yes, for how long 
or to what extent?
To answer these questions one must compare historic 
landownership-cum-planning patterns, and see how each has financially 
enabled households to house themselves, and also how it has contributed 
to what, with hindsight, we can now associate with a sustained, long­
term improvement in housing conditions. For the purposes of this 
exercise I have identified six historic stereotypes, which are depicted 
in Table 6.3. Let us look at them in greater detail.
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Table 6.3: Characteristic Historic Landownership and Planning Patterns
Pattern Typical Cases Housing Outcomes
Landless peasantry, 
urban squatting, no 
effective planning 
controls, private & 
public property rights 
challenged
India,
Peru,
Brazil,
etc.
Marked politicisation of the 
urban land issue; miserabl 
housing conditions mostly 
caused by a combination of 
poverty & overpopulation.
Many private small­
holders, no effective 
planning controls, 
private - but not 
public - property rights 
mostly respected
Greece Fast spread of housing opport 
nities in the right economic 
conditions, but accumulation 
severe long-term external 
costs. Strength of system: 
households have control over 
financing & building process.
Concentrated private 
landownership, owner­
ship rights strongly 
upheld, no effective 
planning controls
19th c. 
British 
rented 
sector
Immediate & long-term housi 
costs in the forms of urban 
squalor, slums, neglect of 
stock. Most households have 
no control.
Varied landownership, 
rule of law, effective 
planning controls, 
restrictive planning
2 0 th c. 
British 
own.-occ, 
sector
Housing conditions mostly hig 
but sustained drops of house 
price/earnings ratio very 
difficult; ratio tends to 
readjust swiftly to its long- 
run average, with house 
prices responding fast to 
productivity-related gains 
in earnings.
Varied landownership, 
rule of law, effective 
planning controls, 
liberal OR development- 
oriented planning
Canada, 
Germany, 
etc.
Housing conditions mostly hig 
periods of drops in the ratio 
longer than in previous case; 
house prices slower to catch 
up with earnings.
Public landownership 
and housing
British
council
housing;
Soviet
departmental
housing
Repair & maintenance problems 
rationing system open to cor­
ruption and/or political mani 
pulation, households have 
little or no control, tendenc 
towards uniformity of output, 
housing investment in direct 
competition with other uses, 
system geared towards the 
'working class 1.
PATTERN 1: India, etc.
Although there are marked variations 
in landownership patterns in the so-called Third World, a combination of 
poverty and overpopulation, as well as a historic tradition of 
concentrated landownership in quite a few such countries (cf. 
Whittemore, 1981), have resulted in urban squatting movements and very 
bad housing in most of the Third World. These movements have often 
challenged, in deeds if not in words, private and public property rights 
over urban land which the squatters have felt they had to settle upon. 
In such circumstances the 'economic' relationship between housing costs 
and incomes often breaks down, and frequently what matters is whether a 
person or 'household' can physically be in a particular place.^ Granted 
that, he or she will subsequently seek whatever materials can be had in 
order to acquire a modicum of shelter: It has been noted that the
construction of shacks in many 'Third World' cities and towns relies 
substantially on discarded materials (e.g., cardboard boxes). For 
instance, in the Juan Pablo barrio of Bogota the use of scrap materials 
or laminated cardboard as a proportion of primary building materials 
used in roof was 27 per cent c. 1979; in six Mexico City barrios their 
use ranged from 19 to 51 per cent (Gilbert & Ward, 1986: 29).^
PATTERN 2: Greece:
Between 1951 and 1981 Greece was urbanised 
fast (58% urban population by 1981 - OECD, 1983: 26). At the same time 
the Greeks managed not only to stick to owner-occupation as the dominant 
and preferred tenure in the country (about 70%), but to achieve housing 
standards near those of advanced countries (Table 4.3). As a very gross
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Table 6 .6 : Eaminqs-years required by three different categories of
employees in order to buy a flat in Greater Athens: a
60 sq.m. flat in 1975; an 80 sq.m. flat in 1984 (see 
footnote 7 of chapter 6).
Centre Periphery
1 9  7 5 Office employees 4.5 3.5
Workers 8.3 6.3
Sales assistants 8.2 6.2
1 9  8 4 Office employees 3.8 3.2
Workers 5.8 4.8
Sales assistants 5.8 4.8
Source: Annual incomes of employees from Table 6.4. Averages of
dwelling prices from Table 6.5.
indicator, by 1981 the number of dwellings per 1000 persons in Greece 
was 411 (NSSG 1985 Yearbook); whereas by 1980 it was 265 in Ireland, 348 
in Canada, 390 in Spain, 387 in the US, 413 in West Germany, 402 in 
Austria, and 317 in Bulgaria (UN, 1987). The Greek performance was the 
result of a wide landownership distribution, of unauthorised building, 
and of a favourable relationship between housing costs and incomes over 
the period.
Even despite unusual inflation in the late 1970s - 
early 1980s, it can be seen from Table 6 . 6 that between 1975 and 1984
the number of earnings-years it took to buy a flat in selected areas of
Greater Athens was reduced for three different categories of male
7
workers. The reduction was larger for the more 'traditional working 
class' categories of Table 6 . 6 than for the 'lower middle class1
category (office staff). Both findings accord with Emmanuel's own 
(1989: 8 ), and are explained by two factors:
(1) The income redistribution policies pursued during the 
first three years of Papandreou's government, which came to office in 
October 1981, and
(2) The effects of rent controls (begun in 1978), in 
conjunction with the socio-institutional features of the rented sector. 
This factor will be discussed at length in chapters 11 & 12; suffice it 
to say that the behaviour of the Greek rented sector is directly related 
to the wide distribution of land and dwelling ownership in Greece.
Conclusion no. 1: In favourable economic conditions 
the Greek landownership-cum-planning pattern is very conducive to the 
spread of housing opportunities and to rising housing standards.
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Table 6.7: Housing Credit Expansion in Greece. 1970-1988 (m. drs).
Year Loan Advances 
(current 
prices)
(1 )
Official
Inflation
Rate
(2 )
Price Level 
Increase
(3)
Nominal 
Increase 
in Loan 
Advances 
(4)
Real 
Increaj 
in Lo< 
Advanc< 
(5)
1970 4,215 3.7 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 100.1
1971 4,879 3.0 103.0 115.7 1 1 2 .:
1972 7,003 6.5 109.7 166.1 151 .
1973 5,997 30.6 143.3 142.3 99.
1974 2,970 13.5 162.6 70.5 43.
1975 5,712 15.2 187.3 135.5 72.
1976 8,897 11 .7 209.2 2 1 1 .1 1 0 0 .
1977 13,084 1 2 . 8 236.0 310.4 131 .
1978 17,744 11 .5 263.2 421 .0 160.
1979 20,087 24.8 328.4 476.6 145.
1980 16,206 26.2 414.5 384.5 92.
1981 31,634 22.5 507.7 750.5 147.
1982 43,491 21 .0 614.3 1,031 .8 168.
1983 41,328 20.5 740.3 980.5 132.
1984 45,474 18.5 877.2 1,078.9 123.
1985 50,689 25.0 1,096.5 1 ,2 0 2 . 6 109.
1986 43,720 16.9 1,281.9 1,037.2 80.
1987 41,428 15.7 1,483.0 982.9 6 6 .
1988 68,687 13.5 1,683.2 1,629.6 96.
1989
1990
1991
1992
Source: Column 1: Bank of Greece unpublished data; Column 2: Bank of
Greece Annual Reports.
However, over the 1975-1984 period the official 
inflation rate in Greece was about 18.5% per year. Households chose to 
preserve their customary level of consumption, and indeed expand it, by 
dissaving (Emmanuel, 1989: 7). At a time when reliance on bank credit 
for housing has been increasing in real terms, with the index of 
housing loan advances rising from 72.3 in 1975 to 123.0 in 1984 
(1970=100), while the average for the decade was 127.4, such advances 
fell sharply after 1984 (Table 6.7). Since the early 1980s construction 
costs have outpaced inflation (Emmanuel, 1989). Because of these 
developments, it seems - although precise data are lacking - that the 
ratio of housing costs to incomes in Greece after 1984 has increased 
considerably (cf. Emmanuel, 1989). In reality, though, the situation is 
more complex because:
(a) informal building has not stopped, and according to 
anecdotal information has even increased in recent years after a period 
of relative lull (see Tzanavara, 1987);
(b) private & public sector wage-earners have had recourse - 
through a party-politicised rationing system - to subvented housing 
loans whose repayment has not, in many cases, been enforced (Pirounakis,
1986), and
(c) on the incomes side the picture is further distorted by 
the fact that Greece has perhaps the largest informal sector - as a 
proportion of GDP - among all OECD countries (with the possible 
exception of Turkey).
These factors may mean that in practice 
households' housing costs in relation to incomes have not increased for 
many of them, but even if true this will lead to further accumulation of 
severe external costs:
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In the case of receivers of subvented housing loans 
who avoid repayment, and who for political reasons get away with it 
(they number tens of thousands), the external cost is extra inflation.
In the case of unauthorised building, and, more 
generally, of unplanned, unsupervised building (whether illegal or not), 
the costs take the form of urban congestion and pollution, traffic jams, 
lack of amenity space, deliberate and unlawful depletion of scarce 
woodland, and destruction of natural landscapes and traditional houses, 
villages, and neighbourhoods - all in the name of convenience and 
financial expedience. In turn, these external costs make achieving a 
civilised quality of life far dearer than the initial savings realised 
through the practices that led to those costs. One cannot assign 
exchange values to things like congenial surroundings, sense of 
community continuity, greenery, clean air, or unspoilt beaches. Yet the 
traditional political weight of small-holders in Greece makes it 
possible and expedient for many of them to define their property rights 
(e.g, where to build, how, or when) in destructively atomistic ways. 
The result has been a marked deterioration in the quality of life of 
most Greeks. Evidence abounds:
( 1 )  Land directly adjacent to the Temple of Poseidon in 
Sounion is being parcelled and sold for housebuilding 
(Sunday Rizospastis, 1989.07.30: 12-13). Treating archaeological sites 
in this way is not of course unique to Greece: I have seen the same
happening in the area adjacent to the pyramids in Cairo, while the cases 
of the Rose Theatre and of the Roman Palace discovered in 1989 in 
London, and already being developed upon, are two more examples. The 
difference is that in Greece, Egypt, and many other less developed
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countries such instances are part of a widespread pattern that is 
tolerated by the state due to a combination of incompetence and 
corruption. (I feel that Prince Charles' campaign for an architectural­
ly more humane and beautiful Britain belongs to a different league 
altogether: romantic though it may be, it is about advancing further
from an already high point.)
(2) Between 1962 and 1988 23,989 forest fires resulted in the 
destruction of 732,755 hectares (1,810,613 acres) of 
scarce woodland in Greece {Rizospastis, 1989.07.27: 18). Many of those
Q
fires were straightforward arson, attempts - overall successful - to
g
create developable land. In a country with just 2.5 m. hectares of 
woodland c. 1980 - or 19% of its surface (OECD, 1983: 85) - such
destruction represents a major loss, the more so since much of the 
affected woodland was near towns and cities. Significantly, 43% of 
those 732,755 hectares were torched from 1982 to 1988 - a period in 
which the particularly populist policies of Papandreou's government gave 
many Greeks a freer hand than usual.
An arsonist would not, of course, have committed his 
crime had he not counted on the fact that after things calmed down, he 
would be allowed or tolerated to build in or develop burnt woodland 
eventually. This happens often, despite the fact that evidence 
(including photographs) often appears in part of the press (e.g., 
Rizospastis, 1989.07.26: 19). One should not really be surprised,
however: The state in effect endorses the practice, and in any case
reforestation has not been high on any government's agenda. The Water 
Authority, for example, has been known to supply tap water even to 
settlements that have sprung on burnt woodland (Rizospastis, op. cit.).
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Table 6 .8 : Air Pollution in Athens and Other Cities in 1978 (annual average
City Total Suspended 
Particulates 
(jig/m3)
Smoke Levels
(COH Units/ |
j
1000 linear feet 24 i
Athens
Centre city commercial 
Suburban residential 
Suburban industrial
Los Angeles - Azusa 
Suburban industrial
Tokyo
Centre city industrial
Sydney
Centre city commercial
Chicago
Centre city commercial
New York
Centre city industrial
Helsinki
Centre city commercial
Montreal
Centre city commercial
Copenhagen
Centre city commercial
Zurich
Centre city commercial
Hamilton (Canada)
Suburban residential 
Centre city commercial
Vancouver
Suburban industrial 
Centre city commercial 
Centre city residential
254.72
NA
NA
173.5
146.0
95.1
87.1
68.5
66.6
64.3
41 .2
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1 .392 
0.747 
0.720
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
0.953
0.669
0.561
0.343
0.327
0.200
Source: OECD, 1983, p. 38.
Other agencies do the same. And in 1987 the government passed a law
that changed the status of much of woodland into pasture land -
therefore land fit for development. In some cases this was a belated
recognition that what was long ago woodland had by 1987 been built upon
anyway. But the law went far beyond established or irreversible cases,
in effect signalling to prospective arsonists-cum-developers-builders
1 0that it is alright to go on. (It must be stressed that much recently 
burnt and developed woodland has not been colonised by hapless
households or urban immigrants seeking primary shelter, but by a few 
'rich' and even more 'poor1 people, already established in urban areas, 
wanting to buy or build holiday or weekend homes.)
(3) Air pollution in Athens is among the highest in the
world (Table 6 .8 ). The causes are many, including an
aged and poorly maintained car fleet, but the failure to delineate land 
uses, create and/or enforce provisions for open spaces, preserve and
expand greenery, etc., have been major contributory factors. The same 
factors are behind the relative lack of open space in Athens c. 1980: 
2.7 sq. m. per capita, against 8.4 in Paris, 9 in Rome, 9 in London, and 
15 in Vienna (OECD, 1983: 31).
Conclusion no. 2: Although a pattern of widely
distributed landownership, and very 'liberal' (or individualistic) 
property rights, seem to help 'translate' rising incomes into rising 
housing standards very fast for most people, the long-term social 
implications are very serious and in many ways countermanding. In the 
Greek 'model ', the lower (sic) limit to the movement of housing costs 
relative to incomes is set at that point where the accumulated social 
costs begin to be experienced by most people individually, sufficiently
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so that an attack on the dominant pattern of property rights can become 
politically feasible.
PATTERN 3: 19—  c. British rented sector:
There is sufficient historical evidence to demonstra­
te that this 'model' is perhaps the least conducive to cutting house­
building and housing costs from among those discussed (cf. Engels, 
1844/45 and Benwell CDP, 1978).
PATTERN 4: 20—  c. British owner-occupied sector:
Britain was the first country to industrialise, and
so could not learn from the experience of others. The combination of
+* v»
abhorrent urban conditions during the 19 century, and the historic
fact of the non-liquidation of the landed gentry (Anderson, P., 1979;
1987) created cultural and political support for a very conservationist
planning practice. Coupled with the strength of private property rights
(see, for example, Shoard, 1987) and widespread respect for the 'rule of
1 1law' in this country, the consequent scarcity of land with planning 
permission has accentuated the speculative character of the British 
housing market, discouraged any sustained drops in the ratio of house 
prices to incomes, and facilitated the rapidity of the ratio's 
readjustment to its long-run average. To substantiate these claims I 
will provide evidence on four areas:
(1) Support for conservationism;-
(2) Comparative data on urban density;
(3) The 'speculativeness' of the housing market, and
(4) The post-war movement of the house price/earnings ratio.
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(1) Support for conservation!sm:
A Which? magazine survey conducted in April 1989 
turned out an 82% 'yes' to the statement "Green Belts should be 
preserved at all costs"; 77% 'no' to the statement "There is nothing 
wrong with building more shopping centres in Green Belts"; 54% 'no' to 
the statement "Green Belts should be used to provide more housing at a 
cost ordinary people can afford"; 54% 'no' to the statement "There is 
so much pressure on space these days that we cannot afford to keep Green 
Belt land open"; and 60% 'no' to the statement "More industry or office 
buildings should be allowed in Green Belts if it creates jobs" 
(Which?, 1989, August: 389).
Bearing in mind that the survey covered a 
"representative national sample of 2,300 adults in their homes" (op. 
cit., p. 389), the above results are all the more remarkable in that 
overwhelming support for the Green Belt was shown at a time of a very
high house price/earnings ratio in Britain: 4.61 (Nationwide Anglia BS,
1 21989, April: 2) - second highest on record since 1956. Further
evidence on central and local governmental support for conservationism, 
as well as on the part of lay people, is in Elson, 1986; Jenkins, S., 
1986; The Economist, 23.08.1986; 21.03.1987; 25.02.1989; Newsweek, 
08.05.1989; The Glasgow Herald, 23.06.1989; The Guardian, 05.10.1989).
(2) Urban density:
In 1971 the UK had the second highest urban density 
of population in the EEC: 34.5 ha/1,OOOp, the same as Ireland's. Only
Italy had a higher density - 22.6 ha/1, OOOp -, but then the UK had 8 % 
of its total area devoted to urban uses, against 1.5% and 4.2% for
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Table 6.9: Dwelliners Started by the Private Sector and the House Price/
Earnings Ratio in the UK, 1961 - 1989.
Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
No. of Dwellings Started
(1 )
192,950 
189,116 
202,536 
251,200 
214,466 
197,241 
237,867 
204,768 
171,463 
169,154
212,198 
232,711 
220,663 
109,604 
153,059 
158,362 
138,582 
161,597 
148,143 
101,420
118,881
145,024
176,645
162,010
169,963
183,168
198,753
219.000
170.000 
136,000'
**
House Price/Earnings Ratio
(2)
3.03
3.14
3.21
3.26
3.36
3.40
3.47
3.51
3.39
3.25
3.50
4.29 
4.95
4.25 
3.65
3.40 
3.34 
3.43 
3.82 
3.61
3.31
3.13
3.29
3.26
3.30 
3.53 
3.80 
4.25
4.50
Sources: (1) Housing and Construction Statistics, HMSO; various years. 
Occasional revisions have been incorporated.
(2) Housing Finance no. 5, Feb. 1990.
Estimation on the basis of 216,262 dwellings for Great Bri­
tain alone (Roof, Housing Update p. 6 , May & June 1990). 
Estimation on the basis of 168,000 and 135,000 dwellings, 
respectively, for Great Britain alone (Financial Times,
**
16.06.1990, p. 6).
Ireland and Italy, respectively. Britain’s density was even higher than 
Holland's (38.3 ha/1,OOOp), whose proportion of urban land (15%) was the 
highest in the EEC. By far the lowest density was enjoyed by Denmark 
(78.3 ha/1,OOOp), while the EEC-9 average was 39.9 ha/1,OOOp (Best, 
1979: 400). Best's comment on this, is very pertinent to our
discussion here:
"At the moment it is not clear why Denmark should differ so 
substantially from the other member states, apart from the 
prevalence of second homes. Even so, this Danish figure is in 
no way unusual when compared with some other technologically 
advanced countries outside Europe. In particular, urban land 
in the United States is developed at much lower densities than 
in the EEC, and this is especially true of housing - the 
largest urban use. In total, the provision of urban land in 
the United States (in 1965) amounted to as much as 137 
ha/1,OOOp (or 83 ha/1,OOOp if transportation land were 
excluded) compared with 40 ha/1,OOOp for the whole EEC"
(Best, 1979: 403-4).
Conclusion no. 3: Urban density is not a matter of
land scarcity in general, but of how 'liberal' or 'development- 
oriented', as opposed to 'restrictive' or 'conservationist', a 
country's planning policy and practice is.
(3) 'Speculativeness':
For a housing market, this can be defined as the 
buying and selling of dwellings in the pursuit of profit - in 
counterdistinction to other possible motives. The 'speculative' behavi-
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Table 6.11: Loans for House Purchase in the UK. 1961-70 to 1981-87.
Figures in '000s.
Period Loans for House Purchase
N SH T
1951-60 NA NA NA
1961-70 1,509 4,067 5,576
1971-80 1,477 6,302 7,779
1981-87 940 7,600 8,540
Source: Table 6.10.
Notes: N = Loans on new dwellings.
SH = Loans on second-hand dwellings.
T = All housing loans.
SH:T
72.9% 
81 .0% 
89.0%
our of the UK housebuilding industry has been so well documented (cf. 
Ball, 1983; Dicks, 1989) that it is expected as a matter of course. 
Even a cursory comparison of dwelling starts per year by the private 
sector to the annual changes of the house price/earnings ratio shows how 
starts picked up dramatically after 1970, and again after 1984, when the 
ratio was on the increase (Table 6.9). Another indicator can be the 
proportion of loans for purchase of second-hand dwellings to all housing 
loans. The proportion has been increasing consistently over the last 
three decades (Table 6.11), a reflection of the increasing weight of 
capital gains in the decision to move house.
(4) Post-war history of the ratio:
Between 1956 and 1989 the longest period in which 
the house price/earnings ratio dropped was 4 years, once from 1957 to 
1960, and a second time from 1974 to 1977 (Table 6.12). There has also 
been a 3-year period of decline, from 1980 to 1982. By comparison to 
the Greek experience of the ’60s, '70s, and early '80s, and to the
Canadian experience between 1961 and 1976, the British periods of 
decline seem short. The house price/earnings ratio in Britain tends to 
readjust to its long-run average very quickly. Characteristically, the 
two periods in which the ratio showed a very marked upward trend, from 
1971 to 1973, and from 1985 to 1989, were associated with marked increa­
ses in real personal disposable income: 1.3%, 8.5%, and 6.8% during
the first period (to be followed by the first drops in income since 1956, 
and the collapse of the housing market in 1974); and 2.3%, 3.8%, 3.2%, 
4.8% and 4.1% during the second (ibid.).
The regional dimension is important: nationally,
increases in real personal disposable income during 1985-89 were
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Table 6.12: House Price/Earnings Ratio and Increase in Real Personal
Disposable Income (RPDI) in the UK. 1956 - 1989.
Year House Price/Earnings Increase in RPDI
Ratio
1956 3.19 2.6
1957 3.12 1.6
1958 3.10 1 .5
1959 2.98 5.1
1960 2.92 6.6
1961 3.03 4.1
1962 3.14 1.1
1963 3.21 4.6
1964 3.26 4.2
1965 3.36 2.1
1966 3.40 2.2
1967 3.47 1.5
1968 3.51 1 .8
1969 3.39 0.9
1970 3.25 3.9
1971 3.50 1 .3
1972 4.29 8.5
1973 4.95 6.8
1974 4.25 -0.8
1975 3.65 0.3
1976 3.40 -0.6
1977 3.34 -1.1
1978 3.43 6.9
1979 3.82 5.4
1980 3.61 1 .4
1981 3.31 -1.3
1982 3.13 -0.1
1983 3.29 2.2
1984 3.26 2.3
1985 3.30 2.3
1986 3.53 3.8
1987 3.80 3.2
1988 4.25 4.8
1989 4.50 4.1
1990
Source: Housing Finance no. 5, Feb. 1990.
ordinary by post-war standards: around 3.6% on average. But the
concentration and ascendancy of financial services in London, the London 
Commuter Belt, and other South-East, particularly since the early 1980s, 
against heavy unemployment in Wales, the North, and Scotland, have 
resulted in a shift in the employment - hence income - structure that 
makes incomes in London and the South-East more important to house price 
appreciation than incomes elsewhere (more on this, in ch. 7, sec. 3). 
Thus, from 1985 to 1989 the house price/earnings ratio in Britain has 
been rising in response to rising incomes in the South-East rather than 
elsewhere, given the rapidity with which house price inflation, 
starting from London, is transmitted throughout the country (DoE, 
1982). (See also Thorns, 1982; Hamnett, 1983; 1984.)
PATTERN 5: Canada. Germany, etc.:
From Table 6.1, column 5, it can be seen that in
Canada between 1961 and 1976 the ratio of dwelling costs to disposable 
incomes fell from 9.8 to 7.6, i.e., a 22% drop, while the average ratio 
for the period was 7.9 (Patterson, 1978: 282). In terms of households' 
housing costs, as Patterson himself notes, this was not necessarily good 
news for one-earner families (see quote in section 1), as during that 
period the proportion of monthly loan repayments to disposable incomes 
rose from 71.2% to 88.4% (column 7); but it was probably good news for 
two-earner families.
The capacity of the Canadian housing system to
sustain such a prolonged drop in the ratio of house prices to earnings
was all the more remarkable because over the same period the cost of
land increased: the ratio of land to dwelling costs went from 17.0 in
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1961 to 23.1 in 1976 (column 6). This means that contrary to the 
British case, the Canadian system did not "internalise" land value 
appreciation into a housebuilding industry mode of operation that was 
resistant to cost-cutting - and/or into a housing market that was 
capable of assimilating into higher house prices (relative to incomes) 
any gains in real incomes the Canadians were making over the period 
under study (column 1).
I think that the main reason for the difference 
between the two 'models' - the British on the one hand, and the Canadian 
(or the US) on the other - is that in the latter countries the planning 
function is much more liberal than in Britain (recall the comparative 
data on urban densities cited above):
"No state can seriously claim it has embraced the ideology of 
land use planning until it transposes this concept into a 
mandatory function of local government rather than a 
permissive one. Until it establishes at the apex of 
governmental responsibilities an agency charged with guiding, 
co-ordinating, sanctioning and enforcing local plans. At 
present no such agency exists in Quebec. [ ] Added to which, 
the laissez-faire tradition of property ownership is without 
exception tenaciously upheld by local government organisations 
[in Canada - NP]"
(Perks, 1965/66: 31).
A 'liberal' planning system is one way of promoting 
land availability. This is the North American way. On the other hand, 
a conscious and deliberate 'development-orientation', albeit 'managed'
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or 'engineered', can have an equally favourable impact on the house
price/earnings ratio without, perhaps, some of the shortcomings of the
1 3North American 'model'. That is the reason why 'development-oriented' 
planning systems, such as that of Germany or Sweden, were included along 
with 'liberal' ones in Table 6.3. Again, the difference from the
'restrictive' British 20 century 'model' is striking: While
"British town planners [ 3 have often regarded the countryside 
as a 'good thing' and urban development (except for New
Towns) as a 'bad thing1 [,] Germany has protected
recreational (wooded) areas from development but has not 
generally sought to restrict the total urban area as such: 
the whole emphasis - stemming from the war damage and refugee 
inflow - has been on zoning enough land for development and 
getting it developed as quickly as possible"
(Hallett, 1977: 106).
Now, although inter-country comparisons of house 
price/earnings ratios are very difficult to make (primarily because of a 
combination of differences in income distribution and tenure patterns - 
e.g., lower income groups may be housed in non-marketable tenures, or 
vice versa; also because of differences in the size and characteristics 
of the private rented sector; finally, because of differences in the 
relative proportions and popularity of flats and houses); still, some 
available evidence (McGuire, 1981, cited in Jones, C., 1985: 169-70)
seems to suggest that around 1976 the costs of becoming an owner-
occupier were lower in the US, Canada, Sweden and Germany than in 
Britain for two kinds of professionals - teachers and managers (probably 
representative of owner-occupation seeking groups). McGuire compared 8
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advanced countries after he had taken account of house prices, monthly 
mortgage costs, any tax benefits, and the monthly incomes of teachers 
and managers (in $US). The UK scored fifth:
Owner-occupied housing:
1 most affordable USA
2 Canada
3 Sweden
4 Germany
5 UK
6 France
7 Switzerland
8 least affordable Japan
This does not mean that house prices relative to incomes will always
fall in some countries just because they have a more liberal or
development-oriented planning system than others. Hallett (1977: 104)
discerns a 'striking' similarity in the long-term land price movements
(upward as well as downward) in Germany, Britain, and the US. To an
important extent the similarity results from the fact that all three
countries belong by and large to the same model development trajectory
(see ch. 4, sec. 2), and have been subjected to similar long-term land
demand and supply influences, to the same phases of "decentralisation,
depression and boom, rises and declines in housebuilding" (op. cit., p.
1 4106). The point, rather, is the following one:
Conclusion no. 4: In a more liberal or development-
oriented planning environment the ratio of dwelling prices to earnings
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is likely to increase more slowly in response to rising earnings than in 
a stricter planning environment.
Another interesting observation concerns the nature 
of housing costs, and is revealed through the contrasting cases of 
Britain and Greece. In both countries the initial liberalism of the
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housing system (19 century British capitalist housing vs modern Greek 
'grassroots1 housing) was manifested in bad housing conditions in 
Britain and in environmental deterioration in Greece. The British 
solution to that problem took the form of a very strict planning 
function, which, together with the speculativeness of the UK housing 
market, makes it virtually impossible for households to avoid incurring 
substantial monetary costs in order to house themselves, or for these 
costs to exhibit any sustained long-term decrease. Equally, should the 
Greek state put its own house in order (e.g., by clamping down on unau­
thorised building, by strict land-use planning, etc.), it should expect 
that monetary housing costs would rise as a result - to the benefit, 
most probably, of those already owning land and dwellings in the capital 
and other cities.
Of course such 'order' need not be imposed by the 
state only. The first (and, less so, the second) generation of (sub-) 
urban settlers, most of them already outright legal owners of their 
plots, make it altogether more difficult for relative newcomers to re­
peat the postwar land colinisation process. Suburban land has become 
parcellised, and this has raised the 'entry' costs for newcomers. This 
process has been an important factor behind increases in new dwelling 
prices, and in rents on new lettings in particular (see chapter 12 and 
Table 12.3) in Greater Athens after 1978. It has also been behind the
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growing role of bank credit in the finance of owner-occupation (see 
p. 155, this chapter).
It might be argued, of course, that as the Canadian, 
German, and US experiences show, observance of planning rules and build­
ing regulations, need not result in a downward-sticky dwelling 
price/earnings ratio. That is, urban 'order' and a 'developmental' plan­
ning philosophy geared towards making more land available for house­
building, can co-exist in principle. But Greece does not have the 
infrastructure, the means of transport, the telecommunications system, 
that would enable her to adopt that model 'off-the-box'. She could not, 
for example, expand the feasible Greater Athens travel-to-work-area the 
same way that Montreal, Toronto, or Los Angeles can expand theirs, or 
incorporate sudden and/or excessive expansions in the periphery of the 
capital into a single, integrated urban economy.
Conclusion no. 5: There seems to be a trade-off,
potentially in most circumstances, between 'external ' or environmental 
housing- costs and individual monetary housing costs.
PATTERN 6: Public housing:
Public landownership and housebuilding may at times 
solve the problem of high land costs, depending on the strength of 
private property rights in the respective setting. Building in bulk may 
also cut construction costs, and extensive use of subsidies makes public 
housing more affordable to those who get it than what they would usually 
be faced with in the market. Although state housing is 'provided' to 
households and not 'acquired' by them (this is its similarity to
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capitalist housing), it is not readily marketable (unless through the 
black market or unless state-owned dwellings are formally sold off - but 
then they drop out of the sector) . It might be argued that because of 
these features, public housing is likely to lead to larger and longer- 
sustained cost savings than any other type of housing would ever be 
capable of generating in any monetised economy. This is not necessarily 
true.
For one thing, when a single agency (local or 
central government) is the source of funds for a variety of uses, the 
upper limit to the extent to which it can satisfy, say, housing needs is 
given by the amount of resources it can singly command (in this case, 
usually taxes), and by a conscious decision as to which areas to 
favour. It has been found, for example, that in the US
"[w]hile public construction has often been advocated (and 
sometimes used) as a means of countercyclical intervention, 
this sector of the economy has in fact exhibited systematic 
procyclical behaviour in relation to GNP fluctuations. [ ]
These fluctuations [in public construction expenditure - NP] 
are explained by the positive response of state and local 
activity to variations in revenues which run with changes in 
business conditions"
(Burns & Grebler, 1984: 375).
On the other hand, when the units that take housing investment (or 
consumption) decisions are many and varied, and different from those 
that take decisions in the non-housing sphere, each of the two sectors 
can expand following and creating its own dynamic, without the
169
relationship between the two being a zero-sum game (recall our 
discussion of housing investment & national income in ch. 4, sec. 3). 
By contrast, a state can endure a housing subsidies burden only so long 
as national (or local) income grows in real terms: otherwise it will
want to shed that burden off, usually by privatising state housing 
stock and/or state housebuilding. Hence recent developments in the USSR 
and other statist societies (cf. Tosics, 1987; Hegedus, 1987):
"Mr Yury Batalin, the Housing Construction Minister, yesterday 
announced [a] radical shift in Soviet housing styles and 
priorities. By 1995, 66 per cent of all new homes would be 
built by co-operatives or by the heads of households who would 
occupy them, aided by construction enterprises [ ] . Large
sectors of the defence industry had, he said, been switched to 
making housing materials and within the next seven years 40 
per cent of all plumbing materials will be made by the defence 
sector"
(Financial Times, 1988.1 1.22).
And
"The Soviet Politburo [ ] has authorised the sale of state
homes to their tenants. [ ] Mr Piotr Feodorov, head of
housing section at the Soviet Trade Unions Centre [ ] said
that a flat, once sold, would become 'personal property and 
you can do anything with it. It can be inherited, or you 
could sell it'"
(Financial Times, 1988.12.07).
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But there are also factors setting a lower limit to 
the cost efficiency (monetary as well as non-monetary) of state housing. 
Take high-rise residential blocks, for instance (not exclusive to the 
public sector, but typically associated with it in many countries). In 
Britain they were built in the !50s and particularly in the '60s in 
order to save money. Initially tenants did not seem uncompromisingly 
averse to them:
"It could be expected that people moving into post-war local 
authority dwellings would be satisfied since, whether the 
dwellings were packaged in blocks of flats, in terraces or in 
separate houses, adequate space and modern plumbing services 
were being delivered to people who had been sharing their 
homes, who had been overcrowded and who had lacked bathrooms [ 
]. Nevertheless the preference for a house [remained] strong 
and [was] expressed by 80 per cent of the respondents in a 
national survey"
(Ash, 1980: 106).
Gradually, as the post-war urgencies began to recede 
into the background, aversion to high-rise grew (for reasons and 
evidence, see Ash, 1980). Vandalism in the estates, and some notorious 
accidents precipitated the situation:
"If the 'commodity1 and 'delight' of high rise had been 
questioned it was their lack of 'firmness' which literally 
caused their destruction"
(Ash, 1980: 112).
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Or, take the repair & maintenance of state housing. 
One can almost intuitively expect that the larger an organisation is, 
the more unwieldy, inflexible and slow to respond, particularly to 
problems it deems minor, is likely to be (cf. Drucker, 1989). For 
example, in an article in Roof (July/August 1986), Glasgow's direct 
labour organisation was described as having "an awful reputation for the 
slowness and poor quality of its repairs service to council houses" (p. 
22). It has therefore been easy for Thatcher's government to pick upon 
and predictably exaggerate problems in the Repair & Maintenance areas as 
part of their ideological attack on council housing. Their solution: 
break up council housing 'empires' and replace them by new forms of 
'social housing', comprising smaller administrative units and a variety 
of landlords .^
Let us, finally, take industrialised housebuilding 
(again, not something exclusive to the public sector). For 
industrialised building to be economically efficient, demand must be 
"both large and continuous" (Harvey, J., 1987: 199); it is therefore
unfeasible in a housing market as speculative and volatile as Britain's, 
and more appropriate to circumstances where a single supplying agency - 
say, a state - wants to respond to urgent needs in a uniform way. This
is another reason why in an environment where consumer choice is
practicable, industrialised building as we know it is not on:
"Increasing the size of contracts would only be possible if
the variety of buildings were restricted to a narrower range.
Yet private clients, especially house-buyers, demand a 
building which is satisfying both functionally and
aesthetically"
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(Harvey, J., 1987: 199-200).16
Aesthetics and choice can be increasingly important 
as raw needs are satisfied, and people’s expectations rise. The USSR 
experience demonstrates well the trade-off between aesthetics and 
functionality (and even political imperative) in this area:
"In the program devised at the end of World War II to combat 
the colossal housing shortage in the Soviet Union, a 
commitment was made not only to high-rise concrete 
construction but to factory-produced precast concrete 
construction. [ ] In American practice shoddy construction is 
frequently camouflaged by well-finished walls, floors, and 
ceilings. In the Soviet Union the reverse is true. Excellent 
construction from a structural point of view is made to look 
shoddy by poor finishing. This condition is surprising since 
in the expertise which has been developed for restoring 
tzarist palaces and old churches it is evident that there is 
an appreciation for and an ability to create good finishes. 
It may be that the appearance of mass-produced buildings is 
partly intentional. The unfinished look connotes an air of 
urgency and an appreciation of the magnitude of the job to be 
accomplished; thus those whose housing needs have not yet 
been met cannot accuse the authorities of wasting time and 
effort on unneeded frills"
(Philleo, 1980: 35-6).17
Conlusion no. 6: State housing, despite the cost
advantages it often has over most of the other models in Table 6.3 (with
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the possible exception of the Greek model) when it comes to large scale 
responses to minimal housing requirements, tends to create costs in 
other areas (choice; individuality; aesthetics; flexibility;
independence) which tend to increase in importance over time, and may 
even outweigh any initial benefits.
* * * * *
It is only apposite to conclude the discussion on 
upper and lower limits to housing costs in relation to incomes with 
comments of a normative character. First and foremost, it was shown 
that one cannot exclude non-monetary costs from the analysis: the
quality of output and the quality of life dimensions are paramount. 
The Greek case, above all, attests to that. Perhaps expectedly, on the 
criterion of reducing households1 monetary and non-monetary housing 
costs in the long-term, none of the historic landownership-cum-planning 
patterns of Table 6.3 is decidedly superior to any other, assuming of 
course that a comparison makes sense: the 'Third World1 pattern is not
exactly a matter of choice, it has been imposed upon those countries by 
poverty, over-population, the political power of big landowners, and
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lack of administrative resources; so was the 19 century British 
housing system imposed upon the working class by the industrial 
revolution. But where a choice of pattern is in some ways feasible, or 
at least can inform policy, all comparable patterns demonstrate 
strengths as well as weaknesses. Some are more appropriate than others, 
depending on circumstances.
Although none of these patterns need, or indeed can, 
be adopted in its entirety by another country, it is a feature of the
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times that knowledge of what should or can be avoided, and of what 
should or can be encouraged, spreads rapidly and widely. This makes the 
evolution of a housing system sensitive to policy, and consequently 
increases both the opportunities and responsibilities of policy makers 
to advise well.
In some cases the emphasis may be on enhancing 
households1 control over the building and financing process, as in the 
Greek model. But we know where this can lead to in the long-term, if 
untempered by broader considerations of the common good and the rule of 
law. In other cases the emphasis may be on making housing cheaper 
relative to incomes, which means that more development is allowed and 
encouraged, with landowners getting compensation at pre-development 
prices. But we know that 'liberal' planning laws are not the only way 
to promote development, as the German and Swedish experiences show.
In short, what is required is an undogmatic and 
informed approach that will deliberately foster variety and flexibility 
in a housing and planning system. Political battles will always have to 
be fought of course over land uses, ground rent appropriation, and in 
order to resolve the potential conflict between the individual and the 
social. But if progressive politicians are willing to formulate their 
land and housing market intervention programmes in a language that 
emphasises the need for balance between household control and the common 
good, between nature conservation and urban growth and transformation, 
instead of speaking in terms of who should own what or how much, or in 
millenarian terms, the people are likely to listen. If anything, the 
previous discussion has shown the need for precisely such a balance. 
The recipe, I admit, is perhaps too ideal, too civilised: in socially
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polarised situations the question is who owns the land, and how strong 
his rights over it are. In such cases, a black-or-white answer is the
i.i_
only one possible. For example, the transition from the 19 century
r i .
British housing system to the 20 century one would not have happened, 
had not economic circumstances and new laws and institutions eroded much 
of the traditional power of landowners and landlords.
One question remains, however. Three of the 
landownership-cum-planning patterns of Table 6.3 are outwith the notion 
of a ’pure' capitalist environment as I postulated it in section 1 of 
this chapter. In particular, speculative builders and landlords are 
secondary features in the Greek 'model', and simply absent from the 
public housing 'model'. Does this in any way compromise my analysis of 
an upper limit to house price fluctuations? The short answer is no. I 
explain why in the next section.
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SECTION 4: Upper Limits to Changes in Housing Costs in 'Mixed' Capi­
talist Environments.
A 'mixed' capitalist environment would ensue if I 
relaxed the assumptions behind a 'pure' one, set forth in section 1. 
Thus:
* Not all people who can be identified as working class are
wage-earners;
* At least some people have some alternatives to capitalist
(i.e., market-cum-provision-based) housing processes.
The combination of these two assumptions can give 
rise to the following set of cross-relationships between an employment 
pattern and a housing pattern - in effect to any from among the real- 
life housing systems of to-day's world:
Fig. 6.1: A Matrix of Employment Types and Housing Processes.
Housing Processes (see ch. 2, p. 35) 
M-A M-P NM-A NM-P
Employment 
Types
Where: S.S.P.E.: State Sector Permanent Employees (i.e., having
tenured jobs; if state employees do not enjoy 
security of tenure, not so much in name as in
S.S.P.E. 
P.S.W.E. 
P.S.S.E. 
C & R
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P.S.W.E. 
P.S.S.E. 
C & R
deed, I consider them to be in the private 
sector for analytical purposes).
Private Sector Wage-Eamers.
" " Self-Employed.
Capitalists 8c Rentiers.
M-A : Market-Acquisition (e.g., the Greek model).
M-P : Market-Provision (e.g., the British model).
NM-A : Nonmarket-Acquisition (e.g., the 'Third World1
model).
NM-P : Nonmarket-Provision (e.g., the public housing
model).
At any one time each of the cells in the above 
matrix is occupied by a certain percentage of the people who reside in a 
given geographical area. The people in each cell belong to a particular 
employment category, and house themselves by means of a particular 
housing process. The percentage of people in each cell can vary, of 
course, from 0% to 100%.
The model of Fig. 6.1 may look static, but this is 
deceptive. All sorts of dynamic processes take place both within and 
between cells continuously. Let us forget that it is possible, and 
occasionally necessary, to break down one or more of the categories in 
Fig. 6.1 into smaller ones, or, for that matter, aggregate them into 
larger: For example, private-sector wage-earners can be differentiated
by income (see Appendix I on this) and/or by place; market-cum- 
provision housing processes involve renting from a private landlord, but 
also buying into owner-occupation from an existing owner-occupier or
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from a speculative builder (i.e., from an anonymous market over which an 
individual has little or no control); part of the self-employed and 
part of the wage-earners can be placed in the wider category of the 
'working class'; combinations of household control over the housing 
process plus state assistance and monitoring of the process can cut 
across the 'Greek' and 'public housing' models, creating varieties of 
'social housing'; etc. One can seek either increasing or decreasing 
detail over a very broad range of scales, but I feel that Fig. 6.1 is 
useful as it stands.
The dynamism implicit in Fig. 6.1 stems from the 
following 3-step mechanism:
1. The housing costs people from a given employment category 
face in the context of any housing process are not just
charges on their own incomes, but also affect the incomes of people in 
all other employment categories. Factors permitting - to a greater or 
lesser extent - this chain effect are: the relative proportions of
people participating in each housing process and in each employment 
category; the opportunities they have to pass from one process or 
category to another; and the nature of linkages between the housing 
processes and between the employment categories.
2. In turn, people's existing housing situations, their 
incomes and employment categories, along with
opportunities for inter-category mobility, affect their choice of 
strategy as to how to house themselves. Such strategies are formed on 
the basis of three questions: how desirable a particular housing
process is (in terms of physical output, and in terms of control over
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one's life), how feasible in a legal and political sense, and what 
value-for-money it offers.
3. Finally, the more - or fewer - people adopt - willingly or 
otherwise - a particular housing process, the more 
comparative costs between the various processes are affected, so that 
the cycle begins all over again, spiral-like.
It is unnecessary to demonstrate this mechanism in 
detail by developing sub-models and/or citing evidence for every 
possible combination of employment categories and housing processes. 
This can be done in the context of studies of particular housing 
systems, or parts of them, and I hope that the framework presented here 
will allow researchers or policy analysts to be aware of the nature of 
the interconnections among the various parts of a housing system. I 
will only elucidate the mechanism by discussing two cases:
* A * A working class made almost exclusively of wage-
earners that is housed partly through a 1 typical' 
capitalist process (e.g., the 'British' model), and partly through
public housing. The typical case is, incidentally, Britain.
* B * A working class made of both wage-earners and self-
employed, some of whom (from both categories) house
themselves through a largely capitalist process, and some through an 
'acquisition' process (i.e., easy access to land, legally or otherwise, 
and household-controlled, or even unauthorised, building). The case I 
have in mind is Greece.
The inclusion of elements of a 'pure' capitalist
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environment in both cases is deliberate. In the modern world it is 
increasingly, and in some cases overwhelmingly, the capitalist sector 
(wage labour or equivalent plus enterprises organised on the basis of an 
expanding division of labour) which sets the pace for the entire 
economy, draws all sectors of society unto itself, or at least makes 
them depend on it, and determines the socially necessary labour time 
for, and consequently the value of, an expanding array of products.
Thus, the interaction between a capitalist sector and any other (or all 
others) plays a decisive role in the evolution of both a society and its 
housing system.
CASE A: Wage-eamers housed by means of public housing and of capi­
talist housing.
Taken separately, these two combinations pose no
problems that I have not already answered: One is the case of section
2, the other that of the public housing sub-case of section 3. We 
recall that, regarding the latter, the upper limit to housing costs is 
given by the capacity and willingness of the state to devote funds to 
the sector.
Taken together in the form of a simplified model, 
some interesting consequences follow:
I assume a world in which the main reason a state
taxes its subjects is to spend most of the proceeds on housing subsidies
or on providing dwellings directly to people. Since there is no point 
in taxing those on whom the money will be spent, the tax base consists 
of business firms and those wage-earners who are not housed by the
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state. Then obviously the more people are housed by the state, the 
heavier the charge on the profits of business firms to pay for this type 
of housing. The pressure on business firms is mitigated by the fact 
that the state, in its capacity as provider of housing, is likely to 
set 'functional' standards rather than 'aesthetic', and also employ 
economies of scale, but is aggravated by the fact that especially in a 
democratic society the provision of housing by the state will be 
sensitive to 'bottom-up' pressures, with people demanding better and 
cheaper housing from the state. The more the second factor prevails, 
the more the pressure on profits will increase through the mechanism I 
described in section 2.
There is a second aspect to this: Assuming that in
the short- to medium-term at least, households' housing costs in the
state housing sector are less than households1 housing costs in the
private, speculative housing sector, firms whose employees are mostly 
housed 'capitalistically' will still be subjected to the pressures I 
described in section 2, and at the same time, through the taxes they 
pay, will be subsidising state housing - i.e., unemployed people and
those who work in other firms or industries. This means that both
management and employees of the first kind of firms will have interests 
antithetical to those of management and employees of the second kind of 
firms - and vice versa. This is a conflict that is bound to be resolved 
through the relative economic and political strength of the two opposing 
groups. Whether the lines of conflict will be drawn over calls for less 
state housing, or, on the contrary, over calls for more of it, depends 
on many ad hoc factors, not least of which is popular and class 
perceptions of which process is 'better'.
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Thus, the decline of the coal, ship-building, and 
heavy engineering industries in Britain, and the upsurge of the 
financial and other services sector, led to the formation of a block of 
interests calling successfully for cutting subsidies to council housing 
and charging council tenants higher rents. Things could have 
conceivably taken another turn, however: 'let's improve public housing,
let's democratise it, let's give people more control over their housing, 
and at the same time let's nationalise land development rights so as to 
rid the housebuilding industry and the housing market of their 
speculative character' - these could have become the predominant 
rallying cry in British housing. That this has not been so, is due as 
much to rising incomes and the decline of traditional class outlooks and 
allegiances, as to the myths of the post-war generation. Those myths, 
D. Donnison (1987) reminds us, involved a belief in the necessity and 
usefulness of large organisations and bureaucracies as tools with which 
to solve social problems, and were compounded by a lack of imagination 
and foresight as to what would or should come next.
CASE B: A Varied Working Class Housed By Means of a 'Capitalist' and
an 'Acquisitive' Process.
In such a world the nature of the linkages between 
the sections of the working class is the factor that matters. In terms 
of structural position in the economy, the categories 'wage-earners' and 
'self-employed' appear quite apart, but this is not necessarily the 
case. Often self-employment is just a euphemism for covert or disguised 
unemployment. Leontidou (1985), for example, finds that "as in Third 
World cities" the inter-war Athenian economy was divided into a
"formal or stable part [,] a protected, rationalising,
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dominant sector made up of domestic and foreign industrial and 
finance capital and the administrative apparatus [and an] 
informal, unstable or peripheral part [ ], a 'traditional',
low-productivity, unprotected sector where small enterprises 
were constantly reproduced"
(ibid., p. 60).
The latter part, she says, was "the main source of employment for the
rapidly increasing labour force" (ibid.). I disagree with her assertion
that "the petty economy [ ] was reproduced as functional for capitalist
development": functional is not the right word, and the two sectors
would be better described as partly accomodating of one another, and
18partly antagonistic to one another. The point, however, is that 
payment of a formal wage is not indispensable to the definition of the 
working class: lack of capital or productive land, insecurity of
employment, possession of common skills, or subsistence-level income are 
more decisive indicators. I recognise that in practice differences 
among workers along (some of) those lines result in very important
sectional divisions. For instance, because they enjoy security of
tenure, public sector employees in Greece perceive themselves as 
better-off than private sector ones, and their political strategies are 
as much directed towards higher pay, etc., as towards perpetuating their 
advantageous position in Greek society (Tsoucalas, 1983, 1986).
Let us now turn to the 'self-employed' - 'wage-
earners' divide, and see what linkages matter in this case - which 
is characteristic of Greece and many Third World countries. According
to Friedmann & Sullivan (1975),
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"[t]he labour force in cities of developing nations is divided 
into three sectors (a small corporate sector, a family- 
enterprise sector and an individual enterprise sector), [ ]
with the individual sector remaining structurally isolated 
from the others, thus countermanding the ordinary behaviour of 
wages in an integrated labour market, which would tend to drop 
when there are more workers than jobs. Instead, wages in the 
individual sector are depressed to subsistence levels when 
additional job seekers enter this part of the labour market, 
but remain unaffected in other sectors"
(Cohen, 1981: 308-9).
The difference between Friedmann & Sullivan's model and, say, the Greek 
case is that the family and individual sectors on the one hand, and the 
corporate and family sectors on the other, overlap much more in Greece 
than in the model (cf. chapter 9). Moreover, the family and other small 
enterprise sectors in Greece are much more resistant to annihilation by 
the capitalist sector proper (Moschonas, 1986) than the model envisages 
(Cohen, 1981: 309). Another real-life divergence from the model
involves the public employment sector: its large size and dominance,
not only in Greece, but also in many Third World countries (e.g., 
India), have been well-documented (Tsoucalas, 1983, 1986; The
Economist, 23.09.1989: A Survey, p. 22). Still, I will go along with 
Friedmann & Sullivan's model in so far as the analytical insights it 
offers help the presentation of the case I am discussing.
Ignoring the public sector, the two sections of the 
working class in the case in question, 'wage-earners' and 'self- 
employed ', house themselves through
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(1) market-cum-provision-based processes, i.e., by renting or 
buying from speculative builders;
(2) market-cum-acquisition processes, e.g., through forms of 
'exchange arrangement1 (Pirounakis, 1986) or by hiring contractors, and
(3) nonmarket-cum-acquisition processes, i.e., squatting 
and/or self-building.
The potentialities inherent in such a set of 
combinations are manifold: In the case of wage-earners who house
themselves capitalistically, upper limits to the movement of housing 
costs in relation to incomes are set via the mechanism I described in 
section 2. However, if the costs associated with housing processes (2) 
and (3) are lower than the costs implicit in process (1), then the 
number of wage-earners who will resort to processes (2) and (3) will 
tend to be high. The larger their number, the smaller the size of the 
capitalist housing market, and the more difficult its expansion. In 
such circumstances, the number of wage-earners on low incomes who are 
housed 'capitalistically' may not be large enough to allow them to 
press successfully for higher wages in response to rises in their
housing costs, and are therefore more likely to pay high prices for 
substandard housing. On the other hand, they may, of course, resort to 
the alternative of housing themselves through either process (2) or (3).
Let us now bring self-employed workers into the
picture: If the wage-earning and self-employed sectors are highly
linked, then, even if housing alternatives (2) and (3) are not readily 
available to most people (who, by implication, are housed 
capitalistically), the presence of covert unemployment in part of the
self-employed sector, will make it harder for wage-earners to press for
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higher wages to cover rising housing costs. The wider the covert 
unemployment, the harder this will get. Substandard housing and/or less 
spending on non-housing goods and services are very likely to be the 
case. But if alternatives (2) and/or (3) are available (or created), 
the result will again be less pressure on wages to cover housing costs, 
while the effect on housing output and conditions may be either positive 
(as in Greece from 1950 to 1980) or negative (as in many Third World 
countries), depending on income growth and distribution.
If, on the other hand, the two sectors are not 
linked, as Friedmann & Sullivan postulate in their model, then high- 
income wage-earners who are housed capitalistically will be catered for 
by a sub-market offering high-quality accomodation, while low-income 
wage-earners will or will not be able to press for a higher 'housing 
cost component1 in their wages, depending on how many of them are housed 
capitalistically.
* * * * *
A very important factor that determines comparative 
costs between the housing processes depicted in Fig. 6.1 is their 
degree of 'marketisation'. If a very large number of people house 
themselves through market processes (whether provision- or acquisition- 
based), then this:
(i) Enhances the dominance of contract and property law in 
the housing system, and thus of private property rights. This makes it 
more difficult for people without land to engage in squatting.
(ii) Enhances the propensity and capacity of the land market 
to reflect 'location premia' and differential rents (see next chapter).
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A consequence of these two factors is that in any 
period in which land prices are increasing, following or even 
anticipating capitalist and urban development (until the latter 
stabilises or reverses), even non-capitalist housing processes will 
exhibit rising real costs. This will tend to foster or reinforce an 
alliance between wage-earners and self-employed to press either for 
higher wages and prices charged to customers, or for some governmental 
intervention in the housing system, or both. The inflationary 
pressures Greece, for instance, has been experiencing in the last 12 
years or so must owe something to this cause. That is, in contrast to a 
more capitalistic and/or industrialised environment, where entrepreneurs 
can respond to higher wage claims by innovating, automating, and 
rationalising their businesses, in order to achieve higher productivity, 
Greece cannot effect such a response precisely because of its employment 
pattern (very large proportion of self-employed and state permanent 
employees in the economically active population, and many family-run 
small businesses: these, in turn, perpetuate the dependency of the
Greek economy on the solutions of agriculture, tourism, remittances from 
overseas, and foreign loans).
In the coming chapter I complete the analysis of 
the economics of housing by discussing the influence on house prices of 
overall social and urban development - encapsulated in location premia 
and differential rents.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6
”[T]he spectacular increases shown for 1966-71 could be attributable 
to the rise in self-employment. [ ] [A]llowing for self-employment, 
the rate of increase in output per head in construction was 
considerably lower than in manufacturing for the period 1954-70"
(Ball, 1978: 83).
A shoemaker may face competition with a shoemaker thousands of miles 
away; although there are always second-best locations to form 
alternatives to a given location, its owner is safe from competition 
regarding his own parcel of land: its location cannot be reproduced
exactly, while shoes can.
Ball (1978) has criticised Colclough's (1965) very similar view 
because
"[t]his [ ] raises questions about the operation of the land 
market for which no answer is given. For example, why the 
initial landowner does not raise the selling price and acquire 
the builder's profit on land"
(p.84).
His own suggestion is to focus on the merchant-producer roles that 
the capitalist building enterprise plays (Ball, 1988: 34-41). My
view is that the ways such an enterprise uses in order to acquire 
the flexibility to tap development gain, and any possible 
confrontations between landowner and builder, although crucial in 
practice and in need of empirical investigation, are not to be 
confused with the aim itself.
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The analysis pursued here owes a lot to ideas and evidence produced 
in Baumol & Blinder, 1988. The authors note "a dramatic narrowing 
of productivity gaps among the industrial countries" (p. 124) over 
the last 100 years or so, describe the process as 'convergence of 
labour productivity levels1, and consider "the speed-up of the 
international spread of new technology" (p. 125) as one of its main 
causes.
"Bombay has 9m people; probably 400,000 of them live on the 
pavements. [ ] Some have been on the pavements for 20 years. [ ] 
But the state government of Maharashtra, of which Bombay is the 
capital, decided in 1981 that it had had enough and started evicting 
pavement-dwe11ers. [ ] The brutality of the evictions brought
civil-rights groups to their help" (The Economist, 23.11.1985b).
The authors note, in addition, that
"[w]ith some 16 million people living in Mexico City, half of 
whom may be engaged in self-help construction, there may well 
be a shortage of planks left around the streets [ ] . Since 
the real cost of land and materials appear to be rising in 
many cities, it is probably getting more difficult for the 
poor to build a self-help home"
(Gilbert & Ward, 1986: 37).
In my calculation I took account of the fact that in 1981/82 the
proportions of households living in dwellings of a given size range 
in Greater Athens were as follows:
Up to 40 sq. m. : 7.8%
41 - 60 sq. m. : 30.5%
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61 - 100 sq. m. : 47.9%
101 plus sq. m. : 13.8%
(NSSG, 1983, mimeo of unpublished survey data).
To arrive at the figures of Table 6.7 I had to recognise that (a) 
flats built for sale tended to be larger than many houses built for 
owner-occupation, and (b) housing standards - in terms of dwelling 
area - slightly increased over the decade. Therefore, I adopted the 
figure of 60 sq. m. for 1975, and of 80 sq. m. for 1984.
D
In 1984, for example, out of 1,284 separate forest fires
470 were identified as arson;
465 were attributed to other known causes, and
349 were attributed to unknown causes (arson probably as well)
(Rizospastis, 1989.07.27: 18).
g
Again, Greece is not alone among European countries to suffer this: 
Some of the forest fires that ravaged the south of France in the 
summer of 1989, and some that happened in the 1970s, are believed to 
have been lit by arsonists working for property developers {The 
Times, 1989.09.16: 29, 31). Britain may have escaped arson-
associated property development because of the strictness of her 
planning rules, but not general environmental and land degradation 
due to the insufficiency of the legal framework governing other en­
vironmentally hazardous practices (see Moss, 1981 and Observer ma­
gazine, 1989).
1 0 Hence the outcry in the Greek press:
Ta Nea, 13.07.87: "Building plots in woodland!
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Unauthorised buildings legalised." 
Eleutherotypia, 24.08.87: "50,000,000 stremmas [5 m. ha - NP]
turned into concrete: The plots of
thousands of squatters made legal." 
Rizospastis, 28.08.87: "Anti-forest bill."
" 29.08.87: "Big interests push for turning
forestland into building plots."
11 For example, self-help building in Britain can only take place on 
land with planning permission. The whole process is organised and 
monitored closely by a local authority, and the costs of land and 
materials have to be paid in full following the end of the project, 
usually through a loan raised with a building society. This means 
that British households cannot simply occupy 'free* or public land 
and build however and whenever they please. In other words, the 
legal and political system forces even households who contemplate 
self-help building to be involved in monetary transactions, rely on 
credit, and build according to rules and regulations. This is a far 
cry from, say, the Greek case, let alone the 'Third World1 one.
12 The highest - 4.95 - was in 1973, just before the housing market 
collapsed (BSA Bulletin, 1988, July: 14).
^  Like homelessness: Cf., e.g., The Times, 1987.02.26: "25,000 wander
the streets of Chicago."
1 4 Although not necessarily at the same time: see D. Harvey s (1983)
discussion of how troughs in investment in fixed capital in the USA 
corresponded to peaks in Britain during the 19th century because of
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the way the two economies were linked.
1 5 "[T]here is a growing dissatisfaction among the tenants of many 
estates about the conditions in which they live, and about their 
lack of control over their own environment and housing. What then 
must we do? [ ] I want us increasingly to think in terms of
transferring ownership of estates or parts of estates in small units 
to others - including the tenants themselves - who will be in closer 
touch with the needs and aspirations of individual tenants"
John Patten, Conservative Government Minister of Housing (1987).
1 fi J. Harvey (1987) offers six additional reasons, on the supply side, 
why industrialised building is not necessarily more cost-effective 
than ’traditional' methods, of which the strongest, I feel, is that 
”[i]f skilled craftsmen and wet finishers are to be eliminated 
in the assembly process, the components of factory-built 
systems must have greater dimensional precision than 
traditional materials. But the greater accuracy of steel, 
plastics, wood and concrete slabs prepared under high pressure 
has to be weighed against their higher cost relative to bricks 
and concrete, especially as they are not as yet fully proven. 
Since materials account for about half the cost of a building 
and labour for one-third, a 25 per cent increase in the cost 
of materials would require a 37.5 per cent saving in labour 
costs just to break even"
(pp. 200-1).
i 7
The ease with which so many buildings in Soviet Armenia collapsed in 
the 1988 earthquake also casts doubt on how general or wide-
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spread the structural soundness of Soviet buildings is.
Moschonas (1986) documents how resistant to capitalist erosion and 
rationalisation the strata involved in petty commodity production 
have traditionally been in Greece.
C H A P T E R  7 
Location Premia and Differential Rents: Extending the Explanation.
SECTION 1: An Introduction With Definitions.
SECTION 2: Dwelling Price Determination: A Synthesis.
SECTION 3: Evidence on the Influence of Differential
Rents on Dwelling Prices.
CHAPTER 7: Location Premia and Differential Rents: Extending the
Explanation.
In chapter 6 I suggested that households1 incomes 
affect dwelling prices by enabling households to meet their housing 
costs (rent or loan repayment installments). In effect, I argued, dwel­
ling prices tend to be capitalisations of the housing cost component of 
the value of labour power, although the direction of causality does not 
run only from costs to prices, but vice versa also. I explicitly 
ignored other influences on dwelling prices - in addition, that is, 
to housing costs and earned incomes. Here I will remedy this by looking 
into differential rents and location premia.
SECTION 1: An Introduction With Definitions.
The analysis that follows revolves around the 
following three concepts:
a. Differential rents;
b. Location premia, and
c. Absolute minimum price (of land).
Although land rent initially involved physical 
payments in the form of agricultural produce to the landowner (Marx, 
1959), it eventually took the form of payments in money. Marx showed 
that in capitalism agricultural land rent would arise on the basis of 
differences in productivity (either in terms of fertility and/or 
distance, and/or resulting from differing amounts of capital applied to 
the land) between land plots. Moreover, rent would come about not 
because agricultural produce is sold above its value, but precisely
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because it is sold at its value (ibid.). Land price, under those circum­
stances, is simply capitalised land rent.
I wish to argue, however, that it is not necessary 
for the landlord/tenant social relationship to exist for land to have a 
price. To the extent that a piece of land does or can yield a rent, 
then its price very swiftly will tend to reflect a capitalised rental
stream. Before that, land, and especially land that is not directly
productive in a physical and commercial sense, may have a price 
unrelated to either a real or a notional rent. What's more, there may 
well be price differences between plots.
For example, as sub-urban land around Greater Athens 
was colonised, first as a result of the influx of Asia Minor refugees in 
1922, and second after 1950, large tracts of that land were not directly 
productive and/or were owned, at least in theory, by the state. As the 
waves of immigrants began to colonise that land, and acquire it for 
owner-occupation, the relative ease of that process virtually precluded 
the use of such land for the purpose, say, of building dwellings for 
rent. In those circumstances, it was meaningless to calculate land 
prices on the basis of expected rents, especially since the permitted 
floorspace ratios in the expanding periphery (in effect, this ratio 
refers to the number of floors) was set very low, thus discouraging 
speculative building decisively (Emmanuel, 1981). Yet plots of land 
around the expanding capital did exhibit a pattern of prices.
I suggest that the basis of that pattern was an
absolute minimum price (AMP). This must be understood as the price of
an "entry ticket" into the area, an "import tarriff", so to speak, re-
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fleeting historic relationships of power which determine the ease of 
access to sub-urban land on the part of settlers (cf. Emmanuel, 1985). 
The absolute minimum price bears some affinity to Marx's 'absolute rent' 
(the only case where landed property itself creates rent - Marx, 1959), 
but it is a broader concept in that (a) it doesn't have to be capitali­
sation of any 'rent', and (b) it's not just the power of a particular 
landowner that is implied here, but wider political and social balances 
(and even the effect of technological constraints and opportunities).
But the absolute minimum price, referring as it does 
to a whole area, a city, or even a country, fails to account for price 
differences between plots (at any relevant level of geographical aggrega­
tion) . Such differences, over and above an AMP, I call location premia. 
Again, these occur even in the absence of a landlord/tenant relation­
ship, and simply reflect the relative desirability of residential plots 
in physical terms. Differing degrees of desirability between residenti­
al plots can exist even in the context of very easy access to an area as 
a whole and to owner-occupation (as in the example mentioned).
Rents come to the fore as an influence on land
prices as soon as tapping rental streams becomes a social and economic 
possibility - for instance, the creation of conditions that bring about 
and reproduce the landlord/tenant relationship. In such an environment, 
location premia are incorporated into rents very quickly, thus giving 
rise to a rent hierarchy. From the time the appropriation of a rental 
stream becomes a viable possibility, land prices can no more be equated 
to an AMP + a location premium. They tend to be capitalisations of
rental streams instead, and even the prices of residential plots or
dwellings that do not at present yield rents, tend to follow the prices
198
of plots and dwellings that yield rents.
What makes this transormation of all land prices pos­
sible - from a simple 'AMP + a location premium' to a capitalised stream 
- is the possibility that the current use of any given plot or dwelling 
can change. What happens elsewhere in the city, affects what happens 
here. The rents that non-residential users of city-space pay to land­
owners (even if landowner proper and businessman proper coincide), 
affect land prices across the city. This particular effect becomes the 
more pronounced the more a market economy expands, and, importantly, 
does not require the presence of residential landlords to take place.
The rents that non-residential users of city-space 
pay to landowners are differential rents. Such rents are the difference 
between the profit that a firm operating in a particular urban location 
makes (or expects to make) by virtue of its being there, and the profit 
it would make (or expect to make) if it were placed elsewhere. It is 
this difference which the landowner, however disguised, pockets, and 
which is capitalised into the plot's land price. Thus, in a market 
economy non-residential land prices are inevitably capitalisations of 
rental streams. Subsequently, the inter-changeability of land-uses, 
depending on the degree to which it is actually possible, makes even 
the price of residential land follow the thus-formed price of non- 
residential land.
Again, the degree of ease of access to sub-urban 
residential land, and to owner-occupation in particular, that new-comers 
in the city, or new households, enjoy, affects the degree of dependence 
of the price of residential land on the price of non-residential land.
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SECTION 2: Dwelling Price Determination: A Synthesis.
The analysis that follows assumes that the reader 
is familiar with the discussion of income differentials among the 
'working class' and of house price bands, pursued in Appendix I, as well 
as with the concept of "pools of 'equivalent access' skills" (ibid.).
As an introduction to dwelling price determination,
I assumed in ch. 6 that dwelling prices are capitalisations of the hous­
ing cost component of the value of labour power, and then went on to 
discuss upper and lower limits to the movement of dwelling prices in re­
lation to modal incomes (which can serve as a proxy for the value of 
labour power).
Real life is of course more complex than that. One 
complication is that the direction of causality runs from dwelling 
prices to incomes as well - through affecting households' housing costs. 
Rising expectations on the part of landlords or home-owners regarding 
the future movement of incomes, and, by extension, the capacity of ten­
ants or house-buyers to meet increased (usually) housing costs is one 
way whereby the direction of causality is reversed. Another way is 
through the fact that for individual people or small groups, dwelling 
prices are given in the short-term.
A second complication is that the 'working class' 
(blue- and white-collar) is not homogeneous in terms of incomes, but 
differentiated by income levels. In addition, the housing commodity is 
not homogeneous in price terms either; it is differentiated by a pattern 
of house price bands.
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However, the analysis of ch. 6 is compatible with 
this complication. The key is to visualise a series of 'values of 
labour power', each appropriate to a particular "pool of 'equivalent 
access' skills" (see Ap. I). Equally, the cohort of workers falling into 
a given 'pool' are not meant (sic) to 'hunt' for housing across the enti­
re stock of dwellings (even in a sub-set of a given travel-to-work-area), 
but only within a 'price band' appropriate to their 'pool' (cf. section 
3 of ch. 3, on 'needs'). Thus, we can have the following schema:
Fig. 7.1: Dwelling Price Determination By Households' Housing Costs.
"Pool of 'eguivalent access' skills" x : (x = 1,...,n)
Value of labour power (for that pool):
Broken down into:
capitalised into
1/ Housing costs Dwelling prices (thus form­
ing house price band x)
< - - - - - - - - -
reverse causality 
(e.g., through expectations)
2/ Food "
3/ Clothing "
4/ Leisure "
5/ Other
In this framework, the form of tenure is less im­
portant than the housing costs in relation to incomes that renting or 
buying within a given 'price band' imposes on households from a given 
'pool'. Also, excess overall housing demand across a given area would 
have the effect of pushing some 'house-hunting' households from a given 
income rung into renting or buying cheaper dwellings than what they
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would have done normally (i.e., under conditions of market equilibrium). 
If the imbalance continued, people from a given "pool of 'equivalent 
access' skills" would end up 'house-hunting' (or 'consuming' housing) 
within a house price band 'appropriate' for people from an 'inferior' 
'pool1. This is the reverse of the 'filtering' process traditionally 
identified in the housing economics literature (cf. Robinson, 1979), and 
we can call it negative filtering. Positive filtering, of course, can 
occur in a situation of excess overall housing supply.
A third complication to the simple account devel­
oped in ch. 6 concerns the influence on dwelling prices of the 'autono­
mous' factor of location premia.
I defined location premia in the previous section as 
'mark-ups' on the absolute minimum price (AMP) of land across a given 
area - mark-ups that in effect differentiate one plot from another in 
price terms. If no mechanisms of rent appropriation exist in the area, 
and, generally, if the housing process involved is acquisition- rather 
than provision-based (see ch. 2, pp. 35-36), then the price of a plot 
there, is
AMP + a location premium,
and that of a plot plus a dwelling built upon it, is
AMP + a location premium + construction cost of the dwelling.
Consider the following general case (based on the
historical experience of Athens - see previous section):
A travel-to-work-area where
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(1) most households have relatively easy access to land plots 
in or near that area,
(2) those households are of the same social class,
(3) rely mostly on own resources (as opposed to borrowing) for 
housing themselves,
(4) the predominant modes of housebuilding are either self- or 
contract-building or both, and
(5) high-rise developments or landbanking are prohibited, 
unprofitable or impractical.
Then the basis for the formation of the asking price 
for a dwelling of a certain type in almost any location in the area 
would be the construction costs of a similar dwelling in the same area.
A prospective purchaser could contemplate either buying at the asking 
price, or, if he found it excessive, building himself or hiring a 
contractor. If these practices were sufficiently standardised and 
available in that area, and indeed across the largest part of a city, 
there is no reason (other than political intervention, which would only 
serve to raise the AMP for land in the area) why an extra dwelling could 
not be added to the stock under the prevailing conditions of 
production, representing, that is, the socially necessary labour time 
for production of such a dwelling. The seller of a dwelling, therefore, 
would have to take the buyer's potential alternatives into account, and 
offer his dwelling for sale at a price commensurate with those 
alternatives.
The catch here is the word 'alternatives'. Despite 
the presence of many homogenising factors across such a landscape, any 
particular plot might be preferable to many another - because of its
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place on a hill, or of proximity to trees or a bus stop, etc. (or even
because of nearness to preferred social groups - cf. Boventer, 1978). A
buyer might still be prepared to pay a location premium for acquiring
2
title to a plot or dwelling in such a location. Otherwise, if the 
landscape were truly homogeneous, the price of a plot would be equal to 
the AMP, and that of a dwelling to AMP + its construction cost (or the 
current cost of construction of similar dwellings in the same area).
Let us now examine the role of location premia in the 
case of a provision-based housing process. In this case dwelling price 
tends to be capitalisation of the housing cost component of the modal 
income (broadly, the value of labour power) typical of those potential 
tenants or home-buyers for whose "pool of 'equivalent access' skills" 
the dwelling is meant, i.e., considered socially appropriate. In turn, 
what makes the dwelling 'appropriate' for workers who belong to a given 
'pool' are three things: (1) the AMP for land in the area, (2) the
dwelling's relative construction costs (i.e., the current costs of 
constructing a dwelling offering a comparable level of amenities and 
comfort), and (3) the location premium of its plot.
The role of the last variable requires a bit of ex­
planation. Location premia are social constructs in the sense that loca­
tion qualities tend to become part of the needs of various social groups. 
Therefore, groups higher up in the social hierarchy are prepared to pay 
more for access to 'appropriate' locations (i.e., locations that satisfy 
the needs of a given group in terms of physical and social amenities cu­
stomarily sought and enjoyed by members of the group) (cf. ch. 3, sec. 3, 
on 'needs'). The relative worth of each location to each group quickly 
becomes common knowledge, along with the purchasing power of each group,
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and the premium of each location is the maximum payment for access to it 
that could be had if the plot or dwelling in question were ’auctioned', 
so to speak, among all groups making up a social hierarchy. In this way, 
its location premium helps to place a dwelling in an 'appropriate' house
price band, 'appropriate' in turn for members of a certain "pool of
'equivalent access' skills". In summary:
a. AMP, construction costs and a location premium make a given 
dwelling socially and economically 'appropriate' for 'pool' x (x = 
1,...,n), and place that dwelling into a relevant 'price band'.
b. Members of 'pool' x expect and/or are expected to pay y% of 
the value of their labour power (empirically approximated by their modal 
income) in order to house themselves.
c. This proportion takes the form of a rent or a loan repayment 
installment.
d. Capitalisation of that, gives the dwelling price.
Location premia need not come in discreet lumps.
One can get very fine variations even within the same house price band, 
and this is one reason (other than differences in construction costs or 
finishing) why the bands into which house prices may be assigned cannot 
be separated by precise or immutable demarcations.
A fourth complication to the account of ch. 6 is 
that construction costs and land prices do not always affect the final 
dwelling price separately. There are circumstances in which they inter­
act with one another. In modern Britain, for example, builders organise 
their operations in ways that enable them to tap as much development ga­
in as possible (Ball, 1983, 1988). In turn, the basis for development
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gain is land value appreciation. Therefore, builders' expectations re­
garding the future movement of land prices are bound to affect both 
their organisation of production and output, and hence construction 
costs.
The last complication concerns the influence on 
dwelling prices of the 'autonomous' factor of differential rents.
The concept of differential rents dates back to 
Ricardo and Marx, and, to date, treatises on the subject have not clari­
fied it conclusively (cf. Ball, 1976; 1980a; 1985a; 1985b; 1987; Clark, 
1987; Murray, 1977; 1978; Tribe, 1977; Fine, 1979a; 1979b; 1980a; 1980b). 
I will not get into the intricacies of that debate. I feel, however, 
that (a certain interpretation of) the concept is required in order to 
complete the explanation of the relationship between dwelling prices, 
housing costs and incomes.
In section 1 I defined differential rents as the 
difference between the profit that a firm operating in a particular 
urban location makes (or expects to make) by virtue of its being there, 
and the profit it would make (or expect to make) if it were placed else­
where. It is time I explained this.
Land is not directly productive in the built 
environment (cf. Ball, 1985b; 1987). The Marxian category of differen­
tial rent II, DR II (i.e., rent that results from the application of 
differing amounts of capital to agricultural land), may therefore, at 
first sight, be inappropriate for the built environment precisely 
because this category of rent involves improvements in the
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productiveness of land that stem directly from capital investment.
It may still be the case, however, that differential 
rent I, DR I (i.e., rent related to location, which in agriculture is 
relevant in the twin senses of fertility and distance from markets), 
exists in the urban environment. But then a question immediately 
arises, namely, what is the significance of location? To which the 
answer cannot be "distance from the city centre, or from a market, or 
from a place of work, or from various amenities, etc."; although 
correct in an apparent sense, this answer begs another question: why
should the centre matter? what makes amenities desirable, and to whom? 
what conditions the separation of dwelling-place and work-place? or, 
for that matter, the separation of some desirable 'amenities' from the 
home? how is any such distance priced and thereby reflected in DR I? 
are such prices a function of distance alone or mainly, as in 
traditional neoclassical rent-gradient theory, or does the nature of 
the locations in question affect the relevant valuations, as in more 
recent neoclassical hedonic theory (see Quigley, 1979, for a review)?
A firm or other organisation may desire an urban 
location for any of a number of reasons: access to a particular
residential area or hub from a retailer's point of view; nearness to 
the state administrative apparatus, the central bank, other firms, 
hotels and restaurants, etc., from the point of view of a firm seeking 
office space; proximity to a workforce, and indirectly to things which 
households are known to value (e.g., schools, nursing and child-care fa­
cilities, trees, the sea, tennis courts) from any employer's point of 
view. In short, in the built environment every plot depends for its 
usefulness on every other plot. This means that every single plot is or
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can be linked to agglomeration economies (or diseconomies) (cf. 
Richardson, 1978: 304-13). The net effect of these economies is
tantamount to the usefulness or value that a city or society as a whole 
imparts to any particular plot; it is this use-value which makes a 
plot, or location, more or less attractive to any particular firm or 
organisation. But that usefulness, in turn, is the result of the total 
motion of the entire social capital, of social development and change in 
their entirety, and as such varies with time. It is for this reason 
that
11 [a]gglomeration economies are a 'catch-all' concept and are 
notoriously difficult to measure. Thus, the hypothesis that 
urban growth depends on agglomeration economies becomes almost 
a truism"
(Richardson, 1978: 304).
Looked at in this way, we see that in the built 
environment we have DR II (which reflects the combined effects of 
capital inmvestment, but, more generally, of the motion of the entire 
social capital) and DR I (which reflects the effects of location) rolled 
into one. (Perhaps this is one reason why Marx illustrated his theory 
of ground rent by reference to agriculture: the two types of capitalist
ground rent could be identified there far more clearly.) Firms and 
other organisations wanting to capture benefits associated with urban 
locations, made possible precisely through the motion of the total 
social capital (city-wise, nationally, and even internationally - see 
Cohen, 1981), are prepared to pay for the use of an appropriate piece of 
urban land. The price they are prepared to pay is a rent. That rent is 
the difference between their expected extra profits, which use of that 
plot is likely to make realisable (not least because of the
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attractiveness of the location to particular types of desirable work 
force), and their ’normal1 profits (say, their profits before 
(re)location, or an industry standard profit (for aliquot parts of
capital invested), or the prevailing profit for the entire capitalist 
economy in question, applicable to aliquot parts of social capital).
The rent that producers of labour power, i.e., most 
households, are in certain circumstances obliged to pay cannot, however, 
be conceptualised in a similar manner. It is not the difference between 
any 'extra' and 'normal' profits. If landlords in a particular area 
demand payment of a rent x for properties of a certain type and in a 
certain location, employers in that area have to ensure that the wages 
they pay their labour force, or segments of their labour force, are high 
enough to enable them to meet their housing costs; in other words, it 
is employers who must foot the bill landlords present to their tenants. 
The question an employer has to ask himself is: If I set up business in
this location, will I be able to pay wages and salaries high enough to 
enable my work force to pay their rents or loan repayment instalments, 
and therefore to ensure that I get enough workers of the requisite 
skills for my purposes? If I remain in this location, will I be able to 
continue doing that, other factors held equal? Thus, to understand the 
pattern of rental payments or loan repayments in a residential area 
characterised by market-based housing provision processes, one needs to 
look at the employment pattern of its residents, and ultimately at the 
opportunities for profit that firms in the corresponding travel-to-work- 
area are faced with.
Differential rents affect dwelling prices to the 
extent that - due to the possibility of land-use change - they make the
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price of residential land follow the price of non-residential land - 
which is determined by capitalised differential rents. We can thus 
identify the following two limiting cases:
CASE 1: No housing cost component in the value of labour power;
acquisition-based housing process (see ch. 2, p. 35):
D = (AMP + CC + LP)f (f>0)
where
D = dwelling price;
AMP = absolute minimum price of land;
CC = relative construction costs;
LP = a location premium, and
f = factor incorporating the expected influence of differential 
rents.
CASE 2: Value of labour power includes a housing cost component;
provision-based housing process (see ch. 2, p. 35):
D = (h:i)f (f>0)
where
h = proportion of the modal income characterising a given "pool of 
’equivalent access’ skills" that landlords or home-owners 
expect prospective tenants or home-buyers from that pool to 
use in order to pay a stream of rents or of loan repayment 
installments BEFORE dwelling prices influence households’ 
housing costs in turn (say, due to the 'autonomous' effect on 
dwelling prices of f);
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i = expected interest rate.
As soon as dwelling prices influence h in turn, the 
mechanism I described in ch. 6 begins to work, setting upper limits to 
the movement of households' housing costs in relation to their incomes 
(subject to the various qualifications which I discussed). Eventually, 
landlords and/or dwelling owners adjust their asking prices downwards by 
moderating their expectations regarding the influence of 'autonomous' 
factors (i.e., factors other than households' housing costs) on dwelling 
prices. In effect, they lower f.
The strength of the influence of differential rents 
on dwelling prices obviously depends on the probability that residential 
land can be converted to non-residential uses. But, importantly, it 
also depends on the extent to which firms realising extra profits 
because of their location are enabled, or find it necessary, to pay 
higher wages and salaries in order to attract the right work-force. (It 
is here that the question of whether urban producers of goods and 
services and urban landowners are separate or the same entities, comes 
to play - cf. Ball, 1985b; 1987; Clark, 1987.) The incomes of those 
workers signal to landlords or home-owners in adjacent residential areas 
the kind of rents or loan repayment installments those workers can be 
expected to meet. Dwelling prices become capitalisations of those 
estimates. And, coming back full circle, this brings us to the question 
of upper and lower limits to the movement of dwelling prices in relation 
to incomes (ch. 6).
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SECTION 3: Evidence on the Influence of Differential Rents on Dwelling
Prices.
In modern advanced capitalist societies, where agri­
culture is of secondary importance (either because capital investment in 
agriculture has made it possible to get more output from progressively 
less land; and/or because a lot of food is shipped over from other 
countries), differential rents are not determined at the urban fringe as 
much as on the basis of the capitalistically highest and best use of 
urban land. The uses involved may be industrial, office, retailing, 
warehousing, or residential (as in the speculative provision of dwel­
lings for rent) . For example, the dominant position of the City of 
London in the world's financial markets has led to over-investment in 
office space in the centre. In other words, he highest bidders for 
land in the City have come from firms offering financial services, and 
secondarily from firms of all types establishing their headquarters in 
or near London. The apex of the pyramid of differential rents in Great 
Britain is thus determined by what those firms can afford, i.e., by the 
profits those firms can make through their global operations. The in­
fluence of these rents, and of the land prices formed on their basis, 
on the prices of residential land - hence of dwelling prices - in Bri­
tain is substantial.
The following evidence is consistent with this view: 
In 1974 and 1975 house prices in Greater London increased by 2.3 per 
cent annually compared to 7.1 per cent in the UK (BSA Bulletin, 1988, 
July: 15). This means that the London housing market was more put off 
by the 1974 housing market crash than the rest of the country. As soon 
as the market began to recover, London surged forward once more: from
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1976 to 1980 house prices in London rose annually by 17.86 per cent com­
pared to 16.56 per cent nationally (ibid.). Then came yet another 
slump, and the London market prices tumbled back to lower rates of 
growth than for the nation as a whole. From 1983 and up to 1987 
dwelling prices in London again rose fast, in fact far more than they 
did nationally (ibid.). To a large extent, the onset of decline in the 
rate of increase of house prices in London in 1988 can be attributed to 
the consequences of the October 1987 international stock market crash, 
which curtailed the profitability of financial firms - among the most 
prominent employers (and renters of office space) in London. It has 
been estimated, for example, that in the two years following the crash 
the City lost between 40 and 50 thousand jobs (Park, 1989).
By the same token, the very high rates of increase 
in house prices in London, relative to the UK, from 1983 to 1987 can 
easily be attributed both to housing demand by employees of the London 
finance and banking sector, and to the high profits - hence high rent- 
paying capacity - the sector increasingly enjoyed over the period:^
"the lifting of exchange controls accompanied a further quan­
tum jump in foreign banking in London, that within a few ye­
ars had taken it over a historic threshold. By 1985 the City 
was a plaque-tournant for global funds amounting to over 
£1 trillion - or more than three times the gross domestic 
product of the UK. [ ] The majority of these were now held 
not by British but by foreign banks, among whom the largest 
single group were no longer American but Japanese"
(Anderson, 1987: 69).
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It is thus no wonder that office space in the City 
of London is taken up first by finance, then by banking, and, quite 
below that, by the professions and insurance (Financial Times, 18 Sept.
1987: 16). In fact, the supply of office space in London closely
follows the outlook for the financial sector:
"Big Bang was reflected in new starts of business centres in 
the City in 1986, when 12 new centres were started, compared 
with only seven in the previous year and only one as recently 
as 1981. The numbers have topped off quite smartly as the 
City has had to retrench in the face of the stock market crash
of 1987. Last year saw only six new centres started in the
City"
(Financial Times Survey, 30 June 1989: XI).
The prominence of London as the financial capital of 
the world during most of the 1980s has been evidenced in the relative
expensiveness of rents for office space there:
(a) In 1984 office rents in
London-City were 38.67 $US per sq ft;
Paris " 22.46
Brussels " 6.32 11
Frankfurt 11 11.46 "
(The Economist, 22.12.1984: 85).
(b) In 1987 "[rjenting an office in London cost $23,000 a 
year, the most expensive of [a sample of 18 - NP] cities" in the western 
world, although, because staff came cheap there, total costs were
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comparatively low, $100,000 {The Economist, 16.05.1987: 115).
(c) In 1989, probably due to the after-effects of the October 
1987 Crash, London moved to second place in the world in terms of the 
cost of renting offices, just before Tokyo, with more than double the 
office rents of Paris and New York, while Hong Kong lay in-between {The 
Economist, 23.09.1989: 167).
In turn, house prices in the London area and other 
South-East have reflected the profit potential of the financial and 
other firms established there, not only in cases where it is possible to 
have residential and office land uses competing against one another, but 
primarily by incorporating a rising 'housing cost component1 (see ch. 6) 
in the modal wage of those firms' employees. Based on data covering the 
first nine months of 1984, the Nationwide BS (1984) was able to show 
that the largest proportion of borrowers with professional/managerial 
status were in Greater London and the London Commuter Belt, 35.9 and 
39.1 per cent respectively, from among the nine major urban areas of 
the UK studied. Of course such people form the majority of housing loan 
borrowers in the UK anyway (32.5 per cent), but even so in 1984 they 
provided a higher proportion of the demand for dwellings in and around 
London than their national average. In the same year the average annual 
income of borrowers in Greater London was £14,458, and in the London 
Commuter Belt £14,530, against £12,509 for the UK. The we11-documented 
income inequality between the South-East and the rest of the country is 
certainly consistent with far higher house prices in the former than in 
the latter.
Finally, the results of the Nationwide BS study
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mentioned in the previous paragraph were reiterated in Kleinman & 
Whitehead's (1985) study "Who Becomes a Home-owner?". On the basis of 
1981 Census data, they showed that in England & Wales the ranking of 
various socio-economic groups, in terms of access to owner-occupation, 
was remarkably consistent across different spatial units (from rural and 
small towns through large towns, free standing cities and conurbations 
to Inner London, Greater London and England & Wales), and was as 
follows:
Professionals Highest proportion of own.-occ
Employers/Managers Second I I I I I I  I I
Other Non-manual Third I I I I I I  I I
Skilled Fourth 11 I I I I  11
Semi-skilled Fifth I I I I I I  I I
Unskilled Lowest 11 I I  I I
Still, they found that
"[t]here is some evidence that manual workers find it slightly 
easier than average to become owner-occupiers outside London, 
particularly in the large towns, and that, in comparison to 
other groups, relatively high proportions of professional and 
employer-manager groups are owner-occupiers in London and 
particularly in Inner London. This latter point provides some 
evidence that incomes at the top end of the scale are high 
enough to offset the problems of the high costs of owning in 
London [my emphasis - NP]"
(Kleinman & Whitehead, 1985: 160-1).
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Kleinman & Whitehead's empirical findings support 
the theoretical rigour of the households' housing costs - incomes - 
dwelling prices model advanced above, and are as expected. In a market- 
cum-provision-based housing process like that of Britain, dwelling 
prices tend to be capitalisations of households' housing costs; 
differential rents, such as those prevailing in and near London, push 
land - and therefore dwelling - prices further up, but then the same 
profits that are the basis for land value appreciation allow higher 
wages and salaries to be paid to the employees of the firms realising 
those profits. Since in the London case the firms in question were (and 
are) predominantly in banking and finance, and secondarily other 
professional firms and corporation headquarters, it is no wonder that 
professional and employer/manager groups achieve relatively higher 
proportions of owner-occupation in and near London than nationally. 
Equally, Kleinman & Whitehead's finding that c. 1981 it was probably 
easier for manual workers to become owner-occupiers in large towns 
outside London, reflects the industrial employment structure of those 
towns, with its attendant link between wages, households' housing costs, 
and dwelling prices there.
* * * * *
In the discussion that was pursued in this and the 
last chapter, socio-institutional factors were pointed out as crucial 
in at least five cases:
( 1 )  The extent to which dwelling prices reach their 'theore­
tical' upper limits, as the result of the operation of the mechanism 
suggested in ch. 6, depends on the capacity and willingness of various
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groups of people to participate in, or create, alternative housing pro­
cesses (e.g., by squatting or engaging in unauthorised building) to the 
one(s) they find too costly.
(2) The same factor affects the extent to which rent
appropriation mechanisms can arise. It has, therefore, a particular 
significance for dwelling price determination.
(3) Additionally, the extent to which these upper limits are 
reached, depends on the capacity and willingness of workers to cause 
the state to interfere in the housing sphere (e.g., through initiating 
rent controls).
(4) The distribution of landownership, and the strength of
property rights on the part of various 'holders', were shown to be deci­
sive factors checking or, alternatively, facilitating falls in housing 
costs in the right economic circumstances - contrast the British and
Greek experiences.
(5) The extent to which urban producers of goods and services 
and urban landowners are or are not the same entities is likely to 
affect the capacity of those producers to transform part of their 
extra profits into higher pay for their employees. It therefore affects 
the extent to which dwelling prices in the adjacent areas are influenced 
by differential rents.
Clearly, an analysis of housing system dynamics 
cannot be complete without considering the formation and defence of 
rights and claims over resources that can help people house themselves
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better and/or more cheaply than otherwise. Such resources are land 
(first and foremost), buildings, and the political capacity to influence 
the legal and planning system, and state policies. In short, I am 
talking about the legal and political dynamics of a housing system. To 
this, let us now turn.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 7
In the form of a rent below which a landowner would not be prepared 
to lease his property. Or, alternatively, of a land price below 
which he would not be prepared to sell.
I suspect this could be the reason why real land prices in a 
middle-income residential area in New Delhi increased by 22.53 times 
between 1957 and 1977, while in Seoul they increased by 7.61 times 
between 1963 and 1974 (Doebele, 1987: 117). That is, the fact that 
New Delhi has gravest urban problems than Seoul makes land 
prices in its relatively 'good' areas appreciate more than those of 
relatively 'good1 areas in Seoul.
3
The rest of the explanation has to involve, of course, rising inte­
rest rates nationally (see The Independent, 26.11.1988, p. 1; The 
Guardian, 05.03.1990, p. 3). These, in turn, have been necessitated 
by the widening current account deficit of Britain from 1988 and 
after - itself the result, to a substantial extent, of the fact that 
many households could (and can) obtain consumer credit on the basis 
of their equity in their dwellings (cf. The Guardian, 10.05.1990, 
p. 5; Huhne, 1990; Muellbauer, 1990).
4
Actually, in line with a long tradition of specialisation in the 
provision of international financial services on the part of the 
City of London (cf. Yeager, 1976: 299-301).
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CHAPTER 8 : Rights and Claims in the Housincr Sphere.
This chapter begins the discussion of the influence 
of political and legal factors on the dynamics of housing systems. My 
approach is unusual in that I do not start by asking how the state 
affects the housing system, or how housing policies develop, but by 
emphasising the importance of 'rights' and 'claims' as both structural 
and constitutive features of any housing system. The reason for the 
choice of approach is that I can then ask how 'rights' and 'claims' in 
the housing sphere relate to societal patterns of rights and claims 
(chapter 9), so that when, finally, I turn to the role of the state 
(chapter 10), I am able to identify the determinants of state action or 
inaction in the housing sphere. Presently I will make my case about the 
significance of 'rights' and 'claims' through five examples.
SECTION 1: Trespass Law in England, 1968-1977.
In his study of squatting in empty dwellings and of 
the political and legal response to it in Britain between 1968 and 1977, 
Vincent-Jones (1987) makes three main points:
1. He associates cases of squatting in the dwelling-place with 
similar cases in the work-place.
2. He suggests that both types of case represented a chal­
lenge to "greater possessors" (individual factory owners and property 
companies and local authorities) on the part of "lesser possessors" (the 
squatters themselves - whether workers doing sit-ins or homeless 
people).
3. He discerns a wider dimension in the practice of squatting, 
namely an ideological challenge to the established legal and social
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order.
More specifically, Vincent-Jones writes that 
between 1968 and 1971 a number of workers staged sit-ins in various 
factories in England in order to frustrate (often successfully) plans 
for redundancies, and even closures, which managers and owners felt they 
were legally entitled to pursue. After all, part of the definition of 
private property rights is precisely the right to exclude others from 
access to, use or enjoyment of, what is owned (Reeve, 1986: 11-12).
Over the same period the number of homeless persons increased, with the 
result that some had to turn to squatting in empty dwellings, owned 
either by LAs or big private landlords.
Until 1970 the legal framework governing eviction 
and repossession in England made it difficult for owners to assert their 
rights of "exclusion". For example, a writ of possession to enforce a 
judgement for possession "could not be issued without leave of the 
court, for which every trespasser [i.e., squatter - NP] must have had 
actual notice of the proceedings, and [ ] at least 14 days must elapse 
between the initial judgement and the granting of the writ" (Vincent- 
Jones, 1987, p. 94). This state of affairs "enabled the Redbridge
squatters in 1969, for example, to 'play musical chairs with the 
council1 by moving out those named in the original order and installing 
different families, forcing the council to begin the entire process 
again" (p. 95).
As such instances of law evasion mounted in both the 
industrial and housing spheres, the outgoing Labour government in 1970 
changed the law of Trespass in order to make eviction and repossession
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easier. This, it turned out, was not enough. Part of the national 
press began a campaign of (mis)representing cases of squatting as a 
threat to the moral and legal foundation of society, and also as a 
threat to ordinary owner-occupiers, who might, it was said, find their 
homes invaded by "layabouts" when they got back from holidays (p. 100). 
The real or imaginary danger that squatting in public-sector dwellings 
posed for waiting-list management was pointed out too (pp. 99-100). 
The press campaign was successful: seven years after the initial
toughening of Trespass law, aspects of squatting were criminalised (1977 
Act). A decline in the numbers of squatters followed. In effect,
"the real function of the Act was not merely to encourage and 
give advantage to particular greater possessors, whilst 
hampering and discouraging particular lesser possessors; 
rather it was to buttress the institution of private property 
in general, and thus meet the ideological and political 
challenge to the capitalist state in a period of [ ] crisis"
(Vincent-Jones, 1987: 108).
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SECTION 2: The Politics of Squatting and the Local State in England,
1968-1977.
Whereas squatting in empty dwellings during the
1970s in England was portrayed by the bourgeois press as an affront to 
private property in general, most squatting, ironically, took place in 
the public housing sector. It was mainly in this sector where both
squatters and landlords adopted explicitly political tactics and
phraseology in pursuing their respective aims, and consequently the
issue was 'politicised' most.
This fact begs the question of "whether squatting
substantiates or refutes Castells's hypothesis about the politicising
effect of state action" (Cant, 1979: 406). In investigating this
problem, Cant (1979) showed that
"squatting in the public sector was characterised by i) a high 
degree of organisation, ii) the use of explicitly political 
tactics, iii) the pursuit of political objectives"
(p. 407).
These three aspects were absent from cases of squatting in the private 
sector. Although the presence of those three characteristics seems to 
corroborate Castells's hypothesis, Cant concludes that there was no 
"real politicisation of the issue at stake which was the right of 
landlords to keep their property empty at a time of homelessness. 
Instead the issue became one of local government efficiency" (p. 407).
In other words, people chose whenever possible to
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squat in the public sector because, for example, they found it easier 
to publicise their circumstances and enter into negotiations with the 
state. The possibility for such negotiations, and the subsequent 
establishment of 'rules of the game', meant that in cases of squatting 
in the public sector "the clash of interests is not as direct as when a 
private landlord confronts a squatter. The existence of a publicly 
owned sector of housing can thus be seen as a buffer which separates 
those individuals whose interests are directly opposed" (p. 411). As a 
result, "radical change [is made] less rather than more likely" (p. 415).
Cant's analysis is a useful reminder that not all 
political confrontations between the state and the have-nots necessarily 
have far-reaching consequences for the social order. The reverse may 
happen as well. What he does not attempt to explain is what determines 
the timidity (or aggressiveness) of the demands made upon the state, or 
the success (or failure) of the latter in dampening radical stands and 
feelings. Neither does he define radical change: Would it consist in
legal endorsement of the practice of squatting - creating, in effect, 
the 'right' of homeless people to occupy empty dwellings? Would it 
involve the nationalisation of empty dwellings? Would it be a massive 
housebuilding programme? Or perhaps the substantial relaxation of 
planning rules so that homeless people could obtain virtually free 
access to land (and what type of land: public? or private as well?
brownfield only? or greenfield too?), and build their own homes as they
saw fit?
If we combine the respective contributions of Cant
(1979) and Vincent-Jones (1987) (whose paper was summarised in Example
1), an inkling as to what a general answer to these questions might be
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begins to emerge. In England it was both the ideological and practical 
importance of private property rights, and broad popular support for the 
'rule of law', by means of which they were interpreted and upheld, which 
circumscribed a rather narrow - and increasingly so - field for 
effecting any "radical" solutions to the problem of homelessness. 
"Radical" here means anything that might threaten established private 
property rights - over empty dwellings or even over unused land. The 
press campaign of the 1970s, which was successful in portraying 
squatting as a threat to the fabric of society, and the subsequent 
legislation of 1977, which criminalised squatting, attest to the 
validity of this interpretation.
By contrast, in societies where the legitimacy of
the state is called into question, the 'rule of law' is or becomes an 
empty concept. There, property rights remain to be defined as well as 
distributed. The implication of such a 'formative' situation is that
the state may in some cases tolerate various groups infringing on the
property rights of other groups or individuals, or of the state itself; 
in other cases, it may not hesitate to infringe upon the rights of its 
own citizens; and in yet other cases, it may effect or encourage harsher 
responses to 'bottom-up' demands than would be necessary in societies 
with well-established legal and political systems, i.e., it may have 
little room for exercising a "dampening", "de-radicalising", or
conciliatory role. The following hypothesis can, therefore, be 
formulated: that the ways and extent in which issues are politicised in
the housing sphere, as well as the limits circumscribing the relevant 
confrontations, appear to be causally affected by what the dominant 
pattern of rights is, and by how dominant it is, in the wider society.
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SECTION 3: Local Soviet Housing vs 'Departmental* Housing in the USSR.
The case of housing in the Soviet Union is 
particularly interesting because it shows vividly the clash not simply 
(or even mainly) between two contrasting processes of (non-market) 
housing provision, but between two equally legitimate conceptions and 
patterns of rights. Although local soviets were repeatedly proclaimed 
masters of their territories, with a duty to provide housing to people, 
in practice this role of local soviets was minimised because of the 
urgency to industrialise fast at any cost.
Thus, in the run-up to the Second World War, 
industrial and transport enterprises, and government departments (hence 
the term 'departmental' housing), built far more dwellings than any 
other agency. The contribution of local soviets was correspondingly 
curtailed. From 1924/25 to 1927/28 the first three agencies accounted 
for 59.6% of public sector housing investment, while local soviets for 
26.7% (housebuilding co-operatives contributed the rest). From 1928 to 
1932, the respective figures were 78.9% and 14.8%; and from 1933 to 
1937, 84.7% and 11.3% (Andrusz, 1984: 34). This trend meant that
aesthetic, urban-infrastructure, and quality-of-life considerations were 
pushed aside as departmental agencies operated under a logic of economic 
exigency and expedience. Typically, this logic necessitated the use of 
housing as a reward or incentive attached to valued categories of 
workers (op. cit., p. 36), or as a penalty calculated to enforce labour 
discipline (p. 36). Even local soviets had to conform to this
framework: they were legally obliged not to house people who had
voluntarily left the state enterprises they worked for, or who had been 
evicted from their departmental dwellings because of work rule or
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criminal violations. This piece of legislation was deliberately 
calculated to get round another statutory obligation of local soviets, 
namely, to provide people with living space (p. 36).
It was only around the late 1950s that the initial 
pressures to industrialise and satisfy very basic needs were mitigated, 
and attention began to focus on raising housing standards, improving the 
urban environment, and responding to higher and more varied local needs. 
As a result, the latent tensions between the local soviet and the
departmental housing sectors (or tenures) increased. Local soviets 
could point to their legally and ideologically enshrined duty to be 
masters of their cities and towns (p. 47) more confidently and
assertively than before, and demand that resources be given them to 
carry out that duty in both the housing and urban-infrastructure 
spheres. Conversely, state enterprises and departments could not easily 
shrug soviets' demands away, as they had so often done in the past. A 
real problem emerged as to whose 'property rights' over resources - the 
local soviets' or the departments' - would prove stronger (p. 45). The 
way the battle between vested interests in the two tenures - soviet and 
departmental - evolved during the post-war period, and up to 1975 at 
least, is shown clearly in the following example from the Russian 
Federal Republic:
"[L]ocal soviet control over the public housing sector 
declined from 45.6 per cent of overall living space in 1940 to 
34.8 per cent in 1950 and 26.8 per cent in 1956. The decree of 
July 1957 began to reverse this decline and initiated the
transfer of housing from state enterprises and institutions to 
local soviets. By the end of 1960, local soviets in the
229
[R.F.R.] controlled 32.4 per cent of the socialised housing 
stock. By January 1965 they had increased their holding to 
about 34 per cent. Yet a decade later the deputy minister for 
Housing and Communal Economy in the [R.F.R.] could only affirm 
that 'at present only 35 per cent of the socialised housing 
stock is in the hands of local soviets in the Russian Federal 
Republic1"
(Andrusz, 1984: 55).
How is the battle going to end? Undoubtedly the age 
of perestroika opens up wider possibilities for articulation of 
political and consumer demands on the part of the citizens themselves - 
with or outwith the medium of local soviets. This new element changes 
the nature of the confrontation significantly. Considering that the 
struggle between the two tenures in the post-war took place through the 
Communist Party (which controlled soviets and enterprises alike), before 
Gorbachev came to power the issue of whether the narrower interests of 
the enterprises, or the broader ones of the soviets, would prevail, was 
discussed and fought over between two Party groups or tendencies - one 
representing the 'civil' demands of the soviets, and another 
representing the 'economic' demands of industry. These confines may now 
be breaking down. A successful perestroika may severely curtail the 
property rights of enterprises, and reinforce those of the soviets (or 
municipalities; or whatever other forms popular activity will generate). 
Such an outcome may at last make local soviets " a social and political 
force independent of and standing against industry whenever the latter 
violate certain presumptions on the nature of socialist society" (p. 
79). At the same time, enterprises may find that despite their enjoying 
lesser rights than previously (e.g., housing their workers as cheaply as
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possible, and damning the consequences), they will now "stand to gain 
economically from the more co-ordinated spatial planning policy which 
local soviets could implement" (pp. 79) if they exercised their new­
found rights.
There is, however, another possibility: that the
present upheavals in the Soviet Union may not simply lead to more rights 
being transferred from the enterprises to the soviets, as in a zero-sum 
game, but that another distribution of (and at the same a time different 
set of ) rights may take place. I have in mind recent moves to sell 
public dwellings to their tenants, and encourage substantially more 
private housebuilding than before (see chapter 6). Such developments 
mean that in effect private citizens stand to benefit from the new 
distribution of rights over resources, which apparently is taking place 
in the Soviet Union. Whether they will do so along with or even against 
local soviets, cannot be foretold. Either way, the role of local 
soviets in the housing sphere is likely to involve more co-ordination 
and planning and less direct and/or universal provision. At the same 
time provision itself may become less bureaucratic, more 'enabling1, and 
more in the nature of welfare than it is presently. The expansion of 
private rights will have both decreased and transformed the rights of 
the soviets. (Possibly to the disadvantage of the poorer and/or weaker 
sections of society: Campbell (1983) has stressed that, on account of 
their non-universal character, welfare rights are not socialist rights.)
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SECTION 4: Unauthorised Building in Greece,
The two examples from Britain and the one from the 
USSR have one thing in common: the successful upholding by a state of
that set of property rights which is consistent with that state's 
official ideology. In Britain, these were the rights of private 
dwelling and factory owners, but also - by extension - the rights of LAs 
over their housing stock. In the USSR, these were the rights of state 
enterprises to obtain and use resources in preference to other agents, 
and also to use the allocation of housing as a disciplinary means.
The efforts of the Soviet state to uphold their 
favoured set of property rights were more direct and brutal than those 
of the British state, which were more indirect and subtle. The reason 
for the difference is simple. In Britain the ideology of the sanctity 
of private property rights, and of the rule of law, was securely 
established, enjoying both historical continuity and at least implicit 
support by the vast majority of the population. This ’climate1 allowed, 
for instance, the 1977 criminalisation of aspects of squatting to appear 
as a dutiful response on the part of the state to legitimate demands and 
worries of the public. By contrast, popular support in the Soviet Union 
for the 'rights' of state enterprises to enforce their notions of 
discipline on the labour force, and more generally for the Soviet system 
as a whole, could not be taken by the state to be either 'natural' or 
secure.
There are circumstances, however, when a state may 
not be so successful in upholding the set of property rights that is 
consistent with its own ideology. This is likely to be the case where
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a state’s official ideology is not a ’representation' of the actual 
ideology that is shared by society at large, but some other ideology, 
and at the same time the state lacks the means, the will, or the
reason to enforce resolutely its own ideology on society.
Such instances of relative 'impotence' on the part 
of the state have been manifested, for example, in large-scale land- 
squatting, as practised in many ’Third World' countries (Drakakis-Smith, 
1981; Ward, ed., 1982; Angel et al., eds, 1983; Castells, 1983; Rodwin, 
ed., 1987). Another example is unauthorised building in Greece.
The case of Greece is particularly interesting 
because, although some squatting on state land has indeed taken place in 
Greece throughout the post-war period, sub-urban expansion has occurred 
mainly on land the new-comers had obtained legal titles to. At any
rate, the right to landownership of the vast majority of urban
immigrants has not been challenged. What has at times been challenged, 
what has been causing environmental and traffic problems, and what has 
been perceived as 'the' issue, has been the practice of unauthorised 
building (mostly on own land, I repeat).
Thus the Greek case diverges from the typical 'Third 
World' pattern in that it demonstrates (among others) a breach of 
planning regulations (such as they have been) rather than a land 
'invasion' by landless peasants. The issue in Greece has not been about 
primary distribution of, or access to, land, but about how property 
rights should be interpreted once a basic right of private ownership 
had been firmly established. As a result, unauthorised building in 
Greece incorporates aspects that are reminiscent both of planning
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problems faced by advanced capitalist countries, and of 'Third World1 
practices and politics. Let us look at it more closely.
Unauthorised building in Greece must not be 
associated exclusively with self-building. A lot of it has been, and 
is, of this kind; but a lot has been the result of contractual 
housebuilding. Neither has it been confined to the residential sphere: 
shops and warehouses, as well as restaurants and taverns along the 
Attica coastline, have often been established without planning 
permission. Finally, it has not been a 'solution' open solely to the 
underclass: villas have sprouted alongside one-storey, cubic dwellings 
made of concrete in rural parts of Attica or Salonica to provide week­
end homes for rich and poor alike.
The extent of unauthorised building in post-war 
Greece cannot be overstated. For example,
"[i]n 1958 the area within the approved Master Plan for Athens 
was 174 sq. km., or 17,400 hectares. By the end of 1962, 21.6 
sq. km. or 2,160 hectares of approved Master Plan were added. 
Approximately 45 sq. km. of built-up area fell outside the 
officially approved plan: of this, unauthorised residential 
developments cover approximately 35 sq. km. and the other 10 
sq. km. are mainly authorised development areas of industrial 
and military expansion"
(Papageorgiou, 1972: 480).
In 1977 the government invited people who had built 
illegally to declare their properties, so as to have them legalised:
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74,228 householders responded. In 1984 the exercise was repeated: 
173,584 responded (Ministry of Planning, 1984). At the same time it is 
highly likely that not all who had built illegally came forth on either 
occasion. In time-honoured fashion, ’planning policy1 in both 
instances, and despite the intentions of the Ministers concerned, did 
not go beyond the legalisation of unauthorised structures (Tsoulouvis, 
1987). As soon as this was done, the planners and their political 
masters were content that they had solved the problem of unauthorised 
building.
Contentment would last until the real problems that 
an anarchically built and growing city throws upon its inhabitants re­
asserted themselves - only to be rephrased as a problem of 'extending 
the plan1 (on paper) in order to legalise more and/or new unauthorised 
structures. Needless to say, legalisation has tended to take place 
around election times, and involve Acts like the following (come to 
effect just before the 1977 elections):
"Unauthorised buildings or parts thereof within and outwith 
approved city or town plans [ ], which were built prior to Law 
651/1977 [ ], are exempt from demolition, even if they
countervene the requirements of existing planning rules, 
provided their owners [ ] submit [ ] declarations [etc.]"
Law 720/1977.
In fact, I would argue that the political impotence, 
technical ineptitude, and corruption of the planning function in 
Greece, have contributed to a situation in which unauthorised building 
is just the tip of the iceberg, and a convenient distraction. For, 
truly, what is the big deal of having something called 'Master Plan'
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when
(a) it does not address problems of the quality of life and 
the structure of the city within its so-called 'approved' area,
(b) whatever its stipulations (if any!) about what should 
happen within the 'approved' area, they are not taken into account, or 
are even countermanded, by other Ministries, or by the government,
(c) there are no effective mechanisms for fruitful
consultations between either government departments or citizens and the 
planning authorities prior to drawing the 'Master Plan', or for 
implementing its stipulations, or for monitoring the degree of its 
implementation, or even for gauging the actual state of the city at any 
point in time, and
(d) there are no general policy guidelines, targets or 
criteria by which to formulate aims for, and judgments about the 
performance of, the plan itself?
In other words, what has passed for city plans in 
Greece has been mainly one-off, cartographic, street-drawing exercises. 
In this respect the significance of unauthorised building, i.e., 
building outside the land-marking confines of the official plan, is
A
mostly legal/financial and political, and not real. It would have 
been real if somehow the development of the 'legal' city were more 
closely monitored and influenced, and the city itself better organised, 
less polluted, more livable than the 'illegal' city. But it isn't. The
'illegal' city may be poorer, and its structures smaller, but it is as
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ad hoc, dysfunctional, and 'anarchic1, and as much the result of 
expediency as the more voluminous, legal city. Foreign planners 
visiting Athens have often not appreciated the extent to which the town 
plans they are presented with by their Greek counterparts, sometimes in 
good faith, are hardly worth the paper they are drawn on.
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SECTION 5: Non-repayment of Housing Loans in Greece.
This practice started a couple of years before the 
1981 elections, and spread rapidly after PASOK came to power. It 
involved mainly borrowers nominated by the Workers' Housing Organisation 
(WHO). Some of these formed pressure groups, and began to publicise the 
'rightness' of their cause (i.e., their 'right' not to repay housing 
loans they had received), lobby political parties, etc. This practice, 
like unauthorised building in Greece, does not mean that all, or even 
most, of the non-repayers were or are necessarily destitute; certainly 
many were, and are, not even manual workers. Some were and are perman­
ent employees of banks or other public sector enterprises (NMBG 
unpublished data).
WHO nominees received their housing loans (heavily 
subsidised by the state, and carrying fixed rates of interest) from the 
National Mortgage Bank of Greece, the biggest housing bank in the
country (with about 69% of all housing loans in 1984). These loans,
along with loans to earthquake victims and loans to persons named by the 
Ministry of Health & Welfare (MHW), were the 'social' loans of the Greek 
state, and were all managed by the NMBG for a nominal commission. They 
also got associated with increasing rates of non-repayment. By 1985 the 
NMBG felt it had no choice but to consider these loans as 
'problematical', i.e., highly unlikely to be recoverable (Mandikas, 
1985). At that time claims arising from those loans were equal to 56% 
of all housing loan claims the NMBG had outstanding - or 34% of total
housing credit outstanding in the economy - or 4.9% of all private-
sector credit outstanding (ibid.; Bank of Greece MSB, July 1987).
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Although the problem of uncollectability of those 
loans was crippling the NMBG, and was a source of inflationary pressure 
on the economy, the government would not even consider simple legal 
measures whereby collection of the debts owed, or repossession of the 
dwellings, could be pursued (WHO, 1984). The essential thing needed was 
to bring the legal status of WHO and MHW loans on a par with ordinary 
mortgage-backed loans. This was not done. The government also felt it 
could not easily curtail the WHO programme because such an act might 
"create more than 500 thousand frustrated, angry voters" (WHO, 1985).
Eventually, with Law 1641/1986, the government 
promised amnesty to non-repayers if they paid their initial debt through 
a ’rescheduling1 scheme which the government arranged for their 
convenience. Still, the problem has not gone away. The upheaval has 
forced the Bank of Greece to cut back on the total amount of housing 
credit that specialised institutions or banks can extend, and also 
to curtail the proportion of 'social' loans in the total - much to the 
dismay and opposition of the central government.
k k k k k
Already the contrast between Britain and Greece in 
terms of the extent to which households can or cannot get away with law- 
breaking is striking. Whereas aspects of squatting were eventually 
criminalised in Britain (and the practice has never really caught on, 
anyway), unauthorised building AND non-repayment of housing loans have 
occurred widely, and, more importanly, been tolerated, in Greece. Both 
countries are broadly capitalist, sharing a belief in, and having laws
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upholding, private property. They are also broadly democratic, enjoying 
parliamentary elections at most every five years, freedom of the press, 
and - ostensibly - equality before the law. Yet aggressive acquisitive 
practices flouting the law in the housing sphere are far more 
pronounced, widespread, and effective in Greece than in Britain. In
effect, property rights are defined differently in the two countries. 
For this reason they enable certain housing processes and constrain 
others in each country - or in the Soviet Union, or anywhere else. For 
example, the speculative housebuilding mode of Britain could not have 
grown the way it has, if large groups of people had taken it upon
themselves to 'colonise' the land that developers have bought and used 
over the years for landbanking purposes. Conversely, if the Greek state 
had upheld private and public property rights in a truly rigid and 
formal fashion, owner-occupation in Greece would have probably been 
significantly less than it is, and capitalism in the housing sphere far 
more securely established.
In the next chapter I examine reasons why property 
rights are defined differently in Greece and Britain. I also ask what 
the implications of differences in the meaning of property rights are 
for the housing systems of the respective countries.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 8
For example, owners of unauthorised structures (i.e., outside the 
formal city plan) cannot mortgage their properties in order to 
obtain loans.
Traditionally the Bank of Greece (with the exception of the 
colonels period, 1967-74) has pursued, and insisted on, sounder 
economic and monetary policies than the central government. To a 
large extent this has been the result of the bank enjoying relative 
immunity from the type of short- to medium-term political 
exigencies that professional politicians in Greece tend to succumb 
to.
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C H A P T E R  9
The 'Rule of Law' and Variations in Private Property Rights:
Britain vs Greece.
SECTION 1: An Introduction.
SECTION 2: Britain: The 'Control' Variable.
SECTION 3: Greece: The 'Test' Variable.
CHAPTER 9: The 'Rule of Law' and Variations in Private Property
Ricrhts: Britain vs Greece.
In this chapter I show how property rights which are 
manifested in the housing sphere are related to broader, societal 
patterns of property rights. I achieve this by contrasting two quite 
different capitalist countries, Greece and Britain. This is a more 
interesting comparison than, say, between the Soviet Union (perhaps 
before perestroika) and a capitalist country, because it can show how 
'grassroots' activity and local political conditions can affect the 
meaning of property rights, and the evolution of the housing system, 
even when two countries otherwise share the same fundamental economic 
orientation.
SECTION 1: An Introduction.
In advanced capitalist countries private property 
rights are interpreted and reinforced by means of the ideological 
concept of the 'rule of law'. This is
" at once a description of the structure of the State and an 
ideal. First, it symbolizes a commitment to the preservation 
of the neutrality of the State between classes and interest 
groups. [ ] Second, the laws are sovereign in their
determination of the issues of who should hold political power 
and how it can be exercised. [ ] Finally, the laws are
available and capable of being readily understood, and are 
enforced according to their obvious meaning"
(Collins, 1982: 135).
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Authors like Hayek ('1944: 54-65) and P. Johnson
(1984) suggest a strong correlation between the presence of the rule of 
law and the presence of market, and specifically capitalist, relations. 
The latter are assumed to be expressed in the private property rights 
traditionally and currently practised in the first countries to become 
capitalist, and in all advanced capitalist countries to-day. 
Admittedly, not all such countries have always adhered to the rule of 
law (cf. Nazi Germany). But there seems to be a long-term tendency 
towards establishment or restoration of the rule of law wherever market 
mechanisms and/or capitalism are found or encouraged: hence, for 
example, "Gorbachev's search for the rule of law" in the era of 
perestroika (Hermann, 1988).
Having accepted that capitalism and the rule of law
have tended to appear together, and even facilitate one another, it does
not follow that one need always be a condition of existence for the 
other; or that once the one is there, the other is inevitable. The 
experiments going on in some state-socialist societies presently may 
lead to co-existence between variants of the rule of law, and of private 
property rights, with forms of social organisation in which citizens 
will hold (certain kinds of) political power directly and statutorily. 
Political power might be used to prescribe and delineate fields and ways 
in which enterprises could operate capitalistically, but would not seek 
to 'move the goalposts' if certain outcomes were not liked by specific 
groups or individuals: grassroots democracy would be exercised in
accordance with the 'rule of law'.
A more immediate concern is to demostrate that
private property rights (a) can co-exist with various degrees of
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adherence to the rule of law, and (b) have different meanings, depending 
on how closely they approximate an established ('time-honoured’) 
conception of the rule of law (as is found in Britain, for example) . 
Whatever the case may be, the practical implications and consequences 
for housing system dynamics and for housing outcomes, of such changes in 
the meaning of private property rights, can be enormous. Let us compare 
Britain and Greece.
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SECTION 2: Britain: The 'control' variable.
Britain (not just England) has traditionally shown a 
very high degree of integration between its conception of private
property rights and the ideology of the rule of law. I think that one
important reason for this has been the fact that she did not experience 
a clear break with her feudal past:
"The social and the economic histories of England until the 
twentieth century largely converge around, or could be written 
in terms of, [the] rent relation. The fact that from quite 
early times the rent relation assumed the form of payments of
money is one fundamental reason why it is so difficult to
pinpoint the 'moment' when England can usefully be said to 
have undergone the transition from 'feudalism' to 
'capitalism'"
(Murphy & Roberts, 1987: 55).
As a result the emergence of private property rights 
went hand-in-hand with the preservation of traditional (feudal) notions 
of authority and subordination. The subsequent definition and exercise 
of private property rights was therefore bound to incorporate such 
notions. This was achieved by means of the capacity of the 'landed 
interest' to enjoy and exercise a very high degree of political and 
legislative power almost up to 1870. "Politics was still in the middle 
of the century 'to a remarkable extent the plaything of the nobility and 
gentry"' (Ryder & Silver, 1970: 64; quoting Clark Kitson, 1962).
I will produce two pieces of evidence to
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substantiate this point. First, the franchise in Britain was 
extended very gradually, and at each stage it was linked to amount of 
property owned. For example, although the 1832 Reform Act "enfranchised 
a quarter of a million new property-owning voters" (Ryder & Silver, 
1970: 73), the proportion of voters as a percentage of the population 
aged over 20 years was just 7.1% (p. 74); the 1867 Reform Act "gave the 
suffrage in boroughs to all householders and to lodgers paying ten 
pounds a year or more, and added one million voters to the registers" 
(p. 74), but the proportion of voters in the population aged over 20 
years increased to a mere 16.4% (p. 74).
In contrast to what happened in Britain, all Greeks 
over 25 years of age who were "owners or practising a craft in rural 
areas" were given the vote as early as 1844 - i.e., 12 years after
Greece re-established national boundaries. The franchise was extended 
in 1864 to all male Greek citizens over 21 years of age 
(Eleutheroudakis, 1929, vol. 5, p. 148). This instance of 'early 
parliamentarism and late industrialisation1 (Mouzelis, 1986) is part of 
the explanation behind the rise of populism and political paternalism in 
Greece (Mouzelis, 1978), and the attendant substitution of politicking 
for law-abiding in the country.
Second, in Britain competitive examinations in the 
civil service were introduced only after 1854; until then, the latter 
was characterised by "aristocratic patronage and domination" (Ryder & 
Silver, 1970, p. 65). On reflection, a civil service enjoying such a 
'heritage' was bound to be less susceptible to, or the object of, the 
kind of 'mob' or 'political clientele' pressure that from Independence 
times has caused the Greek civil service, for example, to become an
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instrument which the government of the day uses directly in order to 
curry favour with, and at the same time manipulate, sections of the 
public (Tsoucalas, 1983, 1986). As a result the British civil service 
has been overall less tolerant of law circumvention, better positioned 
to uphold the principle of equality before the law, and inclined to show 
less favouritism, than the Greek civil service.
The implications of these differing traditions for 
the state of the rule of law in the respective countries can be 
appreciated better by looking at the following two contrasting cases 
from Britain and Greece:
Case 1: The voluntary National Code of Local
Government Conduct in Britain states that prior to approving development 
schemes, or awarding contracts, any LA officials involved in the
proceedings must declare whether they have any familial ties with the 
applicant(s). The Code specifies that "even where no pecuniary interest 
is involved, 'kinship can sometimes influence your judgement and give 
the impression that you might be acting for personal motives'" (Macrae, 
1989). Because such a code of conduct exists, the apparent failure of 
Highland Region's planning chairman, Councillor Francis Keith, to reveal 
that he was the brother of a director of a construction company recently 
awarded a big contract by the Region, caused a major uproar, as soon as 
it came to light in August 1989 (op. cit.).
Case 2: Such a code of conduct is absent from local
planning offices and authorities in Greece. The results are 
predictable. In the municipality of Myrina, capital of the Aegean 
island of Lemnos, the head of the local planning office took part in
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preparing a new town plan, which she eventually submitted to the Myrina 
council and to the Ministry of Planning. Both authorities accepted her 
recommendation, and approved the plan: the council because it was
dominated by the local PASOK party, with which the sister of the head of 
the local planning office was very influential; and the Ministry because 
it relied on the Myrina planning office for information.
The plan was drawn in such a way as to make the 
value of certain plots and buildings owned by members of those sisters' 
extended family appreciate. They did not even hesitate to take away - 
on paper - bits and pieces of gardens and yards owned by many other 
people, in order to further their families' aims; neither did they 
hesitate to slaughter the traditional physiognomy of parts of Myrina 
while they were about it. Fortunately, the plan was withdrawn - for the 
time being at least - after a lot of people rallied against it. This 
happened in January 1989. An important reason for their success must 
have been that national elections were to be held next June.
The proposition that emerges from the above 
discussion is that the 'rule of law' in Britain is more securely 
established than in Greece. It is this 'fact' which informs the 
content of private property rights in Britain (recall chapter 8), and 
lends them strength. It is also this particular combination of the 
'rule of law' with private property rights that explains, in my view, 
the following three general 'facts' about the British housing system.
(a) Housing processes in Britain, whether market or 
non-market, have been in the nature of 'provision ' rather than 
'a c q u i s i t i o n Housing has been provided to households either through
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an anonymous market or by an often bureaucratic local state. Most 
households have had little or no control over the building and financing 
process. Having said that, I can also accept that in the last 100 
years or so many households1 control over their housing situations has 
increased markedly in relation to what had gone before: I can accept,
for instance, that political pressures that have resulted in more 
sanitary cities and the introduction of minimum housing standards 
represent an indirect form of 1 grassroots' control.
One area where there might be room for more 
household control to-day concerns the aesthetics of many dwellings, 
estates, and neighbourhoods. The overwhelming impression one forms by 
walking through many residential areas (both good and bad) in British 
cities and towns is how monotonous, standardised, and even dreary the 
landscape looks. One reason for that has to do, of course, with cost- 
cutting. Another, however, is the obligation to conform to certain 
standards set by the local authority. This, I suspect, is at least in 
part a reflection of the need (felt by various interest groups) to 
preserve a basis of comparison for estimating house prices: so that
buying and selling can be 'rationalised' and facilitated, and, most 
importantly, building societies and banks know where they stand when 
they accept mortgages.
Self-build housing is another area where households 
have little or no control presently (see footnote 11 to chapter 6) 
Access to land is a third. The 'rule of law' and strong established
property rights in Britain have in effect removed land-squatting (even 
on state land) from the realm of the politically possible, or of the 
practically feasible. Typical 'acquisition' housing processes - like
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sub-urban land colonisation and unauthorised building, which have marked 
the housing histories of Greece and many other countries - have been 
virtually non-existent in Britain.
(b) Capitalist processes in the private housing 
sphere have been preserved and even been enhanced, albeit in altered 
forms. Public housing and rent controls may have been a victory for the 
working class, and a defeat for private landlordism, but have also 
served to direct attention away from a socialist restructuring of the 
entire housing system. Such restructuring might, for instance, have 
included land nationalisation without market- or development-linked 
compensation, more democratic control over the planning process, formal 
as well as sustained training of the construction labour force (Ball, 
1983).
In other words, public housing provision and rent
controls were institutionalised in addition to rather than against the
set of property rights that in effect allow one to speculate with land
and buildings (remember, there is no capital gains tax in the vast
majority of dwelling sales in Britain), to create and hold landbanks
(within certain limits), to stop or delay the release of more land for
housebuilding, etc. Whether such rights should be curtailed, how, and
by whom, is a moot point. It could be argued that some of their
consequences are detrimental to the interests of the homeless, or the
poor, for example. At the same time it must be pointed out that whereas
+*v»
the private property rights of 19 century private landlords gained 
strength and meaning by that group's political power, and were 
concentrated within that group, nowaday's private property rights, as 
they pertain to the housing sphere, are much more widely distributed -
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chiefly because of the growth of owner-occupation.
(c) Traditionally dominant class interests have in 
places continued to prevail over the need to house the working class. In 
their excellent study of property and political paternalism in Suffolk, 
Newby et al. (1978) have shown how established farmers and rich new­
comers had consistently managed to frustrate proposals for more 
housebuilding in their areas. They achieved this by means of their 
control of most of the local councils - to which they were elected 
precisely because of their success in patronising the local working 
class. The following extract from the 1966 Survey of the Dedham Vale, 
prepared by the Suffolk and Essex planning authorities, serves to 
illustrate that achievement:
"In our view, the traditional peace and tranquillity of the 
Vale depends on keeping the population scale more or less the 
same as it is today. Natural increases from within the Vale 
should not necessarily be housed within its villages. [ ] The 
existing and anticipated future demand for housing is not 
accepted as an over-riding justification for further large- 
scale land allocations for residential development ... No 
further private or public estate development will be 
permitted"
(quoted in Newby et al., 1978: 251, 253).
Considering the destruction of many traditional 
rural and city sites and buildings that anarchic, individualistic 
development has brought about in Greece, I am not altogether dismissive 
of the sentiments and aims implicit in the above extract. Again, what
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needs to be underlined here is how traditional relations of authority 
and subordination, within an overall 'rule of law1 context, served to 
define and strengthen the private property rights of those who happened 
to own landed property in parts of rural England. This was so to such 
an extent that new homeless households had in fact had to migrate (Newby 
et al., 1978), rather than challenge the local relations of power - by 
squatting, for instance.
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SECTION 3: Greece: The 'test' variable.
In Greece private property rights, although 
absolutely compatible with market relations and a market economy, have 
developed and are often exercised in defiance of law and state, or even 
the legally and morally legitimate interests of other people (regarding 
environmental consequences, for example). The reasons are not hard to 
find:
(1) Greece has not experienced a feudal past, 
whether before, during, or after Byzantine times (Anderson, 1978, 1979). 
The local nobility, which might well have established a feudal system 
given more time, was swept away by the Ottoman conquest of Asia Minor
+- Vi 4- Vi
and the Balkans in the 14 and 15 centuries, an event which also
served to reassert the supremacy of the central state. The latter was 
the main mediator and holder of power in Byzantine as well as Ottoman 
Greece, its main economic interest being the collection of taxes.
One consequence of the liquidation of local
aristocracies as a result of the Ottoman conquest was
"an actual regression to clannic institutions and
particularist traditions among the Balkan rural population ... 
[a] general relapse into a patriarchal localism"
(Anderson, 1979: 373).
The liquidation of the local nobility and the socio-cultural 
'regression' that followed it go some way towards explaining why modern 
Greeks lack a tradition of acceptance of, and submission to, elitist 
authority and strict rules, which a rigid social and political
hierarchy might have made them accustomed to (the Ottoman authority
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structure did not provide a substitute partly because the Ottomans were 
alien conquerors, and partly because they were themselves subjects of, 
and dependent on, the Porte). Instead, Greeks have entered into a love- 
hate relationship with the central state. Most Greeks detest it, yet 
yearn to join the public sector; try to cheat it all the time, but miss 
no opportunity to demand favours from it (Tsoucalas, 1983, 1986;
Moschonas, 1986; Tsoulouvis, 1987).
Another consequence of the Ottoman conquest and the 
absence of a feudal past was that landed property in modern Greece was 
eventually very widely distributed . For, as the country was liberated 
(1821 - 1913),
"Turkish landlords normally and comprehensibly decamped with 
the troops that had guarded them, abandoning their estates to 
the peasants that had tilled them"
(Anderson, 1979: 393).
At the same time the modern Greek state, by proclaiming most of the land 
abandoned by Turks to be 'national land', made it difficult for private 
persons to become big landowners, and for a landowning 'class' to emerge 
and establish itself as such. Even some big estates that a few wealthy 
Greeks bought from departing Turks - for example, in Thessaly - after 
1881, were subsequently liquidated with the 1913-1923 agrarian 
reforms.3
On the other hand, the fact that the modern Greek 
state became the largest nominal landowner in the country (with perhaps 
as much as 58 per cent of the total agricultural area around the middle
A
of the 19 century ) allowed successive governments to engage in a 
privatisation exercise (i.e., to allocate or endorse landownership
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rights to multitudes of peasants) that spanned more than 160 years.
The same fact also served to encourage the pattern of paternalistic 
politics which in altered forms has been carried over to the present.
(2) A second reason for the way private property
rights in Greece are exercised has to do with the early suffrage,
which, as I have already pointed out, was granted to most male Greeks 
almost since conception of the modern Greek state. This fact, together 
with the nominal landowning role of the early modern Greek state, made 
it both possible and necessary for a large section of the agrarian 
population to rely on the political rather than the legal system in 
order to acquire or strengthen their rights of landownership. In turn, 
this helped create a political tradition and 'culture1, that has 
underpinned the process of definition of property rights in Greece ever 
since.
(3) A third reason is that the public 
administration apparatus (the civil service) of the modern Greek state 
has not been manned by members of a pre-existing dominant class or 
elite, but my members of the general public. The latter, in order to 
gain access to the public sector, and hence to a small but secure 
income, have only had to show support for the 'right' politician, the
'right' party, or the 'right' ideology.
(4) A fourth reason is a tradition of populist 
and/or paternalistic politics, along with a belief (mostly justified 
through experience) that formal laws are less important than having the 
right connections and/or political power.
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Table 9.1: Structure of Agriculture in EEC-12.
% of Agric. 
Employment
(1986)
% of Agric. 
Holdings 
LT or E 2 ha 
(1985)*
% of Agric. 
Holdings 
GT or E 20 ha 
(1985)&
Aver.
Holding
Size
(1985)
% of Agrii 
Area 
Owner-farm( 
(1977)
1 2 3 4 5
Belgium 3.2 25 24 13 ha 78.3
Denmark 6.0 2 54 14 97.3
France 7.6 14 45 27 87.2
Germany 5.0 16 28 16 95.7
Greece 28.5 46 2 4 80.5$
Ireland 16.1 5 39 23 99.9
Italy 10.5 54 5 6 90.8
Luxembourg 3.8 14.5 52.8 28.6 NA
Netherlands 5.1 19 27 15 83.6
Portugal 21 .5 74 2 4 NA
Spain 16.2 36 12 13 NA
UK 2.2 10 56 65 76.8
EEC-12 8.1 39 16 13
Sources: (1) Eurostat, 1988: 164-5;
(2) (3) (4) Eurostat, 1987;
(5) Eurostat, 1983: 250.
Notes: Less Than or Equal to;
& Greater Than or Equal to.
 ^ This is a misleadingly low figure to the extent that many 
peasants cultivated land over which they might not have had 
formal titles (e.g., 'national1, i.e., public, land), but 
were nevertheless effective owners, i.e., the landlord - 
tenant relationship was virtually absent or very weak. Cf. 
footnote 5 in p. 266.
These four factors have in turn helped reproduce and 
reinforce two seemingly incompatible things: (a) a set of very
'individualistic1 private property rights, whose exact nature and limits 
are determined more by the kind of political assets individuals can 
bring to bear in any particular situation, and less by laws that are 
applicable to all; and (b) a patronising, favouritist state. This 
combination is not only obviously inimical to the 'rule of law', and the 
emergence of a meritocratic society, but also to the expansion of 
capitalist relations proper - a point of consequence for the dynamics of 
the Greek housing system (cf. chapters 11 and 12 on the rented sector).
The extent to which Greek capitalist development has 
been held back by the above combination can be manifested in a 
comparison of EEC agricultural structure and employment patterns. These 
patterns are highlighted in Tables 9.1 and 9.2.
It can be seen there that, as late as 1986, Greece 
had by far the largest proportion of employers and self-employed in the 
economically active population, the smallest proportion of employees, 
and the largest proportion of family workers in the EEC-12. In 1986 she 
also had the largest proportion of working population in agriculture, 
and, along with Portugal, the smallest proportion of large holdings 
(2%), and the smallest average holding size (4 ha). Finally, Greece's 
proportion of owner-farmed agricultural area c. 1977, although one of 
the lowest in the EEC-12, was in reality quite higher than the nominal 
80.5% of Table 9.1. The reason is that a large part of the land not 
owned directly by the tillers in Greece is public (as opposed to being 
rented from private landowners). Since peasants who use nominally 
public land in Greece pay only a token rent, if any, to the state, this
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Table 9.2: Employment Structure of EEC-12.
% of Employers 
& Self-employed 
in Labour Force
1986*
; of Wage-earners % of Public Admin,
in Labour Force Family Employees as %
Workers of All Employees
1986 1986 1983* 1986&
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
UK
EEC-12
15.5 
9.4
12.7 
9.1
35.3 
21 . 6  
23.9 
9.0
10.7 
26.2
22.6 
11 .5 
15.5
80.9
88.5
83.4 
88.1 
49.3
76.2 
71 .0 
89.1
89.3 
68.8
70.6
88.5 
81 .0
3.6 
2.2 
3.9 
2.8 
15.4 
2.2 
5.2 
1 .9
5.0
6.8
3.5
11 .3 
7.3 
10.2 
11 .2 
10.6 
8.0 
10.8 
9.7 
8.1 
NA 
NA 
7.1 
NA
12.1
8.4 
1 1 . 1
9.8
12 . 0
8.2
14.8
9.7 
NA
1 0 . 0
7.8
6.5 
NA
Sources: * Eurostat, 1988: 130;
$ Eurostat, 1985: 105;
& Eurostat, 1988: 168-9.
land is effectively theirs (after all, their agricultural income is not 
taxed).
Another remarkable fact is the size of the public
sector in Greece. With the lowest proportion of wage-earners in the
EEC-12 (Table 9.2), as well as with one of the lowest figures for public 
spending on health as a proportion of GNP in the entire OECD,^ Greece 
has one of the highest proportions of public administration employees in 
all employees in EEC-12 (10.6% in 1983, and 12.0% in 1986 - Table 9.2). 
Notably these figures do not include employees of state-owned 
organisations, banks and insurance companies (most of whose employees 
enjoy effective security of tenure), 'lame ducks' under state control, 
enterprises in which the state has minority interests, teachers, and 
officers of the armed forces. If all of them were to be included,
nearly 30 per cent of all wage-earners would be shown to depend on the
7
state. That figure, I believe, had gone up to around 35 per cent by 
the end of 1989. At the same time the budget deficit was nearly 20% of 
GDP, and cumulative public debt had mounted to more than 100% of GDP 
(McDonald, 1989).
The strength of smallholders' interests in Greece
can also be gauged from international comparative figures on the size of 
the average retail shop, in terms of manpower employed. While one would 
intuitively expect that Greece would have lower figures than, say, 
Britain or Sweden (both far more developed capitalistically than 
Greece), it appears that c. 1983 her average retail shop employed fewer 
employees than Italy and Argentina as well (countries which in many 
respects resemble Greece - cf. Cole, 1979, esp. pp. 211-15):
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Country Number of Employees 
of Aver. Retail Shop
Population per 
Retail Shop®
Greece 1.78 60.65
Italy 1.87 58.04
Argentina 2.08 62.69
Sweden 5.43 143.55
UK 10.40 247.17
(Source: Tsiambas, 1986: 35)
I will not get into a discussion of how exactly the
Greek employment pattern has come about, or how it is sustained.
Suffice it to recall the combined influences of a paternalistic state,
early universal suffrage, and a wide landownership distribution.
Moschonas (1986), Tsoucalas (1983, 1986), Tsoulouvis (1987), and
Mouzelis (1978, 1986), among others, have studied aspects of the
phaenomenon already: For example, Moschonas has focussed on the
political power of small to medium traders and artisans, Tsoucalas on
public sector employment and, generally, the dominance of the state in
Greece, Tsoulouvis on the planning system, and Mouzelis on the history
of Greek populist politics. What I wish to underline is the nature of
Greece as a smallholders', market-oriented, and at the same time 
g
statist, society. Whatever its origin, this system is bound to
reproduce and enhance individualistic AND politicised interpretations of 
1 0property rights.
It is simple - and correct - to say that in the
housing sphere these property 'rights' have been manifested - and
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resulted - in the practices of unauthorised building, non-repayment of 
housing loans, breaching building regulations, and - importantly - a 
very timid state policy on compulsory purchase (EKKE, 1985). It is
also true that the kind of laissez-faire economic activity that these 
practices and policies imply are a primitive capitalist's dream. Closer 
scrutiny, however, reveals that at least in the housing sphere such a 
situation is inimical to the development of capitalism.
The main reason is that the wide distribution of 
landownership, and the relatively easy access to peripheral urban land 
associated with a 'Greek' pattern of rights, limit the potential demand 
for a capitalist's services - whether as a landlord or as a speculative 
builder. A market presupposes an unequal distribution of desirable 
goods for exchange to become feasible. Capitalism, in turn, presupposes 
the market (as a necessary, not a sufficient condition). To invest in 
the housing sphere, capitalists also need to ensure rates of profit 
comparable to those obtained elsewhere in the economy. Considering the 
long time-horizon for investment in physical structures, the best way to 
ensure that, is to utilise or establish a situation of scarcity, i.e., 
the housing commodity must be in some sense monopolised. These 
conditions are only patchily satisfied where the basic ingredient of 
shelter, namely, land, is more-or-less widely distributed or accessible 
over a relevant travel-to-work-area (like Greater Athens-Piraeus). As a 
result capitalism in housing in that area can only expand slowly and 
with difficulty.
The post-war development of the Greek housing system 
demonstrates this. Speculative housebuilding in Greece has operated 
almost totally through the ' exchange-arrangement'. This means a deal
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Table 9.3: New Buildings, Four-storev High Or More. On the Basis of Permits
Issued (number and percentage of total in each category).
Year Greece All Urban Areas G A P
m Per cent N# Per cent N# Per cent
1966 2,034 5.2 2,024 13.6 1,406 19.4
1967 1,545 2.7 1,256 9.2 833 13.5
1968 1,970 2.7 1,920 12.5 1,181 18.4
1969 3,301 4.7 3,212 20.1 2,172 28.8
1970 3,123 5.3 3,045 18.5 1,914 27.5
1971 3,568 5.6 3,491 18.6 2,225 25.6
1972 5,459 6.6 5,347 21 .3 3,550 32.4
1973 5,572 6.0 5,429 17.2 3,272 28.5
1974 1,721 3.4 1,635 12.9 987 18.2
1975 3,533 6.1 3,451 19.3 1,840 26.1
1976 4,697 8.9 4,602 28.0 2,699 39.7
1977 6,495 11 .4 6,281 33.1 3,408 44.9
1978 7,725 12.7 7,486 32.8 4,786 47.4
1979 7,141 10.9 6,875 29.1 3,844 40.1
1980 3,624 6.2 3,387 19.7 1 ,758 30.8
1981 2,144 3.8 2,039 13.6 1,099 27.1
1982 1,830 3.2 1,719 13.1 947 23.5
1983 2,359 3.8 2,238 14.5 1,190 24.7
1984 1,630 4.2 1,553 15.1 742 25.0
1985 2,085 4.6 1 ,992 16.7 980 27.4
1986 3,000 6.3 2,892 19.9 1,433 29.9
1987 3,104 6.9 2,957 20.1 1,430 27.7
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
Source: NSSG: various Yearbooks.
Notes: 1967-74: period of fascist dictatorship. 1974: Turkish
invasion of Cyprus, general mobilisation, fall of the junta; 
speculative building activity drops dramatically. 1978-79: 
introduction of rent controls; immediate impact on speculative 
building activity.
G A P  stands for Greater Athens & Piraeus.
between a plot-owner and a builder, whereby the former receives a 
certain proportion of the created floorspace (in practice, 2 to 4 flats, 
depending on the size of the plot and the permitted floorspace ratio) 
for allowing the latter to build on the plot: i.e., brick and mortar are 
exchanged for part of the landownership rights applicable to the plot. 
Needless to say, for such deals to make economic sense, the builder has 
to erect high-rise buildings, at least four-storey high (and partition 
them into as many flats as possible).
Table 9.3 contains the numbers of permits to erect 
buildings four-storey high or more, issued in Greece as a whole, in all 
urban areas, and in Greater Athens & Piraeus, as well as their 
proportion in the total numbers of building permits issued, from 1966 to 
1987. It can be seen that in none of the three levels of aggregation 
did the proportion of buildings four-storey high or more reach even half 
of the total number of authorised buildings. The highest figure 
achieved during the period was 47.4%, in GAP in 1978. Unauthorised 
building activity was, of course, almost completely non-speculative.
As expected, the proportion of speculative building 
activity in Greece as a whole was significantly less than in all urban 
areas, and in the latter it was less than in GAP. What is also striking 
is that after 1978 speculative activity, as a proportion of total, 
tumbled back to lower levels - one result of the introduction of rent 
controls. Although that was not the result that policy makers had 
ostensibly intended to achieve, the fact that it was indeed a setback 
for capitalism in the housing sphere, was precisely what made a majority 
of people in GAP - tenants as well as owner-occupiers - support rent 
controls. I investigate this topic at great length later. I show there
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Table 9.4: Population, Urbanisation, and Tenure in Greece, 1951 - 1981.
% of Households 
Owner-occupying 
& Occupying Rent-free
Year Population 
(m.)
g a p/t £ Inhabitants 
per sq. km. 
in GAP
Increase 
in Density 
(1951=100)
Year Greece GAP
1951 7,633 18.1% 3,221 100.0 -- -- --
1961 8,389 22.1% 4,339 134.7 1956/7 00 u> o 60.8$
1971 8,768 29.0% 5,949 184.7 1974 73.1 56.5
1981 9,740 31 .1% 7,090 220.1 1981/2 74.7* 60.0
Sources: NSSG 1977 and 1985 Yearbooks; E Nea Oeconomia, 1957a; 1957b.
n
Notes : GAP/T = Greater Athens & Piraeus into Total population.
$ Estimation, given that: (i) the proportion of owner-occupation 
(and rent-free occupation) in non-rural Greece was 65.1%
(from Table 11.3 of this thesis), (ii) the non-rural population 
(i.e., cities & towns of more than 5,000 inhabitants) was 
approximately 40% of the total, and (iii) owner-occupation 
among the peasants was virtually universal (say, 95%).
^  Data refer to the Neos Cosmos working class - lower middle 
class neighbourhood near the centre of Athens. This place 
could be reasonably taken to represent the tenurial composition 
of the GAP population (see p. 310 of this thesis)
Of which about 8.7% were owning-purchasing (Pirounakis, 1987: 
51). The rest were outright owners.
Figures on owner-occupation include small percentages (around 
2 per cent) of households who occupied rent-free (predominantly 
relatives' homes).
how the dwelling ownership pattern, and the housing processes most 
people in Greece have engaged in, made this kind of political support 
for rent controls, and their attendant deterrent effect on capitalism in 
housing, inevitable.
This should not really be surprising. Already there 
is an extensive - and growing - literature on the economics of 
institutions (Matthews, 1986; Coase, 1960; Posner, 1977; Williamson, 
1985; et al.), how, that is, different institutions lead to different 
economic outcomes. Some authors, in fact, identify alternative economic 
institutions with, precisely, alternative systems of property rights 
(Coase, 1960), or define institutions as "sets of rights and 
obligations affecting people in their economic lives" (Matthews, 1986: 
905). The dynamic of the Greek housing system, which appears as a 
struggle between capitalist and non-capitalist housing processes, is 
underpinned precisely by the Greek pattern of property rights, namely, a 
widely distributed land and dwelling ownership (Appendix II), and an 
individualistic and politicised interpretation of what one can or cannot 
do with one's property.
The strong bias of the Greek housing system towards 
non-capitalist, 'acquisition'-oriented housing processes (like self-help 
and contractual building, whether unauthorised or not) is one outcome of 
that pattern of rights. Another outcome of these demonstrations - 
and/or consequences - of the 'Greek' pattern of property rights, 
facilitated by rises in real incomes in the 1960s and 1970s, and a 
cultural preference for owner-occupation, is that the proportion of 
owner-occupying households remained high (never less than 65%) - both 
nationally and in urban areas - from the end of the civil war down to
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the present (Table 9.4). The significance of this fact is all the 
greater if one realises that during this period, Greece underwent rapid 
urbanisation (Table 9.4). In other words, modern Greece was urbanised 
and experienced her version of capitalism without either the private 
(or a public) rented sector, or the big, speculative, landbanking 
builder/developer becoming dominant - something that cannot be said of 
the urban histories of the advanced capitalist countries. Even more 
remarkably, post-war Greece has managed to achieve what is probably the 
highest proportion of second homes in Europe (see Appendix II).
The Greek post-war housing experience can be 
depicted as the uneasy co-existence of three major housing processes - 
one 'informal1, non-capitalist, 1 acquisition1-oriented (non-contractu- 
al forms of 'self-help'); another 'formal', non-capitalist, and again 
'acquisition'-oriented (contractual housebuilding); and a third, which, 
while mostly 'formal', has been increasingly capitalist and of course 
'provision'-oriented (consisting of provision of 'landlord' services, 
accumulation of dwelling wealth through the 'exchange arrangement' - see 
p. 23 & pp. 250-51 -, etc.).
The co-existence of these processes - their antago­
nism and complementarity - has been circumscribed by two sets of pro­
perty rights: one consisting of formally established rights, delimited
by respective obligations, and another consisting of a mixture of 
established rights and 'contestable' ones, i.e., claims. Speculative 
builders, plot-owners within approved city-plan areas, and many others 
with the economic means to build or buy within those areas, have of 
course supported and utilised mostly the first set of rights in their 
efforts to house themselves or others. By contrast, many without such
263
means, and others who have simply found it possible and convenient to do 
so, have sought to expand the definition of landownership rights, and 
make it include the effective right of a plot-owner to get away with 
building a dwelling in his plot even if it is outside 'the plan'. 
Countless others, whether owning land within or outwith the plan area, 
have housed themselves or built holiday homes by countervening one or 
more building regulations.
Rights are or become 'established' or 'contestable' 
depending on how the political and legal system treats them. In effect, 
this involves questions relating to the nature of the state, the form of 
government, and what the official ideology of the state is. These 
issues are taken up in the next chapter. What I have done so far is to 
show
* how the Greek rights pattern contrasts with the British 
tradition and meaning of property rights;
* how these differing traditions have come about, and how they 
have influenced housing processes in the two countries;
* that in Britain it is the ideology and practice of the 
'rule of law’ which defines property rights;
* while in Greece direct politicking at grassroots level, and 
a weak authoritarian state are part and parcel of their definition.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 9
This does not mean that British authorities never do anything that 
is, strictly speaking, illegal. An example is Neil & Annette 
Crompton vs Westbury Homes (Wales) Ltd (The Independent, 
03.01.1987). The dispute started when the company built two 
detached homes at the side of the Cromptons1 plot. The new houses 
were higher and closer to their property than on the agreed plans 
(1.8 m. further north and 1.8 m. higher). After many actions and 
hearings, the Welsh Office inspector who decided the appeal 
"confirmed that planning permission should have been obtained by 
the company before the houses were re-sited" (op. cit.). 
Nevertheless, he concluded that "[i]t would not be in the public's 
interest at large to require the demolition of the two dwellings 
and the restoration of the land to its former level" (ibid.). This 
ended the matter, while raising a question as to "how sacred are 
planning rules?" (ibid.).
Instances like this are, however, few and far 
between in Britain.
"For Ottoman political theory, the cardinal attribute of 
sovereignty was the Sultan's unlimited right to exploit all sources 
of wealth within his realm as his own Imperial Possession. It 
followed that there could be no stable, hereditary nobility within 
the Empire, because there was no security of property which could 
found it"
(Anderson, 1979: 365-6).
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The biggest single transfer of land to the peasants occurred in 
1917-18. It involved 703,000 ha (Rokos, 1982: 101), approximately 
20% of the total agricultural area.
Estimation on the basis of Rokos, 1982, p. 100, and NSSG 1985 
Yearbook, p. 151.
As late as 1981, 19% of the total agricultural area of Greece was
still nominally public (NSSG 1985 Yearbook, p. 151). Giving land 
and/or legal title over land to peasants was still going on in 
1985. In that year a programme was launched for the free 
distribution of 6,507 ha to landless peasants (Ethnos, 
25.04.1985a). On the same day a news item in small print read 
that "[a]bout 300 families of the Municipality of [ ] obtain legal 
titles to the building plots to which the state had transferred 
them after the 1984 earthquake11 (Ethnos, 25.04.1985b). News like 
this do not make headlines in Greece.
In 1980 these figures were: for Greece, 3.5%; for the USA, 4.1%;
for Britain, 5.3%; for Italy, 8.1%. Source: The Economist,
03.07.1982: a survey of Greece, p.10.
Calculations based on Tsoucalas, 1986; 
mos, 24.11.1983, pp. 25-31; 12.06.1986,
pp. 46-51.
Even in 1988 Greece had the smallest number of people per retail 
outlet from among 15 European countries: 58. That was lower than, 
say, Spain's, Portugal's, Ireland's, and Italy's, among others.
Oeconomicos Tachydro- 
pp. 25-72; 11.12.1986,
The average for the 15 was 103. (The Economist, 12.05.1990, p. 22).
See, for example, Smailes, 1987, pp. 63-4, in which he documents 
and demonstrates the nearly total dependence of Greek trade unions 
on state overt as well as covert funds.
I have suggested that 'individualistic' rights are those that are 
poor in 'law content', i.e., are not defined and upheld by means of 
the legal system, but by the individuals themselves in what is 
essentially a political process, a process of daring, imitation, 
entrenchment, and retreat. This should not be interpreted as 
meaning, for example, that Greeks are somehow 'freer' than, say, 
the British or the Swiss. On the contrary, the very conditions 
that make for the 'Greek' pattern of rights - a Leviathan-like 
state, excessive politicisation, etc. - reduce the rights of 
individuals as citizens.
The reason is that in such a system the civil 
service and other state institutions and organisations become 
highly and decisively partisan. Inevitably, individuals discover 
that only by organising into, or presenting themselves as part of, 
various collectivities can they achieve their aims when dealing 
with the state. As a result, it becomes difficult for individual 
citizens to be heard or respected. Ironically, the individualistic 
expression of property rights in Greece goes hand-in-hand with the 
suppression of individuals as citizens.
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CHAPTER 10: Form of Government, Official Ideology, and Housingr Policy.
The complexity of conflicts and group interests in 
the housing sphere invariably and inevitably draws the state into the 
play. A full discussion of the nature and role of the state is beyond 
the scope of this thesis (cf., e.g., Holloway & Picciotto, eds, 1978; 
Clark & Dear, 1981; Roweis, 1981; Hirsch, 1981; Bedale, 1981 : 37—41 ; 
Damer, 1981; Harvey, D., 1981; Jones, 1985; Healey et alii, 1988)
Still, the preceding discussion requires at least an attempt at concept­
ualising state intervention - or the lack of it - in the housing sphere 
(or, indeed, in any other). In doing so, I reject the notion of the sta­
te as an 'instrument' of the ruling class. At the same time I accept 
that the state is not neutral, but stands for something. That 'some­
thing' is broader principles of societal organisation than what is at 
stake in any localised social conflict, or than what is involved in any 
group's current interests. Its 'principles' may make the state 
support any particular individual, group, or set of interests, and 
indeed make it biased in its support, but not necessarily so. The way I 
resolve this ambivalence is through the notions of the state's 
political substantiation and the state's political constitution.
SECTION 1: The Form of Government.
In discussing the influence of the 'rule of law' on 
the way property rights are defined in society (chapter 9), I drew 
attention to a strong correlation between the 'rule of law' and 
capitalism. I also showed that private property rights, although 
fundamental to capitalism, can co-exist with differing degrees of 
adherence to the rule of law.
269
For the rule of law to reign supreme what is needed 
is a capitalist state in whose ideology and practice that rule is 
strongly emphasised, and a majority of citizens who believe in it, 
thereby enhancing the capacity of the state to uphold its principle. 
Equally, rights, whether about property or other types (e.g., welfare 
rights) have varying degrees of strength, scope, and legitimacy, 
depending on the extent to which the state (including law-making bodies, 
the courts, etc.) supports them. If there is no state support, as is 
usually the case at the initial, formative stage of a 'right', what we 
have is a 'claim' on the part of one or more individuals or groups, 
but not a right (Campbell, 1983).
A state, however, whether capitalist, socialist, 
fascist, or stalinist, can be expressed in a variety of political 
systems, or forms of government. The difference between the two is 
crucial. The 'intrinsic' nature of a state is given by the fundamental 
principles of societal organisation it stands for, both in terms of 
official ideology and in terms of political practice in upholding those 
principles. As Collins (1982) points out, official ideology need not be 
propagandist pronouncements like those that usually come from 
totalitarian states. In capitalist societies, it usually takes the form 
of a widespread sharing of a particular worldview (implicit as well 
as explicit) among members of state bodies and institutions, that 
appears natural and logical. Indeed, it has been held, for example, that
"specifically in the United States, judicial rulings made a 
contribution to economic growth because American judges 
significantly altered the English Common Law tradition by 
giving more weight to the effects of their rulings on economic
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progress and less weight to considerations of equity"
(Matthews, 1986: 911).
The nature of a state is the result of a revolutionary transformation or 
upheaval, that brings about a sometimes violent breach with pre-existing 
principles of societal organisation, and their replacement by different 
ones. Even the origins of the modern English state can be traced back 
to such an upheaval (Goldstone, 1986), despite the fact that the breach 
with the feudal order that it represented, was incomplete.
By contrast, the form of government matters 
precisely because it enhances or stifles particular kinds of political 
activity, or the political activity of certain groups in preference to 
others, and also because it affects the range of issues that are 
legitimate to address. As a result, it may provide the means whereby 
groups other than the ruling ones may become influential, or at least 
find a legitimate voice.
Capitalism can co-exist with many different forms 
of government. This requires a bit of explanation. it is true that, 
whereas non-capitalist economic systems have, as a rule, been based on 
extra-economic coercion,
"the generic character of capitalist society [is] predicated 
upon a fundamental separation of economy and polity"
(Giddens, 1973: 202).
Paradoxically, though, this separation does not diminish the influence 
of politics on the course of economic events. Rather, it serves to make 
people more conscious of the inter-dependence between the two, more
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aware of what they can do or achieve with either kind of activity 
(political or economic), and in this roundabout way bring both spheres 
into sharper relief than ever before in human history.
Thus, the form of government acquires particular 
importance in capitalist society precisely because people can, and 
indeed are supposed to, exploit it in order to pursue their economic 
interests. In other words, the form of government affects the degree of 
governmental sensitivity to popular pressures and/or needs. According 
to the World Bank, who should know of such things as a matter of course,
11 strong democracies ... have a tradition of consultation with 
business and labour; this facilitates acceptance of economic 
programmes. In contrast, where policymaking is conducted by 
technocrats behind closed doors, reform may succeed in the 
short term but may be difficult to sustain. Strong 
authoritarian governments - characterised by continuity in 
leadership, insulation from societal pressures, well 
established and integrated interest groups, and the power to 
enforce decisions - tend to be relatively successful in 
imposing the short-term costs of economic reform . . . Weak 
authoritarian governments, which maintain political authority 
through personalistic patron-client relations, tend to be bad 
at economic reform ... Here the maintenance of political power 
often depends on the discretionary use of public funds, and 
the reform of public finances, while economically rational, 
becomes politically irrational. Such regimes are likely to 
have greater difficulty imposing reform than either strong 
authoritarian regimes or consultative democracies"
(World Bank, 1988: 50).
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This categorisation is not without problems. 
Britain, for example, is a strong democracy, yet Mrs Thatcher does not 
have a reputation for consulting with either the TUC or LAs; neither has 
her reform drive lost impetus after 10 years in office. Greece, by 
contrast, while a paternalistic and populist regime par excellence, is a 
democratic country. In fact, one may easily find grounds for assigning 
Thatcher's government to the 'strong authoritarian regime' type, and 
the Greek to the 'weak authoritarian' one. Nominal democracy, in other 
words, is not tantamount to either democratic content or the 'rule of 
law' .
What is needed is a way of bringing together the 
nature of a state and the political system. The first kind of 
information is important because it tells one what kinds of property 
rights the state is likely to endorse, and therefore what kinds of 
vested interests it is likely to support. Formal accounts of the 
political system may be important only as long as they make it apparent 
who actually holds political power in society - and of what kind. But 
since this is rarely the case, it is preferable to go beyond formal 
descriptions of the form of government, and look into the extent to 
which the political system makes a government - or a series of 
governments - susceptible to 'outside' pressures or not; what these 
pressures are; where they come from; whether they conflict with the 
state's official ideology or not, and what the implications of such 
conflicts, or complementarities, are for the formulation and carry­
ing out of policy.
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SECTION 2: The State and Politics.
The influence of politics (i.e., political struggles 
and pressures as well as the political system) on the state can be
conceptualised by means of the following two theoretical entities:
(a) The political substantiation of the state, and
(b) The political constitution of the state.
The first is really another name for the nature of the state, as defined
in the previous section. I prefer, however, the term 'political
substantiation' because it implies a kind of dynamism, of 'becoming', 
that the term 'nature' lacks. The second theoretical entity means the 
process whereby the power of the state to control, constrain, and coerce 
is (or is not) exercised in the service of determinate social interests, 
and thus the process whereby the state can be said to express, or yield 
to, those interests.
The catch is that those interests may not always be 
the ones which are 'theoretically' dominant in the context of a state's 
political substantiation. E.g., a capitalist state is supposed to cater 
for the interests of capitalists, but in practice it may often take 
measures or adopt policies that are not apparently pro-capitalist. It 
is thus better to link a state's political substantiation to the 
'principles of societal organisation' it stands for, rather than to 
allegiance to specific groups. The political substantiation and the 
political constitution of a state complement and at the same time 
antagonise one another. This is because new developments, and the 
ascendancy of new interests, may at times antagonise the interests that 
the state stands for, and may even force the state to support them
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instead, while at other times may lend strength to those interests.
Greece provides a good example of this point. The 
modern Greek state was established c. 1830 by England, France, and 
Russia as a monarchy committed to bourgeois values. Its political 
substantiation as a capitalist state was reasserted in 1944-49, when the 
nationalists - with the help of Britain and the US - defeated the 
communists in a civil war. As a result of both 'affirmations' of its 
nature, the official ideology of the Greek state is about the 'rule of 
law1, protecting private property rights, enhancing - or at least 
tolerating - private enterprise, and generally upholding bourgeois 
legality, order and rationality.
In practice, as I have shown at length above, it
falls far short of the mark. The reason is that its official ideology
is in dissonance (a) with an ownership pattern that is by and large non­
capitalist, (b) with an employment pattern that is similarly non­
capitalist, (c) with the smallholder's, individualistic, non-capitalist 
ideology shared by most Greeks, and (d) with the large size of the
public sector, and the patronising role of the state in Greece. In
turn, the nominally democratic form of government has enabled the
social interests that have emerged on the basis of the ownership
pattern, the employment pattern, and the large public sector, to press 
more-or-less successfully for policies (or non-policies) conducive to 
what they see as their welfare. And to complete the circle, that same 
form of government, against a background of petty economic interests, 
has traditionally made it necessary for politicians and parties to
pursue populist/paternalistic politics in order to further their own
aims, thus re-affirming the importance of the state in Greece as direct
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(re)distributor of economic 'goodies'.
The results of this 'divergence' between state 
ideology and state practice, between political substantiation and 
political constitution, or between official ideology and 'societal' 
ideology (i.e., the ideology that is shared by society at large) can be 
seen in all aspects of economic and social life in Greece, and, 
inevitably, in the housing sphere also. I have already referred to 
unauthorised building, non-repayment of housing loans, etc. Let me now 
bring additional examples that show how the form of government affects 
the political constitution of a state - in this case, the Greek state -, 
and how state actions in the housing sphere ('actions' because 'policy' 
implies a measure of active commitment and consistency that has been 
absent from Greece ) can be conceptualised as resulting from the inter­
action between a state's political substantiation and its political 
constitution.
( 1 )  The Greek state has demolished many unauthorised 
buildings over the last 30 years or so (an action consistent with its 
official ideology). Still, such actions have been sporadic. 
Unauthorised settlements have sprouted and grown around Greek cities, 
notably Athens & Piraeus, only to be legalised subsequently (an action 
consistent with the state's political constitution), particularly around 
election times (effect of form of government).
(2) In the 1950s and 1960s the Greek state was 
careful not to permit increases in floorspace ratios (i.e., high-rise 
buildings) in many suburbs and neighbourhoods (working- as well as 
middle-class) around central Athens and Piraeus. This deterred
276
speculative building in those areas, helped preserve their traditional 
local colour, and, as regards working class areas in particular, kept 
land prices down. Indeed, as Emmanuel (1981) points out, had this not 
been the case, total housebuilding in those areas would have been less 
than it was, and many from the popular strata would have had extra 
difficulty housing themselves. That this 'policy' was a result of the 
political constitution of the Greek state at the time is made clear by 
the fact that the colonels who took power in Greece between 1967 and 
1974 raised the permissible floorspace ratios in many of those areas 
(including the Old Phalero suburb, this author's own, where the number 
of storeys one could build in a plot was raised from 3 to 7). This was 
so because the colonels' regime enabled a change in the political 
constitution of the Greek state away from 'popular' interests, and 
towards capitalist interests, i.e., interests that were supposed to be 
dominant in the context of its political substantiation.
(3) As an added gesture to capitalist interests, as 
soon as the colonels seized power, they repealed the first - and, so 
far, only - attempt by the Greek state to impose a capital gains tax on 
the sale of buildings (Papamichos & Skouras, 1981). The tax had been 
voted in Parliament in 1964 by the party of George Papandreou (father of 
Andreas) and the Left. It lasted less than three years.
(4) Finally, I should like to repeat that there was 
a dramatic increase in forest fires due to arson, and to rates of non­
repayment of housing loans in Greece after PASOK, Andreas Papandreou's 
party, came to power in 1981 (see Ch. 6). The populist politics and 
policies with which he secured his two electoral victories (the second 
in 1985) represented a further shift of the political constitution of
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the Greek state towards petty (in both senses of the word) interests,
and a further boost to the pattern of individualistic, 'lawless' rights
that is so characteristic of Greek society (cf. Marinos, 1987b).
Examples outside Greece are also easy to find. Let 
us look at some of these.
(5) In 1937 legislation on public housing provision
was introduced in the US. However, the pressures that forced the
American administration to even consider public housing (namely, the 
social after-effects of the Depression) were still weaker than the 
private housing market lobby. An 'equivalent elimination provision1 was 
written into the original 1937 legislation, which said that "for every 
public housing unit built, a substandard dwelling must be removed within 
five years" (Heidenheimer et al., 1983: 94).
The reason lay in the free-enterprise ideology 
2
permeating the American state, plus a political system that makes it 
particularly difficult for 'unorthodox' views to have much or sustained 
effect. In other words, the political constitution of the American 
state is very forcefully (even more so than in, say, Britain) geared 
towards the interests that are dominant in the context of its political 
substantiation, i.e., capitalist interests.
(6) Some of the more authoritarian Latin American 
regimes, faced with urban 'invasions' by landless peasants, have sought 
to manipulate these masses by turning a mix of paternalism and 
intolerance into conscious policy. For example,
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"given the way power has been unevenly distributed within 
[Peruvian] society until very recent times, the land invasion
must be understood to have been the result, in part, of poli­
cies that originated from various dominant sectors. Very often 
landowners and private developers have manipulated the 
squatters into forcing portions of the land onto the real 
estate market, by obtaining from the authorities some urban 
infrastructure for the squatters, thus enhancing the land 
value and opening the way for profitable housing construction. 
In a second stage, the squatters are expelled from the land 
they have occupied and forced to start all over again on the 
frontier of a city which has expanded as a result of their 
efforts. Nevertheless, the main factor underlying the 
intensity of the land invasion in Lima has been a political 
strategy consisting of protection given for the invasion in 
exchange for poor people's support"
(Castells, 1983: 191).
By contrast, the virtual absence of big landowners 
and developers from the Greek scene - a result of the wide distribution 
of land property - is a very important reason why Greek governments have
not been able to manipulate the suburban land issue, and by extension,
the settlers themselves, the way Peruvian governments have done. In 
effect there have been no private land-grabbing interests that the Greek 
sub-urban settlers have needed protection from, and Greek governments 
have usually chosen to tolerate them quietly (breast-beating apart).
(7) Similarly, rising real incomes in Greece during 
the urbanisation years (1960-80), and the fact that many urban
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immigrants could draw upon their countryside resources in order to gain 
a foothold in the city, explain why the sub-urban land issue in modern 
Greece has not been politicised in other respects too - cf. Venezuela 
and Turkey.
In Caracas, for example, barrios (shanty towns) 
"have grown up from invasions of unused areas in the city by mass
organisations with political power [ ] . To be an occupant of such
shanty towns means membership or connection with the group, not
individual choice of site" (Morris, 1978: 301). In Greece, by contrast, 
urban immigrants have bought their way into the city, since land prices 
were, after all, low in the ’periphery’ on account of the low floorspace 
ratios imposed there. Consequently, they have not had to engage in a 
political fight over a 'land issue', or pay a capital sum to a local 
'boss' in order to establish their right to erect a shack on illegally 
occupied land, as new arrivals at gececondu areas in Ankara have often 
had to do (Donnison & Ungerson, 1982: 70-1).
Overall, the absence of big private land interests 
and/or of local 'mediators' of power from the urbanisation process in 
Greece, has allowed a smoother and more direct relationship between the 
settlers and the state. Those settlers' main concerns have been (a) 
to be left to their own devices, and (b) to obtain infrastructural
utilities, but not to struggle for land, which was theirs anyway. This 
is why the political constitution of the Greek state has generally been 
geared towards the interests of the 'popular strata' more consistently 
than has been the case in, say, many Latin American countries, where the
3
power of big landowners is considerable.
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(8) Sensitivity to the interests of big landowners 
may explain state actions in the residential land sphere in quite a few 
cases, but it would be too simplistic to limit the explanation thus. 
Official ideology has a significance (an 'autonomy') of its own - in 
Greece as everywhere else. As a result,
M[m]any Third World governments still try to plan and build 
cities for societies which only exist in the minds of 
technocrats and politicians"
(Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1987).
Governments with over-technocratic and over-
legalistic notions of 'the good' city, have created a conceptual 
dichotomy between legal and illegal housing and land-use processes. 
This dichotomy, in turn, has allowed such governments to justify their 
ostensible rejection of squatting - that is, when they do not try to 
manipulate the 'illegal' settlers'. It is only in recent years that 
Third World 'self-help' housing is increasingly being seen in a more 
favourable light. The reasons for the gradual change in attitude are, 
first, the failure of past policies, and the fact that the failure has 
been recognised by influential international bodies like the World Bank 
and the UN (Nientied & Linden, 1985; Huyck, 1987); second, the retreat
of military rule in a number of Third World countries (cf. The
Economist, 23.01.1988), and, third, the fact that the advancement of 
market relations that has occurred in the meantime has made efforts at 
'formalising' 'informal' housing processes more viable than before (see 
Peattie, 1987; Klaassen et al., 1987).
(9) Let us, finally, look at state support for
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owner-occupation in Britain. From 1925-26 mortgagors could set their 
interest payments against their liabilities for tax. This arrangement 
was given legislative force in 1951 (Merrett & Gray, 1982: 2).
Initially, the tax system ensured that this subsidy was limited to the 
higher income groups. For this reason the 1967 Housing Subsidies Act 
introduced option mortgages "to allow households with low incomes to 
benefit from subsidy and to broaden the social base of owner-occupation" 
(ibid: 37). (Taxation of the imputed rental income of owner-occupiers 
had already been abolished in 1963.)
Mortgage interest tax relief (MITR) helped owner- 
occupation expand at a time when the middle class itself expanded to 
take in many from the working class, and the real incomes of most people 
were rising also. The percentage of owner-occupied dwellings in Great 
Britain was 29.0% in 1950, 42.3% in 1961, 50.6% in 1971, and 57.1% in
1981 (Boleat, 1986: 6). Even without considering improvement grants to 
owner-occupiers, and the selling of public sector dwellings to sitting 
tenants at heavy discounts on their market prices after 1981,  ^ MITR 
has been increasing dramatically. Its total has for a number of years 
now been far higher than the sum of exchequer housing subsidies to Local 
Authorities plus rate fund contributions plus housing benefit for rent 
to public sector tenants. Also, in 1983-84 MITR per owner-occupied 
dwelling was 44% of the sum of these three subsidies per LA dwelling, in 
1984-85 it was 51%, and in 1985-86 62% (Boleat, 1986). Still, none of 
the main political parties dares stop the subsidy (although both 
Conservative and Labour have tried to trim it) because over the years 
they have had to satisfy increasing numbers of voters who were either 
expecting to become owner-occupiers, or were already in debt, and 
therefore would not tolerate any government which might take this
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subsidy away from them.
The British state, of course, has had an ideological 
bias towards provision-based housing processes (speculative 
housebuilding and the housing market, and municipal housing) because 
these processes have been consistent with the 'rule of law1 principle it 
stands for. In this respect, the historical difference between the 
Conservative and the Labour party has been that the former tended to 
favour the market-oriented housing process, while the latter the non- 
market one. Both, however, have been equally averse towards 
'acquisitive1, 'grassroots' housing processes (contrast with Greece). 
It is this common denominator between the two parties that allows us to 
talk of a state official ideology as regards the formation and carrying- 
out of housing policy in Britain. This is also what made it difficult 
for the Labour party to formulate an alternative to bureaucratic public 
housing provision, allowing the Tories to appear as the champions of 
'choice' - meaning, of course, market choice. Expectedly, the Labour 
party nowadays has no choice but to idealise owner-occupation too (cf. 
Griffiths & Holmes, 1985).
In other words, it is not simply the pressure of 
voters that explains party political support for owner-occupation. One 
must also take into account how official state ideology has delimited 
the alternatives offered to the public, and how the state's political 
substantiation and political constitution have circumscribed potential 
'grassroots' initiatives, by defining what is permissible and what is 
not.
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SECTION 3: Housing System Dynamics: Change and Interaction Through
Patterns of Rights and Claims.
One can conceptualise the dynamics of housing
systems along two dimensions, which for the most part act con-currently. 
A vertical dimension, which is about the evolution of a particular 
housing process through time (e.g., LA housing provision in Britain, or 
self-help housebuilding in Greece). And a horizontal dimension, which 
is about the interaction of two or more housing processes at any moment 
in time (e.g., the private rented sector vs the public rented sector and 
owner-occupation in Britain; self-help vs speculative housebuilding in 
Greece; soviet vs departmental housing in the USSR). I will discuss
these in turn.
Vertical Change.
When people try to house themselves, or improve 
their housing conditions, they utilise both economic and political 
means. Exclusive reliance on economic resources means that people
choose to take advantage of an institutional framework, including a 
certain pattern of property rights, which will enable them to achieve 
their aims. By so doing these people give at least implicit support to 
that institutional framework.
Others, however, may choose or be forced to utilise 
political means as well. Their purpose will be to minimise their 
housing costs (monetary of other), and maximise housing benefits (often 
including a sense of personal or collective independence from other 
parties). Their claims may take many forms - e.g., demand for land,
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demand to occupy empty properties, demand for state housing provision, 
demand to build as, where, and when they see fit, demand for tax 
relief and/or other kinds of subsidies, etc. Their decision to form 
and press such claims will affect the political constitution of the 
state, depending of course on the correlation of forces. Eventually 
their claims may become 'rights', if they are legally established as 
such through the political system, or they may be thwarted and 
suppressed instead.
The more a state's political constitution is geared 
towards a specific set of interests, the more the 'rights' of the people 
who have those interests become a pattern, or structure, that enables 
their housing strategies to be organised in a cost minimising/output 
maximising way - subject to any overwhelming constraints that may exist.
An enabling pattern of rights, that is, can allow people to move some 
way towards bridging the gap that may exist between their (housing) 
needs and resources, but not necessarily all the way.
At the same time, a pattern of rights that is 
beneficial to some people, and enables them to pursue most successfully 
their goals of socio-economic advancement, may well in itself constrain 
the efforts of others. An example is the issue of squatting in Britain, 
which I have already discussed.
Whatever the output of people's efforts, it will be 
added to the existing stock of buildings, change the configuration of 
the physical landscape, and, in general, become a datum to take into 
account. It will thus affect the extent of any asymmetry that may exist 
between people's needs and resources, which they, or their offspring,
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will experience subsequently.
This, in turn, will induce them to modify their
strategies, and perhaps advance different claims in the future. It will 
also affect the optimality criteria under which the new strategies will 
be formulated. The cycle I have described will then repeat itself under 
changed conditions. In effect, what we have is not a cycle, but a 
spiral, in which the outcome of each round is internalised into human 
strategies that affect what happens next. Therefore, predictions of how
a housing system will look like two, three, or more 'rounds' from now
depend on getting right the strategies, and political claims, that
particular groups are likely to formulate, as much as getting right
future developments affecting housing conditions. This is very
difficult - the more so since an observer who attempted the task might 
well affect the outcome of the situation under study by getting ideas 
into his/her subjects' heads. In his study of low income settlements 
and the law in Mexico City, A. Azuela de la Cueva (1987) concluded that
"[a]ctual control over land, involving different modes of 
acquiescence by the govenment, combine with different sets of 
legal rules. The impact of that combination on the formation 
of property relations during the urbanisation process cannot
be predicted by any pre-given formula"
(Cueva, 1987: 538).
I would have to add, however, that an 'urbanisation process' is not the 
only set of circumstances under which new property rights might arise. 
It would be interesting, in this respect, to see what the effect on the 
exercise of the planning function in Britain might be of a clear
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majority of outright owner-occupiers, especially if for some reason the 
housing market became for a relatively prolonged period of time less 
lively than it has been traditionally.
Horizontal Interaction.
The corollary of recognising the enabling influence 
that a particular set of rights has on the growth of a particular 
housing process, is to recognise the constraining influence that it may 
have on other housing processes, which, in turn, will be associated with 
different 'rights1 patterns, or with different claims.
Consider, for example, the very hostile attitude of 
British developers and builders towards the employment of direct labour 
by LAs (Direct Labour Collective, 1978). Or the way private landlordism 
in Britain has been suppressed by, among others, the achievement of the 
right to decent and affordable housing on the part of the working class. 
Or the role played by the administrative determination of floor-space 
ratios in enabling or constraining the growth of self-help vis-a-vis 
speculative housebuilding in the capital of Greece.
In the last example, the rights of many people to 
enjoy a traditional-looking neighbourhood, and, in general, a more 
humane city, or to have access to relatively cheap land (whose existence 
was conditional on low floor-space ratios), were and are pitted against 
the rights of plot-owners and speculative builders to enjoy the kind of 
development profits that had been made possible in those parts of the 
city which had already had high floor-space ratios.
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Change and Interaction
This is also a case where one can see the horizontal 
and vertical dimensions of housing system dynamics operating together. 
On the one hand the practicable travel-to-work-area around the core of 
the capital of Greece has already been built up. Remember, this area is 
determined by the location of available employment, the availability of 
transport and other facilities, and the nature of work (e.g., whether 
it can be done from one's home or not). Already the grand-children of 
urban immigrants in Athens & Piraeus are coming of age, and for many of 
them it is often meaningless to buy land and build too far away from the 
capital, unless it be for holiday purposes. It is true, of course, 
that almost any point in Attica is nearer the capital than, say, Baldock 
is to London, yet many of those who live in Baldock commute to London 
every week-day. But in practice the absence of comparable transport 
facilities, plus, importantly, other amenities (like schools, shops, 
maybe tap-water, etc.) delineates a smaller practicable living area 
around the Greek capital than is the case in Britain.
On the other hand, present-day speculative 
pressures in the already built-up areas, or in areas adjacent to them, 
are making it increasingly difficult to buy or rent in those areas. 
One factor here has been rises in floor-space ratios, which the 
colonels' regime decreed in many previously spared parts of the capital, 
and subsequent governments have not repealed. This is a conflict 
between two different housing processes in Greece, and between their 
underpinning sets of rights - enabling to some people, but constraining 
to others. The struggle has been manifested primarily as a 'rents' 
issue - whether to have rent controls or not, and of what kind -, but at
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its root is a struggle between a capitalist housing provision process 
and the traditional 'acquisitive' housing process of Greece (see next 
chapter).
The result of these developments is that the nature 
of claims in the housing sphere has gradually been transformed. In 
addition to defending the effective 'right' to build outside the 
official city plan, and generally to be left alone to house oneself as 
one likes (and can), many in the capital nowadays press for rent
controls, rent subsidies, cheap housing loans, etc. In fact, Greece is 
increasingly getting into a housing mess as continuation of the old ways 
can only add to the environmental and traffic problems of the capital 
and other cities and towns, large-scale intervention in the land sphere 
is very difficult politically because of the very wide land-ownership 
distribution, and the state cannot increase its (meagre) level of 
financial assistance to dwelling-seekers because its own finances are in 
a sorry state anyway. (It is interesting to note that, for different 
reasons, an untenable situation in the housing sphere is being 
experienced by Britain as well.^)
Different housing processes, and their associated 
'rights' patterns, are not, however, always antagonistic to one another. 
Often they can be complementary. In Ankara, for example, the ardiyes 
(informal organisations for the supply of materials to gececondu 
settlers) eventually became very influential in the construction 
process, and even "able to dictate the availability of credit and buy- 
up land on which to erect speculative houses, thereby inflating the 
prices of adjacent land and houses" (Payne, 1982: 134). And the local 
government institution of the mahalle gave both political legitimacy and
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power to the urban immigrants, through which they could obtain municipal
infrastructural resources for their gececondu areas - even though
occasionally some property demolition had to occur (ibid., pp. 125-7). 
Equally, Peattie (1987) notes that "facts are beginning to be
collected on the processes of shelter production in the marginal [Third
World] settlements. [ ] The building process is [ ] found to be a
commercialised one, in the sense of employing paid labour. [ ] There
is a lively market for housing in the marginal settlements" (p. 268) .
Similarly, in Greece the self-help sector (including 
both self-building and contractual building) and the speculative sector 
have not been completely alien to one another. They overlap - for 
example, by employing wage labour, or by buying building materials from 
suppliers, or even by means of the same person entering into an 
'exchange-arrangement1 in the city, and becoming an unauthorised self- 
help builder somewhere else. It is precisely this mixture of antagonism 
and complementarity that makes the dynamics of housing systems 
fascinating to watch, and their outcomes so varied.
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SECTION 4: Housing System Dynamics: A Summary of the Main Points.
1/ The housing processes that households take part 
in, are, broadly, either acquisition-based (e.g., contractual building, 
self-building) or provision-based (buying or renting from someone else). 
A further distinction of those processes is into market- and non-market- 
based. In reality, one or more of these dimensions blend together.
2/ Households try to minimise their housing costs 
and maximise their housing benefits. In this respect, the relationship 
between dwelling prices and housing costs is crucial.
3/ Housing needs, like all others, change all the
time. Their satisfaction depends on existing constraints and opportuni­
ties - economic and political.
4/ Subject to these constraints and opportunities 
households form various strategies in order to house themselves as 
cheaply and as well as possible. In doing so, households enter, create, 
or abandon various housing processes. They also use economic and 
political means interchangeably, and often in a complementary way.
5/ As a result, households will at times utilise an 
existing institutional framework (e.g., the right to own a dwelling as
private property), and at times oppose it (e.g., if it grants
'excessive' rights to landlords or landowners). If the existing
framework is not satisfactory to some people, they will advance claims 
whose purpose will be to create rights and opportunities beneficial to 
them.
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6/ Success or failure in this process depends on 
the political constitution of the state (see chapter 10).
7/ The political constitution of the state also 
determines the kind of housing policy (or other policies affecting the 
housing sphere) the state will or will not pursue.
8/ Eventually a new institutional framework is 
created, which distributes new rights and opportunities among the
population.
9/ In turn, this framework enables certain housing 
processes and constrains others. It thus determines the viability of
each housing process.
10/ Meanwhile the extent of the satisfaction of 
housing needs has altered, as a result of new social developments, but 
also of the operation of existing housing processes. A new round in the 
spiral of the evolution of a housing system is about to begin.
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SECTION 5: Housing Policy in a Changringr World.
One conclusion of the preceding discussion is that 
what is usually understood by the term 'state housing policy' is not the 
only, or even the main, way whereby the state influences housing 
outcomes. Jones (1985) has pointed out that social policy makers often 
tend to confuse the output(s) of a policy (e.g., levels of spending; 
streams of professionals; buildings where a service is given; etc.) with 
its outcome(s) - how social conditions are actually affected by the 
policy or policies in question. Unintended consequences (whether 'good' 
or 'bad') often follow from them, along with intended ones (e.g., the 
discouragement of high-rise building after the introduction of rent 
controls in Greece in 1978-79, or rising homelessness in the streets of 
Britain as a result of the Tories' attack on public housing).
In many ways, therefore, policy is as much about 
minimising unintended consequences as about achieving stated aims. A 
sustained effort to co-ordinate housing policy with other sectoral 
policies, or different layers of government with one another, or 
encourage citizen participation, is a response to the first kind of 
need. Addressing the second kind of need means using tools like tax 
relief, direct subsidies, slum clearance, public housing, or 
infrastructure provision.
But housing outcomes are also determined by the 
absence of state intervention. I suspect this is likely to be 
increasingly the case as the modern world, in both East and West, 
deregulates fast - not least in the housing sphere. The recent shift in 
Soviet housing policy towards privatisation of state stock, but also of
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housing production, has already been mentioned (Ch. 6). Similar 
developments have been taking place in Hungary for some time (Tosics, 
1987; Hegedus, 1987). And,
"[o]ver the past ten to fifteen years, the United States and 
Western European nations have been shifting away from 
production subsidies in favour of housing allowances that go 
(more) directly to households. [ ] As the housing stocks and 
economies of Western European nations recovered from the 
devastation of World War II, the middle-class became less 
satisfied with the limited options associated with government 
provision of housing. [ ] This increasing citizen preference 
for greater housing options has reshaped government support of 
housing in a way familiar to the United States: subsidies in
the form of tax relief for owner-occupiers"
(Roistacher, 1987: 143-4).
In such an environment housing outcomes will be 
increasingly determined by people's activities at 'grassroots' level. 
Housing associations, co-ops, contractual housebuilding, and 
entrepreneurship will flourish. The housing tenures and processes that 
presently exist in Europe will multiply and become more varied. 
Although direct state provision of housing will decrease, states will 
get involved in the housing sphere by mediating between individuals and 
groups, who will be constantly attempting to broaden their own property 
rights, and perhaps narrow down the rights of others. Such people will 
be seeking legitimacy for their claims by recourse to the state, and, in 
the new democratic climate, by politicising the issues that affect them. 
The importance of the legal and political framework in determining
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housing processes and outcomes will become greater - in a sense, 
precisely because this framework will be 'negotiable' between people 
seeking to house themselves or others, and the state.
The liberalising Eastern European countries, the 
Mediterranean countries, and countries with a tradition of co-operative 
housing (chiefly the Nordic countries) are the ones to watch in this 
respect. Whatever the rate of deregulation, do not expect to see the 
landbanking developer of Britain becoming dominant there, or her 'rule 
of law' tradition triumphing across the continent. For one thing, a 
tradition of socialism and/or statism in many of those countries may be 
too strong to allow something as important as housing provision to be 
left completely to capitalists. The 'in-built' resistance of Greek 
society, and of the Greek housing system, to the spread of capitalist 
relations has also been pointed out. If anything, the expansion of 
owner-occupation and a widening landownership distribution, especially 
if combined with genuine deregulation, may well encourage the export of 
the Greek 'model' to, say, Britain rather than the other way around.
For another thing, the political histories of many 
continental countries have been too turbulent to allow people to accept 
the notion of the neutrality of the state. After decades of distrust, 
fear, and even hate of the state, Eastern European countries are 
particularly unlikely to incorporate the apparent orderliness and 
respect for authority that typifies British society, for example. 
They will probably adopt a 'Greek' or 'Italian' model of the 
relationship between state and society, in which citizens will be 
cheating the state while demanding favours from it, and the state 
itself will not be all that keen to enforce order for order's sake.
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Such a model will in fact become all the likelier if the employment and 
dwelling ownership patterns of those societies evolve towards the 
'smallholders' type as the state there recedes.
Whether housing outcomes are the result of policy or 
the lack of it, the way(s) the state reacts to individuals and groups 
who advance various claims on resources, or attempt to define their 
ownership rights, is a decisive factor shaping those outcomes. If 
anything, the preceding discussion has shown that the nature of the 
socio-institutional framework, including the main kinds of property 
rights and obligations that are recognised as legitimate, the structure 
of landownership, the extent to which ownership of economic assets in 
general is diffused throughout society, and the degree of adherence to 
the rule of law, are all important determinants of housing strategies on 
the part of various groups, as well as of housing outcomes. Thus, the 
influence of 'politics' on the housing system does not go away as a 
country becomes richer and the state more securely established and 
legitimate. In very real ways the influence of the state on, for 
example, the British housing system is paramount, and, I dare say, more 
profound and direct than in Greece. One needs only to consider the
emergence of public housing, the present-day curbs on LA spending on 
housing, or the control of LAs over the supply of land for 
housebuilding.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 10
In his letter of resignation to the Minister of Planning and Public 
Works, the Chairman of the Public Corporation of Town Planning, 
Settlements, and Housing (DEPOS), John Calantides, wrote that the 
Greek state had "no housing policy, not even guidelines ... [as a 
result] our promises, declarations, and state policy announcements 
have rung hollow" (cited in TO PONTIKI, 19.12.1986: 8).
Tsoulouvis (1987) is equally dismissive of the use 
of the term 'policy' to denote state actions in the planning sphere 
in Greece: "Greek planning is characterised by a never-ending
process of creation of plans that are not implemented" (p. 500) .
2 "The United States as a whole seems caught within an ideological 
framework that allows little else but the recreation in modernised 
form of nineteenth-century solutions to the housing problem" 
(Heskin, 1981: 199).
o
In Venezuela "there is an extreme concentration of land ownership, 
so that suburban land is in the hands of a few large landowners. 
Large estates, sometimes of thousands of hectares, may occupy land 
up to the outskirts of the cities, and if sold in their entirety, 
are necessarily sold not to buyers of a house plot but to 
developers" (Morris, 1978: 302).
4
Such sales contributed to about half the growth of owner-occupation 
between 1981 and 1985.
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c
And not only there: "Police used bulldozers to break down burning
barricades and smashed through the roof of a mansion yesterday to 
evict the last band of squatters occupying premises in central 
Amsterdam" in The Guardian, 21.11.1989, p. 11.
 ^ See "Housing crisis: Action needed !to stop catastrophe1" in The
Times, 15.11.1989, p. 6.
7 "Talk about immunity [from legal penalties when taking strike 
action] gives the impression that the trade-union movement wants 
to be above the law. That is quite wrong. The trade-union 
movement has accepted, since time immemorial, that it should be 
subject to the law of the land. The argument is simply about what 
the law is"
John Edmonds.
(Secretary of the General & Municipal 
Workers Union, speaking to BBC1 during 
the TUC conference, 08.09.1989.)
Professor D. Donnison has pointed out to me that the traditional 
British respect for authority may, in addition to reasons that I 
mention in the main text, be related to the fact that England has 
not been conquered and occupied since 1066 A.D.
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C H A P T E R  11 
The Greek Private Rented Sector, 1978 - 1990 (A).
SECTION 1: The Political Economy of Housing in Greece.
SECTION 2: Emergence of a 'Rents' Issue.
SECTION 3: 'Landlord' and 'Dwelling-owner'.
SECTION 4: 'Owner-occupier' and 'Tenant'.
SECTION 5: 'Tenant', 'Landlord' and 'Rentier'.
CHAPTER 11: The Greek Private Rented Sector, 1978 - 1990 (A).
In this and the next chapter I analyse developments 
in the Greek private rented sector since 1978, when rent controls in 
one form or another began to be re-introduced after about 20 years of 
'laissez-faire' in the sector. I do so using suggestions and insights 
from the rest of the thesis. My aim is to integrate political, econo­
mic, and social factors in a framework that both stresses the signifi­
cance of property relationships in the housing sphere, and illuminates 
those developments more fully than has been possible thus far.
In the present chapter I show that in Greece the 
categories of 'landlord', 1owner-occupier' and 'owner of one or more 
dwellings' are fluid and overlap one another - a result of Greece's 
employment, land- and dwelling-ownership patterns. Moreover, tenure and 
'class' in Greece are not correlated. The politics of the rented sector 
make sense only against this background.
SECTION 1: The Political Economy of Housing in Greece.
Elsewhere in the thesis (ch. 2, p. 35 & ch. 6, p. 
177) I suggested the use of two matrices for understanding housing 
processes. One that defines them along the lines of 'provision - acqui­
sition' and 'market - non-market', and another that combines housing 
processes and types of employment. On the basis of the first type of 
matrix, the Greek housing system can be depicted graphically as a 
system biased towards the acquisition-cum-market combination, with the 
other three lagging behind to varying degrees:
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Fig. 11.1: Housing Processes in Post-war Greece.
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The predominance of acquisition-based housing 
processes, together with the kind of employment pattern that characteri­
ses modern Greece (see ch. 9), have had the following implications for 
the economics and politics of housing in post-war Greece:
1/ Individual housing costs have tended to be low in 
relation to incomes (cf. ch. 6, pp. 154-55). The absence of big private 
landowners, incomes generated in the large informal sector (see 
Pavlopoulos, 1987), and a large public employment sector, have been 
contributory factors here. Civil servants, for example, have 
traditionally enjoyed a higher proportion of scarce and subsidised 
housing loan advances than their own proportion in the economically 
active population (Mandicas, 1972, p. 20; Pirounakis, 1986).
2/ Housing costs have not, in general, been part of 
the value of labour power in Greece, which explains why state housing 
policy has not treated housing as an item of contention between capital 
and labour (cf. Kotzamanis & Maloutas, 1985). If anything, 'workers' 
have enjoyed higher proportions of outright owner-occupation than the 
'middle class' (cf. Table 11.5, p. 324). The assumption of both 
employers and employees in Greece (recall, from ch. 9, that as recently 
as 1986 the proportion of wage-earners in Greece was just below 50%, 
having risen gradually from much lower levels over the post-war period)
Provision
Acquisition
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has been that, somehow, employees would manage to house themselves 
either through familial resources or through some acquisition-based 
housing process. To the extent that this assumption has been true, 
location premia or differential rents have had a less direct, and more 
gradual, effect on land and dwelling prices in Greece than in, say, 
Britain. The wide distribution of outright dwelling ownership has 
largely justified making that assumption. The reason is that such a 
distribution has implied (a) relatively easy access to land for 
housebuilding, and (b) the infrequent occurrence of identifiable regular 
monetary outlays for housing, like rents or loan repayments (as 
evidenced by the fact that in 1981 only 25.3% of households were 
renting, and only about 6.5% were owning-purchasing - Pirounakis, 1987).
3/ On the other hand, as I pointed out in p. 175,
marketisation of a housing process (whether acquisition- or provision- 
based) and the creation and distribution of private claims over urban 
and sub-urban land, always tend to increase real land and housing costs 
over time, especially for newcomers, other things held equal. In a
situation of lax planning regulations and controls, as in Greece, 
coupled with wide land and dwelling ownership, such costs can easily be 
contained by rises in real incomes. The reason is that there are 
neither big speculative landowners (or landowners/developers) nor strict 
local authorities to cause artificial, ceteris paribus, land scarcity.
Of course, availability of transport, and the geographical pattern of
employment, will still serve to define the habitable area, and hence 
influence land prices. But these two factors are far weaker than 
deliberate restrictions on the supply of land, as, in addition to 
other reasons, the transport system and the nature of people's jobs tend 
to be broadly compatible technologically.
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If, however, real incomes stagnate or fall in a 
country with Greece's employment structure and sources of income, the 
results of rising land and housing costs will be two-fold:
(a) Exacerbation of iflationary pressures, as the multitudes 
of small proprietors, self-employed, and public sector employees begin 
to charge higher prices to their customers, or demand higher pay, 
respectively. The way dwellings in Greece are at the centre of mutual 
support strategies pursued in the context of extended families (e.g., 
dwellings are the most popular form of dowry) explains why this should 
be so. And, in a vicious circle, inflation, however caused, further 
enhances the significance of real estate as a safe investment for self 
and kin.
(b) Emergence and politicisation of a 'housing issue', which 
in these circumstances will not be about introducing public 
housebuilding, or creating landbanks (this would hurt the interests of 
those involved in the acquisitive housing processes, i.e., the majority 
of the population), but about enabling financially the consumption of 
housing, where, that is, actual monetary outlays are involved. In other 
words, the 'housing issue' will be about regulating the private rented 
sector and/or securing subsidised housing loans from the state (or 
state-controlled banks). These are precisely the two aspects of the 
'housing issue' which for more than ten years have been politically 
'visible' in Greece.
Below I discuss in detail how state intervention in 
the rented sector in Greece has come about, and why it has taken the 
forms that it has.
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SECTION 2: Emergence of a 'Rents' Issue.
The recent history of rent controls in Greece has 
passed through the following stages:
a. In the wake of the 1978 earthquake in Salonica, the right- 
wing central government decreed that leases in the prefecture of 
Salonica, due to end within the period from 24 May 1978 to 31 August
1980, were extended up to the latter date. Later in the year, rents on 
dwellings were placed under a regulatory regime throughout Greece.
b. Between 1980 and 1985 five laws were passed governing rent 
levels and/or the duration of leases. Three of those laws were made by 
the 'socialist1 government of PASOK, which came to power in October
1981. Increasingly, the press began to write of a black market in 
rents, and of the deliberate withdrawal of lettable properties from the 
market.
c. On 1 Feb. 1986 the PASOK government initiated a 
deregulatory process in the rented sector. The process was sanctioned 
formally in law on 2 June 1986. The law extended the duration of most 
leases up to 31 Jan. 1987, and stated that rents on new leases, and 
on extensions of leases, effected after 1 Aug. 1984, and of course 
after 31 Jan. 1987, would be determined freely between tenants and 
landlords.
d. The 1986 law caused an outcry in the left-wing press 
(populist, non-populist, and even pro-government), who interpreted it as 
too harsh, potentially, on tenants. The government, faced with imminent 
municipal elections, decided to do an about-turn, and was discreetly
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committed to the re-introduction of a regulatory framework after the 
elections (E Prote, 4 Aug. 1986: 15; Claudianos, 15.01.1987: 12-13).
e. It turned out that it was too late: The PASOK party
carried 143 municipalities (47.2%), against 166 (60.1%) which it had
carried in 1982 (To Pontiki, 21 Oct. 1986: 3). Notably, the three
biggest municipalities - Athens, Piraeus, and Salonica - were won by the 
right-wing New Democracy (ND) party. As a matter of fact, many 
communist voters (approximately 10 per cent in Greece as a whole, but 
more highly concentrated in the urban centres) either abstained during 
the second round of the elections (that was the official CPG line) or 
actually voted for the ND candidates in order to pique the leadership of 
PASOK. In effect, both dwelling owners and tenants penalised PASOK. 
Tenants from all over Greece for its attempted deregulation of the 
rented sector, and owners for its about-turn. The 'rents issue' was 
not of course the only influence on the way the votes were cast, but it 
is widely believed that it was a main one (Marinos, 26 Feb. 1987: 5), 
especially if one takes into account the huge emphasis that the issue 
received in the press throughout the summer before the elections (see 
Table 11.1).
f. Much to the dismay of the pro-free-market press (Marinos, 
15 Jan. 1987; 26 Feb. 1987), rent control began to creep back in 
steps, first on 5 Nov. 1986 (Siomopoulos, 16 Nov. 1986), and then on 1 
Feb. 1987 (Nicolaou, 15 Jan. 1987). A new regulatory law appeared on 27 
May 1987. The law established a Minimum Compulsory Rent calculated on 
the tax authorities' assessment of the value of a dwelling, and a 
Maximum Allowed Rent similarly calculated (To Pontiki, 1987).
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g. 'New' regulations appeared early in 1990 (Sunday Eleuthe-
rotypia, 21.01.1990: 61), enacted by the coalition government which was 
formed because the elections of 8 Nov. 1989 resulted in a hung parlia­
ment. The conformity of the 'new' regulations to the pattern of inter­
vention already established was, if anything, striking.
Table 11.1 associates the above chronology with the 
way some of the Greek press have reported the issue. The reporting 
itself is sociologically and politically significant. It replicates the 
ambivalence characterising the government policy in the rented sector. 
For instance, newspapers with diverse political affiliations were 
careful not to side fully with either tenants or owners, but give the 
impression that they stood for both. In effect, this meant that 
newspapers, implicitly or otherwise, were blaming or holding responsible 
for the 'problem' the government alone. In November 1986, following a 
period of left-wing outcry at the attempted deregulation of the rental 
market, and after the government had decided to do a policy reversal, To 
Vema, a paper of the political centre, wrote:
"Tenants and owners disagree with the proposals" (16.11.86).
Seven months later, in the wake of the re-introduction of a regulatory 
framework, E Vradyne (right-wing) echoed To Vema thus:
"Despair at the rents law - Owners and tenants seek immediate 
changes" (27.06.87).
The contrariety and irresolution of government policy in the sector were 
depicted avidly and truthfully in the following extract from the left- 
wing E Prote:
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"In a reassuring tone the minister of Commerce [ ] affirms
that the basic provisions of the law that sets the rents free 
will not change. The affirmation secures the owners1 
tolerance and, in a way, wins them over at a time of municipal 
elections.
On the other hand, informal ministry sources 
intimate that the situation is under scrutiny, that data are 
being collected, and that the minister's wish is to take 
measures after the elections which will balance the 
differences between tenants and owners"
(E Prote, 4 Aug. 1986).
Another commentator summed up the situation thus:
"Left-wing parties focus on tenants, but do not abandon owners 
either, and even seek tax-exemptions for the latter. 
Conservative parties focus on owners, but clamour about rents 
being too high as well. The government always asserts that it 
satisfies all"
(Claudianos, 1987: 13).
The accuracy of this analysis is borne by the 
following extracts from the positions that two parties at opposite sides 
of the political spectrum have held in regard to the rents issue:
New Democracy (right-wing)
"To-day, there exists a situation that hurts both sides in a
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leasing contract. The lessee is faced with abrupt rent 
increases at a time when his pay-packet is reduced due to the 
incomes policy of the government. On his part the lessor- 
landlord has been excessively burdened by taxation, and lives 
in fear of a new rent-freeze. [ ] The New Democracy believes 
that every Greek is entitled to be an owner-occupier - and 
that the state is obliged to help the citizen acquire a home.
[ ] To-day, unfortunately, no housing policy exists”
(To Vema, 27 July 1986: 22).
Communist Party of Greece (CPG)
"It is clear to us that the government's decision to 
deregulate rents will not benefit the petty landlords because 
they, too, are heavily taxed on this type of income. The 
beneficiaries will be those landlords who, because they enjoy 
high incomes, are in a position to blackmail tenants. [ ]
First of all, the price-control of rents must come back. 
Second, repossession should be allowed only in cases of a 
landlord wanting the premises for personal use [ ]. Third, 
income from leasing of dwellings must be tax-exempt up to a 
specified amount [ ] in a way that compensates petty landlords 
for any loss associated with the price-control of rents we are 
proposing"
(To Vema, 27 July 1986: 22).
Clearly, the fact that the govenrment, the press, 
and parties in opposition have consistently tried to pursue a middle-of- 
the-road course in relation to the presumed divide between tenants and
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landlords, suggests at least the influence of large numbers of voters 
(and newspaper buyers) in both camps. I have actually calculated that 
in 1981 about 431,000 landlords confronted roughly 800,000 tenants 
ordinarily resident in Greece ('ordinary1 tenants), or that one landlord 
confronted 1.86 tenants (Appendix II). But these are crude relation­
ships. They do not capture certain crucial interconnections in the 
housing sphere that the pattern of highly dispersed dwelling ownership 
in Greece makes possible and, indeed, inevitable (ibid.).
The presence of such interconnections means that the 
political impact and significance of any rent control policy are likely 
to go far beyond the 'current' number of tenants and landlords. In its 
turn, the politicisation of what each party in a leasing contract can 
or cannot do determines the nature and strength of property rights in 
the rented sector. In this way a particular pattern of rights is 
created, to which the fact of a widely distributed dwelling ownership 
supplies only the basis. The eventual pattern of property rights 
influences the availability of rented dwellings, housing 'investment' as 
a whole, and the relative proportions of the two tenures. I shall 
elaborate on this process in detail, beginning with the three types of 
interconnections in the housing sphere that are relevant to the process 
referred to.
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SECTION 3: 'Landlord' and 'Dwellinq-owner'.
'Landlord' here is taken to mean 'owner of one or
more rented dwellings'. A 'dwelling owner', by contrast, owns one or
more unrented dwellings. If he or she owns just one dwelling, and at 
the same time occupies it, then he or she is an owner-occupier, 
otherwise I will be using the term 'dwelling-owner', or simply 'owner',
to describe such a person.
The boundary between 'landlord' and 'owner' in 
Greece is such that 'osmosis' between the two categories occurs 
frequently. Consequently, whilst some landlords may find it expedient 
to withdraw their properties from the rental market, perhaps because of 
rent controls, other people may enter this market as new landlords at 
their leisure, and yet others may have to do so. To all categories of
'landlord', factors such as the number of dwellings owned by their
families, the location of those dwellings, the current family pattern 
and its place in the family life cycle, the diversity of sources of 
family income, and the specific provisions of rent control legislation, 
are likely to be more important in their decision to leave or enter the 
rental market than the existence of controls per se.
In other words, the decision of a substantial 
number of landlords and owners, or, if one likes, of actual and
potential lessors, to lease or withdraw their available lettable 
dwellings, or have them repaired, is unaffected, or affected very
little, by government regulation of the rented sector. The cultural
2
determinants of this behaviour cannot be overstated. A Greek owns 
property in order to keep it; that property is not only, or even
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mainly, a personal asset, but a familial one.
In turn, this way of looking at property reflects 
the importance of the family in Greece as a mechanism whereby strategies 
of socio-economic advancement are instituted and carried out (cf. Tsou- 
calas, 1977; 1983; 1986; Hirschon, 1983; 1989; Hirschon & Thakurdesai, 
1970). Such strategies typically involve parents paying for their 
children's education until their late twenties (and sometimes beyond) 
or one or two family members getting tenured posts in the state sector, 
while other members chance their arms as self-employed entrepreneurs. 
Meanwhile the build-up of housing wealth creates assets that both 
enhance the life chances of marriageable offspring, and sustain the phy­
sical proximity of relatives through time. The strong familial 
interconnections of the Greeks, and their survival in an urban context, 
are themselves rational, economising responses in the face of adversity 
(Hirschon, 1983).
Remarkably, the accumulation of housing wealth has 
not always had to involve 'trade and bargaining' in some market, and, as 
a precondition of that, the build-up of market capacity on the part of 
individuals (or households). Simpler strategies, entailing minimal mone­
tary outlays, but presupposing a family working and co-operating as a 
unit, have achieved much the same result. An example is the formation 
of inter-generational linkages among family members in Greece via 
apportionments of dwelling property. In her study of the Yerania Asia 
Minor refugee neighbourhood in Piraeus, R. Hirschon showed how suc­
cessive partitionings of, and building next to or even under, a given 
structure could offer
"flexibility in providing shelter, and hence ... negotiability 
in strategies surrounding marriage as well as ... symbolic 
asssociation with the autonomy of the family"
(Hirschon, 1989: 134).
For such strategies to be successful, it has been 
necessary that planning regulations and building controls in Greece had 
been lax enough to enable a very large number of families to attune 
their accumulation of housing wealth to their life cycle and level of 
savings, and build the ground floor, or, alternatively, the first floor 
now, and another floor later. But the laxity of what has passed for the 
planning function in Greece has been precisely the result of (mostly) 
indirect political pressures on successive governments (see chapter 10) 
exercised at the level of yet higher collectivities than the family - 
that of the 'popular strata1 (cf. Emmanuel, 1981; Leontidou, 1985; 
1986). Incidentally, I would argue that there may well be a connection 
between Greek 'populism' (see Mouzelis, 1978a, 1978b, 1986, 1988) and 
the central role of the family in Greece. It is natural for the Greeks, 
that is, to seek and reproduce in the public sphere a parental figure 
precisely because they are accustomed to bowing to one at home.
Changes in the requirements of family members will 
affect the ways familial property is used in Greece. Whether, for 
example, it is rented to 'outsiders'; made available to relatives for 
rent-free occupation, handed down as dowry, or, occasionally, sold.^
The speculative use of dwelling property in Greece 
is usually directly proportional to the number of dwellings owned by a 
household, and inversely proportional to the expectation of
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1metastasis' (literally: going from one place to another) in the
owner's family. Intra-familial 'metastasis' is in turn a function of a 
number of variables, like weddings and, less strongly, deaths and 
births. The two factors together - number of dwellings owned and the 
expectation of 'metastasis' - mean roughly that bigger families owning 
fewer dwellings (in practice 2 or 3) are more likely to place the 
dwellings that are not currently needed (usually 1 or 2) in a grey area 
between 'suspended owner-occupation1 and 'lettability1 , than are 
smaller families owning more dwellings (i.e., more than 3). The heads 
of the second kind of families (who are anyway a minority in Greece^) 
are more likely to use the 'excess' dwellings (i.e., over and above 
those currently owner-occupied) as investments in order to secure rental 
income.
Another factor that distorts and/or reduces the
influence of rent controls involves the relationship between overall 
income and number of dwellings owned. The higher the proportion of
income from dwellings (or built property in general) in a household's
total income, and the fewer the number of dwellings this proportion is 
derived from, the more likely it is that the household cannot afford to 
withdraw their let or lettable property (-ies) from the rental market 
even in the face of rent controls. Again, the high incidence of 
dwelling ownership in Greece makes such households fairly common.
It must also be noted that in such an environment 
even dwelling-owners whose non-rent income constitutes a higher 
proportion of their total income than is the case for most low-income 
households, are likely to face pressures to lower the rents they ask. 
Pressures of this kind will become greater if some of the dwellings
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offered by higher-income households are similar in terms of construction 
and/or location to the dwellings offered by lower-income households 
(i.e., if there is a low degree of market segmentation).
In the absence of sufficient appropriate data (a sad 
fact confronting any researcher into Greek matters), I will try to 
substantiate some of the above claims by whatever means available, 
forming 'surrogate' hypotheses where necessary. Let us, for example, 
take the hypothesis that
the likelihood of 'forced' participation in the Greek rental 
market as landlord is a positive function of the proportion of 
income derived specifically from rented dwellings into total 
income, and a negative function of number of dwellings owned.
To form some realistic impression of the 
distribution of dwelling-ownership in Greece we must go to Appendix 2.
I have calculated there that around 1981 one 'landlord' must have owned
1.77 separate dwellings rented out to 'ordinary' lessees. This suggests 
that the bulk of these households must have owned one let dwelling each, 
and that the number of big landlords of rented dwellings must have been 
small. D. Emmanuel has concluded much the same thing:
"in Greece [ ], the incidence of [ ] significant landlords in 
the housing sector is negligible. In 1967, for example, 
landlords whose income from built properties of all types was 
above 200,000 drs p.a. made up 0.9% of all taxed landlords and 
accounted for 17% of the declared income from built 
properties. This does show a high concentration of wealth in
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the hands of a small minority, but is caused by the wide 
dispersion of properties among a large number of households, 
each owning a small proportion of them"
(Emmanuel, 1979: 89).
I would only like to add that a substantial part of income from built 
property at the top income level comes about not as a result of a large 
number of individual properties owned (of which dwellings are a part), 
but of the type of property owned - for instance, luxury apartments and 
villas, up-market flats in central Athens, centrally located shops and 
offices. Consideration of this fact makes one even more appreciative of 
the extent of dispersion of ownership of rented dwellings.
Turning our attention specifically to the contribu­
tion of income from rented dwellings to total income at various income 
levels, my surrogate hypothesis will be that
there is a trade-off between income from built property (which 
can serve as a surrogate for dwellings) and income from wages 
and salaries in all categories of income declared by 
households to the Tax Authorities. The trade-off is such that 
the lower the total income, the more important does income 
from built property become.
Verification of this hypothesis would suggest that a 
number of the less well-off, income-declaring households (or families) 
were strongly dependent on income from built property for preservation 
of their life styles. Such households would have therefore been more 
likely to be price-takers than price-setters in the rental market -
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assuming of course that at the same time demand and supply in the market 
for rented accomodation were roughly equal to one another. Appendix II, 
already mentioned, confirms that this was indeed the case c. 1981.
Evidence in favour of the hypothesis is presented in
7
Table 11.2. Several comments can be made by way of interpretation.
(1) Along the row depicting the low-income level 
(below 30 for 1974, and below 150 for 1979 and after) the proportion of 
income from built property is high and tends to increase over time. 
This, however, does not necessarily suggest a large number of households 
to whom income from that source is important. The reason is that 
because of inflation (see Table 6.7) the proportion of total income 
(and, presumably, the proportion of the total number of income- 
declarers) falling into the lowest-income category diminishes. For 
example, it was 4.3% in 1974, rose to 19.1% in 1979, when the threshold 
for the lowest-income category was raised from 'below 30' to 'below 
150', only to fall again to 1.6% by 1984. Thus, the year 1979 provides a 
more accurate picture of the income distribution of the population of 
income-declarers, and of the contribution of wages and built property to 
their total income than any other year in Table 11.2.
(2) I can reformulate the data for 1974 in a more 
realistic way, and also make that year more comparable to 1979, by 
compacting the first three categories of income for the year to one, 
'below 100', category. The primary data for this exercise are in TEE 
(1979: 30). The results are:
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Income Range 1974: Contribution to Total Income of
(th. drs) Wages & Salaries Built Property i/Y
Below 100 44.5% 18.5% 33.3%
100 - 400 64.4% 5.7% 54.8%
400+ 18.8% 11.7% 11.9%
I/Y = Contribution of a given income range to total income declared to
the Tax Authorities.
In this form comparison of 1974 and 1979 reveals
that in both years the lowest-income category was associated with the
highest proportionate contribution of built property to total declared
income. Moreover, the proportions of total income falling into the 
lowest-income-range category were significantly high: about a third of
all income in 1974 (33.3%), and a fifth in 1979 (19.1%). If the propor­
tions of declarers in this category roughly approached those for income, 
then a third and a fifth of declarers, in 1974 and 1979 respectively,
relied quite substantially on income from built property. That kind of
income made up 18.5% of the total income of the lowest-range category in 
1974, and 26.1% in 1979. More likely, in the mid- to late 1970s, the 
real proportions were somewhere in the middle. That is,
approximately the bottom quarter of income-declaring 
households relied on income from built property for about one
O
fifth of their total income.
(3) Looking at the series of years from 1979 to 
1984, one is struck by the steady increase in the proportion of income 
from built property in the lowest-income-range category as inflation 
diminishes the proportion of total income (and of the total number of
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declarers) falling into the 'below 150' category. The proportion rose 
from 26.1% in 1979 to 47.1% in 1983, and only began to fall in 1984 
(26.9%) as inflation finally pushed most of those who received income 
from property to the category above (150 - 200), and left the least 
wealthy behind as a residual.
(4) The reformulated data from 1974 and those from 
1979 are also interesting because they suggest that income from built 
property contributed proportionately more to the income of the lowest- 
and highest-income groups than to the income of those in the middle 
ranges of income:
1974
Income Range Income from 
(th. drs) Built Property
Income Range 
(th. drs)
1979
Income from 
Built Property
Below 100
100 - 400 
400+
17.6*
5.7^ 
11 .73
Below 150 
150 - 200 
200 - 300 
300 - 500 
500+
26.15
14.85
0.05
4.15
7.35
This pattern does not contradict my initial 
'surrogate' hypothesis (p. 315), but, rather, corrects it by adding 
strength to the notion of the importance of wealth in the form of built 
property in Greece. The wealth of most lower-income households is, to a 
large extent, in the form of housing, including rented dwellings (or was 
in the period under study). On their part, the richest invest heavily 
in built property. And it is only the middle-income groups (i.e., not 
yet rich enough to invest significantly in built property) who appear to
318
earn relatively more from other sources than from built property. As a 
result they are likely to have a greater propensity than the lowest- 
income groups to divert their higher incomes to bank deposits, gold 
sovereigns (see Bank of Greece Annual Report, 1964: 15; 1965: 84), life 
assurance policies (a little), and cars and other consumer durables.
Another hypothesis I have advanced in this section
is that
the number of dwellings owned, together with the 
prospect of intra-familial 'metastasis' (see p. 313), are more 
important influences on decisions to enter or leave the rental 
market than rent control per se.
Again, the validity of this hypothesis cannot be 
tested accurately because direct evidence is lacking. Available evidence 
merely points to the tendency of many landlords, who want to repossess 
their rented dwellings, to offer 'repossession for the purpose of owner- 
occupation1, usually by first-degree relatives, as the reason - and that 
is all. The reason is valid under Greek law provided repossession 
follows expiry of the lease contract, and is also carried out for the 
stated purpose, i.e., if the reason is not proven ex post to have been a 
mere excuse to throw a tenant out. Of course one expects that a number 
of landlords will use that loophole if they feel if profitable to do so, 
and if they can get away with it. But the point is that one can only 
tell genuine cases of 'repossession for owner-occupation' from false 
ones with great difficulty and/or at great cost. It is no wonder that 
during the deregulated 1986 the number of repossession notes lodged with
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courts, most of which invoked owner-occupation as the ostensible reason 
(E Prote, 4 August 1986, p. 15), and some, no doubt, as the true reason, 
increased dramatically:
"... over the last two months [i.e., June and July 1986, just
after the deregulatory law had been passed on June 2nd - NP]
repossessions in Salonica [on the basis of court-lodged notes
- NP] rose by 90.4% in comparison to the same period last
year, whilst during the first seven months of 1986 ... by
62.25% in comparison to the corresponding period of 1985 [the
1 nderegulatory process had begun on Feb. 1st, 1986 - NP]
(ibid.).
E Prote further commented that
"[t]he situation is caused by landlords who utilise the excuse 
of owner-occupation in order to throw tenants out, and who are 
forced to leave even before a court hearing as such a 
procedure is costly and the law itself is pro-landlord. 
Consequently actual repossessions are a multiple of the notes 
lodged with courts"
(ibid.).
The law does require that repossession on the 
grounds of owner-occupation must be used for such, but the onus of 
proving the ’misuse1 of repossession, if any, lies with the ousted 
tenant. The latter, it seems, "very rarely monitors and reports any 
possible 'breaches of stated intention1 on the landlord's part" (Papa- 
yannakis, 1986). Thus, the number of true 'metastasis' cases cannot be 
ascertained through a survey because it will be very difficult to
320
disentangle 'truth' from 'falsehood'. A landlord who has lodged a 
repossession note with a court cannot be expected to confide to an 
interviewer that what he or she intends to do is offer the repossessed 
property to the highest bidder rather than let a son or daughter have 
it. Obviously, direct monitoring of 'breaches of intention' at a 
substantial scale is a task for a state agency. On the other hand, 
looking at repossession court cases of earlier years would be an irrele­
vant exercise precisely because prior to 1978, and even prior to 1983, 
the rented sector was ostensibly unproblematical. What we really need 
is the social history of a given dwelling: when it was built or bought,
by whom, how the owner's family has evolved since, whether the property 
was intially owner-occupied or rented, whether there have been changes 
of tenure status, and for what reason. This is a formidable endeavour 
even if the sample size is kept small, say, one per cent of all regular 
dwellings in Athens.
At any rate, the practical significance of the 
'metastasis' hypothesis is that landlord households owning one or, in 
some cases, two dwellings, and expecting an inta-familial 'metastasis' 
in the short- to medium-term (one to five years), may be less inclined 
to bother throwing out a regularly paying tenant, advertising, losing 
income while the property is vacant, possibly effecting a few repairs, 
and taking in an 'unknown quantity', than households with different 
characteristics. Further, even the prospect of a rent increase - within 
limits - obtained from a new tenant (an increase that cannot be 
spectacular since, after all, in 1981 one landlord confronted 1.86 
tenants), may not be enough to induce them to bother.
321
Table 11.3: Occupation/Profession & Tenure in Non-rural Greece.— c. 1957.
Occupation/
Profession
; in the 
sample
Tenure of Households 
Per cent: 
Owner-occupying Renting Under
& Occupying a Rent Control
Civil servants 9.2
Civil service
pensioners 6.3
Other pension­
ers 9.8
Labourers 17.1
Private sector 
clerical 
staff & an­
cillary staff 10.3
Solicitors &
Notaries 0.5
Other Professi­
onals &
Self-employed 46.8
Rent-free"
57.3
55.5
68.9
66.1
51 .6
51 .8
Regime
10.4 
8.3
6.8
15.5
25.7
26.8
69.9 16.8
T O T A L 1 0 0 . 0 65.1 15.4
Notes: Cities and towns of more than 5,000 inhabitants
Approximately 92% and 8%, respectively,
Source: E Nea Oeconomia, 1957a,
Renting Under 
a Liberal 
Regime
32.3
36.2
24.3
18.4
22.7 
21 .4
13.2
19.4
SECTION 4: 'Owner-occupier * and 1 Tenant1.
There is a high likelihood that both owner-occupiers
1 1and tenants 'belong' to the same 'class' - as judged by such a proxy
for class as occupation and/or profession. I can support this claim by
reference to the results of a 1957 survey conducted by the NSSG
(coverage: 719,500 families (sic) residing in cities and towns of more
than 5,000 inhabitants). This is one of the few Greek studies that
1 2associate - however incompletely or inaccurately - occupation and/or 
profession and tenure. The results of the survey are summarised in 
Table 11.3, the emerging pattern being one of no correlation between 
tenure and occupation/profession.
Further evidence that 1 class1 and ' tenure' in urban 
Greece are not correlated is in a study of the Neos Cosmos suburb of 
Athens that the Social Security Foundation (IKA) carried out in 1956.
The choice of the suburb was conditioned by, among others, the fact that
it was "mixed, i.e., it had neither a purely working-class population 
like, for instance, Drapetsona, nor refugees alone like, for example, 
Asyrmatos. In addition, it is a relatively new area of Athens since 
many of its inhabitants (21%) settled there after 1 940" (E Nea
Oeconomia, 1957b: 618). The survey covered 13,775 families, or 44,714 
persons. As it conveyed information on both the tenure and the
amenities distributions in Neos Cosmos, it will be interesting to see 
whether bad housing (another proxy for 'class') coincided with any
particular tenure. The results of the survey are summarised in Table
11.4.
Given that the 13,775 families in the survey area
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Table 11.4: Tenures & Physical Features of the Housing Stock in Neos
Cosmos, Athens, Greece, c. 1956.
Total
56.4% 
39.2% 
4.4% 
1 0 0.0%
Physical Features of the Dwelling Stock
Damp 51.6%
Inside Kitchen 60.0%
Tap Water 51.0%
Bathroom 8.0%
Sewerage Connection 7.0%
Household Tenure Settled Prior Settled
to 1940 1940 - 1956
Owner-occupiers 60.9% 38.7%
Renting 34.8% 56.4%
Occupying rent-free 4.3% 4.9%
All 100.0% 100.0%
Source: E Nea Oeconomia, 1957b.
had 28,080 rooms at their disposal, 88% of which were deemed fit for 
habitation, overcrowding, in the sense of two or more families occupying 
the same dwelling, must have been negligible or even non-existent. This 
means that one can associate households and dwellings on a one-to-one 
basis. If so, the proportions of dwellings which were damp, had no 
tap water, no inside kitchen, no sewer, and no bathroom, were in excess, 
or far in excess, of the proportion of rented dwellings. In other
words, to a significant extent owner-occupiers and tenants faced much 
the same (bad) housing conditions. If different grades of housing 
quality are sometimes taken to imply class differences, perhaps in
Giddens1 sense of 'distributive groupings' (Giddens, 1973: 109), then
clearly in the Neos Cosmos case tenure was not a predictor of 'class', 
the same way that in Table 11.3 occupation/profession (or 'class') was 
not a predictor of tenure. If anything, the period of settlement in the 
area was a far stronger influence on tenure than 'class'.
Let us, finally, look at some of the results of the
1974 Household Expenditure Survey, carried out by the NSSG. That survey 
again associates the profession of the heads of households with tenure 
(Table 11.5).
Notably, it is the very high owner-occupation rate 
among peasants and fishermen, and their high proportion in the Greek 
population (about a third), that brings down the proportion of renting 
households among all households (see Table 9.4 for the tenure distribu­
tion at various points in time in Greece). Apart from that, the 
striking conclusion is that household heads higher up in the occupation­
al hierarchy seemed to be in the rented sector proportionately more 
often than those below. In a way this is consistent with one of my
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Table 11.5: Renting Households By Household Head's Profession. Greece,
1 9 7 4 .
Profession of Household Head Renting Households
(% of occupational group)
All Households 26.9%
Scientists, liberal professionals,
technical assistants 44.9
Directors and managers 43.9
Clerical staff 41 .9
Providers of services 37.9
Workers (skilled & unskilled) 35.7
Traders and shop assistants 27.7
Non-working 25.0
Farmers, fishermen, et alii 2.7
Source: TEE, Jan. 1979, p. 29.
conclusions from the previous section, whereby at middle income levels 
the proportion of income from built property into total declared income 
declined.
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SECTION 5: 'Tenant1. 'Landlord' and 'Rentier1,
Quite often landlord and tenant belong to the same 
'class1/ and even when they do not (according to some criteria of 
'class')/ it is not always safe to assume that it is the landlord who is 
'superior'. Evidence for this lies in the fact that all socio-economic 
groups (SEG) in Greece enjoy income from built property.
For example, between 1974 and 1984 those described 
as 'rentiers' by the Tax Authorities declared income which was derived 
from various sources thus (TEE, 1979; NSSG, 1977: 405; 1985: 394):
1974 1976 1984
52.2% 55.0% 45.0%
3.0% 3.6% 0.1%
16.6% 22.5% 38.7%
25.8% 17.0% 12.9%
2.4% 1.9% 3.3%
In the same years the composition of the declared 
income of those described as 'merchants, industrialists, artisans' was 
like this:
1974 1976 1984
Built property 8.6% 10.0% 11 .2%
Securities 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
Wages & salaries 10.1% 13.9% 19.0%
Enterprise 78.4% 73.1% 68.1%
Misc. 2.4% 2.5% 1 .2%
Of those described as 'wage-earners', it was like
Built property 
Securities 
Wages & salaries 
Enterprise 
Misc.
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this:
1974 1976 1984
Built property 4.5% 3.9% 2.8%
Securities 0.4% 0.3% 0.1%
Wages & salaries 90.9% 92.3% 94.8%
Enterprise 3.0% 2.5% 1 .7%
Misc. 1 .2% 1 .0% 0.6%
this:
And of those described as 'pensioners', it was lik<
1974 1976 1984
Built property 14.2% 13.0% 9.9%
Securities 0.5% 0.4% 0.2%
, , * 
Wages & salaries 81 .0% 83.3% 87.6%
Enterprise 3.5% 2.7% 2.0%
Misc. 0.8% 0.6% 0.3%
Including pensions.
From the above data it can be seen that the 
contribution of wages & salaries (and pensions) to the income of all 
four groups increased between 1974 and 1984. The most dramatic
increases were registered, in fact, in the categories 'rentiers' and 
'merchants et al.': 233% and 188%, respectively. At the same time the
contribution of income from built property declined in three of the ca­
tegories (the exception being 'merchants et al.'). It is thus 
questionable whether the term 'rentiers' adequately describes a group 
38.7% of whose declared income in 1984 was in the form of wages and 
salaries, and only 45.0% in the form of income from built property.
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The insignificance of stock market income in all 
categories is striking, and it lends support to the notion of the 
importance of immovable wealth in Greece. Even the category 'merchants, 
industrialists, artisans' appeared in 1984 to have restructured their
portfolio of income sources to the direction of wages & salaries, and of
built property, but not of bonds and shares. Their proportion of 
income from securities remained stable between 1974 and 1984, at 0.5 per 
cent.
At the same time that the importance of wages was 
increasing in Greece, even to those described as rentiers, the 
respective contributions of various SEG to the total declared income
from built property were altering. This pattern is depicted in Table
1 1.6 :
Table 11.6: Break-down of Declared Income From Built Property By SEG
Which Has 'Earned' It, 1974. 1976, 1984.
S E G 1974 1976 1984
Rentiers
Merchants et al.
Peasants
Wage-earners
Professionals
Pensioners
26. 0s 
30.2^ 
0.25 
16.55 
9.0? 
18.15
25.3%
30.6%
0.2%
17.4%
9.3%
17.2%
23.25
28.65 
1 . 4 5
18.65 
8.75
19.55
Source: TEE, 1979: 31; NSSG, 1977: 405; 1985: 394.
Not all income from built property is income from 
dwellings; neither is it all from renting out premises to a tenant- 
household or tenant shopkeeper. For instance, some of it may have come
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Table 11.7: Import of Capital Into Greece for Investment in Real
Property, 1978 - 1986.
Year Amount (m. $US) % of Current Account Deficit Financed
In This Way
1978 409.6 42.9
1979 592.1 31.5
1980 599.0 27.0
1981 487.8 20.1
1982 398.9 21.2
1983 422.9 22.5
1984 473.8 22.2
1985 430.9 13.2
1986 462.7 27.2
Source: Bank of Greece Annual Report 1980; 1983; 1986.
from renting advertising space. Such cases, however, must have provided 
a small proportion of total income from built property, while it is 
dwellings that make up most of the latter.
If that is so, the pattern shown in Table 11.6, to­
gether with the information in pages 325-26, points to the conclusion 
that
while rental income is becoming proportionately less 
and less in Greece, the 'role' or 'function' of 
'landlord' diffuses more and more among different 
SEG, including wage-earners and pensioners. Over
the same period, SEG traditionally associated with the 
capacity to provide 'landlord' services - rentiers and 
merchants et al. - have become less important in this respect.
This pattern is partly the result of the propensity 
of the Greeks to invest in real property more than in other fields. The 
contribution of emigrants' remittances to the Greek balance of payments, 
and to investment in housing and other real estate in particular, is 
a case in point (Table 11.7). But the pattern also has to do with the 
implications of competition among 'rentiers'. There are so many land­
lords, each, moreover, facing approximately 1.86 tenants (see Appendix 
II), that they are forced to rely on non-property sources of income as 
well. Conditions in the rental market are such that the increase in the 
number of 'landlords' is actually leading to a reduction in the number 
of 'rentiers'!
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 11
In what follows I will not be re-discussing these patterns, which 
have been reported at length in chapter 9 and Appendix II.
Cultural characteristics are the result of a people's experience. 
The Greeks have known perhaps more than their fair share of war, 
occupation, revolution, civil strife, political instabiliy, and 
inflation (cf. Freris, 1986; Clogg, 1987). To them physical pro­
perty represents the utmost security.
This behavioural pattern is only a specific case of a more 
widespread fusion between 'business1 and 'household' in Greece - 
and not only there (cf. Tsoucalas, 1986; Redclift & Mingione, 
1985). Emmanuel (1981) has also commented on the phaenomenon: "... 
in conditions where an economy of the household type (peasant-like) 
is widespread, household wealth provides to petty businessmen a 
hedge against adverse circumstances and a base for much-valued 
'autonomy'. Here the concepts of 'household' and 'business' lose 
their analytical precision and, in terms of behaviour, become 
intermingled". In my view the behaviour referred to can be 
replicated in urban settings, albeit in different forms. 
Possession of dwelling wealth is precisely one of the means whereby 
it can be made possible.
I refer to the secondary housing market. The primary market in 
finished dwellings has been catered for almost exclusively by 'spe­
culative' builders (see chapter 2).
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In Greece unmarried children are expected to stay with their 
parents (cf. Hirschon, 1986).
See Table A.II.1, of Appendix II.
To get an idea of the significance of figures arrived at on the 
basis of the number of those who declare income to the Tax Authori­
ties, and of the relative magnitude of that income, one must take 
into account that, e.g., in 1981 about 1.6 m. people declared their 
income (Statistics of the Declared Income of Natural Persons and 
Their Taxation, 1982). In the same year the number of households 
was nearly 3 m. (Statistical Yearbook, 1985). This means that, 
roughly, 1.3 m. households did not declare their income. The 
largest single category among those were peasant households, as 
peasant income is not taxed in Greece to the extent that it derives 
from 'primary-sector' activities. Another sizeable group must have 
been students.
Notably, the incidence of owner-occupation in rural 
areas was 93.2% in 1981, while 2.5% of rural households occupied 
rent-free (NSSG, Household Expenditure Survey, 1981/2). Therefore, 
the use of income declaration statistics can be accepted, by and 
large, as relevant to this study precisely because such data can be 
taken to refer predominantly to urban areas, and to 'settled1, 
economically active, wealth-owning households from those areas. 
The possibility that some of these households simply do not bother 
to submit income declarations cannot be discounted, but I think 
that they are a small minority.
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This conclusion may be questioned on the grounds that a substantial 
number of landlord households do not declare all their income from 
built property (let alone other sources). However, since there is 
no reason to assume that richer households are more adept at, or 
inclined to, hiding their income than poorer households, or vice 
versa, the absolute amount declared may well be lower than the real 
income from built property, while the pattern presented by the pro­
portional contribution of such income to total income declared at 
each income range, can be taken as 'true1.
The normal lease period for dwellings in Greece is one to two years.
The absolute figure for repossession cases for the whole of Greece 
cannot be known with certainty. In two instances the press gave 
prominence to a claim made by the chairman of the Pan-hellenci 
Society for Tenants' Protection, according to which the number of 
repossession notes lodged with courts was 40,000. However, we are 
not told how the Society arrived at that number, and we become even 
more suspicious by the fact that eleven months intervened between 
the two identical claims, which were nevertheless made with respect 
to different periods and different regions of court jurisdiction:
(a) April 1986 - beginning of August 1986 for Athens, Piraeus, 
Salonica and Patrae (E Prote, 06.08.1986, p. 19), and (b) 1 Dec.
1986 - 20 June 1987 for Greece as a whole (E Vradyne, 27.06.1987, 
p. 1).
I am inclined to think that those 40,000 
repossession cases were just a 'calculated' guess on the part of 
the good chairman (or of the papers citing him), politically
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inspired. The true figure may have been significantly lower. 
After all, if 40,000 notes were lodged with courts during each 
period, simple arithmetic suggests a total nearer to 80,000 than to 
40,000. Unless, of course, the courts of the four aforementioned 
cities miraculously managed to process 40,000 repossession cases 
from the beginning of August 1986 to the end of November 1986. A 
truly Herculean task even if one takes into account the possibility 
of out-of-court settlements - and were there not fresh repossession 
cases in those four months?
I use the term 'class' in Giddens' sense (Giddens, 1973: 100-106). 
Roughly, 'class' - in capitalism - is a large, relatively stable 
social grouping, 'membership' of which is nominally open to all, 
and which comes about through the operation of identifiable 'stru­
cturation' factors. This usage contrasts with the medieval 
'estate' or the Indian caste.
One error was in the 'civil servants' row of the ENO table. I have 
had to ignore the data therein, and adopt instead the proportions 
arrived at in the October 1956 census of civil servants (E Nea 
Oeconomia, Feb. 1957, p. 112).
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CHAPTER 12: The Greek Private Rented Sector, 1978 - 1990 (B).
In the previous chapter I showed that "actors" in 
the Greek housing scene are socially and economically diffuse. Here I 
discuss the implications of this situation for the behaviour of the
rented sector in the face of rent controls.
SECTION 1: Main Implications of the Sectoral Features.
The Greek rented sector is characterised by the
following features, as the analysis pursued in chapter 11 and Appendix 
II has revealed:
(1) The roles of 'landlord1, 'dwelling-owner1, and 'rentier' 
are not well-defined, but are often interchangeable and/or transitory.
(2) These roles, plus that of 'tenant', are not related to 
any conventional conception of 'class', but span all social classes 
instead.
(3) Dwelling property is very widely distributed in Greece, 
and the ratio of 'landlords' to tenants c. 1981 was 1:1.86.
(4) 'Tenants' are often owners of dwellings themselves.
These features of the sector are another aspect of
the morphology of Greece as a smallholders’ society, and the result of
the wide distribution of landownership, of the employment pattern (see 
chapter 9), and the way property rights in the country are defined (see 
chapters 9 and 10). I will now examine the consequences of the chara­
cteristics of the rented sector for the behaviour of the sector as well 
as for the politics of rent control. In summary, these consequences 
were:
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(1) The decisions of most landlords to stay in, or 
leave, the market, or of various dwelling-owners to enter the market as 
landlords, were affected very little by a rent control regime. I will 
show that the latter did not deter new landlords appearing in the 
market, and did not stop, over the period under study, the number of 
landlords increasing.
(2) The distribution of effective power between
landlords and tenants was such that the collective capacity of landlords 
to exploit tenants was severely compromised.
(3) A significant number of landlords can be said 
to have shared a particular common interest with most tenants: namely, 
aversion to the emergence of capitalist housing processes. If that was 
the case, rent control in Greece can be viewed only in part as a
tenants' protection device. Its additional significance has lain in 
discouraging concentration of the rented stock into fewer hands, and the 
activities of speculative builders.
(4) Rent control, then, tends to reinforce the
nature of Greece as a smallholders' society, while at the same time it
is bound to take the form of a series of disjointed, often inconsequen­
tial measures and pronouncements, and be highly susceptible to political 
circumstance.
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SECTION 2: Consequence 1: Rent Controls Did Not Discourage Growth in
the Number of Landlords.
In 1978 the Right-wing government of Greece 
introduced a form of rent control for the first time since the late 
1950s. Approximately since that year the speculative building sector in 
Greece has been in recession (cf. Table 9.3). I have no doubt that, in 
addition to the influence of other factors, the series of rent control 
measures after 1978 has been an important influence on the sector1 
weakness.
Still, the number of those who declared income from 
built property to the Tax Authorities kept rising throughout the 1979 - 
1984 period:
Table 12.1: Declarers of Income From Specified Sources. 1979 - 1984.
Year Number of People Who Declared:
Income From 
Any Source
Income From 
Built Property
Income From 
Wages & Salaries
o
o
o,
o
1 2 3 4 3:2 4:2
1979 1,437,955 507,842 927,350 35.3% 64.90
1980 1,547,262 526,840 998,909 34.0% 64.56
1981 1,631,199 538,944 1,063,195 33.0% 65.18
1982 1,723,461 562,543 1,136,179 32.6% 65.92
1983 1,805,778 586,107 1,200,215 32.5% 66.47
1984 1,881,398 608,091 1,259,950 32.3% 66.97
Source: NSSG, Statistics of the Declared Income of Natural Persons and Their 
Taxation, respective years.
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A simple calculation shows that from 1979 to 1984 
the number of those who declared income from built property increased by 
19.7%, and the total number of declarers by 30.8%. The latter figure 
reflects, among others, the growth in the number of those who declared 
income from wages and salaries (35.9%). There are many tentative 
reasons why the absolute number of declarers of income from built 
property rose in a period of rent controls. My more specific concern is 
how much ot the increase (about 100,000 declarers) involved owners of 
let dwellings, and why their number rose under those conditions. I 
calculate this through the following steps:
(1) A small part of the increase must have involved owners of 
shop, office, and warehouse premises. Since in Appendix II I subtracted
50.000 declarers of income from non-dwelling built property from the 
total number of declarers of income from built property in general for 
1981, i.e., 8 to 9 per cent, I can do the same here, and subtract, say,
10.000 from the total figure of 100,000.
(2) Another sizeable chunk must have consisted of people 
inheriting dwellings during the period. I mention this category 
because it augments the number of declarers of income from built 
property, including dwellings, without necessarily implying the 
introduction of new let dwellings, or new landlords, into the market. 
Obviously the net influence of this group on the number of landlords is 
not only a function of the total number of inheritors, but of the number 
of the deceased as well. I suggest a figure of 10,000.
(3) Taken all together, this leaves about 80,000 people who 
entered the rented dwelling market as landlords to ordinary tenants
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(as opposed to room-letting tourists: the Tax Authorities count income
from that source as from 'commercial & industrial enterprise' rather 
than from 'built property') during a period of rent controls. I think 
that this figure can hardly be brought below 65,000, even if a need is 
felt to adjust the above calculations downwards. One must also consider 
that over the same period some landlords may well have withdrawn their 
properties from the rented sector. This piece of evidence also lends 
support to my point about the fluidity of the boundary between 'owner' 
and 'landlord' in Greece. On the other hand rent controls, along with 
other factors (see footnote 1) deterred big, speculative investors in 
the sector.
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SECTION 3: Consequence 2: On the Distribution of Effective Power.
Power, in the landlord-tenant context, refers to the 
capacity of either group to influence the level of rent and/or the 
duration, security, and other conditions of the tenure, in its favour.
In a free market landlords do tend to be in a superior position, but 
even then there are many gradations of asymmetry in the distribution of 
power between the two groups, which are all-important in a real-life 
situation. In the Greek case, for example, there is relative power 
parity, however precarious, between the two groups. Let us look at it 
more closely.
(a) One form of relative power parity exists when the number 
of new dwellings far exceeds that of households seeking to rent. 
Between 1974 and 1981, for example, 1,189,680 new authorised dwellings 
(let alone unauthorised ones) were added to the stock (on the basis of 
permits issued between 1973 and 1980 - NSSG, various Yearbooks), while 
the number of tenants increased by 100,000 (see below). Still, this 
type of parity doe not take into account,
(b). Relative parity between the number of landlords and that
of tenants - an occurrence which implies that there may be competition
among landlords as well as among tenants. Recall that in 1981 one
landlord corresponded to 1.86 ordinary tenants (Appendix II). Recall
also my estimation that between 1979 and 1984 the number of landlords to
ordinary tenants increased by about 80,000 (or 65,000, if one accepts
the lower estimate). Against that increase, the number of tenants
between 1974 and 1981 rose by about 100,000 (on the basis of NSSG 
2
figures ). In other words, between 1974 and 1981 about 14,300 new
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tenants appeared on the market each year, and between 1979 and 1984 
about 16,000 (or 13,000) landlords did so. But even relative parity in
numbers does not capture the whole story, as, in addition to taking
advantage of the number of 'actors' in the opposing camp, the effective 
power of both tenants and landlords can be enhanced by certain other 
features of the Greek society.
(c) Tenants: The morphology of Greece as a smallholders
society, with a markedly weak and diffuse hierarchy of socio-economic 
(class and/or role) positions available to, or imposed upon, individuals 
(Tsoucalas, 1986), is also manifested in the physiognomy of urban areas. 
The latter do, of course, include some 'good' and some 'bad' areas, but 
otherwise the urban landscape is more-or-less socially homogeneous - at 
least far more than in Britain. For example,
* A 1968 study found that "about half of the city's jobs [in
GAP - NP] are spread over its entire area in proportion to
its population, in units of 5,000 - 10,000 inhabitants"
(Vivirakis, 1972). The significance of the finding is that 
it lends support to the notion of a non-strict segregation 
of residential and work areas in GAP. Assuming that the 
stricter the work-residence segregation, the greater the 
possibility of the emergence of a strict hierarchy of loca­
lities in terms of relative desirability, then the GAP 
pattern, if true, implies greater homogeneity between loca­
lities (see also Table 12.2).
* A second homogenising influence is the absence of local
authority rates as most local government finance comes
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from the central state. Households only have to pay to 
their local authorities 18% of their electricity bills.
* A third factor is that the cost of public transport any- 
anywhere within the GAP, Salonica, and other cities is the 
same, low, subsidised, flat rate.
A relatively homogeneous urban landscape means that 
a prospective tenant's 'hunting ground' is extended significantly, and 
so does his bargaining power. But by far the greatest source of 
strength for tenants is the existing potential for moving on to owner- 
occupation - building cheaply outside the formal city plan, if they must 
(recall chapters 6 and 9).
(d) Landlords: In a democratic society numbers mean votes,
and the larger a group the higher the probability that it will influence 
the formation of policies in its favour. A ratio of landlords to 
tenants of 1:1.86 c. 1981 seems guaranteed to make rent control 
policy, if embarked upon, hazy and indecisive, but the ratio alone does 
not indicate all there is - in terms of numbers, and hence of political 
power - on the landlords' side. In chapter 11 I argued that there is a 
constant 'osmotic' relationship between the categories 'landlord' and 
'owner'. Because of this, too sweeping a clamp down on the rented sector 
might well meet with opposition not only from 'current' landlords, but 
also from a far wider bedrock of prospective or even potential land­
lords. To the latter type, small-scale landlordism can be, for 
instance, a way of recouping part of their investment in an extra dwel­
ling until such a time as a son or daughter get married, and are given 
the dwelling as dowry or a gift.
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More generally, the overlap of roles between 'land­
lords' and 'owners' means that too rigid forms of rented sector control 
would amount to an attack on the prevalent notion of private ownership 
of dwelling wealth in Greece. They would endanger one of the distinctive 
features and conditions of reproduction of the smallholders strata (in 
effect, the majority of the population) in this country, and would not, 
therefore, be tolerated politically. (See also section 5.)
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SECTION 4: Consequence 3: Small Landlords - Tenants: Mutual
Opposition to Capitalism in Housing.
The characteristics of many dwelling owners,
landlords, and tenants in Greece are such that it is wrong to view them
as antagonistic groups alone. A considerable area of common interest
remains at the end of the day, made possible by the aversion of all par­
ties to the possible emergence of capitalist landlords in the Greek 
urban scene. In this respect, two questions are relevant:
(1) Would that have been, and/or can it still be, a likely, or 
even imminent, outcome of the evolution of the Greek housing system at 
the end of the 1970s, and/or today? Does any evidence corroborate this 
possibility?
(2) If yes, to what extent can rent control be attributed to
the imminence of such a potential development? Can we identify ways
whereby the worries of both tenants and small landlords were brought to 
the attention of political decision-makers? Were such worries delibera­
tely articulated in the first place? Was the 'threat' I am postulating 
recognised as such by interested parties?
In answer to the first question, let us look at 
Table 12.3. The Table compares selling price and letting price 
increases (of newly constructed apartments and new lettings, respective­
ly) in as representative a sample of GAP areas as the available data
made possible. Increases in prices are compared over three periods:
* January 1976 - January 1979, when rent control had not been
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introduced yet;
* January 1979 - January 1982, a period of increasingly 
bolder steps towards rent control;
* January 1982 - January 1985, a period of relative consolida­
tion of rent control.
It is apparent from Table 12.3 that during the first
period rent increases were higher, and often a lot higher, than selling
price increases over most areas in the sample (2 out of 6 in cluster 1; 
10 out of 17 in cluster 2; 2 out of 2 in cluster 3). Possibly the trend 
was more pronounced in the suburbs (cluster 2) than in the municipality 
of Athens (cluster 1) because of more new development occurring in the 
former. In the second period the tendency became stronger: 6 out of 6
areas in the first cluster, and 14 out of 17 in the second showed it. 
Moreover, the increases in rents during that period were even higher 
than in the preceding one. Still, the gradual introduction of rent 
control during the second period caused an astonishing deceleration in 
the rate of increase of selling prices in period 2 in comparison to 
period 1 . In 3 out of 6 areas in cluster 1, and 10 out of 17 areas in 
cluster 2, the increase in selling prices was lower than in period 1.
That this was a real tendency of the selling prices, 
and not a random occurrence conditioned by the choice of sample is borne 
out by developments in the third period, 1982 - 1985. Almost throughout 
the sample range selling price increases have collapsed relative to the 
previous periods.
My interpretation of these results, in full 
recognition of the possible inadequacy of the data, is that selling
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prices in the first period (1976 - 1979) increasingly tended to reflect 
a speculative component, namely an expected rental stream. Whether this 
development signified the deliberate construction of apartments-to-let 
as opposed to apartments-to-sell (i.e., a shift of speculative builders 
and plot-owners away from the owner-occupied and towards the rented sec­
tor), is academic. More to the point, the explicit influence of rents 
on selling prices signified the 'coming of age1 of speculative building. 
Before that period, and especially before the colonels (1967 - 1974), 
even 'speculative' housebuilding in Greece had a strong 'contractual' 
hue (see chapter 2, p. 28) . But the stronger link between selling 
price increases and rent increases, which became apparent by the late 
1970s, points to the emergence of a new breed of bigger, financially 
more secure builders and housing investors. Hence the deceleration of 
selling price increases at the prospect of rent control, even though
3
letting prices kept going strong in 1979 - 1982. In other words, these 
new housing entrepreneurs, or capitalist landlords, explicitly priced 
their housing assets on the basis of projected rental streams to be 
provided by future unknown clients in the general market.
Let us now turn to whether the emergence of 
capitalist agents in the housing sphere was perceived as a threat by 
other groups, and whether such perceptions contributed to the imposition 
of controls.
To be sure, between 1976 and 1979, and even up to 
1982, the level of rents was not a hot issue politically or in the 
press. The first organisations claiming to speak for tenants and land­
lords, respectively, appeared only in 1986. They are of doubtful repre­
sentativeness, more in the nature of press release centres than mass
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associations. Indeed, the characteristics of the Greek rented sector 
preclude the emergence of highly 'focussed' and partisan 'movements'.
So it was that the gradual introduction of control, from 1978 onwards, 
occurred and was received, to cite Eliot, 'not with a bang, but a 
whimper'. It was precisely this kind of acquiescence that points to 
large sections of society having perceived certain developments in the 
housing sphere as a 'threat'.
The reasons are manifold. High dwelling selling 
prices, perhaps even more than high letting prices, meant that tenants 
could not hope to become owner-occupiers as easily as in the past. 
Tenants might also have felt that higher-income, bigger landlords were 
more powerful opponents than lower-income, smaller landlords. Higher 
selling prices - of dwellings as well as of plots - also meant that many 
families, even owner-occupying, were finding it difficult to augment 
their housing assets, say, for the purpose of renting one or two flats 
or securing a child's housing future. And, incidentally, whereas the 
average family might welcome a kind of intervention in the rental market 
that would discourage capitalist speculation and landlordism, it would 
not, on the other hand, welcome so strict controls as to interfere with 
that family's housing strategies. (For example, a life-tenancy means 
that the dwelling cannot be given to a son or daughter upon marriage, 
and it would therefore be an extremely unpopular form of rent control.)
For the same reasons, even small landlords could be expected to be 
averse to the emergence of capitalist landlordism, especially consider­
ing how their category overlaps with that of mere 'dwelling-owner'.
It could be argued, though, that small landlords 
were not seriously threatened by developments in the housing market
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because, the argument goes, their large number would make it more diffi­
cult for speculators and capitalist landlords to earn 1supra-normal' 
profits than for small landlords to be 'crowded out1 by big ones. Al­
though not incorrect in particular localities, the argument as a whole 
is too simplistic. The very number of small to medium and/or lower- 
income landlords (cf. chapter 11), at a time when the ratio of 
landlords to tenants was 1:1.86, could make the following script 
possible:
(Recall - chapter 1 1 - that tenants in Greece are not
concentrated in one class or stratum only, and, if anything, 
there are proportionately more of them in the 'white-collar' 
class than in any other.) Initially, richer tenants would be 
drawn into new, speculatively built apartments in the more 
desirable locations of Athens and other cities. This is one 
potential loss to the average, traditional landlord, occurring 
in a situation that simultaneously made it difficult for such 
landlords (prospective or current) to enter the top end of the 
market for new-build accomodation on account of the high land 
and dwelling prices brought about precisely by the activity of 
the speculative builders of the late 1970s.
As a result the small landlord would be increasingly 
obliged to rely on middle- to low-income tenants for his
rental income. But this would mean that the small-scale land­
lord - existing as well as potential new-comer - would be
faced with an increasing ratio of average landlord to average 
tenant. Competition between small- to medium-scale landlords
would, therefore, intensify. Raising rents would only make
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them lose more tenants. This time the loss would be of house­
holds refraining from entering the rented sector, or opting 
out of it (by self-building or borrowing, as, e.g./ by the 
early 1980s housing loans were easier to get and more 
plentiful). Such an eventuality would increase competition 
between landlords even further.
To small and medium landlords and dwelling-owners 
the prospects depicted in the above scenario meant mounting anxiety, 
uncertainty as to where to set the rent level on particular properties 
(too high, it would discourage tenants at a time when their formal real 
incomes were reduced; too low, it would not be worth the bother), long 
periods of keeping properties empty in search of a better deal, diffi­
culty in planning ahead. Clearly some co-ordination would not be amiss 
- and this was precisely where rent control came in, and why it was wel­
comed by more than tenants (see section 5).
Of course in such a context rent control was bound 
to be a hit-and-miss affair. Quite probably it has not affected the 
formation of actual rent levels (see footnote 3), and has at times 
displeased some groups more than others. Its broad perceived merits 
were that it provided (a) a frame of reference that the average landlord 
and/or owner in Greece must have felt was needed by the late 1970s - 
early 1980s (hence the increase in the number of landlords during the 
control period - see section 2), and (b) a deterrent to large-scale 
speculative building and capitalist landlordism.
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Table 12.4: Opinions of households in GAP on rent-related questions -
October - December 1986.
The level of rent should (a)
be determined (b)
(c)
Rent increases should be (a)
controlled by the state (b)
All who replied 'yes1: (a)
The increase should be (b)
(c)
A dwelling should be made (a)
available for reposses­
sion by the owner (b)
All who replied 'no': (a)
The lessee should have (b)
the right to stay (c)
Source: EKKE, 1987b: 33.
By the state 66%
Freely between lessor 
and lessee 31%
Otherwise 3%
Yes 92%
No 8%
Equal to the inflation rate 20%
Equal to the rate of incre­
ase in wages & salaries 55%
Significantly less than the 
inflation rate 25%
Immediately after expiry of
the contract 24%
Not immediately after 76%
One year more 48%
One to two years more 4%
As long as he finds it 
necessary 48%
Key statistic: In GAP, in 1981, about 40% of households were renting, 
57% were owner-occupying, and 3% were occupying rent- 
free (Pirounakis, 1986: 35).
SECTION 5: Consequence 4: The Politics and 'Policy* of Rent Control
in Greece.
Public opinion is especially important in a 
democratic society. In the previous section I asserted that rent 
control must have been welcomed by more than tenants. It is time I 
supplied evidence for this.
Between October and December 1986 the National 
Social Science Research Centre (EKKE) undertook a study of housing 
conditions in Greece on the basis of answers to a questionnaire given to 
a sample of households (about 5,000). Part of the questionnaire sought 
the opinions of households on matters relating to rented housing. Table 
12.4 sums up some of the results, which show that in GAP
"the majority of the interviewees are expressly in favour of 
1) determination of the level of rents by the state, 2) 
determination of the magnitude of increases in rents by the 
state, and 3) a tenant having the right to remain in the 
dwelling even after expiry of the contract"
(EKKE, 1987a: 50).
EKKE further commented that
"[recognition of the need for measures to protect tenants is 
not difficult to explain when this opinion is expressed by 
tenants or owners of unrented dwellings. In this case, 
however, the results refer to the total number of 
interviewees, independently of tenure status and ownership of
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rented dwellings. Realising that in GAP 4 tenants correspond 
to 6 owner-occupiers, then a number of owner-occupiers express 
an opinion supportive of the interests of tenants. If some of 
the owner-occupiers are also owners of rented dwellings - a 
question that cannot be answered prior to elaboration of all 
the data -, then we do not have merely a case of support for 
the interests of others, but also one of neglect of one's own 
interests"
(EKKE, 1987a: 52).
The results of the EKKE should not, however, be 
surprising after the analysis pursued in chapter 11 and in the previous 
sections. On the basis of that analysis, things could not have been 
otherwise. When dwelling owners expressed opinions supportive of 
control, it may well have been the parents of tenants, or the childern 
of tenants, but, more generally, people with an interest in lower land 
and dwelling prices, and in opposing capitalism in housing, who were 
often involved. Equally, I disagree with EKKE when it describes the 
emerging opinion pattern as a case of 'neglect of one's own interests'.
On the contrary, the aforegoing analysis suggests that even landlords 
who supported various forms of rent control did so precisely in their 
own interests.
This climate of opinion, and the socio-economic 
interests that made it possible, explain the evolution of rented sector 
politics in Greece after 1978. On the excuse of the Salonica earthquake 
of that year, which anyway did no extensive damage, the right-wing 
government (and not a centre or left-wing one) re-introduced a rent 
control process in Greece, 20 years after the lifting of the last
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remnants of control. Inevitably - and I do not think it was in that 
government's intention to achieve this - rent control discouraged newly 
emerging interests in the housing sphere, namely, capitalist speculators 
and landlords. Rent control tilted the balance back towards more 
traditional interests in the housing system - small-scale landlords, 
owners, and, of course, tenants. It is difficult at this point to 
disentangle the deterring influence of control on speculative building 
from factors such as sluggish economic growth or reduced urbanisation 
rates, phaenomena which occurred at the same time as the introduction of 
controls. Does it matter though? It was, after all, falling incomes 
and rising rents that provided the ostensible reason for pursuing a rent 
control policy. Despite increasing protests from higher-income 
landlords, and mainly right-wing building professionals and their 
political friends, the policy has met with overall approval on the part 
of a broad coalition of tenants, many landlords, and a lot of owner- 
occupiers.
Successive governments have sought to keep the 
coalition happy by continuously altering the specific rent control pro­
nouncements and regulations (see Table 11.1). Their behaviour, although 
erratic and, in a sense, internally inconsistent (which is why the term 
'policy' may not be appropriate to describe state actions in the rented 
sector), is in fact a rational response to the requirements of the 
actual situation. It is, in other words, consistent with the diffuse 
and small-scale interests characterising the rented sector, the housing 
system, and the wider society.
A comparison to Britain might be useful here (main 
source: Robinson, 1979: 83). Full rent control was introduced in 1915.
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A new provision in 1919 excluded from control houses built for rent 
after that year. In Greece, so far at least, there has been no 
distinction between old- and new-build dwellings - which is consistent 
with my analysis of the threat posed to small-scale landlords and to 
most tenants by speculative builders. Although in 1923 gradual 
decontrol was introduced in Britain, in 1933 full control was re-intro­
duced for lower-valued property. Middle-valued property fell under 
creeping decontrol, and block decontrol was introduced for higher-valued 
property. In 1938 the Ridley Committee recommendation on block decon­
trol for middle-income housing was implemented. Then came the Second 
World War, when general full control was reintroduced, but in 1957 block 
decontrol of all higher-valued property came back (and creeping decon­
trol of all other property). As one would expect, in Britain specula­
tive developers have been encouraged, and this is why higher-value pro­
perties have been the first to be decontrolled whenever the opportunity 
has arisen. But, in addition, throughout the period covered, housing 
ownership was not widely spread, the ratio of landlords to tenants was 
far smaller than in Greece, and many landlords owned not just one or two 
extra flats for renting, but substantially more, even as late as the 
middle 1970s (see Merrett & Gray, 1982: 141; Elliott & McCrone, 1975).
For these reasons the interests of most British 
households were not in thwarting speculative builders, but private land­
lordism in general. Under those conditions decontrolling higher-value 
property did not matter much. Most tenants were too poor to afford it, 
while the better-off households were increasingly turning to owner- 
occupation.
In Greece, by contrast, post-1978 rent control has
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not excluded higher-value properties^ precisely because in an ex-post 
sense part of its raison d' etre has lain in frustrating speculative 
builders and capitalist landlords. Marinos, editor of a pro-free- 
market weekly, has been quick to point out this feature of the control 
provisions time and again:
"[H]ow does one justify the fact that the tenants' protection 
measures have included every villa and apartment, independent­
ly of floorspace and degree of luxury, which of course no so­
cial need and no socialist sensitivities made necessary?"
(Marinos, 1987a: 10).
Marinos goes on to argue that the universal coverage 
of control was brought about by the 'administrative nomenklatura' who, 
while enjoying the capacity to make housing policy, also like living 
(renting?) in the high-status suburbs of the capital. Such a hypothesis, 
clever, funny, and difficult to prove though it is, is really superflu­
ous. My own analysis, and the evidence on public opinion that supports 
it, suggest that the particular rent control regulations enacted in 
Greece between 1978 and 1987, helped deter, or at least slow the pace 
of expansion of, capitalist housing processes. Significantly, the new 
regulations governing the rented sector, which the new (right-wing) Mi­
nister of Trade (of an all-party coalition government) issued early in 
1990 did not exempt large or new dwellings either (Sunday Eleuthero- 
typia, 21.01.1990: 61). In fact, the 'new' regulations did not diverge 
one iota from the 'philosophy' of the older ones.
At a more general level the Greek rented sector 
experience points to the possibility and viability of a complementary
353
relationship between a strongly interventionist state and a strongly 
private-property-oriented populace - provided, of course, that it is not 
private property in some abstract sense that is meant here, but widely 
spread, 'egalitarian' private property in the context of a small­
holders' society.
This kind of complementarity suggests an interesting 
possibility. It has often been assumed that state intervention in 
housing comes about either when 'capital' somehow requires it, or when 
poverty and/or grassroots mobilisation combine with homelessness, or 
'Rachmanism', to force a welfare role on the state (Jones, 1985: 42- 
53). The Greek experience suggests that under certain circumstances 
tenants AND owner-occupiers AND small landlords can welcome state 
intervention. The pattern of property rights that is both a basis for 
and an outcome of such intervention is attuned towards maximising 
personal and familial socio-economic and tenurial mobility as well as 
autonomy from interests (such as big, private ones) that are not easily 
amenable to political pressure from below.
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CHAPTER 13: Concluding Comments and Research Implications.
This chapter looks into whether the main questions 
of the thesis have been answered, and what these answers mean for future 
research in the field. I feel it would have been unnecessary to repeat 
here the main conclusions or insights of the thesis, as these have been 
pointed out elsewhere in the thesis (pp. 149-151; 154; 158; 161; 166; 
168; 173; 217-18; 291-92; 334-35).
SECTION 1: On the links between the housing system and the wider
economy and society.
I have rejected the notion that development stages 
and/or levels of national income are necessarily associated with speci­
fic levels of housing investment. Such a connection may be true for 
some countries over certain periods, but it is neither general nor ine­
vitable. Levels of spending on housing can be associated with the posi­
tion a country is in with respect to its 'typical' (if, indeed, it is 
so) development trajectory, usually described by such processes as urba­
nisation, suburbanisation, industrialisation, de-industrialisation, etc. 
But levels of spending are also influenced by the socio-institutional 
framework (e.g., the dwelling and land ownership pattern, the prevalent 
planning 'philosophy' and practice, etc.), which is, of course, specific 
to each country. I have also drawn attention to the problematical rela­
tionship between housing investment and housing consumption, which in 
each particular case must be clarified before the variable 'spending on 
housing' can be utilised and quantified properly.
An interesting research project might therefore be
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about identifying the separate effects of a country's development 
trajectory (and of its position along it), and of a country's socio- 
institutional framework on its building activity and/or housing spending 
pattern. This endeavour would probably have to involve the following 
steps:
(1) Each country (or region) could be placed in a group on
the basis of demonstrable similarities, particularly as
regards their development path. Notably, the development 
paths of the countries in the group do not have to begin 
from the same chronological point, as calendar time and 
'social time' often do not coincide (cf. Moos & Dear,
1986a; Thrift, 1981).
(2) The development path of each country from within a given
group would then be associated with ups and downs in
building activity and/or spending levels ('investment' as 
well as 'consumption') the country has experienced.
(3) The question would then be how closely the building
and/or spending patterns of countries in the same group 
resemble one another, or, alternatively, how far they 
diverge. Can the characteristic development trajectory 
of the group be associated with a characteristic building 
cycle and/or spending cycle pattern?
(4) Next, the socio-institutional framework of each country
in the group should be described. Here, the analysis
pursued in chapters 2 to 3, and 8 to 10, could prove
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useful. The housing system of each country could be 
described as a set of interconnected processes; the 
evolution of each process could be followed over time; 
and the nature and strength of 1 rights1 and 1 claims' that 
have enabled or constrained each of those processes could 
be gauged accordingly. To make the exercise easier,
the final outcome could be in the form of short general 
statements, typifying a relatively short list of socio- 
institutional contexts (probably along the lines of Table 
6.3, p. 153).
(5) Given the 'type' of socio-institutional framework each
country in the group belongs to, one would need to ask 
to what extent 1 close resemblance * between the countries1 
building or spending patterns can be attributed to the 
'fact' (if such is the case) that they share, approxima­
tely at least, the same socio-institutional 'type' in 
addition to the same development path. Or, alternatively, 
to what extent any 'divergence' can be attributed to 
socio-institutional differences between the countries.
(6) The analysis can, and indeed must, be extended, however.
A number of different groups of countries can be 
constructed, each group exemplifying a characteristic 
development trajectory. The question now would be to 
what extent building and/or spending patterns (e.g., as a 
proportion of some measure of national income) have been 
similar or different between the groups, and whether any 
similarities or differences in socio-institutional pat­
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terns can account for similarities or differences in the 
building and/or spending patterns - in addition to the 
effect of a distinct development path.
(7) Throughout the above procedure, a plausible hypothesis 
one could test might be that as regards countries from 
within the same group (all sharing the same broad 
development path), socio-institutional differences are a 
more important explanation of building and/or housing 
spending patterns than actual income levels or the exact 
details of the development path a country has followed. 
On the other hand, development trajectories might be a 
more potent explanation of inter-group differences in 
building and/or spending patterns, than socio-institutio­
nal characteristics. If true, this result would enhance 
the importance of the socio-institutional framework in a 
world that becomes increasingly integrated.
(8) One could end with policy conclusions of the following 
type: If country A is on the same development path as 
country B, but has a 'worse' housing situation than B 
because of certain socio-institutional features (say, a 
too restrictive or too liberal planning policy), then if 
country A adopts some of B's features or innovations, 
country A should have strong reasons to expect an 
improvement in its housing situation. Moreover, such 
improvement would come about independently of country A's 
present income or resources. This would happen because 
the socio-institutional changes that A would adopt,
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would liberate and/or create resources for investment 
into housing. The existence of policy conclusions of 
this type would, in addition, have obvious political 
potential, which would not be missed on interested 
parties in, say, country A.
The other way in which the connection between a 
housing system and the wider economy and society has been illuminated is 
by focussing on the relationship between dwelling prices, incomes and 
housing costs. The framework I developed for this purpose allows for a 
large number of capitalist 'environments' (a 'pure' and a variety of 
'mixed' ones) in which that relationship can occur (i.e., different 
combinations of housing processes and employment patterns), but 
postulates that the same essential mechanism operates throughout those 
different settings. I also showed the kind of approach required in the 
case of 'mixed' environments. The approach, in its general form, begins 
by constructing a matrix of housing processes and employment patterns 
(p. 177), and goes on to study any existing inter-connections.
My explanation of the relationship between dwelling 
prices, incomes and housing costs is based on the simple proposition 
that in an increasingly inter-connected world the value of labour power, 
among similarly advanced countries, tends to be affected more by the 
'local' element of housing costs than by the cost of most other goods 
which working people (blue- and white-collar) demand. The prices of 
most of these goods tend to be standardised internationally as capital­
ism advances. The analysis can be extended to tackle varying levels of 
geographical aggregation, or differing patterns of dwelling prices and 
incomes (see Appendix I).
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Certain consequences follow from this proposition, 
which, depending on the socio-institutional framework, set lower and 
upper limits to the movement of dwelling prices in relation to incomes. 
What is at issue is the capacity of land and dwelling owners to siphon 
off rises in people's earnings, the result, perhaps, of higher producti­
vity, in the forms of higher rents or higher land and dwelling prices. 
However, the imposition of higher housing costs on households may well 
result in higher wage demands, which, if satisfied, are likely to affect 
negatively the international competitiveness of the productive sector of 
the economy. Such costs can result not only from landowners' and dwel­
ling owners' expectations regarding the capacity of households to sus­
tain rises in rents and/or mortgage repayments, but also from the fact 
that firms' demand for urban space affects, through the formation of 
differential rents, all land prices, and not just the price of non- 
residential land. It is these expectations, coupled with the impact of 
differential rents, which explain why homelessness among the poor often 
increases, and can be experienced for considerable periods, as a capita­
list country becomes richer.
In turn, reduced competitiveness in the productive 
sector of the economy will mean reduced real incomes for the working 
population. This will eventually check further rises in rents and/or 
land and dwelling prices, or induce some sort of political intervention 
in the residential land and housing spheres.
The obvious research project that could be 
undertaken in connection to the above, would be to test for the opera­
tion of the postulated mechanism in the context of a given country or 
region, or of particular socio-economic groups, or industries, or
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'pools' of work skills (cf. Appendix I). Such a project would involve:
( 1 )  A description of (say) a country's employment, or 'source- 
of-income' pattern over the period of study.
(2) A description of the country's housing processes over the 
same period.
(3) An association of the two, along the matrix of p. 165.
(4) An assessment of the operation of the mechanism within the 
capitalist sector of the matrix. Questions to ask here 
would fall into two main categories: Those aimed at 
establishing the existence of conditions and/or paths for 
the operation of the mechanism; and those aimed at 
verifying its operation by looking at its effects on
(i) dwelling and land prices, and (ii) wages and profits.
Conditions/Paths
* How deeply is the working population differentiated in 
terms of skills and/or incomes?
* Where do they work? Do they work in industries that 
produce products that compete internationally (whether via exports or 
via competitors' imports, or both)?
* How have rents and land and dwelling prices varied over 
time? How widely differentiated is the housing market?
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* What has the consumption pattern of households in each 
particular sector of the working 'class' been? How has it changed, if 
at all, over time? How has the proportion of households' budgets 
(from each working class sector) spent on housing (and what kind of hou­
sing) varied? How have households' housing costs changed over time? 
How have other costs changed?
* Can one identify instances where higher housing costs 
have actually led to higher wage demands (in the context of particular 
'crosses' between working class sectors and housing market segments)? 
One could approach this question by constructing consumption 'baskets' 
representative of particular populations of households, and following 
the movements in the prices of housing (households' housing costs) and 
in the prices of all other goods and services. If a pattern of rising 
real housing costs did emerge in relation to the cost of non-housing 
items, one could then associate such price movements in the consumption 
budget with documented wage demands, and their effects on competitive­
ness. During that exercise, however, one should take care to account 
for (i) rises in dwelling quality demanded over time, (ii) synergistic 
effects between increased dwelling space and spending on consumer goods 
and services, and (iii) the implications of the possibility that 
declining production prices per unit of output in manufacturing have 
been behind increasing prices for services in all advanced economies 
(cf. Baumol & Blinder, 1988: 640-43).
* A second line of approach would have to involve compa­
risons between similar groups of workers (blue- and/or white-collar) in 
the given country and in one or more other countries - say, workers 
from the same industry. If housing costs were shown to differ between
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the two groups, while other costs were being equalised, the existence 
of a sufficient condition for the operation of the mechanism I have de­
scribed in this thesis would have been verified.
Effects
* One could also test for the existence of this mechanism 
by studying its possible effects. Namely, by associating movements in 
land and dwelling prices to ups and downs in productivity and earnings 
in the productive sectors of the economy. This kind of test is necessa­
ry but is not sufficient. High correlations between the two sorts of 
magnitudes, as might, for example, be obtained by looking at UK data 
(after adjustments for lagged effects) would make sense only in the con­
text of a theoretical explanation of their relationship - such as this 
thesis has provided - and only after 'paths' whereby the postulated me­
chanism can operate have been established empirically (through the pro­
cedure suggested above, for example).
(5) Finally, the research project would have to involve an as­
sessment of how the mechanism in question is, or has 
been, affected by (a) the presence of other housing 
processes and employment patterns, in addition to those in 
the capitalist sector of the matrix, and (b) the 
formation of high land prices as a result of space demand 
on the part of producers of various kinds (e.g., financial 
institutions).
Such an exercise could provide a government or a 
political party with ammunition for justifying, say, a more development-
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oriented and/or liberal planning policy, if it could show, for example, 
that the way the ratio of dwelling prices to incomes is readjusted over 
the long-term tends to affect adversely the productivity of the 
manufacturing sector. Alternatively, it could show, perhaps, that the 
way land and dwelling owners exploit the productive sector of the econo­
my (not only manufacturing) acts as an incentive to employers in the 
sector to tackle the problem of high wages demanded as a result of high 
housing costs by taking measures to increase productivity more than they 
would have done 'normally' (although I doubt it).
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SECTION 2: On the dynamics of housing systems.
I have advanced a conception of housing system dyna­
mics in the form of a spiral, where the 'output' of a previous evolutio­
nary round (in terms of housing conditions, tenures, housing processes, 
'modes of housing production', etc.) becomes the 'input' of the next
round. I have supplied a series of tools and frameworks that can allow 
one to follow the evolutionary pattern of a housing system by focussing
on how housing processes change over time, and how they interact with
one another. Moreover, I have shown the housing system to be an open 
system, subject to influences generated in a wider context (demogra­
phics; availability of economic resources; rising needs; the form of go­
vernment; the nature of the state; etc.).
The general idea behind this approach is that any
component of a housing system (a tenure; a housing process; etc.) follo­
ws a path of birth, growth, diversification and/or decline. The system 
itself does not 'die' (at least as long as the factors that give it its 
'systemic' character are present - see pp. 23-27); it is only 
transformed as its component parts change all the time.
The approach bears a strong affinity to the product 
life-cycle theory of marketing (cf. Kotler, 1976; Day, 1981; Midgley, 
1981; Tellis & Merle Crawford, 1981). That theory is not without prob­
lems of its own (Tellis & Merle Crawford, 1981). One problem is how to 
account for environmental influences on the life-cycle of a product. In 
this respect, I tend to support Tellis & Merle Crawford's thesis. These 
authors have abandoned the rigidity of more traditional product life­
cycle models, and advanced a model of their own, which they call 'the
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product evolutionary cycle'. The difference from more conventional 
models is not just in the label. The authors have shifted "the emphasis 
from the identification of proper curves to the analysis of underlying 
forces and trends" (ibid., p. 130). In their view, the factors of 
government mediation, managerial effectiveness, and market dynamics 
become crucial influences on the 'history' of a product. They have also 
stressed that in real life many products do not exactly 'die', but, as 
with living organisms, simply change in a variety of ways.
If one substitutes political interference for 
'government mediation', the capacity of 'actors' in the housing system 
to formulate and pursue their own strategies, for 'managerial effective­
ness', and the interaction of housing processes with one another, as 
well as their dependence on resource availability, for 'market 
dynamics', then the affinity between my approach and Tellis & Merle 
Crawford's becomes obvious. Additionally, I have been at pains to 
stress that tenures, for example, are not sufficiently described, or 
their dynamics understood, by reference to their generic names only. In 
practice, many tenures evolve (and do not just 'die') in accordance with 
changes in the array of legal and effective rights and obligations, 
opportunities and constraints, that circumscribes each.
Of course any similarity between the two approaches 
presupposes that the term 'product' is not understood narrowly (cf. 
Reeve, 1987: 91-92). Granted that, any component of the housing system 
can be considered a 'product', be it a housing process, a tenure, or a 
set of specified housing standards. They are all products, that is, of 
social development as a whole. The choice of 'product' one will focus 
upon is, of course, a matter of personal preference or of the objective
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one has in mind. One can describe, for example, the evolution of the 
British housing system either as a series of housing standards attained 
(or not attained), in which case the different housing processes of 
Britain will become, perhaps, explanatory variables at the background.
Or one can describe the same evolution in terms of housing processes, 
like
* the secondary housing market;
* the primary housing market;
* the entire market for owner-occupied housing;
* the allocation and management of public housing;
* the private rented market.
In which case, other factors, like the formation of rights and claims, 
the nature of the state, etc., will become the explanatory variables. 
Alternatively, one can focus on tenures, and ask, for example, how a 
tenure like owner-occupation diversifies into sub-categories through the 
operation of factors such as degree of dependence on building improve­
ment grants, condition of the dwelling, location, and saleability.
On the basis of the above comments, two related re­
search projects can be attempted. One can be about the history of a
given housing system; another, about forecasting future developments on 
the basis of trends and sensitivities identified through the first kind 
of project. I would recommend the following steps:
(1) Identification of the main housing processes in the sys­
tem.
(2) Construction of a series of qualitative statements descri-
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bing the pattern of legal and effective rights and 
obligations that circumscribe (by enabling as well as con­
straining) each housing process.
(3) Identification of social, economic and political develop­
ments that have affected the 'history1 of each process.
(4) Quantification of gains and losses from and to other
housing processes (in terms, perhaps, of number of house­
holds participating; of number of dwellings built or 
transacted; of value created; etc.).
(5) Gauging of the sensitivity of each process, or of 
any of its features, to both general 'environmental' 
factors, and to other processes. Which relationships are 
complementary, and which antagonistic?
(6) It might then be possible to establish, for instance, the 
extent to which a specified change in the legal 
parameters of a particular housing process will affect the 
flow of resources into that process, enhance or curtail 
its viability, etc. Or, alternatively, the extent to 
which particular demographic changes, for example, will 
alter that process, thereby affecting (possibly) the 
meaning of a tenure, and what the implications of such 
developments will be for the future course of the housing 
system. The results of this kind of exercise could then 
be fed into the housing-policy-making process.
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SECTION 3: In Lieu of An Epilogue.
From the start I viewed this research project not as 
an effort to come up with immediately practicable applications, but as 
an attempt at understanding. Nevertheless, I did make a number of poli­
cy-relevant comments (pp. 174-76, 293-96, and in the two preceding sec­
tions) . Rather than resummarising those comments, it is of greater 
significance to ask what this thesis has been about; what, in other 
words, its main contributions to knowledge have been.
Methodologically, the thesis has not been about a 
new set of statistical or econometric techniques. It is not even 
something which has been advanced in competition to any quantitative 
technique. It is, rather, a way of thinking about housing problems, the 
housing system and the residential aspect of an urban system. This way 
of thinking involves combining 'politics', 'economics', and 'sociology' 
(and even marketing theory) in order to address a part of the social 
reality - the housing sphere - which is not amenable to disciplinarian 
fragmentation. It is, I believe, about innovative ways of effecting 
this conceptual 'mix'.
In many ways the approach adopted and enhanced is 
also the substance of the thesis. I would consider as its potentially 
most useful contribution its emphasis - I hope, a paedagogic one - on 
the need and possibility of thinking about housing-related issues in a 
holistic manner. Every single problem I addressed in the thesis was a 
step in that direction. For instance, I showed that the question of 
whether housing investment levels can be associated with particular GDP 
levels should really become a question of how to account separately for
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the effects of economic development and of the socio-institutional fra­
mework on housing investment levels (and only after 'investment' and
'consumption' expenditure have been distinguished clearly from one 
another).
The second major contribution of the thesis has been 
its proposition that the structuration of rights and claims in the 
housing sphere are conditioning factors which both enable and constrain 
housing processes. For example, the broad success of owner-occupiers 
in the southern counties of England in stopping a lot of potential 
housebuilding over the past 20 years, is tantamount to creation of a 
'conservationist right' (cf. pp. 149-150). I showed in chapter 4 that 
the scarcity of developable land thus created (cf. Muellbauer, 1990: 16 
& 20) has served to check any prolonged drops in the ratio of dwelling 
prices to earnings, and has therefore affected the way the housing 
market and the building industry work (cf. Barrett & Hooper, 1983). If 
the 'conservationist right' were to be challenged effectively at a truly 
grand scale (cf. Nicholson-Lord, 1990), the result might be more
housebuilding in the south (intended consequence), but would probably 
also affect the operation and structure of the housing market and the 
building industry (unintended, perhaps, consequence). In turn, the 
approach developed throughout this thesis can help one conceptualise
precisely this kind of housing system dynamics.
The third major contribution of the thesis has been 
its analysis of the trade-off that often exists between the individual 
and the social; the fact, in other words, that 'efficient' solutions to 
housing 'problems' from a narrow, short-term point of view are very 
often sub-optimal, and even disastrous, from a broad, long-term
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viewpoint. One example is the dilemma between conservationism and new 
housebuilding in the south of England mentioned above (cf. The Guardian, 
05.10.1989: 20; Miller, 1990). Another is offered by the Greek dilemma 
between encouraging more housebuilding in areas outside formal city
plans (chiefly around Greater Athens), as a relatively cheap and conven­
ient way of alleviating local housing shortages and/or improving the 
housing stock, and discouraging new housebuilding there until a proper 
plan, planning apparatus, and funds for infrastructure provision are av­
ailable.
In both of these examples the difficulty that
planners and policy-makers face results, in part, from a narrow, non­
lateral way of thinking. Recently Prince Charles has argued that
Britain’s
"new housing estates need not always be strewn clusters of 
separate houses set at jagged angles along windswept planners' 
routes"
(HRH The Prince of Wales, 1989: 87).
He insists that there are ways of reconciling England's 'green and plea­
sant land1 with satisfaction of growing housing needs. There is always 
a choice as, for example,
"[n]ew buildings can be intrusive or they can be designed and 
sited so that they fit in"
(ibid., p. 78).
New types of town and/or estate, and of course a new 'philosophy', are
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what is required. Among other things, he advocates 'enclosed' 
architecture, which should also foster a much missed sense of 
neighbourhood:
"A community spirit is born far more easily in a well-formed 
square or courtyard than in a random scattering of developers1 
plots”
(ibid., p. 87).
In Greece, on the other hand, new housebuilding in 
areas 'outside-the-plan' could be encouraged and accompanied by measures 
which, while easily observed, would not require much state spending, and 
would also part with the implicit assumption that built-up areas 
are/should be primarily for cars and traffic, and not for people and 
neighbourhoods. Most importantly, the number of permissible floors in 
those areas should be set at a maximum of two. This would also serve to 
discourage the growth of speculative housebuilding in those areas, and 
therefore preserve the affordability of land.
I will not try here to work out perfect ways to
resolve these and similar dilemmas. The topic belongs elsewhere. My
point is that very often such debates tend to be cast in terms of the
right or safe 'mix' of 'green' land and development carried out through
a conventional housing process - like, in Britain, speculative 
housebuilding or bureaucratic public provision. This is wrong. If new 
types of towns and/or estates are the solution, it is perhaps futile to 
expect speculative builders to come up with commercially viable schemes, 
affordable by ordinary people. New housing processes will be needed in 
order to have these new, environmentally friendly, and 'humane' towns
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and estates. This brings us back to the domain of politics (cf. Ball, 
1983: 370-391). After all, the reason why 'conservation vs
development' debates have been cast in rather narrow terms, is not 
merely the 'narrow-mindedness' of planners, but also the influence of 
established interests and lobbies of all sorts (cf. Healey et al., 
1988).
Throughout this thesis I have stressed that housing 
processes are not about brick and mortar, but about the kind of rights 
that various agents involved in the production and consumption of 
housing enjoy or lack. In its broadest sense, the problem concerns the 
degree of independence and control that households have over their 
housing and - why not? - their localities and communities. If it comes 
to that, the Greek process of achieving and enjoying owner-occupation 
may have something of value to teach planners and architects of more 
advanced and orderly countries. Yes, the Greek way has caused - and is 
causing - grave environmental harm (see chapter 6) . But the route 
whereby this has happened has not always been direct. For example, the 
parcellisation of urban land in Athens has indeed played havoc with what 
proper traffic planning ideally requires. A congested urban system, in 
turn, aggravates pollution from car exhaust fumes. But it is not 
natural or obvious that modern cities will have to accomodate an expand­
ing number of 'dirty' private cars (cf. Sweezy, 1973). This is no 
less of an ideological assumption and political choice than the ones 
about the value of household independence and control regarding their 
housing.
At a time, however, when the need for a new relati­
onship between man and the environment is felt by more and more people, 
it is highly appropriate and encouraging that new types of towns and
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estates, and a new architectural and planning 'philosophy' are sought 
as part of the solution. Inevitably this kind of search will make an 
increasing number of people aware of the need to question both estab­
lished planning philosophies and established housing processes. If so, 
my attempt to advance an understanding of housing system dynamics from 
the point of view of the formation and significance of 'rights' and 
1 claims' may have been highly opportune.-
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A P P E N D I C E S
I: Income Differentials Among the 'Working Class'
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to Further Research.
II: The Structure of Dwelling Ownership in the Greek
Housing System c. 1980.
APPENDIX I: Income Differentiation Among the 'Working Class' and House
Price Bands: Preliminary Notes Prior to Further Research.
The following discussion involves three steps. Step 
1 explains how recognition of the existence of wage differences can be 
compatible with retention of the analytical category of the 'working 
class'. This is achieved by means of the device of "pools of 
'equivalent access' skills". Step 2 reconciles the existence of a wage 
hierarchy and of a hierarchy of dwelling prices with the mechanism 
that checks rises in households' housing costs (and consequently in dwel­
ling prices) in a 'pure' capitalist environment (see ch. 6, sec. 2). 
Step 3 demonstrates the affinity of the concept of "pools of 'equivalent 
access' skills" to income distribution theory, and shows that it can be 
a more useful way of accounting for income distribution than some past 
attempts.
The analysis pursued here can be applied at 
different levels of geographical aggregation: a country, a region, a
travel-to-work-area, a city, a town. For this reason it will be 
conducted without prior specification of a spatial frame of reference.
Step 1: The question I will try to answer in this Appendix
is: Can the mechanism that sets an upper limit to 
households' housing costs, and indirectly to dwelling prices, operate 
even when the working class is not just a homogeneous mass, but is 
differentiated by income and/or sector? In other words, can the model 
I advanced back in sec. 2 of ch. 6 be expanded in order to incorporate a 
more realistic view of the world, where substantial differences in pay 
can exist between, say, unskilled and skilled labourers, or between
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blue- and white-collar workers?
The appropriate starting point for answering this 
question involves defining the term 'working class'. I think that the 
conventional conception, according to which only possession of 'raw' 
(unskilled, manual) labour power qualifies someone as part of the 
working class, is incorrect; its acceptance might lead one to 
'discover' the relative 'disappearance' of the working class in advanced 
capitalist countries - something which would only result in mystifying 
the processes of wealth creation in those societies. I will not get 
into details; the topic has been discussed extensively elsewhere (cf. 
Giddens, 1973, 1987; Gorz, 1982). I feel, however, that an operational 
definition of the working class should include the possession of market 
capacities for which a wage is paid, and at the same time those who 
possess such skills do not occupy managerial or leadership positions in 
society's or an enterpise's hierarchical structure (I am having im mind 
enterprises that employ staff unrelated to management or ownership). In 
section 4 of chapter 6 I suggested that this basic definition can be 
qualified to include small entrepreneurs who simply disguise their own 
unemployment, and others besides - but I will ignore such subtleties 
here. This definition will allow me to preserve the analytical insight 
offered by the concept of class, while acknowledging the existence of a 
hierarchy of wage levels.
A wage hierarchy exists because society values and 
devalues different skills, or 'market capacities', all the time. Most 
probably increasingly valuable skills will be in short supply, and 
increasingly devalued skills in excess supply, at any point in time. 
The former tend to command higher remuneration than the latter. If,
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however, enough socially necessary labour time is spent on the 
reproduction and deployment of a labour force with the requisite skills 
(e.g., through formal training of school leavers or retraining of the 
current work force), the relative lucrativeness of the increasingly 
valuable skills will be eroded. So what matters is the ease with which 
workers from different industries and/or with different skills, or 
school leavers (if available), can compete for jobs in any particular 
occupation or industry.
For example, few workers can compete for a brain 
surgeon's job because of the years of training it takes to become one, 
and/or because of the high degree of intelligence and the rarity of 
other personal qualities required for brain surgery. All these 
qualities, even if innate, can be understood as the effective equivalent 
of abnormally long periods of training. Most people lack the capacity 
and/or the willingness to undergo the requisite kind of training and 
sustain the associated period of 'waiting' in order to become brain 
surgeons. However, more people can compete for jobs in the electronics 
or information technology industries, and vastly more for unskilled 
jobs.
We can thus envisage a hierarchy of "pools of 
'equivalent access' skills" demarcated by the period of time required to 
transform 'raw' labour power into qualitatively specific labour power, 
i.e., into skills. In other words, the roughly equal length of time 
different people take in order to 'access' a given skill assigns them in 
a certain, 'equivalent access', pool of skills. It goes without saying 
that many different skills can be part of the same pool. People 
'belonging' to a particular pool of 'equivalent access' skills can be
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said to form a cohort of competing workers. In general, the larger the 
cohort, the greater the downward pressure on the wages offered by the 
industries or in the occupations involved (assuming constant or 
declining productivities). Conversely, and assuming at least some 
freedom of movement of capital and labour between sectors, productivity 
gains in anyone sector that result in higher wages for the labour force 
there, will tend to exercise upward pressure on the wages of the entire 
cohort. An example is productivity gains in the manufacturing industry 
resulting in higher wages there, which in turn pull wages in the service 
sector up (without commensurate increases in the service sector 
productivity though: hence the long-term rise in the cost of personal
services in all advanced countries, according to Baumol & Blinder, 1988: 
8, 640-43).
These pools of 'equivalent access' skills provide a
way of linking particular market capacities for which a wage is or can
be paid, to the structuration of the working class. For example, most 
doctors in the past were definitely not working class because fewer 
people than to-day (proportionately speaking) could afford to study
medicine. Therefore, the total amount of labour time society devoted to 
producing doctors fell far short of the socially necessary labour time. 
Doctors' incomes, as a result, tended to be far higher than modal 
incomes. Nowadays the process of doctor production is more standardised 
and assembly line-like (albeit with severe quality controls attached to 
it) . Consequently, an increasing number of doctors approach the
'positional' category of the 'working class': they work for
collectively negotiated rates either for some national health service or 
for private clinics and hospitals.
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Thus, depending on shifts in the learning curve for 
various skills and on how long enterprises and organisations can wait 
before they are forced to hire personnel possessing new skills, the 
pool of 'equivalent access' skills that defines the working class can be 
extended substantially - from jobs that require no pre-learnt basic 
skills to jobs that require one, two, or even more years of training. 
One cannot draw a precise line as pools of 'equivalent access' skills 
are in a permanent state of flux, cutting across middle and working 
class, for example. But in the context of the relationship of dwelling 
prices to wages, the conclusion is that we do not have to limit the 
discussion to manual or industrial workers only. We can use the concept 
of pools of 'equivalent access' skills to include a broader spectrum of 
skills, jobs, and workers, while holding onto the analytically crucial 
concept of the working class, and at the same time incorporating the 
empirical fact of a hierarchy of wage levels.
Step 2: In a housing market different dwellings have
different prices. Consequently dwellings fall into 
price bands. Now, if most wage-earners in a particular place and of a 
certain pool of 'equivalent access' skills house themselves through the 
market, their wages will tend to include a component that goes towards 
meeting their unavoidable and recurring housing costs, like rents or 
loan repayment instalments. The magnitude of the 'housing cost 
component' enables workers in that pool to 'address' (i.e., consider 
renting or buying) dwellings from within an 'appropriate' (broader or 
narrower, depending on price) dwelling price band.
What the relevant price band is for given groups of 
workers, or for given pools of 'equivalent access' skills, is not
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intuitively obvious, and therefore needs elaboration. The question I 
will try to answer in this subsection is: Why should the housing
component of the wage of, say, white- as opposed to that of blue-collar 
workers enable the former to 'address' dwellings in a higher price band 
than it enables blue-collar workers to do? One can, of course, reply 
that white-collar workers tend to have higher incomes than blue-collar 
ones (this may not always be true, but this is besides the point), 
and are therefore able to afford better - and more expensive - 
accomodation. This answer does contain an important insight - namely, 
that people's needs expand with their incomes -, but does not 
immediately explain how movements of dwelling prices relative to incomes 
come upon a certain upper limit, as I have postulated. To do so, we 
need to look at the hierarchy of pools of 'equivalent access' skills.
In this hierarchy each level tends to be associated 
with a higher modal income than the one below, and a lower modal income 
than the one above it. This is so because higher levels are associated 
with more years of training, or equivalent, for the various (socially 
valuable) skills contained in the respective pools than lower levels 
are. Now, people's needs do expand with incomes, so income 
differentials are a sufficient explanation of why people in higher 
income brackets aim for better housing than those in lower brackets. On 
the other hand, what wage-earners need or want is only an indirect 
influence on whether their employers will give it to them, and often, at 
least in the short-run, employers tend to be very insensitive to wage- 
earners' needs. The catch is that employers do want people with 
particular skills, which in effect means people from particular pools of 
'equivalent access' skills, and are therefore prepared to pay wages 
commensurate with the position of each pool in the hierarchy.
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The fact that wages, and incomes in general, form 
the basis for the different expectations and needs of different groups 
of wage-earners implies that each pool of 'equivalent access' skills 
becomes associated with certain needs and standards of fulfillment 
consistent with the reproduction of the skills going into the pool. 
Housing is one of those needs - a basic one. A particularly apposite 
example comes from Eastern Europe. Donnison & Ungerson (1982) note that 
housing in these countries is not 'free' but 'rationed', that is, 
"allocated in prescribed amounts to people who qualify for it owing to 
their needs and owing to their place in the productive system: it is a
ration provided along with wages" (p. 107). As a result, "priority for 
public housing is given to 'keyworkers' and undermanned industries, and 
the distribution of housing is used as a substitute for wage 
differentials" (pp. 95-6).
In other words, people from pool A (say, electronic 
engineers, computer analysts, lecturers, et al.) have to have a certain 
standard of housing, usually superior to that for people in pool B (say, 
bin-men, cleaners, et al.) in order to continue to provide their 
customary standard of service, and for new recruits to be attracted to 
pool A. Consequently, if the prices of dwellings that are usually 
'addressed' by people in A go up, their wages will have to go up too - 
subject to the 'control' mechanism I described in sec. 2 of ch. 6. This 
is essentially what I mean when I say that the housing component of the 
wage enables wage-earners to 'address' dwellings in a relevant price 
band.
Step 3: The statement made above, that employers pay wages
commensurate with the position of each pool in a
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hierarchy of pools of 'equivalent access' skills, amounts to a 
hypothesis purporting to explain income distribution from wages. It 
introduces elements from both the Pareto and Lydall approach, and the 
Gibrat and Tinbergen approach (Pen, 1971). What W. Pareto said was that 
"the number of people earning at least a given income decreases by a 
fixed percentage, if we let that income increase by 1%" (op. cit., p. 
235). Although it is now "generally recognised" that Pareto's Law
"applies only to higher incomes" (p. 245), still the right-hand tail of 
the Pareto curve (which is a right-skewed distribution) has had to be 
explained. H. Lydall suggested that the skewness is a result of
somebody's income corresponding to his place in the social hierarchy (p.
243). Pen argues that although "[t]his theory is a good find ... its
logic is confined to bureaucracies - it is concerned with incomes with
regard to which status and prestige are decisive. If the forces of the 
market are involved another result may be expected, for it is difficult 
to see why supply and demand should yield exactly a price that is 
proportionate to a person's responsibilities. After all, there are 
people in the world with high incomes and hardly any subordinates" (p.
244) .
It was the apparent skewness of observed income 
distributions which enticed Pareto and others to reject chance as an 
explanatory principle behind income distribution. On the other hand, R. 
Gibrat and others have maintained that an observed income distribution 
is related to another, unobservable, distribution, "which is governed by 
the laws of chance" (p. 245). The unobservable distribution might be 
that of each of various talents, or of a certain combination of them. 
By utilising logarithms, Gibrat was then able to show that the tail of 
an observed income distribution is forced back towards the middle -
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hence Gibrat's Law states that the personal distribution of income is 
lognormal (p. 246). In turn, a severe weakness of Gibrat's Law is that 
possible intercorrelations of people's talents or qualities would in 
fact result in even skewer income distributions than are actually 
observed (p. 251).
J. Tinbergen incorporated this criticism into his 
own theory of income distribution. He did not merely "take into account 
the availability of these qualities", but focussed also on "the degree 
to which these qualities are desired by society" (p. 252). In other
words, according to Tinbergen, it is only "if the spread of the 
contributions [i.e., of separate positive qualities - Pen, p. 252] 
supplied does not differ from the spread of the contributions demanded" 
(p. 253) that a Gibrat distribution appears.
I would argue, then, that the pools of 'equivalent 
access' skills hypothesis offers a way of 'marrying' Tinbergen's 
emphasis on market dynamics (between supplied and demanded skills or 
traits) and Lydall's suggestion that one's income depends on the rung in 
the social hierarchy one is. I would say that a hierarchy of incomes is 
the result of an ordering of socially valuable skills, in terms of the 
length of required training, or its effective equivalent, rather than of 
the extent of administrative responsibility or position in a bureaucracy 
as such. For instance, if I study 5 years for a Ph.D. that nobody cares 
about, my income will be quite lower than someone else's who has trained 
for 5 or even fewer years on skills that society values. But as soon as 
whatever effective market capacities I actually possess have placed me 
in my appropriate pool of 'equivalent access' skills, my income will 
depend on the position of my pool in the entire hierarchy of pools of
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'equivalnent access' skills rather than on 'absolute' demand and supply 
for my particular skill.
Let us rephrase this: Society values and devalues
productive qualities all the time. Productive skills are acquired 
through formal training and/or experience, while the learning process 
may be assisted by the presence of innate intelligence and other 
personal qualities. What matters from the point of view of remuneration 
is not a person's actual length of time it takes him/her to acquire a 
skill, but how generally accessible a skill is, in relation to the
accessibility of every other skill. Broadly, the shorter the learning 
time, the more accessible the skill. New and/or rare socially valuable 
skills do tend to attract higher remuneration than other skills in the 
same 'equivalent access' category, but this is simply a reflection of 
the fact that, as yet, society has not invested enough labour time, or 
equivalent, in producing the new skills or reproducing the rare skills 
to a larger scale. Given time, such deviations tend to be ironed out.
In the above framework, the reason why income
distributions tend to have a rather long right-hand tail, and a shorter 
left-hand tail, is simple enough: the rich or well-to-do have more
power than the rest, so they 'mark the cards' to their favour more
effectively than the less rich, and in many different ways, while the 
really poor have no or very little power.
387
APPENDIX II: The Dwellinq-ownership Structure of Greece, c. 1981.
In this Appendix my aim is to estimate how many 
households from each tenure grouping owned how many dwellings in Greece 
around 1981 - and whether these dwellings were primary residences,
rented properties, second homes or other (vacant and/or ruined). I will 
have to make a number of assumptions in order to compensate for the lack 
of precise or appropriate data. I hope that my 'feel' of the Greek 
society, and a conscious effort to treat availabe data in a consistent 
manner, will make this exercise worthwhile. My results should be 
interpreted as reasonable approximations to orders of magnitude rather 
than word on stone tablets. I also hope that the 'reconstruction* at­
tempted here will provide useful insights into the context of housing 
politics in Greece, as regards, for instance, the crucial areas of rent 
control and urban planning.
SECTION 1: Sources and Definitions
My primary sources are the NSSG 1985 Yearbook,
specifically Tables II: 20 (p. 35), II: 23 (p. 38), and XII: 7 (p. 279); 
the NSSG "Statistics of the Declared Income of Natural Persons and Their 
Taxation During the 1982 Fiscal Year"; EKKE (1987b), and Pavlopoulos
(1987). The censi refered to below took place in 1981.
From Table XII: 7 I get the total number of
dwellings in 1981. A 'dwelling' is defined as "a separate and independ­
ent space which, by the way it has been built, rebuilt or converted, is 
intended for habitation, or one not intended for habitation but occupied 
as living quarters at the time of the census" (NSSG, 1985: 268).
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From Table II: 20 I get the total number of
households in 1981, the numbers of households living in 'regular' and 
'non-regular' dwellings, and the numbers of sharing and non-sharing 
households.
A 'household' is "(a) any person living alone in a 
separate housing unit or occupying a room as a lodger, provided that, in 
this case, he does not share meals with the family he is staying with, 
and (b) a group of two or more persons (related or not) living together 
in the same housing unit and sharing meals. Every person staying in a 
private household and sharing meals with family members was considered 
as household member. A distinction was made, however, between regular 
members and temporary guests. Persons who, on account of the nature of 
their work, cannot have regular meals with the household, have been con­
sidered as household members if they actually belong to the family. 
Strangers have been considered as household members, if they have at 
least one principal meal a day with the family or the household head, in 
which case they were reported as boarders. Otherwise, they were consi­
dered as a separate (usually one-person) household" (NSSG, 1985: 13).
A 'regular dwelling' is "a permanent and independent 
structure constituted by one regular room at least and intended for the 
purposes of habitation by a private household" (ibid., p. 13). A 'regu­
lar room' is "a space within a building reaching at least to a height of 
2 metres, of a size enough to hold a bed for an adult (that is 4-square 
metres at least), with direct day-light from window or a glass door" (p. 
13). A 'non-regular dwelling' is "(a) other spaces intended for human 
habitation, constructed, however, with cheap or locally available mate­
rials (huts, shanties), (b) other spaces not intended for habitation 
(stables, barns, garages, warehouses, offices, natural caves, etc.), (c)
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mobile housing units which have been made to be transported and are in­
tended for habitation (trailers, ships, boats, yachts, caravans and 
gypsy camps)" (p. 13).
Finally, from Table II: 23 I get a breakdown of
occupied regular dwellings into owned, rented, other (usually occupied 
rent-free) and 'undeclared tenure status'.
Because of sharing, the breakdown of households 
into owner-occupying, etc., is bound to differ from that for dwellings. 
Also, the number of propertied households is likely to be quite larger 
than the number of ower-occupying households, as in Greece a lot of 
renting households (and even more owner-occupying ones) own, in whole or 
in part, dwellings in the villages or towns they originally come from.
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SECTION 2: Assumptions (in italics) and Processing of the Data.
(1) Households:
Total number in 1981 
Living in non-regular dwellings 
Living in regular dwellings 
Of which: Sharing
Non-sharing
2.974.450 
38,000
2.936.450 
76,980
2,859,470
(2) Dwellings:
Total number in 1981 3,999,332
Assuming that (a) households living in non-regular dwellings occupi­
ed a total of 30,000 such dwellings, and (b) all other dwellings - 
occupied or not - were 'conventional' or 'regular' dwellings, and 
deducting this number from the total number of dwelling, I get:
Total number of regular dwellings 
Occupied regular dwellings (a da­
tum - see Table II: 23)
Excess of unoccupied regular dw­
ellings over occupied regular 
dwellings
3,969,332
2,895,840
1,073,492
(3) The number of shared occupied regular dwellings is given by 
deducting the number of non-sharing households living in regular 
dwellings from the number of occupied regular dwellings, i.e.,
2,895,840 - 2,859,470 = 36,370
This means that 76,980 sharing households occupied 36,370 regular 
dwellings, or 2.1 households per dwelling.
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(4) According to Table II: 23, in 1981 occupied regular dwellings were 
distributed by tenure status as follows:
Total of dwellings : 2,895,840
Owner-occupied (00) : 2,028,510 or 70 0%
Rented (R) : 768,910 or 26 6%
Occupied rent-free (ORF) : 87,750 or 3 0%
Of undeclared status (U) : 10,670 or 0 4%
Assuming that the tenurial distribution of U dwellings is similar 
to the distribution suggested by the other three categories, the 
total distribution becomes:
Owner-occupied (00) : 2,036,065 or 70.31
Rented (R) : 771,741 or 26.65
Occupied rent-free (ORF) : 88,034 or 3.04
All dwellings : 2,895,840 or 100.0
(5) To sum up results so far: 
Dwellings, occupied: 
a . Regular:
2,895,840
a.1. Non-shared:
2,859,470
a .2. Shared:
36,370
b. Non-regular:
30,000
Households
} 2,936,450
} 2,859,470
76,980
38,000
(6) I will now associate the tenure distribution of dwellings to that of
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households, taking account of the distorting effect of sharing. 
Logically one would expect those who share to fall into one of the 
following categories:
00/00 i.e., 'both' sharing households are owner-occupying;
00/R i.e., one is owner-occupying, the other is renting;
00/0RF i.e., one is owner-occupying, the other is occupying 
rent-free;
R/R i.e., they are both renting;
R/ORF i.e., one renting, the other occupying rent-free;
ORF/ORF i.e, they are ’both1 occupying rent-free.
One may safely ignore all cases but 00/R and R/R. 
If the sharing households are both 00, they are almost certain 
to be familially related. As such they will have counted as a 
single household after the NSSG definition of one. Also, the number 
of those who share as well as occupy rent-free do so either on the 
landlord's sufferance (the vast majority of cases, as when landlord 
and tenant are related), or because they squat. Either way it is 
unlikely that they would accept sharing their space with an alien 
household, i.e., someone they would not be sharing meals with and/or 
familial ties. Finally, one must also disregard cases 00/0RF and 
R/ORF. Barring confiscation of property in the context of emergency 
measures (e.g., like it happened for a few years after the 1922 Asia 
Minor catastrophe, and the influx of refugees that followed it - see 
Ghizeli, 1984), it is equally unlikely that either an owner-occupier 
or a tenant will take in rent-free a household unrelated to them. It 
should be recalled that temporary guests do not count as members of 
a household.
By far the most widespread type of sharing is likely
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to involve two or more renting households (e.g.,students, civil 
servants seconded away from home, etc.). Less common will be the 
case of an owner-occupying household sharing with a rent-paying 
tenant (I am not considering here the case of room-letting to 
tourists).
I suggest, therefore, the following tenure distri­
bution for sharing households:
R/R 75% i.e., 57, 735
00/R 25% i.e., 19,245
All 100% i.e., 76,980
Assuming that in the 00/R case the sharing ratio is
1:1, we get
Dwellings
00
R
9,622;
26,748;
36,370
9,623
30,987
or
9,622 00
67,358 R
76,980 Households
On the basis of these results, the 'real' tenurial 
distribution for all households becomes:
Dwellings 
Owner-occupied:
2,026,443 non-shared
9,622 shared
Rented:
744,993 non-shared 
26,748 shared 
Occupied rent-free:
88,034
Total:
2,895,840
Households 
Owner-occupying:
2,026,443 non-sharing
9,622 sharing
Renting:
744,993 non-sharing 
67,358 sharing 
Occupying rent-free:
88,034
Total:
2,936,450
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In other words, in 1981:
69.3% of all households living in regular dwellings were owner- 
occupiers;
27.7% were renting privately, and 
3.0% were occupying rent-free.
This distribution slightly diverges from that given in the 1981/82 
Household Expenditure Survey (on the basis of a sample of 6,035 
households), according to which the corresponding figures were 
72.0%, 25.3% and 2.7%, respectively.
(7) While most of the rented stock was owned by owner-occupying 
households, not all of them owned rented stock, and, in addition, 
some of the rented stock was owned by renting households. To 
estimate the number of owners of rented stock, I turn to the 1982 
"Statistics of the Declared Income of Natural Persons and Their 
Taxation" mentioned earlier. The number of taxpayers who in 1982 
declared income from 'built properties', which was earned in 1981, 
was 562,543. I assume that this number corresponded to 534,416 
households (95 per cent of the taxpayers), as in Greece husband and 
wife declare in common to the Tax Authorities.
Understandably, not all of the 'built properties' in 
question were dwellings, and, moreover, a number of those taxpayers 
must have earned income from properties owned in common. The latter 
point is of no consequence here as my aim is to find the number of 
households with property stakes in dwellings, no matter how small 
those stakes may have been. Still, one must make allowance for 
those taxpayers whose income from 'built properties' derived 
exclusively from non-dwellings. Assuming that such cases were a
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relatively small minority, I suggest a figure of 50,000.
It is also possible that the number of those who 
received income from dwellings was larger than those who declared 
such income to the Tax Authorities. I have no doubt that the 
discrepancy was material in the case of people who let rooms to 
tourists (Pavlopoulos, 1987: 135-36). Still, that leaves about
40,000 households who, according to my estimate on the basis of 
Pavlopoulos, op. cit., in 1981 did declare income from that source. 
What is less clear, is whether income from room-letting to tourists 
passes down in the books of the Tax Authorities as ' income from 
built property1 or as 'income from enterprise1. I know that the Tax 
Authorities tend to opt for the latter definition, but not in all 
cases necessarily.
However, I do not think that the discrepancy between 
the number of those who earned income from dwellings and those who 
declared such income was material in cases of renting to households 
ordinarily resident in Greece. The reason is that such households 
can charge their conspicuous rental payments against their declared 
income, and thus have an incentive to declare their tenant status to 
the Tax Authorities. By analogy, landlords cannot easily hide the 
fact that they have property income from tenant households 
ordinarily resident in Greece. It is more probable that the black 
economy in this particular market 'manifests' itself as undeclared 
income rather than as undeclared cases of letting to tenants ordina­
rily resident in Greece. Taking all this into account, we come up 
with
534,416 - 50,000 - 40,000 = 444,416 households,
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who in 1981 received declared income from tenants ordinarily 
resident in Greece.
(8) My next question is: Did all the 9,622 owner-occupiers, who in 1981 
shared with tenants declare their income? I think not. Although 
those tenant households must have been ordinarily resident in Greece 
in order to count as households in the census, a very large number 
of them must have been non-liable to income declaration, e.g., 
students or young officer cadets. In addition, it is easier for a 
landlord not to declare income earned from an in-resident than from 
tenants occupying separate dwellings. Therefore, accepting Pavlo­
poulos' estimate of two non-income-declaring, room-letting landlords 
to one who declares this type of income, out of 9,622 households 
mentioned, 6,351 did not declare, and 3,271 did so. Deducting the 
latter figure from 444,416, leaves 441,145 landlord households who 
in 1981 owned 771,741 let dwellings in addition to those they them­
selves occupied.
(9) Another point concerns the breakdown of those 441,145 landlord- 
households into owner-occupier and tenant. Below I estimate the 
number of let dwellings owned by households who rented in turn, as 
10,132. Assuming that each such dwelling was owned by one 
household, leaves 441,145 - 10,132 = 431,013 owner-occupying, 
landlord-households owning 771,741 - 10,132 = 761,609 rented 
dwellings.
(10) Sharing households who rented had no property stakes in dwellings.
(11) Two thirds of non-sharing, renting households had no stakes in
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dwelling properties at all (i.e., 491,695 households), and one
third had dwelling property stakes (i.e., 253,298 households).
(12) The renting households with dwelling property stakes owned into 
dwellings 80% of their number (i.e., into 202,638 dwellings), as 
some of them must have shared property rights over dwellings owned 
in common.
(13) The dwellings owned by renting households were distributed thus: 
65% (or 131,715) were second homes, 30% (or 60,791) were vacant 
and/or ruined, and 5% (or 10, 132) were rented.
(14) Sharing, owner-occupying households had no property stakes in 
other dwellings. Even if some did so, the numbers involved must 
have been negligible, as to share one's dwelling with an alien 
household implies a low permanent income and/or wealth level.
(15) Households occupying rent-free had no effective property stakes in 
any dwellings, and even if they did in a legal sense, the 
effective ownership rights over those extra properties were likely 
to reside with the landlord-households who owned the dwellings 
occupied rent-free, or with other younger relatives. Otherwise, 
such households were likely to be too poor to have property stakes 
anyway.
(16) 40 per cent of the dwellings occupied rent-free were owned by 
owner-occupying households in receipt of income from other 
dwellings, and the rest by owner-occupying households not in 
receipt of such income, at a ratio of 1:1. I assume these
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proportions on the grounds that households owning a number of 
properties were more likely to afford to let someone in one of 
their properties rent-free than households owning one or even two 
dwellings only; on the other hand the latter type of household 
were more numerous than the former type (by a little less than four 
to one, in fact).
(17) Owner-occupying households who were neither 'landlords' nor owners 
of dwellings occupied rent-free owned into second and/or vacant 
homes 80% of their number (i.e., 751,563 x 80%). The reasoning is 
the same as in the case of renting households. Owner-occupying 
'landlord' households did so 60% of their number (i.e., 431,013 x 
60%) as a large part of them got stakes into lettable 
properties through the mechanism of the 'exchange arrangement'. 
This means that they had had urban land plots at some point in the 
past, which by 1981 made most of them longer-standing urban 
dwellers than the 'average' owner-occupying, non-landlord- 
household. In other words, their connections with rural Greece, 
where most of the second and/or vacant homes are located, must 
have been less strong than those of more recent urban immigrants. 
Finally, owner-occupying households owning dwellings occupied rent- 
free, but who did not receive income from (other) dwellings, owned 
into second and/or vacant homes 40% of their number (i.e., 52,820 x 
40%). The reason I suggest a 40% proportion is that, since their 
own dwellings, and those occupied rent-free but still owned by 
them, already must have taken up most of their wealth, their extra 
property stakes were likely to be smaller than those of the other 
two categories of owner-occupying households.
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(18) The concept of a second home as opposed to a vacant and/or ruined 
one is very fluid. In 1981 vacant dwellings in Greater Athens & 
Piraeus were estimated to be 18.5% of the stock, and 12% were unfit 
for habitation (EKKE, 1987b: 14, quoting the Athens Master Plan
1983). This might mean that vacant dwellings all over Greece could 
have been 25% - 30% of the stock - and, indeed, the excess of 
unoccupied regular dwellings over occupied ones in 1981 was 27% of 
the national stock (see (2) above).
I would contend, however, that most of the excess 
must have been in reality second homes, as opposed to merely 
vacant. That is, they must have been summer, weekend, or holiday 
homes, and, often, ancestral homes in one's place of origin. Truly 
vacant homes, in the sense of advanced deterioration or complete 
desertion by their owners must have been a minority in the excess 
stock. Further, owners of ancestral or holiday homes may be 
prepared to put up with a higher degree of deterioration, or 
economy of construction, or lack of amenities, than as regards 
their principal residences. In other words, a deteriorated 
dwelling in an urban centre is more unsuitable for habitation than 
a 'similar' dwelling used during holidays. Thus, I propose that 
35% of the excess stock in 1981 (1,073,492 dwellings) be considered 
'vacant and/or in ruin’, and the rest 'second homes'. This 
translates into 9.5% and 17.5% of the total stock, respectively. 
By comparison, 17.4% of all dwelling units in France in 1982 were 
either second homes or classified as vacant (Boleat, 1986: 29).
Only 4% of the stock in Spain was considered to be 'in ruin' 
(ibid.). (See also Ashby et al., 1975.)
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(19) It is unlikely that the distribution 65% - 35% (for 'second' and 
'vacant' homes, respectively) suggested in (18) above was the same 
throughout all propertied categories. One would expect, for 
instance, that 'landlord' households would own proportionately more 
'vacant' (as opposed to 'ruined') than 'second' homes, since some 
vacant homes were very likely to be 'for rent', but registered as 
'vacant' at the time of the census. I would suggest, therefore,
the following proportions for 'second homes' and 'vacant and/or ru­
ined' dwellings falling into each propertied category:
Second Homes Vacant and/or Ruined
Dwellings
'Landlord' households : 45% 55%
All the rest : 71% 29%
(20) On the basis of the above assumptions and calculations, I have
worked out the property structure of the Greek housing system
around 1981. I present the results in Table A.2.1.
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SECTION 3: Results and Comments.
(1) Regarding households:
69.30% were owner-occupiers;
27.70% were renting;
3.00% were occupying rent-free;
14.68% were both owner-occupiers
and landlords to 'ordinary' tenants;
27.27% had no property stakes in dwellings 
other than their own homes;
27.37% were owner-occupiers, had property 
stakes in other dwellings, but did 
not let those;
8.63% were renting, but had also property 
stakes in other dwellings;
22.04% had no property stakes in dwellings 
whatsoever, and
77.06% had such stakes.
Comment 1: Since a number of households without property stakes must 
have been students, officer cadets, and young civil 
servants, i.e, people with potential but no actual property 
stakes in dwellings, the proportion of families with pro­
perty stakes in dwellings must have been even higher than 
that for mere households - possibly 80% - 82%.
(2) Regarding dwellings:
407
51.30% were owner-occupied;
19.40% were rented;
2.20% were occupied rent-free; 
17.50% were second homes;
9.50% were vacant and/or ruined.
(3) Regarding households and dwellings:
14.68% of households were owner-occupiers, were
also landlords to 'ordinary' tenants occu­
pying separate dwellings, and owned 37.45% 
of the dwelling stock, and 98.70% of the 
rented stock;
27.27% of households were owner-occupiers with­
out any other property stakes in dwel­
lings, and owned 20.17% of the stock;
27.37% of households were owner-occupiers with
stakes in dwellings other than letting to 
ordinary tenants occupying separate dwel­
lings, and owned 37.27% of the stock;
8.63% of households were renting and occupying
separate dwellings, had stakes in other 
dwellings, and owned 5.10% of the stock.
(3) Regarding property relationships between households:
15.01% of households who were owner-occupiers 
confronted as landlords
408
27.70% of households, who were renting;
14.68% of households who were non-sharing owner- 
occupiers (i.e., 431,013) confronted 
as landlords
27.37% of households (i.e., 802,728), who rented 
but did not share with an owner-occupier. 
I.e., one such 'landlord* household 
confronted 1.86 such tenants.
0.03%' of households who were renting 
confronted as landlords 
0.03% of other households;
0.33% of households who were owner-occupiers 
confronted as landlords 
0.33% of households who shared with 
them as tenants.
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Table 6.4: Wages & Annual Receipts of Various Categories of Waqe-Eamers
in Greece. 1975 and 1984.
(a) Annual averages of monthly receipts of office staff in industrial & 
handicraft establishments with 10 persons or more:
1975 1984
All
Men
Women
11,471 drs 
12,706 
6,962
63,394 drs
69,196
42,275
To find annual receipts we multiply the above figures by 13 because 
employees in Greece receive their monthly wages 13 times a year:
All
Men
Women
149,123 
165,178 
90,506
824,122 
899,548 
549,575
(b) Annual averages of weekly receipts of workers in industrial & 
handicraft establishments with 10 persons or more:
All : 1,481 10,022
Men : 1,728 11,422
Women : 1,108 8,297
These we multiply by 4 and then by 13:
All : 77,012 521,144
Men : 89,856 593,944
Women : 57,616 431,444
(c) Annual averages of monthly receipts of employees in the retail trade:
All
Men
Women
These, again, we multiply by 13
All
Men
Women
6,045 
7,063 
5,150
78,585 
91,819 
66,950
39,928
45,403
33,548
519,064 
590,239 
436,124
Source: 1977 and 1985 Yearbooks of the NSSG re. monthly and weekly figures.
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Table 6.10 : Number of Loans for House Purchase in the UK, 1960 - 1987.
In '000s,
Period Building Societies Banks
N SH T N SH T
1960 94 231 325
1961 101 249 350
1962 108 267 375
1963 112 288 400
1964 139 309 448
1965 132 250 382
1966 146 315 461
1967 147 357 504
1968 155 343 498
1969 128 432 560
1970 133 407 540
1961-70 1,301 3,217 4,518 20 50 70
1971 165 488 653
1972 164 517 681
1973 142 403 545
1974 102 331 433
1975 121 529 650
1976 129 586 715
1977 122 615 737
1978 134 668 802
1979 117 598 715
1980 94 584 678
1971-80 1 ,290 5,319 6,609 97 402 499
1981 87 649 736 } 44 352 396
1982 94 766 860 }
1983 110 839 949 21 145 166
1984 130 955 1,085 17 98 115
1985 119 955 1 ,074 18 158 176
1986 122 1,110 1,232 21 225 246
1987 106 943 1,049 33 253 286
1981-87 768 6,217 6,985 154 1,231 1,385
1988
1989
1990
1981-90
Source: Housing & iConstruction Statistics; Financial Statistics
(cont’d)
Notes : N: Loans on new dwellings; SH: Loans on second-hand dwellings;
T: All loans. Figures in italics are, or derived from, my own
estimations.
Table 6.10 (cont'd): Number of Loans for House Purchase in the UK,
1960 - 1987. In '000s.
Period Insurance Companies Local Authorities
N SH T N SH T
1960 14 34 48
1961 } 62
1962 } 53
1963 } 86 212 298 58
1964 } 77
1965 } 87
1966 } 46
1967 12 22 34 57
1968 14 28 42 39
1969 13 27 40 19
1970 9 23 32 44
1961-70 134 312 446 54 488 542
1971 8 22 30 47
1972 7 18 25 45
1973 7 22 29 59
1974 6 20 26 75
1975 4 18 22 102
1976 3 14 17 24
1977 2 14 16 23
1978 3 14 17 27
1979 3 16 19 35
1980 2 15 17 16
1971-80 45 173 218 45 408 453
1981 2 13 15 4
1982 2 14 16 4
1983 2 16 18 3
1984 2 16 18 1
1985 2 16 18 1
1986 3 27 30 1
1987 4 36 40 1
1981-87 17 138 155 1 14 15
1988
1989
1990
1981-90 (cont'd)
Source: Housing & Construction Statistics; Financial Statistics (HMSO).
Notes : N: Loans on new dwellings; SH: Loans on second-hand dwellings;
T: All loans. Figures in italics are, or derived from, my own
estimations.
Table 6.10 (cont'd): Number of Loans for House Purchase in the UK,
1960 - 1987. In '000s.
Period TOTAL
N SH T
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1961-70 1,509 4,067 5,576
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1971-80 1,477 6,302 7, 779
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1981-87 940 7,600 8,540
1988
1989
1990
1981-90
Source: Housing & Construction Statistics; Financial Statistics (HMSO)
Notes : N: Loans on new dwellings; SH: Loans on second-hand dwellings;
T: All loans. Figures in italics are, or derived from, my own
estimations.
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Table 12.2: Proportion of Greater Athens Population Living in Perceptively
'Good' and/or Distant From the Centre Areas, c. 1981, 
Kind of Area Proportion of Population
1. 'Good' Municipalities:
Best^ 5.0%
Other2 10.0%
3
2. Distant Municipalities
(when not included above) 5.0%
3. Municipality of Athens 35.0%
4. Rest of Greater Athens 45.0%
Source: NSSG 1985 Yearbook, p. 25.
i
Notes: Hecali, Kefisia, Marousi, New Psychico, Philothei, St
Paraskevi.
9
Alimos, Glyfada, Heracleion, Khalandri, Kholargos, Old 
Phalero, Papagos.
3
Camatero, Hymettus, Khaidari, Lycovrysi, Melissia, New 
Erythrea, New Penteli, New Khalkidon, Penteli, Pevki, Voula, 
Vouliagmeni, Vrilessia.
Comment on Table 12.2:
In Table 12.2 I have calculated the proportion of 
'Athenians' living in parts of Athens that are perceptively similar (the 
assumption here is that perceptions are a social fact that cannot be 
discounted even if 'wrong'. Perceptions of relative desirability 
influence, for instance, residential decisions and dwelling prices). 
Often the categories selected overlap in terms of relative desirability. 
For example, Kolonaki, a supposedly posh area of central Athens may be 
as, or even more, attractive to some as, or than, Old Phalero or 
Marousi, which appear in category 1 . On the other hand, Kallithea 
(category 4) may hold more appeal than congested Kypseli (category 3). 
Notwithstanding such possibilities, the notable point is that in 
constructing the four categories I was unable to identify any truly 
'bad' areas. If anything, the status of areas in category 2 ('distant' 
municipalities) is nowadays being upgraded because of pollution in 
central Athens. Before this started happening, most of these areas were 
considered relatively 'bad' (because of (a) their remoteness, (b) their 
working class population, and/or (c) their comparative lack of 
amenities).
In other words, about 80% of the population of 
Greater Athens (categories 3 and 4) live in broadly similar 
environments, and only 20% live in distinctly 'good' and/or distant from 
the centre areas. This means that a prospective low- to middle-income 
tenant, although he might have personal reasons to prefer a certain area 
to another (because of nearness to relatives, friends, or work), enjoys 
in effect a potential hunting ground that encompasses up to 80% of the 
population of Greater Athens.
Table 12.3: Increases in the selling (SP) and letting (LP) prices of dwellings 
in GAP, 1976 - 1985 (percentages).
1976-■79 1979'-82 1982-85
LP SP LP SP LP SP
Cluster 1
Acharnae 57 100 82 54 -15 2
Ampelokepoe 50 62 67 41 0 25
Kypseli 100 50 100 57 0 -15
Neos Cosmos 80 100 122 65 0 21
Pangrati 33 53 150 73 10 7
Patesia 100 60 127 67 0 13
Cluster 2
Aegaleo 30 73 85 53 0 55
Alimos 43 76 120 57 0 28
Caesariani 180 73 157 105 0 13
Galatsi 78 65 125 86 0 18
Glyfada 100 51 114 114 7 17
Helioupolis 75 127 129 59 0 10
Kallithea 25 127 100 53 -10 2
Kefisia 138 21 89 30 0 50
Khalandri 115 56 57 5 -9 22
Kholargos 154 106 43 28 0 27
Marousi 67 78 120 44 0 30
Nea Ionia 157 59 56 100 0 9
Nea Smyrna 140 94 67 61 0 10
Nea Philadelphia 75 140 100 58 7 16
Old Phalero 31 78 138 81 0 12
St. Paraskevi 192 96 14 45 0 36
Zographos 64 35 122 68 0 12
Cluster 3
Piraeus (centre) 40 35 100 106 0 3
Nicaea - Keratsini 116 64 100 106 0 8
Source: Express, an Athenian economic daily; 15/16 January, 1976 - 1985.
Prices refer to newly constructed apartments, and to new lettings.
Notes: (1) Cluster 1 includes areas of central Athens. Cluster 2 includes
municipalities around Athens. Cluster 3 includes Piraeus and 
surrounding municipalities.
(2) The prices on which Table 12.3 is based are top prices. As 
the Express data involved two prices only, a low and a high,
I chose to use the high one as more appropriate to a study 
of speculative trends. Had I chosen to use the mean of the 
two listed prices, the general picture would not change.
(3) The municipalities in cluster 2 accounted for 29% of the GAP
population in 1981 (NSSG, 1985 Yearbook).
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